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PREFACE
There is perhaps no branch of the substantive law which is the
subject of more constant and rapid development and modification,
not to say change, than that which governs the relation of principal
and agent ; for as Dr. Wharton truly says, "Agency is the creature of
usage as established by the courts, and that usage can only be settled
by cumulative rulings;" and usage, which is but the result of our
habits of business and our methods of dealing, is as evolutionary as is
the race itself.
The demand of the present-day lawyer is for the book which pre-
sents the law in plain and concise form, supported by an abundance of
the most recent and best-considered authorities. It has been the pur-
pose of the author to make a succinct and intelligible exposition of the
modern law of Agency as administered in this country and in England.
While he has not sought to multiply authorities, he has made the notes
sufficiently full to support the text, and also, by quoting liberally from
the opinions of judges, to furnish illustrations of the questions in-
volved.
It has been the author's purpose to be accurate rather than original,
realizing, from his experience at the bar, on the bench, and in the
class-room, that the profession wants books to aid in the search for
the law as it is, and not as the author thinks it should be. He has not
hesitated, however, where the cases conflict, to give his own opinion as
to what is the weight of authority, or the rule resting upon the more
reasonable foundation, stating the reasons for his opinion.
The first ten chapters of the work present the general principles
and rules of the law of Agency. The succeeding chapters treat sep-
(iii)
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arately the more conspicuous classes of agents, and show the applica-
bility of the general principles contained in the previous chapters to
the cases of these special classes of agents.
A chapter on Master and Servant as it affects agency, with an
appendix containing the Employers' Liability Acts of England and
several of the American states, will be found very useful, from the
fact that the two subjects are so closely related that it is impossible to
treat intelligently the one without frequent reference to the other.
Among the features to which the author feels warranted in calling
special attention is the presentation, in the chapter on the Authority'
of the Agent, of the subject of filling blanks in written instruments,
and the authority which is necessary for that purpose.
Attention may likewise be called to the chapters on Insurance
Agents and Traveling Salesmen ; for it is believed that these subjects
have not hitherto received that special attention in works on Agency
wliich their importance would seem to demand.
George L. Eeinhard.
Bloomington., Ind., November 15, 190S,
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§ 1. Importance of this branch of the law.—In these days of al-
most unparallelecl commercial activity it would be difficult indeed to
overestimate the importance of the place occupied by the law of
agency in the great body of substantive law, and as a branch of con-
tracts. So extensive have the active business operations everywhere
come to be that no one would expect to find in any community any
considerable number of business men who have sufficient time and
(1)
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capacity to attend to their affairs without the assistance of agents or
servants. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the great bulk of
the trade and commerce of the world is carried on through the in-
strumentality of agents ; that is to say, persons acting under authority
delegated to them by others, and not in their own right or on their
own account. The magnitude of this importance becomes still more
manifest when we include also the field covered by the law relating
to the subject of torts, which we must do in order to be as thorough
as we should be in our consideration.
§ 2. The maxim "Qui facit per alium facit per se."—The doctrine
of agency is founded upon certain fundamental principles expressed
in a few maxims of the law. The most general of these is the maxim
"Qui facit per alium facit per se/' which, when rendered into
English, means, "Whatever a person does through another, he does
himself."' The proposition meant to be expressed is that, ordinarily,
whatever act or business one is capable of doing himself he may
empower another to do. The correlative maxim is "Qui per alium
facit, per seipsum facere videtur"—"He who does an act through the
medium of another is, in law, considered as having done it himself."
These general statements of the principle that one may act through
the instrumentality of another must, however, be received with some
qualifications. One of these is that only such persons may act by
others as would be capable of acting for themselves in a given transac-
tion; or, to state these maxims somewhat differently, whatever a
person sui juris and competent may do of himself, he may do by an-
other; and any person sui juris and competent who does an act through
another is deemed to have done it himself. For it is not every one
who is capable, in law, of performing a business transaction or other
affair, but only those who are not laboring under some legal disabil-
ity, such as infancy, coverture, lunacy, idiocy, etc.^ A further lim-
itation upon the maxims is the statement that the party who is to
perform the act must also possess the requisite legal ability, by being
free from any incapacity which the law imposes upon him in certain
contingencies. But, as we shall hereinafter point out, the incapacities
of agents are far less frequent than those of principals. The doc-
trine may therefore be stated, without further qualification, that
whatever a person sui juris and competent may do of himself, he
may do through another who is not by law incompetent to do it.
'Broom Legal Maxims 817; Story Ag., § 2.
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§ 3. The maxim "Respondeat superior."—Another maxim, stand-
ing in near relation to those above quoted, is that of "Respondeat
superior"—"Let the superior (principal) respond (be held responsi-
ble)." It is applicable, however, mostly to actions ex delicto, while
the others apply more especially to actions growing out of contracts.
It is the foundation of the doctrine that the principal is liable for the
torts—the wrongful acts—of his agent. This general maxim is like-
'wise subject to qualification, however, in that the principal is not in
fact liable in all cases for the torts of his agent or employe, but only
for those committed in the course of the agency or employment ; while
the agent himself is, in such cases, for reasons of public policy, also
liable for the same.-
§ 4. Reciprocal rights and obligations of principal, agent and
third parties.—The rights and obligations that grow out of the doc-
trines that have been established upon these fundamental principles
are of a reciprocal nature; for it would not be just or equitable that a
person should reap a benefit from a given transaction without at the
same time assuming the corresponding burdens incident thereto, or
naturally arising out of the same. The result is that if a person
would claim the benefits of a transaction performed for him by an-
other, the law casts upon him the duty of conforming to all the re-
quirements involved in such transaction, even though these result in
hardship rather than in benefit to him. This is especially true of
contracts and of the various incidents involved in their execution and
performance. Moreover, from certain considerations of public pol-
icy to be hereinafter explained, the law deems it proper and just
that one who selects a substitute to act for him, and who is therefore
presumed to know his qualifications and to have chosen him with
reference thereto, and who has it in his power to remove him for his
misconduct, and whose orders such substitute is bound to obey and
execute, should be held responsible for his acts; provided, of course,
that they have been committed in the performance of the task for
which he was employed.^ Obligations are likewise incurred by those
who have dealt with the party to whom authority has been given,
usually denominated third persons. Their position is in many re-
spects similar to that of the one in whose behalf the transaction is
entered into. If it be a business matter—a contract—the third party
= Broom Legal Maxims 843. 499, 509; Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod.
^ Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 490, per Lord Holt.
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acquires certain rights, of course, but the law likewise demands of
him that he shall comply with the conditions in consideration of
which the rights have accrued to him.
§ 5. Aim and design of the law of agency.—To define the relation
between those by whom authority is delegated to others and those
who receive such authority ; to show the effect of such relation, how it
may be created and established, and who may and who may not enter
into it; to point out what are the rights and liabilities of those who
confer and those who undertake to execute such authority, and the
rights and liabilities of those with whom dealings are had as a result
of such delegation of authority, and how such rights and obligations
may be enforced; and to apply the principles to the various classes
of agencies,—is the aim and design of the law of agency.
§ 6. Definition of agency.—Agency is the jural relation subsisting
between two competent parties, one of whom is called principal and
the other agent.
§ 7. Purpose of the relation.—The purpose for which such a rela-
tion is entered into is that the agent may represent and act for the
principal in some lawful dealing or transaction of a business charac-
ter with some third party or parties; and to accomplish this purpose
the principal confers upon the agent certain power called the agent's
authority.
§ 8. Nature of the relation.—The relation thus created between
the principal and agent is a contractual one, inasmuch as it usually
arises out of the employment of the agent by the principal or out of a
contract between them, express or implied ; although in certain excep-
tional cases it results, or is conclusively presumed, as a matter of
law; as where the law authorizes a wife to pledge the credit of her
husband for necessaries which he has refused or neglected to pro-
vide for her.^
§ 9. Authority—How it may be delegated.—If the contract be
express, it may be by mere verbal delegation of authority, or it may be
by written instrument under seal or by simple contract not under seal.
A written instrument delegating authority to an agent is termed a
letter of attorney, or power of attorney. For the delegation of some
authority it is required, at least by the rules of the common law, that
* Mechem Ag., § 62. .
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there should be a deed,—that is to say, a sealed instrument, or a power
of attorney under seal,—as in cases where power is conferred to convey
real estate ; while in most other instances a power conferred by simple
instrument in writing and not under seal is sufficient. In a very large
number of cases no written authority whatever is required, but the
express authority may be shown to have been given by mere verbal
delegation of the same. In most of the American states the re-
quirement for a seal has been abolished. When the authority has
not been expressly delegated, either in writing or verbally, it may
be inferred from the nature of the service, the declarations or con-
duct of the principal, or from other circumstances which the law
deems sufficient. To determine either the existence or the extent
of the authority the courts will look to the intention of the parties,
which may be established by the contract and by the conduct and
declarations of the parties, the same as in other contracts. When
the relation arises ex lege the actual intent of the parties will have
but little controlling influence, for they will be presumed to have
intended that which is the legal consequence of their personal rela-
tion and situation to each other. The agent's authority may also
be shown by proof of ratification, or estoppel; but it can hardly be
said that in such cases the authority has been "delegated," but rather
that it has been assumed by the agent, and the principal is, from
considerations of public policy, held to acquiesce in such assumption.
§ 10. The constituent elements of agency.—In order to constitute
an agency the following elements are essential: 1. There must be
a competent principal. 2. There must be a competent agent. 3.
There must be a delegation of authority from the principal to the
agent, either by contract, express or implied, or authority must be
shown to exist by operation of law from the peculiar relation of the
parties and the circumstances of the transaction, or by estoppel or
ratification. 4. The purpose for which this authority is delegated
—
the transaction to be performed by the agent—must be a lawful one.
It must not be illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy.
§ 11. Who is a principal.—A principal—sometimes otherwise
called master, constituent, employer—is a person who, being compe-
tent and sui juris to do any act for his own benefit, or on his own ac-
count, employs another to do it ;^ he is the person from whom authority
is derived." He "is the party whom the agent represents and from
"Story Ag., § 3. "Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
34.
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whom he derives his authority ; he is the one primarily and originally
concerned in the contract of agency."^
§ 12. Who is an agent.—An agent—sometimes otherwise called
servant, representative, delegate, proxy, attorney—is a person who
undertakes, by virtue of authority conferred on him in that behalf,
or without authority but by some subsequent ratification of the prin-
cipal, to transact some business or manage some affair for the latter,
and to render an account of it. He is a substitute for a person, em-
ployed to manage the affairs of another.^ He is a person duly author-
ized to act on behalf of another, or one whose unauthorized act has
been duly ratified.^ There are various classes of agents, each of which
is known or recognized by some distinctive appellation or name; as
factor, broker, etc.
§ 13. Subagent.—A subagent is a person selected by an agent to
assist him in the performance of his duties as agent, or part of them,
or to perform any or all of the acts for which the agency was created.
§ 14. Other definitions of agency.—]\Iechem defines agency as "a
legal relation, founded upon the express or implied contract of the
parties, or created by law, by virtue of which one party—the agent
—
is employed and authorized to represent and act for the other—the
principal—in business dealings with third persons."^" Wharton's
definition is as follows: "Agency is a contract by which one per-
son, with greater or less discretionary powers, undertakes to represent
another in a certain business relation."^^ The popular idea of the term
"agency" is that of a relation created by an agreement, express or im-
plied, made between the parties before the i^erformance of the act in
question and with reference to it.^- Chancellor Kent says : "Agency
is founded upon a contract, either express or implied, by which one
of the parties confides to the other the management of some business
to be transacted in his name, or on his account, and by which the
other assumes to do the business, and to render an account of it. The
authority of the agent may be created by deed or writing, or verbally
without writing; and for the ordinar}' business and commerce the
"1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.) ^'' Mechem Ag., § 1.
938. "Wharton Ag.. § 1.
'1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.) « i Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.)
938, and note 5. 937, note 2.
« Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
33.
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latter is sufficient. Though the statute of frauds of 29 Charles II
requires, in certain cases, a contract for the sale of goods to be in
Avriting and signed by the party to be charged, or by his authorized
agent, the authority to the agent need not be in writing. It may be
in parol. The agency may be inferred from the relation of the
parties and the nature of the employment, without proof of any ex-
press employment. It is sufficient that there be satisfactory evidence
of the fact that the principal employed the agent, and that the agent
undertook the trust. The statute of frauds does not require that the
authority of the agent contracting even for the sale of land should be
in writing. But if the agent is to convey or complete the conveyance
of real estate or any interests in land, or to make livery of seisin, the
appointment must be in writing; and where the conveyance or any
act is required to be by deed, the authority to the attorney to execute
it must be commensurate in point of solemnity, and be by deed also."^^
§ 15. Analogy to relation of master and servant.—Lotz, J., speak-
ing for the appellate court of Indiana, says : '"In the primitive con-
ditions of society the things which were the subjects of sale and trade
were few in number. There was little occasion for any one to engage
in commercial transactions, and when it did become necessary the
business was generally transacted by the parties thereto in person.
But the strong and powerful had many servants, who were usually
slaves. The servants performed menial and manual services for the
masters. As civilization advanced the things which are the subjects
of commerce iiicreased, and it became necessary to perform commer-
cial transactions through the medium of other persons. The rela-
tion of principal and agent is but an overgrowth or expansion of the
relation of master and servant. The same rules that apply to the
one generally apply to the other. There is a marked similarity in
the legal consequences flowing from the two relations. It is often
difficult to distinguish the difference between an agent and a servant.
This difficulty is increased by the fact that the same individual often
combines in his own person the functions of both agent and servant.
Agents are often denominated servants, and servants are often called
agents. The word 'servant,' in its broadest meaning, includes an
agent. There is, however, in legal contemplation, a difference be-
tween an agent and a servant. The Bomans, to whom we are indebted
for many of the principles of agency, in the early stages of their laws
>= 1 Kent Com., star p. 613.
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used the terms "mandatum" (to put into one's hands or confide to the
discretion of another) and "negotium" (to transact business or to treat
concerning purchases) in describing this relation.^^^ Agency, prop-
erly speaking, relates to commercial transactions, while service has
reference to actions upon or concerning things. Service deals with
matters of manual or mechanical execution. An agent is the more
direct representative of the master, and clothed with higher powers
and broader discretion than a servant.^* The terms 'agent' and
'servant' are so frequently used interchangeably in the adjudicarions
that the reader is apt to conclude they mean the same thing. We
think, however, that the history of the law bearing on this subject
shows that there is a difference between them. Agency, in its legal
sense, always imports commercial dealings between two parties by
and through the medium of another. An agent negotiates or treats
with third parties in commercial matters for another."^^
§ 16. Distinction between the relations.—One of the well recog-
nized distinctions between the two relations is that, in the case of
master and servant, the employer always retains the right to direct
the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result
to be accomplished; or, in other words, not only what shall be done,
but how it shall be done ; whereas, in the case of principal and agent,
the latter always has a considerable degree of discretion.^^ It is
true that in the relation of master and servant some degree of dis-
cretion also exists in most cases on the j^art of the servant, but
the discretion is much more limited than in the case of agency; and
there are other points which distinguish the two relations, such as
the terms of the emploj^ment, the matter of rendering compensation,
and the character of the transaction to be performed. ^^ Judge
Cooley draws the following distinction between the words "agent"
and "servant": "The common understanding of the words and
the legal understanding is not the same; the latter is broader, and
comprehends some cases in which the parties are master and servant
only in a peculiar sense and for certain purposes. In strictness, a
servant is one who, for a valuable consideration, engages in the
service of another, and undertakes to observe his directions in some
lawful business. The relation is purely one of contract, and the
"a Citing Story Ag., § 4. « Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132
" Citing Mechem Ag., §§ 1, 2. U. S. 518.
•= Kingan & Co. v. Silvers, 13 Ind. " Mechem Ag., § 2.
App. 80.
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contract may contemplate or stipulate for an^^ services, and any con-
ditions of services not absolutely unlawful."^^ Webster defines a serv-
ant as "one who serves or does service voluntarily or involuntarily;
a person who is employed by another for menial offices or for other
labor, and is subject to his command; a person who labors or exerts
himself for the benefit of another, his master or employer; a subor-
dinate helper." An agent is defined to be a person duly authorized
to act on behalf of another, or one whose authorized act has been duly
ratified. ^^ "The word 'servant,' in our legal nomenclature, has a broad
significance, and embraces all persons, of whatever rank or position,
who are in the employ and subject to the directions and control of an-
other in any department of labor or business. Indeed, it may in
most cases be said to be synonymous with 'employe.' "-° It will be
seen from the foregoing observations and citations that the word
"servant" is often very difficult to distinguish from the word "agent."
In its popular sense, the word "servant" indicates one who is hired
by another for wages and is.subject to his directions. Such a person
Mr, Parsons calls a servant in fact ; "but," he says, "the word is also
used in many cases to indicate a servant by construction of law; it is
sometimes applied to any person employed by another, and is scarcely
to be discriminated in these instances from the word 'agent.' "^^
§ 17. Scope of authority.—"Scope of authority" is a term used to
designate the extent to which an agent may go in representing his
principal in a particular transaction. The agent may in many cases
involve his principal in liability contrary to his private instructions,
or outside of the limit of the actual authority delegated to him ; pro-
vided he does not exceed the bounds within which agents of his class
are permitted to exercise such authority, and the party with whom
he deals for his principal does not have knowledge of the limitation
of his powers. In such cases he is said to be acting within the
apparent scope of his authority or employment. If he does not ex-
ceed the powers actually delegated to him, he is said to be acting
within the actual scope of his authority or employment.
§ 18. General and special agents.—The power or authority of an
agent may be general ; as when it extends to all acts connected with a
certain business, employment or trade ; as where a person is authorized
^' Cooley Torts 531. =' 1 Parsons Conts. 101. And see
'^ Flesh V. Lindsay, 115 Mo. 1. 18. Hand v. Cole, supra.
-" Hand v. Cole, 88 Tenn. 400, 404,
citing Wood Master and Serv., § 1.
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generally to purchase the goods required in a particular trade or busi-
ness. Such an agent is called a general agent. Or the power or
authority may be limited to a single act or single transaction, as the
execution of a particular deed, or the purchase of a particular article
of merchandise; and in that case the agent is designated a special
or particular agent.^-' In Loudoji Savings Fund Society v. Hagers-
ioicn Savings Banl^-^ it was said by Woodard, J., speaking for
the court: "By a general agent is understood not merely a person
substituted in the place of another, for transacting all manner of
business, but a person whom a man puts in his place to transact all
his business of a particular kind ; as to buy and sell certain kinds of
wares, to negotiate certain contracts, and the like. An authority of
this kind empowers the agent to bind his employer by all acts within
the scope of his employment, and that power can not be limited by any
private order or restriction not known to the party dealing with the
agent. A special agent is one who is employed about one specific
act, or certain specific acts, only, and he does not bind his employer
unless his authority be strictly pursued.''^^ A general authority,
said Lord Ellenborough in Whitehead v. Tuclcett/* "does not import
an unqualified one, but that which is derived from a multitude of
instances." And in Wood v. McCain/*^ the supreme court of Ala-
bama said: "The difference between a general and special agent is
said to be this : The former is appointed to act in the affairs of his
principal generally, and the latter to act concerning some particular
object. In the former case, the principal will be bound by the acts
of his agent within the scope of the general authority conferred on
him, although these acts are violative of his private instructions and
directions. In the latter case, if the agent exceeds the special au-
thority conferred on him, the principal is not bound by his acts." It
is often difficult to draw the line of demarcation between a general
and a special agency. Thus, a person is often spoken of as a general
agent whose authority is more limited than in the definition above
given; as, for example, a person who has authority in regard to
some particular object or thing, such as the purchase or sale of a
particular article or parcel of goods, or the execution of a particular
contract, his authority not being limited to any special mode of doing
it. And so an agent is sometimes said to be a special agent because,
" Story Ag., § 17. -* 15 East 408.
'=a 36 Pa. St. 498. "a 7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 614.
=' Paley Ag. 199, et seq.
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though authorized to act generally in some particular business, his
authority is yet limited to some particular territory, or is otherwise
qualified and restricted by certain instructions and conditions. In
such a case he may be treated by the person dealing with liim as a gen-
eral agent, while, as between him and his principal, he is only a special
agent. Hence, a general agency does not always import an unquali-
fied authority, but usually one which is derived from a multitude of
instances, or in the general course of an employment or business;
whereas a special agency is confined to a particular transaction, and
may also be qualified or limited as to the mode or means of performing
the same.-^
§ 19. IJniversal agents.—A universal agent is said to be an agent
who is appointed to perform all acts which the principal might him-
self perform and which he may lawfully authorize another to perform.
Such agencies are, however, of very rare occurrence. "And, indeed,"
says Story, "it is difficult to conceive of the existence of such an
agency, practically, inasmuch as it would make such an agent the com-
plete master not merely dux facti, but dominus rerum,—the complete
disposer of all the rights and property of the principal. It is very
certain that the law will not, from any general expression, however
broad, infer the existence of any such unusual agency, but it will
rather construe them as restrained to the principal business of the
party, in respect to which, it is presumed, his intention to delegate
the authority was principally directed."-*^ It must be remembered,
moreover, that while these classifications and distinctions are useful
and important, they are—all of them—only relatively accurate, and
may, if employed indiscriminately, serve to mislead rather than to
aid the student. They are to be employed, therefore, with caution.
Certain rules of agency have been based upon them, however, and
they are well recognized in the terminology of the laM^ of agenc3^-^
§ 20. Other classifications.—Other classifications are made with
reference to the nature of the duties to be performed. Thus, some
agents are called brokers, some factors,- others attorneys, etc., depend-
ing upon the nature of their engagements.
§ 21. Brokers—Various classes of.—Brokers are agents who are
engaged to negotiate contracts for other persons relative to property,
^=See Story Ag., §§ 18, 19. =^ Mechem Ag., §§ 1, 284.
^« Story Ag., § 21.
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with the custody of which they have no concern.'^ Story and Evans
say that a broker is an agent employed to make bargains and con-
tracts between other persons in matters of trade, commerce or naviga-
tion, for a compensation commonly called brokerage.-'' He is a mere
negotiator between the other parties. ^''^ It is the duty of a broker
to bring the contracting parties together for the purpose of making a
contract, or he may, if so authorized, make the contract for them.^''
He is a middle man who brings parties together to bargain, or bar-
gains for them, in private purchase or sale of property of any sort,
not ordinarily in possession.^^ There are different classes of brokers
;
as real estate brokers, merchandise brokers, stock brokers, bill and
note brokers, exchange brokers, insurance brokers, brokers for sale,
pawnbrokers and ship brokers. There may he other classes to an
indefinite extent, depending, of course, upon the demands and neces-
sities of trade and commerce. Those enumerated are among the
most important. Real estate hrohers are those who negotiate between
buyers and sellers of real estate. Among the duties most generally
performed by them are those of finding purchasers for persons who
have property for sale, and finding sellers for those desiring to pur-
chase such property. In many instances they also engage in letting
or leasing property and collecting rents, and in negotiating the loans
of money on mortgages and other securities.^^ Merchandise brokers
are those who negotiate the sale of merchandise without having pos-
session or control of it as factors have.^^ Stoclc brokers are brokers
emplo3'ed to buy and sell shares of stock in incorporated companies
and the indebtedness of governments.^* Bill and note brokers nego-
tiate the purchase and sale of bills of exchange and promissory notes.^^
Exchange brokers negotiate bills of exchange drawn on foreign coun-
tries, or on other places in this country. ^"^ Insurance brokers procure
insurance and negotiate between insurers and insured.^^ Such a
broker usually has a number of insurance companies on his list, and
places insurance with them when applied to by his customers who
desire to be insured. He is usually also the agent of the insured,
while the ordinary insurance agent is usually not so regarded.^* He
^ Paley Ag. 13; Bouvier Law Die, ^ Bouvier Law Die, tit. Brokers.
tit. Agency. ^' Id.
-•Story Ag., § 28; Evans Pr. & ^* Id.
Ag. (Bedford's ed.) 36. ^Ud.
^'a story Ag., § 28; Evans Pr. & »7fZ.
Ag. (Bedford's ed.) 36. =" JfZ.
^'Mechern Ag., § 927. =^' Mechem Ag., § 931.
» Bishop Conts., § 1135.
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is agent for the assured and also for the underwriter.^^ Paivnhrokers
lend money in small sums, on the security of personal property, at
various rates of interest. They are licensed by the authorities and
exempted from the operation of usury laws.*" Municipal officers
usually have authority to license such brokers, and in some states
this authority is conferred upon them by their charters or by their
general laws, or statutes. A pawnbroker is, strictly speaking, not a
broker at all. as he generally makes the loan from his own capital
and takes the pledges of security to himself.'*^ Brohers for sale
are persons who undertake to find purchasers for those wishing
to sell, and vendors for those wishing to buy, and who negotiate and
superintend the making of bargains between them.*^ Ship brokers
negotiate the purchase and sale of ships and business of freighting
vessels.'*^ Marriage brokers are persons who intervene, for a con-
sideration to be received by them, between a man and woman to .
negotiate contracts of marriage.'** The business of marriage brokers,
though it may have been recognized as a lawful occupation under
the ancient common law, is not now regarded as legitimate in English-
speaking countries, and courts of equity will hold such contracts
void.''^
§ 22. Factors, consignees, commission merchants, del credere fac-
tors.—A factor is an agent who, by virtue of authority delegated to
him for that purpose, undertakes to sell goods or merchandise con-
signed or delivered to him by his principal, for a compensation called
a commission or factorage, which is usually a percentum of the pro-
ceeds. For these reasons he is also called a "consignee" and "com-
mission merchant," and the goods sent to him at any one time are
called a "consignment" of goods.**' A del credere factor or agent is a
factor who, for an additional compensation, guarantees the payment
of the debt due from the buyer of goods of such agent. The words
"del credere" are of Italian origin, signifying a guaranty or warranty.
The factor is said to be acting or selling upon a del credere commis-
sion.*'^
==• Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) "4 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.)
37. 962.
'"Bouvier Law Die. tit. Brokers. « Bouvier Law Die, tit. Marriage
*^ Mechem Ag.. § 933. Brokers.
« 4 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.) *" Story Ag., § 33.
961. " Id.
" Bouvier Law Die:, tit. Brokers.
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§23. Attorneys—Attorneys at law, advocates, counsellors, bar-
risters, solicitors, proctors.—In the general sense of the word, an
attorney is one who is put in the place or turn of another. "It is an
ancient English word and signifieth one that is set in the turn, stead
or place of another; and of these some be private, * * * and
some be public, as an attorney at law, whose warrant from his master
is ponit loco suo talem aUornatum suum, which setteth in his turn or
place such a man to be his attorney."** Attorneys are of two kinds-
attorneys at law and attorneys in fact. An attorney at law is an
officer in a court of justice, who is employed, and in fact whose pro-
fession and business require him, to try cases in court and give legal
advice to those who employ him for that purpose.*^ They are known
variously by the names advocates, counsellors, barristers, solicitors,
proctors, etc. Advocate.—In civil and ecclesiastical law, an advo-
cate is an officer of a court, learned in the law, who is engaged by a
suitor to maintain or defend his cause.^" The word is used in Con-
tinental Europe to designate practicing lawyers. Counsellor.—In
the United States supreme court and in some of the state courts
the term "counsellor" is used to designate the senior or special counsel
in the case, while attorneys carry on the practical and formal parts.^^
Barrister.—In English law, "a counsellor admitted to plead at the
bar."°^ Solicitor.—One who practices in the courts of chancery.
In signing pleadings in chancery proceedings an attorney usually
styles himself "solicitor" instead of "attorney," as in common-law
cases. The distinction arises simply from the two modes of pro-
cedure.^^ Proctor.—"One appointed to represent in judgment the
party who empowers him by writing under his hand called a proxy.
The term is used chiefly in the courts of civil and ecclesiastical law."®*
Practitioners in admiralty and probate courts in this country are
also called proctors.®^ In England, the term "attorney" is applied to
officers who practice in common-law courts, while proctors are those
who practice in admiralty and ecclesiastical courts, and solicitors
those who practice in chancery. None of them, however, conduct
cases in open court, as that is done by advocates or counsel.®* These
distinctions, however, do not prevail to any extent in the United
*»Coke on Litt, 51b. " Stinson v. Hildrup, 8 Biss. (U.
*' Anderson Law Die. and Boiivier S.) 378.
Law Die, tit. Attorney. " Bouvier Law Die, tit. Proctor.
" Bouvier Law Die, tit. Advocate. ^ Standard Die, tit. Proctor.
" 1 Kent Com. 307. ^^^ 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.)
^^ Bouvier Law Die, tit. Barrister. 282.
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States, the term "attorney" being applied to all who practice law."
In tliis country the term "attorney" or "practicing attorney" means
an attorney at law, unless a contrary meaning is indicated by the
context.^"* The professional business of attorneys, in this country,
is not confined to the preparation and trial of cases in court, but
embraces such work as collections of notes and other claims, without
suit, the examinations of titles to property, the conduct of negotia-
tions for settlements of estates, compromises of threatened legal con-
troversies, etc.^** An attorney at law is an officer of the court in
which he practices, although not a public officer in the ordinary sense
of the term.^° He is a quasi officer, though not perhaps a public
officer of the state where justice is administered by the court in which
he practices.*'^ An attorney in fact is defined as any private or
special agent appointed for some particular purpose, not connected
with a proceeding at law, by a formal authority called a letter or
power of attorney, in which is expressed the particular act or acts
for which he is appointed and the extent of his authority."^ "The
term is employed to designate persons who act under a special agency,
or a special letter of attorney, in that they are appointed in factum
for the deed, or special act, to be performed; but in a more extended
view it includes all other agents employed in any business or to do
any act or acts in pais for another."*'-^
§ 24. Auctioneers.—An auctioneer is an agent who, for a com-
mission, sells goods or other property at auction.*'^ He is agent for
both purchaser and seller at a public sale.®* An auction, in the widest
sense of the term, is a sale, however conducted, by which a person
obliges himself to transfer property to the highest bidder within the
conditions of the sale ; it ordinarily denotes such a sale conducted
in the usual manner.®^ The sale is usually conducted competitively,
"1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.) "3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.)
282. 281.
^^ Ingram v. Richardson, 2 La. ''^a Bouvier Law Die, tit. Attor-
Ann. 839. ney.
°° See the opinion of Crumpacker, "3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.)
J., in Moore v. Staser, 6 Ind. App. 489; Story Ag., § 27.
364. «* Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
^"Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U. 60.
S.) 333; Matter of Burchard, 27 Hun ''= Bateman Auctions (1st Am.
(N. Y.) 429. ed.) 1.
•1 Matter of Mosness, 39 Wis. 509,
20 Am. Rep. 55.
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by public outcry, to the highest bidder. An auctioneer differs from
a broker in some particulars : A broker can both buy and sell, while
an auctioneer can only sell; a broker can not sell at auction, as that
is not his function, but that of the auctioneer. An auctioneer can
not sell at private sale, but a broker may.®^ In the absence of a
statute to the contrary, any person may be an auctioneer. But a
state, in the exercise of its police power, may require a license-tax of
an auctioneer, and may also authorize municipal corporations to re-
quire such tax. This is a common practice in England and many
of the states.''^
§ 25. Bank cashiers.—Bank cashiers are officers of banks, intrusted
with its funds, notes, bills and other choses in action to be used for
the ordinary and extraordinary exigencies of the bank. The cashier
usually receives, through himself or subordinates, all moneys and
notes of the bank; delivers up all moneys and receives in exchange
for loans all discounted notes or bills ; signs drafts on corresponding
banks, and, as an executive officer of the bank, transacts much of its
general business. He need not be a stockholder. He is usually re-
quired to give security for the faithful performance of his duties. He
is required to make a report to designated officers of the state or
general government as provided by law, and false statements made
by him officially are punished, and render him liable to the injured
person for damages.''^
§ 26. Supercargoes.—"In maritime law, a person specially em-
ployed by the owner of a cargo to take charge and sell to the best ad-
vantage merchandise which has been shipped, and to purchase re-
turning cargoes and receive freight as he may be authorized. Super-
cargoes have complete control over the cargo and everything which
immediately concerns it, unless their authority is either expressly or
impliedly restrained.'"^^^ Supercargoes are a variety of factors, being
intrusted with both the selling of cargoes accompanied by them on the
voyage, and the purchase of new ones for the return trip or other
return voyages.'"' A supercargo is a factor authorized to sell a cargo
which he accompanies on the voyage.''"
«' Story Ag., § 27. «% Bouvier Law Die, tit. Super-
*^3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.) cargo.
489. '' Mechem Ag.. § 15.
*' Bouvier Law Die, tit. Casliier. '"Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
35.
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§ 27. Ship's husband.—A ship's husband is an officer or agent, in
maritime law, appointed by the owner of the ship and authorized to
make requisite repairs, and attend to the management, equipment
and other concerns of the ship. He is the general agent of the owner
of the vessel. He may be appointed by writing or parol. He is
usually, but not necessarily, a part owner. It is his duty to see that
the ship has the proper outfit in the repairs and necessary furniture,
and that she is furnished with provisions and stores according to the
necessities of the voyage. It is his duty to see to the regularity
of the clearances from the customhouse and of the registry. He
must settle the accounts against the ship for proper contracts and
furnishings. It is his duty to enter into charter parties or engage
the vessel for freight or other service. He has all authority in-
cidental to the carrying out of these obligations.'^^ His authority
does not extend to the procuring of insurance on the vessel without
the assent of the owner.'^^
§ 28. Ships' masters.—The master of a ship is, in maritime law,
the first officer or commander of a merchant vessel,—the captain.
A vessel sailing without a competent master is deemed un sea-
worthy. He is selected by the owners of the ship, and, if he dies
or is incapacitated on the voyage, is succeeded by the mate. It
is his duty to see that the vessel is seaworthy before she starts on her
voyage; that she is provided with all requisite stores and provisions.
He makes all contracts with the seamen, if the voyage is a foreign
one. He must see that all goods and freight are properly stored.
He must obey all instructions of the owners, except in cases of emer-
gency, when it becomes necessary in his judgment to depart from
them. It is his duty to take all possible care of the cargo during the
voyage, and in case of shipwreck to file a statement of circumstances
called a protest. He must do everything reasonably required for the
safety of the vessel and cargo in the interests of the owners. For
want of reasonable care and skill he is liable to the owners in dam-
ages. He has supreme authority on shipboard, but his authority is
of a civil character. He may, however, use such force in directing
the crew as may be necessary to enforce obedience to his lawful com-
mands. If necessary to suppress a mutiny, he may even take life.
He may punish acts of disobedience and such offenses as are dangerous
" Bouvier Law Die, tit. Ship's '- Story Ag., § 35.
Husband.
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to the discipline of the ship; though flogging and other hrutal penal-
tics arc prohibited in the United States, and render him civilly liable
to the injured party and also to the public in a criminal proceeding.
In case of necessity he may issue bonds on the credit of the vessel,
and may even pledge the cargo to obtain the necessary repairs and
supplies. He has a lien on the freight carried by the ship for repairs
and supplies for which he has paid; also for wages of the seamen
paid by him, but not for his own wages.'^^
§ 29. Partners.—In partnerships each member of the firm is the
general agent of any other member and of the firm as a whole in
respect to all the partnership's business. The rules governing the
rights and liabilities of partners, when acting in the discharge of their
duties as such, are in most respects similar to those pertaining to
other agents.'^* "jSTotwithstanding the fact that every partner is, to
a certain extent, a principal, as well as an agent, the liability of his
copartners for his acts can only be established on the ground of agency
as their agent. He has no discretion, except within the limits set
by them to his authority, and the fact that he is himself as one of the
firm, a principal, does not warrant him in extending these limits, save
on his own responsibility."^^ The power of one partner to bind the
others in the firm is confined to the scope of the firm's business, pre-
cisely as the power of an agent to bind his principal is limited to the
scope of the business for which he is employed. A partner, as the
agent of his firm, may thus bind his copartners whenever it is neces-
sary in his judgment to do so, by borrowing money, making, signing,
indorsing or accepting paper, selling or pledging partnership prop-
erty, paying its debts, etc., when he does so in the name of the firm
and on account of the partnership."'' The rule that a partner may
thus bind the firm generally applies, however, only to trading part-
nerships. In cases of non-trading partnerships, no general rule can
be laid down, and each case must be determined upon its own facts. "^
" See 3 Kent Com., Lecture xlvi. '" Pooley v. Whitmore, 10 Heisk.
'* Story Ag., §§ 37, 39. (Tenn.) 629, 27 Am. Rep. 733; Lind-
" 1 Lindley Part. 239. ley Part. 198.
^' Story Ag., § 124; Story Part,
§§ 101, 125.
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§ 30. Competency in general.—It ma}- be stated as a general rule
that every person sui juris is capable of becoming a principal. The
exceptions are those persons who labor under some disability imposed
upon them by nature or the law.^ Of course, before a person can
become a principal as to any matter, he must have the right to con-
tract with reference to such matter in his own person, and for him-
self. If, as the maxim considered in the opening chapter implies,
he is capable of performing the act himself, he may perform it by an
agent. The converse of the proposition is also true, that if he can
not do the act himself, he can not legally authorize an agent to do
it for him. One may, for example, authorize another to sell his own
goods or land, or any interest he may have in goods or land, for he
could do this himself. But he can not authorize another to sell my
goods or lands, or goods and lands in which he has no interest, be-
cause he could not sell these himself. Hence, we have the rule that
any person capable of making a binding business engagement on his
' Story Ag., § 5.
(19)
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own behalf is competent, as to such business engagement, to be a volun-
tary principal- By "voluntary principal"' is meant a person who may
Toluntarily enter into the relation, as distinguished from one who
has assumed the relation by operation of law or the action of a com-
petent court; as when a court appoints a tutor or guardian for an
insane person.^ Conversely, a person who labors under some dis-
ability to contract or act in his own behalf is under corresponding
disability to make a valid contract for the appointment of an agent.
§ 31. Classes of principals.—A contract for the appointment or
selection of an agent may be made either by an individual or by an ag-
gregation or association of individuals. If the latter, it may be a
corporation, a partnership, or an association intermediate between the
two, such as an unincorporated stock company, a mining company, etc.
If an individual or natural person, he may Ije an adult or an infant,
and may be compos mentis or non compos mentis; and if a woman, she
may be single or married. The question of the competency or incom-
petency of all of these will be separately considered.
§ 32. Causes of incompetency.—Incompetency to contract is gen-
erally traceable to two kinds of causes; namely: 1. Natural causes;
2. Legal causes. When incompetency is due to some natural cause or
causes, it is ordinarily owing to some mental infirmity, such as
lunacy, idiocy, habitual drunkenness, etc. When it is the result of a
legal cause or causes, it may be traced to the common or statute law
of the state in which the incompetency is alleged to exist. The in-
competency, from whatever cause it may arise, is either absolute or
total, limited or partial, and hence the contract made by such in-
competent person may l3e wholly void or it may be voidable only.*
§ 33. Infants as principals.—One of the causes of incompetency
to be a principal is that arising from infancy. This may be said to
be partly natural and partly legal ; for certainly it could not be main-
tained that the reason an infant under seven years of age is incom-
petent to contract is purely a legal one. Such an incompetency, es-
pecially before the infant has reached a period in life when he is
able to discriminate at all, must be attributable, in part at least, to
his mental incapacity. By the Eoman law, an infant under seven
years of age was absolutely incapable of doing business; while be-
« Wharton Ag., § 9. * Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
'Wharton Ag., § 10. 44.
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tween infancy and puberty an infant could do no act prejudicial to his
estate without his guardian ; and between the ages of puberty and
majority he could not alienate his property without the consent of
the court. This distinction is believed to be retained in large part,
at least in our own jurisprudence, and it has frequently been held
that an infant may act through an agent when the act is for his
benefit, though it is not conceived that an infant under the age of
seven years is capable of committing any judicial act.^ However
that may be, the broad proposition is frequently made, and is doubt-
less law in most jurisdictions in this country, that an infant, no
matter how near the age of majority, can not bind himself by a con-
tract to employ an agent,^^ and can not legally ratify the acts of such
agent after the infant has attained to the age of majority, whether
such act was originally authorized by the infant or not.^^ Indeed, it
is held that the only act that an infant can not legally bind himself
to perform, at least by subsequent ratification, is the appointment of
an attorney or agent.*'
§ 34. The soundness of the doctrine in last section questioned.—
The doctrine thus broadly stated does not seem to be founded in logic
or reason, and has been subjected to frequent criticism. It is not
easy to perceive why the contract of an infant appointing an agent to
perform some specific act, especially if made for the infant's benefit,
should not rest upon the same fundamental principle upon which other
contracts made by him are founded, namely, that they are voidable
at his option, and not absolutely void. The reason assigned for the
broader doctrine, as gathered from the decisions cited, seems to be
that the spirit of the rule by which an infant may avoid his contracts
requires that he should be left free to affirm such acts of his agent
as he chooses, and to disaffirm all others; but that he can not
= Wharton Ag., § 12. Rob. (N. Y.) 553; Armitage v.
=a Fonda v. Van Home, 15 Wend. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124; Ware v. Cart-
(N. Y.) 631. ledge, 24 Ala. 622; Tapley v. McGee,
"bDoe V. Roberts, 16 M. & W. 778; 6 Ind. 56; Flexner v. Dickerson, 72
Fonda v. Van Home, supra; True- Ala. 318; Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 111.
blood V. Trueblood, 8 Ind. 195; Arm- 158; Bennett v. Davis, 6 Cow. (N.
itage V. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124. Y.) 393; Wambole v. Foote, 2 Dak.
''Oliver v. Woodroffe, 4 M. & W. 1; Carnahan v. AUerdice, 4 Harr.
650; Lawrence v. McArter, 10 Ohio (Del.) 99; Hiestand v. Kuns, 8
37; Trueblood v. Trueblood, 8 Ind. Blackf. (Ind.) 345; Fetrow v. Wise-
195; Knox v. Flack, 22 Pa. St. man, 40 Ind. 155; Robinson v.
337; Sadler v. Robinson, 2 Stew. Weeks, 56 Me. 102; Fonda v. Van
(Ala.) 520; Robbins v. Mount, 4 Home, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 631.
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do this if he is required to affirm the appointment in, toto, as that
would involve the ratification of all the acts done by the agent in
the course of the appointment ; while, if he disavows the appointment
as a whole, he can not, at the same time, sanction some of the acts
done by the agent under the appointment. He would thus be pre-
vented from exercising that freedom of choice, after arriving at the
age of majority, which the law has always accorded to him in order
to secure him against imposition during minority. It may be eon-
ceded that if the appointment of the agent involved the performance
of a number of different transactions, the reasons given for the rule
might have some force. But it is difficult to understand, if an
infant should authorize another person to do a single act of business
for him, such as buying a horse which he needs in the cultivation of
his crops, for example, an act essentially for his benefit, how it would
interfere with his freedom of choice if he were permitted to ratify
such an act upon reaching the age of majority. Just why an infant
is incompetent to bind himself, even for necessaries, when he procures
them through the agency of another, it being universally admitted that
he would render himself liable if he procured the articles in person, is
difficult to explain upon any rational basis of argument. And yet if
the rule is to be applied as broadly as the statement of it would seem
to indicate, this would be the necessary consequence. That not all
of the courts are willing to adhere to this anomalous doctrine is ap-
parent from many decisions of some of the ablest judges. Thus, in
Tucher v. Moreland'' j\Ir. Justice Story, speaking for the supreme
court of the United States, holds that an infant might bind himself
in appointing an agent to do an act for him unquestionably to his
advantage. In a California case,® the court decided that an infant
might in certain circumstances execute a promissory note by an agent,
and that an infant promisee might transfer by indorsement through an
agent, the title to a note,—such acts l^eing voidable only, and not void.
A similar holding was made by the supreme judicial court of Massa-
chusetts.^ Professor Huffcut says that the American cases show a
decided tendency to confine the rule to cases in which the appointment
MO Pet. (U. S.) 58. of agent—for certain purposes at
8 Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. least—voidable only); Patterson v.
195. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457; Welch v.
« Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457. Welch, 103 Mass. 562; Keegan v.
To the same effect, see Hardy v. Cox, 116 Mass. 289; Fairbanks v.
Waters, 38 Me. 450. See also, Towle Snow, 145 Mass. 153.
V. Dresser, 73 Me. 252 (appointment
23 COMPETENCY OF PARTIES, § 35
of the agent was by formal warrant of attorney, and to hold that the
appointment of an agent by an infant is generally a voidable and not
a void act.*^^ But however unsatisfactory the reasons may seem upon
which the rule is founded, it is doubtless true that the great weight of
authority in this country holds to the doctrine that an infant can not
be a principal, and is incapable also of ratifying any act done in
furtherance of such agency, whether the act was done in pursuance of
a previous employment of the agent or not. That a formal power
of attorney made by an infant is absolutely void seems to be the set-
tled rule, both in England and the United States.^" It is sometimes
said that all contracts of an infant are merely voidable except two;
namely: (1) His contract for necessaries, which is valid, and (2) his
contract for the appointment of an agent, which is void. By the
weight of authority in this country the statement is believed to be
correct, although it can not be claimed that the cases are in entire
harmony.
§ 35. Married women as principals.—Another instance of legal in-
competency, at common law, is that of married women. As the wife
was generally under disability of making any valid contract what-
ever, she was, of course, likewise incompetent to employ an agent.^''^
But to the extent that her common-law disabilities have been removed
by statute, she has become qualified to enter into such contracts as
she is thereby empowered to make. In many of the states, most,
though perhaps not all, of her disabilities have been removed; while
in others she has full control of and power to contract only as to her
separate property, and even then she is generally incapable ofcon-
veying her real estate unless her husband join in the deed. It may
be regarded as the correct rule, therefore, that in jurisdictions in
which she has not been relieved of any of her common-law disabilities
she is incapable of appointing an agent; whereas in others she may
legally appoint an agent to perform any and all acts that the stat-
utes have enabled her to perform in person. It is, therefore, un-
necessary that a statute should confer express authority upon a mar-
ried woman to become a principal or to appoint an agent. The
power to choose an agent or to act through an agent is implied from
'a Huffcut Ele. of Ag., § 15. 119; Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435.
1" Oliver v. Woodroffe, 4 M. & W. "a Kenton Ins. Co. v. McClellan,
650; Ashlin v. Langton, 4 M. & S. 43 Mich. 564; Weisbrod v. Chicago,
719; Turner v. Bondalier, 31 Mo. etc., R. Co., 18 Wis. 40; McLaren v.
App. 582; Knox v. Flack, 22 Pa. St. Hall. 26 Iowa 297; Rowell v. Klein,
337; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 44 Ind. 290.
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tlic power conferred upon lier to do the act herself. Hence, if the
statute empowers her to make contracts with reference to her separate
property, she may by force of it make such contracts through an agent,
although no stattite in terms authorizes her to do so. This is upon
the principle of the maxim that whatever one may do himself he may
do through another. Her authority to act must be found in the
statutes of the state within the jurisdiction of which she resides, or
by which the particular act is governed at the time she undertakes
to perform it. In those states in which the common law prevails as
a fundamental rule of action, the presumption is always against her
capacity to act ; but this presumption is overcome whenever it appears
that the particular disability has been abrogated by legislative enact-
ment, inasmuch as the validity of any contract and the rights and
liabilities thereunder depend upon the law of the state in force in
which it was entered into.^^
§ 36. Their acts of a personal nature not capable of delegation.—
It must not be forgotten, however, that the general rule implied in the
maxim "Qui facit per alium facit per se" admits of a well recognized
exception in the principle that wherever the act to be performed is of
a personal nature, involving a matter of trust or confidence, or the
exercise of some special function authorized by law, the performance
of it can not be delegated to another. This question will receive more
attention when we come to consider the power of delegation of author-
ity. For the present it is sufficient to show the applicability of the
doctrine to the case of persons having specific authority conferred
upon them by law to do some act or acts. In such cases, such persons
are required to perform the acts so authorized in person, and can not
delegate the power to others. Under this rule, where a party is re-
quired by statute to perform a certain act as a means of accomplish-
ing some other act, the act constituting such means must be performed
in person. Hence, if a married woman be authorized by statute to
convey her real estate by means of a deed duly acknowledged by her
upon private examination before an officer, she can not make the
acknowledgment by an agent.^- In an early Indiana case in which
this question arose, the court said : "A married woman, by the com-
mon law, can alien her real estate only by fine and recovery. Our
statutes authorize her to sell it by joining with her husband in a
deed, and by acknowledging before the proper officer, after having
"See 14 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. "Story Ag., § 12; 1 Bishop Mar.
(2d ed.) 609-618. Women, § 602.
25 COMPETENCY OF PARTIES, § 37
been by bim examined separate and apart from her husband, and after
having its contents made known to her by the officer, that she did vol-
untarily seal and deliver the deed as her free act, without coercion
from her husband. * * * She certainly can not acknowledge a
deed by an attorney, because that mode of acknowledgment does not
admit of her examination by the officer taking it, in the manner pre-
scribed ; and her conveyance, being entirely statutory, is not binding
upon her, unless it is acknowledged agreeably to the provisions of the
statute.-"'"
§ 37. May appoint husband.—In cases where the wife has the
power to employ an agent she may, of course, authorize her husband
to act for her, as well as any other person; and this agency may be
proved by circumstances as well as by direct evidence. The mere
fact that he is the husband will not warrant an inference of agency,
in the absence of other evidence that she has employed him as such."^
The agency may be inferred, however, from proof of such relation
together with other circumstances,—such as permitting him to manage
her estate generally ; or that he acted as her agent in similar matters,
previously, without objection on her part, etc.^* Of course, the agency
must be established as in other cases, and the rights and liabilities
growing out of it are not materially different from those arising in
other instances of agency. It is also held by some courts that a
married woman can not, at common law, appoint an agent unless
she is possessed of an estate of her own.^^ But the same court holds
that she may have a servant or servants, and that she and her husband
are jointly liable for the negligent acts of such servant or servants.^*^
§ 38. Persons of unsound mind as principals.—The question
whether a person of unsound mind is capable of appointing an agent
and of binding himself by his acts in matters of business depends,
as it does in other cases of agency, upon the c{uestion as to whether
or not the principal, or party assuming to act as such, has the legal
capacity of contracting. If a person non compos mentis enters into
a contract with a person of sound mind, is such contract void or void-
able for that reason? This, like all other questions arising in the
" Dawson v. Shirley, 6 Blackf. "a Anderson v. Gregg, 44 Miss. 170,
(Ind.) 531. See also, Holladay v. 179.
Daily, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 606; Mott v. " Barnett v. Gluting, 3 Ind. App.
Smith, 16 Cal. 533; Sumner v. Co- 419; Shafer v. Archibald, 116 Ind.
nant, 10 Vt. 2; Lewis v. Coxe, 5 29; Hunt v. Poole, 139 Mass. 224.
Harr. (Del.) 401. ^= Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 388, 390.
"Flesh V. Lindsay, 115 Mo. 1, 18.
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law of agency, depends upon the law of the state or country in which
the contract is made. If such person is incapable of binding him-
self, under the law of the land, to make any contract whatever, he
would be necessarily disqualified to make a contract of employing
an agent ; as he would not be permitted to do by another what he is
incapable of doing himself. Story lays down the rule that "idiots,
lunatics and other persons not sui juris are wholly incapable.""
This proposition Mr. Evans^^ seems to regard as not wholly tenable,
when he says: "Mr. Justice Story lays it down broadly that idiots,
lunatics and other person not sui juris are wholly incapable of ap-
pointing an agent. This can not be accepted without qualification
as the law of this country [England], for it has been distinctly laid
down by the court of exchequer chamber, after a review of the cases,
that when one of the parties to a contract is of unsound mind, and
the fact is unknown to the other contracting party, no advantage
having been taken of the lunatic, this unsoundness of mind will not
vacate a contract, especially where the contract is not merely ex-
ecutory, but executed in whole or in part, and the parties can not be
restored altogether to their original position.^^ It is conceived that
the same result would take place if the contract were made through an-
other, who acted upon the authority of the lunatic, without having
been aware or taken advantage of his state of mind. The principle
of the above decision was acted upon in a more recent case."^" The
exception mentioned by Evans is well recognized by the weight of
authority in this country. It is now generally held that if the dis-
ability was not known or apparent to the other contracting party,
and the contract was free from fraud, and the lunatic has received
the benefit thereof, it can not be avoided by him unless both parties
can be restored to their original position.^^ And a contract made
" Story Ag., § 6. to the same effect. Beckroege v.
i« Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) Schmidt. 5 Week. Law Bui. (Ohio)
44. 788, 6 Ohio Dec. R. 994; Matthiessen
" Citing Molton v. Camroux, 4 & Weichers Refining Co. v. Mc-
Exch. 17. Mahon, 38 N. J. L. 536; Beals v. See.
=" Citing Beavan v. M'Donnell. 9 10 Pa. 56, 49 Am. Dec. 573; McCor-
Exch. 309. See, to the same effect, mick v. Littler. 85 111. 62, 28 Am.
Pollock Conts. 76-84. Rep. 610; Copenrath v. Kienby. S3
=^Flach v. Gottschalk Co., 88 Ind. 18; Physio-Medical College v.
Md. 368, 71 Am. St. 418. See the Wilkinson. 108 Ind. 314; Young v.
elaborate note at p. 425, for a full Stevens, 48 N. H. 133, 97 Am. Dec.
citation and discussion of the au- 592.
thorities on this subject. See also.
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by a lunatic during a lucid interval is valid,- But contracts made
with a lunatic after his mental unsoundness has been established by
an inquisition and the appointment of a guardian are absolutely
void.^^ Mr. Mechem seems to approve of the general rule as stated
by Story, but says that it is "subject to the qualifications quite gen-
erally applied to other contracts with persons of this class ; that where
the unsoundness of mind is unknown to the other party, who has acted
in good faith and taken no advantage of it, the contract will not be
set aside, where it has been executed in whole or in part and the
parties can not be altogether restored to their original situation."-^
In an English case decided in 1892 by the queen's bench division,
it was said by Lopes, L. J., that "a defendant who seeks to avoid a
contract on the ground of his insanity must plead and prove, not
merely his insanity, but also the plaintiff's knowledge of that fact,
and unless he proves these two things he can not succeed:"-^ The
doctrine thus broadly stated by Story can not, therefore, be said to be
the prevailing rule in this country, although it must be admitted that
the decisions are by no means harmonious. If the statute of the
state declares the contracts of persons adjudged insane void, they
will, of course, be held not only voidable, but absolutely invalid by the
courts.-'' But an insane person not so declared by the judgment of
the court may in many instances bind himself by his contract, at
least in the absence of a statute making such contract void. The
supreme court of Indiana say: "We think it may be safely stated,
both on principle and authority, that where a person apparently of
sound mind, and not known to be otherwise, and who has not been
found to be otherwise by proper proceedings for that purpose, fairly
and bona fide purchases property and receives and uses the same,
whereby the contract of purchase becomes so far executed that the
parties can not be placed in statu quo, such contract can not be after-
ward set aside, or payment for the goods refused, either by the al-
leged lunatic or his representatives."-" A deed or power of attorney
== Lilly V. Waggoner, 27 111. 395; =" Redden v. Baker. 86 Ind. 191;
Gangwere's Estate, 14 Pa. 417, 53 Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312;
Am. Dec. 553; Tozer v. Saturlee, 3 Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.)
Grant (Pa.) 162. 279; Rogers v. Blackwell, 49 Mich.
=' Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 192; Hardenbrook v. Sherwood, 72
15 Am. St. 386; Fitzhugh v. Wilcox, Ind. 403.
12 Barb. (N. Y.) 235. = Wilder v. Weakley's Estate, 34
-^ Mechem Ag.. § 48. Ind. 181. See also, Fay v. Burditt,
-'^ Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, L. 81 Ind. 433.
R. (1892) 1 Q. B. 599, 603.
^ 39 PRINCIPAL AXD AGEXT. 28
uiuler ?oal executed by a lunatic or person non compos mentis is held
by some courts absolutely void.-* The court, in the Xew York case
just cited, treats the act of an insane person in making a power of
attorney as analogous to a similar act performed by an infant, saying
:
"The doctrine that a lunatic's power of attorney is void finds con-
firmation in the analogy there is between the situation and acts of
infants and lunatics. Both such classes of persons are regarded as
under the protection of the law. But, as already remarked, a lunatic
needs more protection than a minor. The latter is presumed to lack
sufficient discretion. Reason is wanting in degree. With a lunatic
it is wanting altogether. Yet it is universally held, as laid down by
Lord Mansfield in Zouch v. Parsons,-^ that deeds of an infant which
do not take effect by delivery of his hand (in which class he places
a letter of attorney) are void. We are not aware that any different
rule exists in England or in this country. It has repeatedly been
determined that a power of attorney made by an infant is void.
* * * In fact, we know no case of authority in which the letter of
attorney of either an infant or a lunatic has been held merely void-
able." As to the extent of the mental unsoundness, it has been held
in New Jersey that a deaf-mute, sixty-five years old, who is ignorant
and can not read nor write, nor be made to understand an ordinary
business transaction, is incapable of appointing an agent to manage
her property for her.^" And that the contract was negotiated for the
lunatic or person of unsound mind by an agent will not render such
contract binding upon such person, as one who is mentally incapable
of making a contract can not have an agent.^^
§ 39. Same.—All contracts of lunatics and persons of unsound
mind, except for necessaries, are doubtless void if made after
such person has been so declared by a comi^etent court, and a guar-
dian appointed, whether the statute so provides or not.^^* They are
likewise void, or at least voidable, if the incompetency is known to
the other contracting party or he has reasonable grounds to believe
the principal insane.^- And whenever a statute declares a contract
"Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. (U. S.) ''a Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen, S N.
9. But it is held to be only voida- Y. 388; Redden v. Baker, 86 Ind. 191.
ble by other courts: Blinn v. =- Crawford v. Scovell. 94 Pa. St.
Schwartz, 71 N. Y. Supp. 343. 48; Alexander v. Raskins, 68 Iowa
-^ 3 Burr. 1804. 73; Matthiessen v. McMahon's Adm.,
^ In re Perrine, 41 N. J. Eq. 409. 38 N. J. L. 536; VanDeusen v. Sweet
=1 Marvin v. Inglis, 39 How. Pr. 51 N. Y. 378; Rogers v. Blackwell,
(N. Y.) 329. 49 Mich. 192; Gibson v. Soper, 6
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by an insane person void, a contract of agency l)y such person would
be void also. Generally they would be inTalid even without such a
statute, after an adjudication by an inquest.^^ If not declared void
by statute, or if the person had not been adjudged insane by a proper
court, when the contract was made, such contract may still be void-
able, if the party who contracted with the insane person can be placed
in statu quo, even though he had no knowledge or notice of the in-
sanity. If the contract was for necessaries, the person will be liable,
and it is difficult to perceive why the cohtract of the lunatic's agent
for that purpose, made in his behalf, would not be equally binding.
There is still another contingency in which the contract may or may
not be binding on the lunatic, and that is in a case in which the
principal was of sound mind when the agency was created but
became non compos mentis afterward. In that case, if the third
person was ignorant of the principal's infirmity, the principal,
having held the agent out to the world as such, will be bound,
whether the agent knew of it or not; and conversely, if the third
person was aware of it, the contract would be voidable whether
the agent knew of the insanity or not.^* The reason for the doctrine
just enunciated is so aptly stated in an English case, by Brett, L. J.,
that it is deemed useful to cjuote a portion of his language: "It is
difficult to assign the ground upon which this doctrine, which, how-
ever, seems to me to be the true principle, exists. It is said that the
right to hold the insane principal liable depends upon contract. I
have a difficulty in assenting to this. It has been said also that the
right depends upon estoppel. I can not see that an estoppel is
created, but it has been said also that the right depends upon repre-
sentations made bj the principal and entitling third persons to act
upon them, until they hear that those representations are withdrawn.
The authorities collected in Story on Agency^^ seem to base the right
upon the ground of public policy; it is there said in effect that the
existence of the right goes in aid of public business. It is, however,
a better way of stating the rule to say that the holding out of another
person as agent is a representation upon which, at the time when it
was made, third parties had a right to act. and if no insanity had
Gray (Maes.) 279; Lynch v. Dodge, "American Trust, etc., Co. v.
130 Mass. 458; Burnham v. Kidwell, Boone, 102 Ga. 202; Hovey v. Hob-
113 111. 425; Carter v. Beckwlth, 128 son, 53 Me. 453, 89 Am. Dec. 705;
N. Y. 312; Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Hughes v. Jones. 116 N. Y. 67.
Ind. 98; Stockmeyer v. Tobin, 139 =^ Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. 156.
U. S. 176. ==Ch. xviii, § 481, p. 610 (7th ed.).
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supervened would still have a right to act. * * * The defendant
became insane and was unable to withdraw the authority which he
had conferred upon his wife; he may be an innocent sufferer by his
conduct, but the plaintiff who dealt with her bona fide is also innocent,
and where one of two persons, both innocent, must suffer by the
wrongful act of a third person, that person making the representa-
tion which, as between the two, was the original cause of the mischief
must be the sufferer and must bear the loss."^®
§ 40. Drunkards as principals.—A person who is at the time of
the execution of a contract in a state of intoxication may avoid such
contract, if at the time of making the same his reason was so far
dethroned as to render him incapable of knowing what he was doing.^®^
In such cases the contract is not void, but voidable only, and before
the person wishing to avoid it upon that ground can do so he must
offer to restore whatever was received in consideration thereof.^'^
Intoxication, when it totally incapacitates, will avoid the contract,
it being only a species of mental unsoundness. But drunkenness, at
the time of the execution of the contract, will not generally avoid it,
if the party was not wholly incapacitated and no unfair advantage was
taken of him, or if the other party to the contract did not procure the'
intoxication in order to induce him to make the contract.^* But if
the party was so intoxicated as to render him mentally incapable of
contracting, it will be a good defense to an action on the contract.^*
And where the party's mental capacity has been so far impaired from
habitual drunkenness as to render him irresponsible, he may avoid
the contract.*'' The principle here declared applies to a contract of
agency as well as to other contracts. A party making such a eon-
tract while in an intoxicated condition may ratify the same when
he becomes sober.*^ A person is in a state of intoxication, or drunk,
in a legal sense, when he is so far under the influence of intoxicating
liquor that his judgment is impaired by the liquor. "Drunkenness
is that effect produced on the mind, passions or body by intoxicants
^"Drew V. Nunn, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. ^* Rodman v. Zilley. 1 N. J. Eq.
661. 320; Campbell v. Ketcham. 4 Ky.
^'^a See Arnold v, Hickman, 6 Munf. 406.
(Va.) 15. ^'"Jenner v. Howard, 6 Blackf.
'" Williams v. Inabnet, 1 Bailey (Ind.) 240; Bush v. Breinig, 113 Pa.
(S. C.) 343; McGuire v. Callahan, 19 St. 310, 57 Am. Dec. 469.
Ind. 128; Joest v. Williams, 42 Ind. *<> Gates v. Meredith. 7 Ind. 440.
565. 13 Am. Rep. 366; Bursinger v. "Mansfield v. Watson, 2 Iowa
Bank of Watertown, 67 Wis. 77; Mc- 111; Carpenter v. Rodgers, 61 Mich.
Clain v. Davis, 77 Ind. 419. 384.
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taken into the system, which so far changes the normal condition,
as to materially disturb and impair the capacity for health, rational
action and conduct; which causes abnormal results, or such as would
not ensue in the absence of intoxicants—the changed effect produced
by the immoderate or excessive use of intoxicants, as contrasted with
normal status and conduct."*- The ratification or disaffirmance of
the contract of a lunatic or drunkard may be by the guardian or
committee ;*^ or, after his death, if a deed, by his heirs.** WTien the
guardian of a habitual drunkard has been discharged, it will he pre-
sumed that the ward has reformed.*^ If the contract was made
during a sober interval, it is binding.*''
§ 41. Corporations as principals.—A corporation is, from its very
nature, a competent principal, for it is inconceivable how it could
perform any of its functions except through the media of its officers
or agents. Usually the charter or general laws under which it is
organized provide for the appointment or selection of these ; but
whether this be true or not, the election of directors, trustees and
other suitable officers or agents to govern the affairs of the company
and transact its business is a necessary incident of its corporate exist-
ence, and may be held without being expressly authorized by the act of
incorporation.*^ But when the charter or statute of incorporation
provides a certain method of election or appointment of the officers,
that method must be substantially pursued, any other rendering the
selection void.*^ Where, however, it is provided that the trustees of a
corporation shall be elected annually, the words are only directory,
and do not take away the incidental power of the corporation to elect
afterward, when the annual day has, by some means, free from design
or fraud, been passed by.*^ And where the record is sflent upon
*= State V. Savage, 89 Ala. 1, 8. *^ Walseburg Water Co. v. Moore,
''McClain v. Davis, 77 Ind. 419. 5 Colo. App. 144, 38 Pac. 60;
" Schuff V. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458. In re St. Helen Mill Co., Fed. Cas.
"Makepeace v. Bronnenberg, 146 No. 12,222, 3 Sawy. (U. S.) 88;
Ind. 243. Moses v. Tompkins, 84 Ala. 613;
^'' Ritter's Appeal, 59 Pa. St. 9. People v. New York Infant Asylum,
^'Hughes V. Parker, 20 N. H. 58, 122 N. Y. 190; State v. McCullough,
65; Kitchen v. Cape Girardeau, etc., 3 Nev. 202; Miller v. English, 21 N.
R. Co., 59 Mo. 514; St. Andrew's Bay J. L. 317.
Land Co. v. Mitchell, 4 Fla. 192, 54 ''People v. Town of Fairbury, 51
Am. Dec. 340; Hayden v. Middlesex 111. 149; Hughes v. Parker, 20 N. H.
Turnpike Corp., 10 Mass. 397, 6 Am. 58; Beardsley v. Johnson, 1 N. Y.
Dec. 143; Kearney v. Andrews, 10 Supp. 608, 49 Hun (N. Y.) 607.
N. J. Eq. 70.
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the subject, the presumption will be indulged that the selection was
according to the prescribed methods.^" So, where no particular mode
of making the choice is provided, if all having the right to vote have
an opportunity and the officers chosen are the choice of the majority
of those voting, the election is valid.^^ As a general rule, an agent
authorized to make a contract for a corporation must be appointed,
on the vote of the directors, but the appointment may be implied
'from the adoption or recognition of the agent's acts by the corpora-
tion or the directors.^^ And it is not generally necessary that the
vote by which the agent was appointed be recorded or entered on the
minutes, but the same may be inferred from the fact that the cor-
poration permitted him to act as such.^^ Kor is it essential that
such an agent should be appointed by an instrument under seal.^*
If the acts of an agent of a corporation were unauthorized in the
first instance, they ma}^ if within the scope of its corporate powers,
be subsequently ratified, and such ratification will cure any defects in
the appointment of the agent.^^ In the absence of express provisions
to the contrary in the charter of a mutual company, such company
possesses the power to appoint such agents as may be necessary to
transact its business ; and the members of such company are presumed
to have consented that it shall be represented by such agents or officers
as are reasonably necessary for the conduct of its business.^® The
agent may he a member of the corporation.^" But a corporation can
not be bound by its agents for acts beyond its corporate powers.^^
When the appointment of an agent of a corporation is ultra vires,
it is void and can not bind the corporation ; but where the corpora-
^'Blanchard v. Dow, 32 Me. 557. '' Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8
"Philips v. Wickham, 1 Paige (N. Wheat. (U. S.) 338; Church v. Ster-
Y.) 590. ling, 16 Conn. 388; Home Life Ins.
== Equitable Gas Light Co. v. Bal- Co. v. Pierce, 75 111. 426.
timore Coal-Tar & Mfg. Co., 65 Md. =" Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Foote,
73, 3 Atl. 108. 79 111. 368.
=^ Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Kidd, 29 ' Stoddert v. Port Tobacco Parish,
Ala. 221; Wood v. Wiley Const. Co., 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 227.
56 Conn. 87; Planters' Bank v. Biv- "^^ Hayden v. Middlesex Turnpike
ingsville Cotton Mfg. Co., 10 Rich. Co., 10 Mass. 397, 6 Am. Dec. 143;
L. (S. C.) 95. Sandford v. McArthur, 18 B. Mon.
'^Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8 (Ky.) 411; Gregory Co. v. Raber. 1
Wheat. (U. S.) 338; St. Andrew's Colo. 511; Ryan v. Manufacturers',
Bay Land Co. v. Mitchell, 4 Fla. etc.. Bank, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 308.
192, 54 Am. Dec. 340.
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tion has dorived a benefit from the services of such agent, the cor-
poration may, in some cases at least, be liable on a quantum nieruit.^^
^ 42. Partnerships as principals.—The law of partnership is a
branch of the law of principal and agent."" Each partner is a prin-
cipal, as well as an agent of the other partners. Besides, each partner
has the implied authority to appoint such agents or servants as may be
necessary for the proper conduct of the business.®^ An agent thus
appointed is an agent of the firm and not an agent of the individual
partner merely.®- Such an agent, when acting within the scope of
his authority, may bind the principal firm to the same extent as if
such principal were a natural person.®^
§ 43. Unincorporated societies as principals.—An unincorporated
society, such as a church, lodge or political organization, can not be-
come a competent principal. It is not a legal entity. But if all the
members have acted jointly in the appointment of an agent they
may be held liable as joint principals for the acts of such agent.''*
Those who appoint the agent will, of course, be liable. The converse
of the proposition is also true, that those not joining in the appoint-
ment will not be liable.
§ 44. Alien enemies as principals.—A citizen or subject of a coun-
try at war with the United States can not lawfully appoint an agent
in the United States during the existence of hostilities.®^ But if the
relation of principal and agent already existed, prior to the JDeginning
of the war, it will not be terminated by reason of the breaking out of
the war between the two countries, provided it does not involve any
communication across the line, and it can be shown that the agency
continued by the mutual consent of the parties thereto. ®®
§45. Joint principals.—As shown in the case of unincorporated
societies, two or more persons having authority to do so may jointly
^^ Slater Woollen Co. v. Lamb, 143 '- Johnston's Ex. v. Brown. 18 La.
Mass. 420. Ann. 330; Ayer v. Ayer, 41 Vt. 346.
^" Cox V. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. "^ Henderson v. San Antonio R.
268. Co., 17 Texas 560.
"^Paton V. Baker, 62 Iowa 704; '^ Ray v. Powers, 134 Mass. 22;
Durgin v. Somers, 117 Mass. 55; Newell v. Borden, 128 Mass. 31.
Harvey v. McAdams, 32 Mich. 472; "= United States v. Grossmayer, 9
Tillier v. Whitehead, 1 Dall. (Pa.) Wall. (U. S.) 72.
269; Sweeney v. Neely, 53 Mich. 421; "« 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d ed.)
Carley v. Jenkins, 46 Vt. 721. 943.
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appoint an agent. They are then called joint principals. If two
or more persons are jointly interested in a business enterprise, one
of them can not appoint an agent for all except by the consent of
jjljeea jf the interest is a common one, each being authorized to act
for all, as in the case of a partnership,^^^ one may appoint an agent for
all, and the act will be binding. If, however, the interests be sepa-
rate and distinct, one can not bind the others by the appointment
of an agent.'''^
§ 46. Who may be agents—Generally.—As a general rule, any
person may be an agent except a lunatic, imbecile, or child of very ten-
der years. Hence, slaves or villains, persons outlawed or excommuni-
cated, married women, infants, and aliens may become agents for
other parties, although incapable of binding themselves by contract.®®
It is obvious that many persons may be agents to carry out the in-
structions of or to act for others when they would not be competent to
do such acts for themselves. Thus, an infant may deliver a deed
or an article of personal property for another when he could not bind
himself individually by such act. The act to be done in such case
may be purely mechanical or ministerial, and it is evident that a
much lower degree of competency would be demanded than in cases
calling for the exercise of skill and discretion. A mere child may
])e competent to deliver a deed or money, or perform many other acts
of that character involving no particular skill or discretion. Hence,
a person, though incompetent to act as a principal, may in many cases
take upon himself the duties of an agent ; and this is especially so
where the duties are more in the nature of those of a servant than of
an agent, strictly speaking. So, infants, married women and aliens
may be agents.'''' It is not necessary for a person to be sui juris in
order to be qualified to act as agent for others; and it may be stated
as a general rule that all persons of sound mind are capable of becom-
ing agents."''
§ 47. Infants as agents.—There is no rule of law which prevents
an infant from being an agent, and a contract made by such agent
is binding upon the principal the same as if the agent were an adult.
This is especially true if the infant is above the age of seven years
""aSewall V. Holland, 61 Ga. 608; " Mechem Ag.. § 60.
Reiman v. Hamilton, 111 Mass. 245; !! 5^:'°" \- _^^"l- ^^ *^^^' ^^^'
Hearsey v. Lambei-t, 50 Minn. 373.
"b Deakin v. Undei'wood, 37 Minn
98.
=» Story Ag., § 7.
•"Story Ag., § 7; Evans Pr. & Ag.
(Bedford's ed.) 15.
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and there is no statutory provision against his being such an agent.^^
The rehition between an adult principal and an infant agent can not
be said to be a perfect one, however. Of course, the act of the prin-
cipal to be performed by the infant agent may be as completely ac-
complished through him as if he were an adult, and, so far as the
principal is concerned, his liability to the agent and to third persons
would be the same. But the contract between the principal and such
infant agent would not be binding on the latter, if he saw proper to
avoid it, such a contract being voidable on his part, the same as any
other. He would, therefore, not be liable to the principal for failing
to meet his obligations as an agent, nor would he be liable to third
persons on an implied warranty of authority, as other agents are
liable ; nor in any other way, except, perhaps, for fraud or other torts
committed in the execution of his powers. The agency of an infant
or other person non sui juris is therefore only a qualified agency.''^
§ 48. Persons of unsound mind as agents.—Persons of unsound
mind are, as a general rule, as incompetent to be agents as they are
incompetent to be principals. A person not possessing sufficient
mental discretion to do an act in relation to his own affairs can not
be held to have sufficient capacity to perform such an act for another.
The appointment of such an agent in a matter in which discretion is
required would be void, and so would all the aeis performed by him
in pursuance of the appointment.^^ Such a person may, however,
be a nuntius, or messenger, though he can not become a mandatarv'.
A message or package might be delivered through him as well as it
could be by means of a wire or a vehicle.''* Hence, if the act or acts
to be performed are merely ministerial or mechanical, such as the
delivery of title papers, or of goods and chattels, or other articles, the
act performed through a lunatic or idiot will be valid if authorized.
In such cases the agent, if such he may be called, is no more than a
machine or instrument in the hands of the principal, and when the
act is done it is the same as if the principal had done it himself.
But if the performance of such act involves the exercise of any dis-
cretion, however slight, and the agent does not have the capacity to
exercise such discretion, the act is void. Hence, it is believed that
while the principal might lawfully deliver a horse. to a vendee through
''Talbot V. Bowen, 1 A. K. Marsh. "Story Ag., § 7; Evans Pr. & Ag.
(Ky.) 436; Brown v. Hartford Fire (Bedford's ed.) 115.
Ins. Co., 117 Mass. 479. "* Wharton Ag., § 15.
'-Wharton Ag., § 13, et seq.
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one who is of unsound mind, he could not effect a valid sale of such
horse through such person, as that would require some discretion on
the part of the agent. Of course, if the agent did possess sufficient
mental discretion to perform the act, though he were otherwise non
compos, or if the act were subsequently ratified, it would be rendered
valid. And if the third party did not know or have reason to believe
such agent non compos, the principal may be bound. ^^^
§ 49. Married women as agents.—It may be stated, as a general
rule, that a feme covert may lawfully be the agent or attorney of her
husband and bind him by her act or contract, even at common law,'*''
or she may act as agent for another in a contract with her own hus-
band. '^^ But it is not clear that she ma}-, at common law, act as the
agent of a third person, as against the express dissent of her husband,
as such agency might involve duties and services not consistent with
her duties or relations to the husband and family."^* But in states
in which the legal disabilities of a married woman to make contracts,
etc., have been removed by statutes, any restriction of the common
law by which she would be prevented from acting as agent is abro-
gated also. It was said by the supreme court of Indiana : "Where
the wife engages in business, with the knowledge and consent of her
husband, the business is regarded as that of the husband, the wife
as his agent, and he is bound for the performance of contracts which
she may make relating to such business."^® The husband is not
liable, however, if the wife obtained the goods on her own credit ex-
clusively, as there can be no presumption in such cases that she was
acting for her husband. ^^ In cases where the law authorizes the wife
to pledge the credit of her husband, it creates a compulsory agency,
and he is liable for her acts.'^^ The marriage relation alone does not
give to' the wife any authority to act as agent for her husband, so as
to bind him in contracts of a general nature. Her relation in this
respect is more nearly analogous to that of a servant to her husband.
At least, such was the conception of the common law."^
§ 50. Husband as agent of wife.—The husband may be the agent
of his wife in all cases where by law she is competent to appoint an
agent.^**^ Such agency may be established by circumstantial evidence;
and the fact of the relation of husband and wife, and that the husband
openly acted for his wife under circumstances implying a knowledge
on her part that he was acting for her, as well as evidence showing
that the husband was permitted by the wife to perform other and
similar acts for her, may be considered in determining whether
^^aMechem Ag., §§ 255, 260. "' Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Mass.
'^bWeisbrod v. Chicago, etc., R. 418.
Co., 18 Wis. 35. " Selwyn Xisi Prints 288.
" Story Ag., § 7. "a Baxter v. Maxwell, 115 Pa. St.
"a story Ag., § 7. 469: Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Smith.
'" Jenkins v. Flinn, 37 Ind. 352. 44 Ohio St. 156: Brown v. Thomp-
" Jenkins v. Flinn, supra. son, 31 S. C. 436.
37 COMPETENCY OF PARTIES. § 51
there was, in fact, an agency.^'' While a husband may, without ques-
tion, be the agent of his wife, his agency can only come from one
source ; and that is, the authority conferred by his wife, whether that
authority be conferred directly or indirectly. The evidence of the
agency, however, should be clear and satisfactory.*^
§ 51. Corporations as agents.—A corporation, unless it is author-
ized to do so by its charter or as an incident of its general powers, can
not act as agent for another; but otherwise it has the same power in
this respect as a natural person, and the corporation may act as agent
for an individual, a firm or another corporation.®- Thus, a national
bank can not act as a broker in the purchase or sale of bonds or
stocks on commission;*^ nor can a savings bank act as such broker if
it has only the ordinary powers of such corporation;** nor has a
manufacturing company the power to act as agent for another like
corporation in making sale of its product;*^ nor can the corporation
act as an attorney at law, although it may be authorized for and be
carrying on the business of a collecting agency that may employ at-
torneys for others and recover fees paid them.*'' National banks, as
a general rule, can not act as agents for others in the sale of stocks,
notes or other property ; but if such a bank holds a note of its debtor
as collateral, it may lawfully act as an agent in the sale of such note
to a third person, this being an incident of its power to collect the
claim. *^ And it has been held that a corporation may under some
circumstances execute a conveyance of land as attorney in fact for
another.**
§ 52. Partnership firms as agents.—A partnership, like a corpora-
tion, may be organized for the express purpose of carrying on an
agency, such as real estate brokerage, etc. If not organized for such
express purpose, it may not carry on such business, unless the same
is incident to its general powers. But when authority is properly
delegated to the firm for that purpose, either partner may execute it,
and the act of one partner is considered in law the act of the entire
partnership for this purpose.*'^
§ 53. Alien enemies as agents.—What has been said in reference to
alien enemies as principals is true of them also as agents. As a gen-
eral rule, such an agency is invalid during a period of war between
^ Barnett v. Ghiting, 3 Ind. App. *° Westinghouse Machine Co. v.
415; Arnold v. Spurr, 130 Mass. 347. Wilkinson, 79 Ala. 312.
^iRowell V. Klein. 44 Ind. 290; Mc- '"Snow, Church & Co. v. Hall, 19
Laren v. Hall, 26 Iowa 297. Misc. (N. Y.) 655.
**- Westinghouse Machine Co. v. " Anderson v. Grand Forks First
Wilkinson. 79 Ala. 312. National Bank, 5 N. Dak. 451.
'^ First Nat'l Bank v. Hoch, 89 Pa. *' Killingsworth v. Portland Trust
St. 324. Co., 18 Ore. 351, 17 Am. St. 737.
^ Jemison v. Citizens' Savings -'•> Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich.
Bank, 122 N. Y. 135, 19 Am. St. 14.
482.
g 52 PKIXCIPAL AXD AGEXT. 38
the respective countries of the principal and the agent, involving any
communication across the line of hostilities.^" The agency is not
discontinued, however, by virtue of the breaking out of hostilities, if
it existed prior thereto and the parties consented to its continuation.®^
And payment of debts to the. agent of an alien enemy is allowed
when the agent resides in the same state with the debtor. ^^
§ 54. Persons having adverse interests as agents.—One who has
an adverse interest to that of the principal in the subject-matter of
the agency may not lawfully act as agent therein, and in many in-
stances he can not act as agent for two principals in the same transac-
tion, if his duties require him to do incompatible things; but it is
otherwise if he is to act for principals in matters that do not involve
a performance of acts that are incompatible, or where both principals
have full knowledge of his relation to each.®-^ And a person can not
be an agent for a party opposed to himself in the same transaction,
such as being an attorney in a cause in which the agent himself is
the adverse party.®^
§ 54a. Joint agents.—Joint agents, or those appointed to execute
the authority of their principal jointly, must act together in the exe-
cution of the business for which they have been employed, or it will
not be valid.®* Hence, a joint agent, acting without the co-operation
of his fellow agents in such cases, is not a com])etent agent to execute
the will of his principal. This rule, however, applies only to private
agents; that is, agents who are appointed by some private person or
corporation to perform some act or acts of agency. If the agency be
a public one, as in the case of public oflficers,—for example, a board of
county commissioners or a city council or a school board,—in making
a contract, if the act is performed jointly by a majority of such public
agents or officers it is valid.®^
'"Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. App. 177; Kimball v. Rannev, 122
561; U. S. V. Grossmayer, 9 Wall. Mich. 160; McDoel v. Ohio Val." Imp.,
(U. S.) 72. etc.. Co. (Ky.), 36 S. W. 175; Oliver
'^Ward V. Smith, 7 Wall. (U. S.) v. Lansing. 48 Neb. 338; Webb v.
447; Monsseaux v. Uhrquhart, 19 Marks, 10 Colo. App. 429; In re Wat-
La. Ann. 482; Wharton Ag., § 16; In- kins' Estate, 121 Cal. 327; Stanley v.
surance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425. Luse, 36 Ore. 25.
"-Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. '*^ Rollins v. Phelps, 5 Minn. 463;
425. Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114.
"'aMorey v. Laird, 108 Iowa 670; "=^ Loudon Savings Fund Soc. v.
Duesman v. Hale, 55 Neb. 577. Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498, 78
•'^Tewksbury v. Spruance, 75 III. Am. Dec. 390; McNeil v. Chamber of
187; Taussig v. Hart. 58 N. Y. 425; Commerce, 154 Mass. 277; Woolsev
Hammond v. Bookwalter, 12 Ind. v. Tompkins, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 324.
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I. By Appointment.
§ 55. Appointment and acceptance.—It has already been shown
that an agency may be created between the parties by contract, ex-
press or implied. Indeed, this is the normal way in which the rela-
tion is formed, and the only way, unless it be shown by proof of rati-
fication, or estoppel, or unless it is created by implication of law. Such
contract is usually designated the appointment of the agent, and if
it be in writing, it is called a letter or power of attorney. An appoint-
ment also involves an acceptance thereof on the part of the agent.^
An agency, like any other contract, presupposes a meeting of the
minds. If the parties are present when the contract is entered into,
or both parties sign or acknowledge the instrument, if there be one,
this will be proof sufficient. If the agent indicates his acceptance by
letter, this is equally sufficient. But an acceptance may be pre-
sumed or inferred from the acts of the agent ; as, by acting upon the
appointment. In such case no formal acceptance need be proved.^
* First Nat'l Bank v. Free, 67 Iowa - Delano v.
11; Cameron v. Seaman, 69 N. Y. Mass. 63.
396, 25 Am. Rep. 212.
Smith Charities, 138
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The appointment, however, must be accepted, and until then the con-
tract of agency does not go into effect.^
§ 56. Elements of appointment—Intention.—As already indicated
in a previous chapter, before an agency can be created there must be
competent parties to make the contract, there must be a valid con-
sideration, a legal object to accomplish, and in some cases a particu-
lar form.* It must also appear from the circumstances that there
was an intention on the part of the principal to appoint the agent.
Unless such intention is real or apparent from the words or actions
of the parties, there can be no agency.^ Thus, a mere correspond-
ence in relation to a transaction, between an owner of real estate and
a broker, evincing no intention on the part of the owner to make the
broker his agent, would not amount to an appointment; and the
words "I will sell," or their equivalent, accompanied by the specifica-
tions of the terms of sale by the owner of the land, were held not to
constitute an appointment, as there was no intention evinced to make
such a party an agent.** And where an agent sends a price list of land
to a future purchaser, this is not regarded as establishing an agency,
if the person addressed merely responds by inquiring as to terms.''
§ 57. The form of the contract—Instruments under seal—Parol
authority.—A contract of agency must of necessity possess all the
elements of any other contract enforceable in law. It may be a simple
contract in writing or in parol, or it may be a contract under seal,
called a specialty. If a simple contract in writing, its form and
contents may be simply of the tenor that the party of the first part
(the principal) does hereby constitute the party of the second part
(the agent) his true and lawful attorney, or agent, to act for him
and in his behalf and stead, in the performance of a certain transac-
tion named in the contract. Of course, the purposes of the appoint-
ment should be stated explicitly. The appointment may be shown,
however, as has been seen, in the form of a correspondence between
the parties, such as a proposal by one and an acceptance by the other
of the terms of the agency. Where a writing becomes necessary, as
^Cameron v. Seaman, 69 N. Y. 396, Ct. 53; Central Trust Co. v. Bridges,
25 Am. Rep. 212. 6 C. C. A. 539, 57 Fed. 753.
* See Anson Conts. (8th ed.) 10, et "Bosseau v. O'Brien. 4 Biss. (U.
seq. S.) 395.
° Felton V. McClave, 46 N. Y. Supr. " Stewart v. Pickering. 73 Iowa
652.
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when it is required by reason of the provisions of the statute of frauds,
the requirement would be met if the agreement were in the form
of such a correspondence by letter or by telegram, and if it showed
the intention of the parties. In many instances, however, as in other
simple contracts, the appointment may be verbal; that is to say, by
mere word of mouth, and without any writing. But in some cases
the contract, by the rules of the common law, is required to be under
seal, as when an agent is appointed to make conveyance of land, and
then a greater formality is necessary. In that case the signature and
seal of the principal are essential, although the latter requirement
has been abolished in many of the states, and the tendency is to do
away with the distinction that formerly obtained in the use of seals.*
If the appointment requires a sealed instrument, the latter should
contain an accurate description of the subject-matter of the agency
;
as, for example, the real estate which the agent is authorized to con-
vey. The rule of the common law as to such an appointment re-
quired that if the act were done by the principal himself, instead
of being performed for him by an agent, and a sealed instrument
were necessary to its performance, the instrument of agency must
likewise be a sealed instrument. In other words, the instrument
constituting the appointment must be of the same nature, in point of
solemnity, as that required by the principal, were he to transact the
business in person. But if the instrument be executed by the agent
in the immediate presence and under the direction of the principal,
express or implied, no written appointment is necessary, and this
is true although such instrument is by law required to be in writing,
or under seal, such as a negotiable instrument, or a deed.^ In such
cases there is no reason why the name of the attorney should be em-
ployed in the instrument which the agent writes by the direction of
the principal, and in his presence, such as exists in cases where the
instrument is executed in the principal's absence. The principal
merely avails himself of the aid of the agent as he would make use
*Thus in Indiana and many other 193; Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen
states the statutes abolish the re- (Mass.) 309; Eggl.eston v. Wagner,
quirements of a seal: Burns' R. S. 46 Mich. 610; Meyer v. King, 29 La.
Ind. 1901, §§ 454, 1309, 3421; 21 Am. Ann. 567; McMurtry v. Brown, 6
& Eng. Encyc. L. 888. Neb. 368; Croy v. Busenbark, 72
" Handyside v. Cameron, 21 111. Ind. 48; Crow v. Carter, 5 Ind. App.
588, 74 Am. Dec. 119; Gardner v. 169; Mackay v. Bloodgood, 9 Johns.
Gardner, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 483; Jan- (N. Y.) 285; Ball v. Dunsterville, 4
sen v. McCahill, 22 Cal. 563; Mutual, T. R. 313; Harshaw v. McKesson, 65
etc., Ins. Co. v. Brown, 30 N. J. Eq. N. C. 688.
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of an inanimate instrument to carry out his purpose. The agent is
but an amanuensis. It is immaterial whether the agent thus writes
the whole of the instrument or only a portion, such as the signature, or
the filling of a blank.^"
§ 58, Authority to fill blanks in instruments.—With regard to the
filling of blanks by an agent, in the absence of the principal, a some-
what different rule prevails. If the instrument be a simple contract,
negotiable or non-negotiable, or a bond, the general rule is that an
agent may fill the blank in pursuance of parol authority.^^ As in such
instances the principal might have authorized the agent by parol to
execute the entire instrument, so he may empower him to execute it in
part, by completing or perfecting it. Indeed, the presumption is that
when a paper of this character is delivered to an agent with blanks left
in it, such agent is authorized to perfect the contract by filling the
blanks, for any sum, and upon any terms as to time, place and condi-
tions of payment and name of payee.^- The principal may, indeed,
limit the authority of the person to whom the paper is intrusted, as to
the extent to which he may or may not go in filling in the blank spaces,
and such limitation of authority will bind the agent, as between him
and the principal. But as to ho7ia fide transferees of such paper, the
principal will be bound by it, even if the authority has been exceeded,
unless the transferee had notice of the limitation.^^ The principle un-
derlying the presumption of authority in favor of the agent is that of
estoppel on account of the negligence of the party who delivered the
paper in blank. Such blanks carry with them, upon the face thereof,
an implication of authority to be filled, and if the principal or maker
"See Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. Rep. 813; Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y.
313; Mackay v. Bloodgood, 9 Johns. 234, 13 Am. Rep. 573; Yocum v.
(N. Y.) 285; McMurtry v. Brown, 6 Smith, 63 111. 321, 14 Am. Rep. 120;
Neb. 368; Hudson v. Revett, 5 Bing. South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me.
368, 15 E. C. L. 467; Warring V. Wil- 89, 87 Am. Dec. 535; Rainbolt v.
liams, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 322. Eddy, 34 Iowa 440, 11 Am. Rep. 152;
" Boardman v. Gore, 1 Stew. Cronkhite v. Nebeker, 81 Ind. 319.
(Ala.) 517, 18 Am. Dec. 73; 2 Starkie "1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 142; Jones
Ev. 480, n. 1; Angle v. Northwestern v. Pincheon, 6 Ind. App. 460; Frank
L. Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 330; Greenleaf v. Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 377;
Ev. (16th ed.), § 568a, notes. Snyder v. Van Doren, 46 Wis. 602;
^^Spitler v. James, 32 Ind. 202; Johnston Harvester Co. v. McLean,
Gillaspie v. Kelley, 41 Ind. 158, 13 57 Wis. 258; Eichelberger v. Old
Am. Rep. 318; Emmons v. Meeker, National Bank, 103 Ind. 401; Spitler
55 Ind. 321; Hepler v. Mt. Carmel v. James, 32 Ind. 202; Emmons v.
Savings Bank, 97 Pa. St. 420, 39 Am. Meeker, 55 Ind. 321.
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of the, paper permits it to pass into the hands of persons thus ap-
parently empowered to perfect it, he ought not to be permitted to
deny the authority of such person if the transferee receives it without
notice of the facts. The principal should not by his acts, or silence,
or negligence, be permitted thus to mislead an innocent person so
as to cause injury to such person, but rather should be compelled
to bear the loss himself.^* And whether a person was expressly con-
stituted an agent for the purpose of filling blanks in such paper or
not is immaterial; the party to whom the instrument is delivered
in blank, though a payee, indorsee or other taker thereof, becomes,
ipso facto, the agent of the maker, indorser, etc., and has implied au-
thority for that purpose.^^ The presumption of agency does not
apply, however, to a case in which the agent or party intrusted with
the instrument has made alterations not contemplated and not needed
to make a complete instrument,—as, by raising the sum named to a
higher one,—although the alteration does not appear on the face of
the instrument. In such case the alteration is considered a forgery,^**
and not a mere completion of an imperfect paper, as it would be if
the amount or date had been left blank, with authority, express or
implied, to fill it up, and it had been accordingly filled up.^' The
right to fill up blanks in negotiable paper may be exercised not only
by the first holder of the paper, but by any transferee, who is, in law,
regarded as an agent for that purpose. ^^
§ 59. What authority implied—Material alteration of instru-
ment.—Even when there is a clear departure from the specified
authority of filling such blanks, still, if the matter inserted is no
"Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa. St. chanics', etc., Bank v. Schuyler, 7
82, 5 Am. Rep. 412; Blakey v. Cow. (N. Y.) 337; White v. Duggan,
Johnson, 13 Bush (Ky.) 197; Red- 140 Mass. 18, 54 Am. Rep. 437; Boyd
lich V. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234. v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 93;
^^Vlolett v. Fatten, 5 Cranch (U. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. (U.
S.) 142; Gibbs v. Frost, 4 Ala. 720; S.) 343; Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal,
Bridgeport Bank v. New York, etc., 22 How. (U. S.) 96.
R. Co., 30 Conn. 231; White v. Al- ^'Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich,
ward, 35 111. App. 195; Quinn v. 427, 7 Am. Rep. 661; Luellen v.
Brown, 71 Iowa 376; Abbott v. Rose, Hare, 32 Ind. 211. See also, cases
62 Me. 194, 16 Am. Rep. 427; Appeal cited in notes 12 and 13, supra.
of Bechtel, 133 Pa. St. 367; Marshall i" Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 194;
V. Drescher, 68 Ind. 359; Gary v. Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427, 7
State, 11 Tex. App. 527; Norwich Am. Rep. 661; Luellen v. Hare, 32
Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; Fuller- Ind. 211.
ton V. Sturgis. 4 Ohio St. 529; Hoi- ''Page v. Morrell, 33 How. Pr.
land V. Hatch, 15 Ohio St. 464; Me- (N. Y.) 244.
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more than is apparently called for to make the paper complete, it
will be protected in the hands of an innocent transferee. Thus, where
a paper was on its face non-negotiable, and it was expressly agreed
that it should not be made negotiable, but the indorsee inserted a
provision in a blank space which made it payable in cash, and thus
negotiable, and then transferred it, the court held that the transferee
could recover.^^ And where the name of the payee is left blank, and
the paper thus delivered and sent into the world, such delivery im-
plies authority to fill up the blank with the name of any bona fide
payee.-*^ It is otherwise, however, if the paper is complete upon its
face, and an insertion is made wliicli changes the terms or the relations
of the parties. In such case, although the alteration may not be
apparent on the face of the paper, yet the authority exercised can not
be implied, and the alteration will be considered as unauthorized.^^
And where the words "or his order" were inserted in a promissory
note, in the space after the name of the payee, the note was thereby
rendered invalid in the hands of an innocent holder, although the
instrument was on its face free from suspicion, the note being already
complete without the w^ords of negotiability.^-
§ 60, Filling blanks in sealed instruments.—As to deeds or in-
struments required to be under seal at common law, there is still great
diversity of opinion among the courts as to whether authority to fill
blanks therein may be validly conferred by parol, when it is to be
done in the absence of the principal. According to some courts, in
jurisdictions where the common-law distinction between specialty con-
tracts and simple contracts is still observed, the authority to fill up
the blanks with material provisions in an instrument of such solemnity
"Spitler v. James, 32 Ind. 202; void: Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich.
Gillaspie v. Kelley, 41 Ind. 158; 427.
Orick v. Colston, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 189. "Bruce v. Westcott, 3 Barb. (N.
-" Armstrong v. Harshman, 61 Ind. Y.) 375; Blacknall v. Parish, 59 N.
52; Brummel v. Enders, 18 Gratt. C. 70, 78 Am. Dec. 239; Simms v.
(Va.) 873; Cruchley v. Clarance, 2 Hervey, 19 Iowa 273. And where
Mau. & Sel. 90; Close v. Fields, 2 the drawer of a check intrusted an
Tex. 232; Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md. agent with its delivery to the payee.
118; Townsend v. France, 2 Houst. and the agent forged an indorse-
(Del.) 441. ment of the check and collected the
" De Pauw v. Bank of Salem, 126 money from the bank, it was held
Ind. 553. Even the insertion of the that the drawer was not bound by
words "10 per cent." in a blank the indorsement and could recover
space in a note, after "interest at," the money from the bank: German
has been held to render the note Savings Bank v. Citizens' National
Bank, 101 Iowa 530, 63 Am. St. 399.
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as is required in a deed can only be conferred by power of attorney
nnder seal ; and parol authority is, therefore, insufficient for the pur-
pose, unless the instrument be redelivered after the blank has been
filled.-^ On the other hand, it has long been held, even in
jurisdictions where the common law governs as to the subject, that
the filling up of a blank in a sealed instrument necessary to make such
instrument perfect, will not vitiate it, if authorized by parol.^^ In
some jurisdictions, in which the use of seals has been abrogated by
statutes, it is held that, by reason of such abrogation, authority to fill
blanks in deeds, mortgages and other instruments, such as were for-
merly required to be under seal, may rest in parol.-^ The tendency
of modern decisions generally is to disregard the technical require-
ments based upon the common law, in this respect, and to hold that
parol authority is sufficient to authorize the filling of a blank in a
deed, mortgage, and other instruments of that character.-*^ And it is
-^Davidson v. Cooper, 11 M. & W.
778; Hibblewhite v. M'Morine, 6
M. & W. 200; Burns v. Lynde, 6
Allen (Mass.) 305; Gilbert v. An-
thony, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 69, 24 Am.
Dec. 439; Byers v. McClanahan, 6
Gill & J. (Md.) 250; Ayres v. Pro-
basco, 14 Kan. 175; Preston v. Hull,
23 Gratt. (Va.) 600, 14 Am. Rep.
153; Ingram v. Little, 14 Ga. 173, 58
Am. Dec. 549; Upton v. Archer, 41
Cal. 85; Williams v. Crutcher, 5
How. (Miss.) 71, 35 Am. Dec. 422;
Cross v. State Bank, 5 Ark. 525;
Graham v. Holt, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 300;
Moseby v. State, 4 Sneed (Tenn.)
324. In Schintz v. McManamy, 33
Wis. 299, the court held that while
the agent might be authorized by
parol to insert the name of a speci-
fied grantee, he could not, under
such authority, insert the name of
another grantee.
-* South Berwick v. Huntress, 53
Me. 89, 87 Am. Dec. 535; Boardman
V. Gore, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 517, 18 Am.
Dec. 73.
" Swartz V. Ballou, 47 Iowa 188,
29 Am. Rep. 470; Threadgill v. But-
ler, 60 Tex. 599; Lockwood v. Bas-
sett, 49 Mich. 546; McClain v. Mc-
Clain, 52 Iowa 272; Barton v. Gray,
57 Mich. 622.
=^Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. (U. S.)
24; State v. Young, 23 Minn. 551;
South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me.
89, 87 Am. Dec. 535; Commercial
Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wend. (N. Y.)
348, 34 Am. Dec. 317; Bartlett v.
Board of Education, 59 111. 364;
Dunn V. Commercial Bank, 11 Barb.
(N. Y.) 580; Whiting v. Daniel, 1
Hen. & M. (Va.) 391; Beery v. Ho-
man's Com., 8 Gratt. (Va.) 48; Sig-
fried v. Levan, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 308;
Collins V. Welsh, 7 Mart. (La.) 402;
Swartz V. Ballou, 47 Iowa 188, 29
Am. Rep. 470; Phelps v. Sullivan,
140 Mass. 36, 54 Am. Rep. 442; Van
Etta V. Evenson, 28 Wis. 33, 9 Am.
Rep. 486; Field v. Stagg, 52 Mo. 534,
14 Am. Rep. 435; Duncan v. Hodges,
4 McCord (S. C.) 239, 17 Am. Dec.
734; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Ore. 211, 28
Am. St. 746; Owen v. Perry, 25 Iowa
412, 96 Am. Dec. 49; . Bridgeport
Bank v. New York, etc., R. Co., 30
Conn. 274; Wiley v. Moor, 17 S. & R.
(Pa.) 438, 17 Am. Dec. 696; Stahl
V. Berger, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 170, 13
Am. Dec. 666, and note, pp. 669-671;
Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55;
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to be observed that courts whieli hold that the authority to fill blank
spaces in sealed instruments can not be shown by parol, and those in
which it is held that it may Be so shown, frequently agree that at all
events the principal may estop himself by his acts in delivering sealed
instruments, containing blank spaces, to his agent, with authorit}' to
fill the blanks, if, when so filled, the document is received in good
faith by an innocent grantee or obligee. This is according to the
well-known maxim of law that "when one of two innocent persons
must suffer by the acts of a third, he by whose negligence it happened
must be the sufferer.''^^
§ 61. What are "blanks"—What may be filled in—Ratification of
act previously unauthorized.—It is a question of importance, fre-
quently, just what insertions may be regarded as "blanks" so as to be
authorized under the holdings of the cases that recognize the suffi-
ciency of parol authority. It is certain, we think, that if the instru-
ment is wanting in everything but the signature and seal of the
grantor or obligor, or does not contain the substantial parts, or at
least a sufficient portion of the contract to be expressive of the in-
tention, the writing has no validity and can acquire none by the filling
in of the missing parts, at least without a redeliver}'.^* The blank
spaces for the filling up of which parol authority has been held suffi-
cient must be such as leave the instrument merely incomplete in
some minor parts. Thus, it is held that a note and mortgage in each
of which is left a blank for the name of the payee and mortgagee,
Richmond Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 7 188, 29 Am. Rep. 470; South Ber-
Blackf. (Ind.) 412; Bell v. Kennedy, wick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89. 87 Am.
100 Pa. St. 215; Allen v. Withrow, Dec. 535; Tisher v. Beckwith, 30
110 U. S. 119; McClung v. Steen, 32 Wis. 55; Jewell v. Rock River Paper
Fed. 373; McNab v. Young, 81 111. Co., 101 111. 57; McNab v. Young. 81
11; Farmers' Bank v. Worthington, 111. 11; Pence v. Arbuckle, 22 Minn.
145 Mo. 91, 46 S. W. 745; Threadgill 417.
V. Butler, 60 Tex. 599; Schintz v. "'Gilbert v. Anthony, 1 Yerg.
McManamy, 33 Wis. 299; Campbell (Tenn.) 69, 24 Am. Dec. 439; Linds-
V. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26. But see ley v. Lamb, 34 Mich. 509; Simms v.
contra. Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85. Hervey, 19 Iowa 273; Ayres v. Har-
='Dolbeer v. Livingston. 100 Cal. ness, 1 Ohio 368, 13 Am. Dec. 629;
617; Reed v. Morton, 24 Neb. 760, 8 Ayres v. Probasco, 14 Kan. 175;
Am. St. 247; Phelps v. Sullivan, 140 Duncan v. Hodges, 4 McCord (S. C.)
Mass. 36, 54 Am. Rep. 442; Camp- 239. 17 Am. Dec. 734. See note to
bell V. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26, 27 Am. Woodworth v. Bank of America, 10
Rep. 5; Swartz v. Ballou, 47 Iowa Am. Dec. 271.
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and which are deliverod to an agent to enable him to borrow money
thereon, may be validly filled up with the name of such payee and
mortgagee, when the money is obtained, by an agent authorized by
parol authority for that purpose, without a new execution and de-
livery.-" And where a deed duly signed and acknowledged by the
grantor was delivered to an agent for the purpose of negotiating a
sale of the land therein described, and of delivering the deed in pur-
suance of such a sale, it was held that if the name of the grantee
and the amount of the consideration were by the agent inserted in the
blank spaces left for that purpose, the agent was held presumptively
to have authority to fill such blanks when the deed was delivered to
a third party who had no kno\^ledge of the circumstances.^"
So, also, where a deed was thus executed and acknowledged with a
blank left therein for the grantee, the court held that parol authority
might validly be given an agent by the grantor to fill the blank with
the name of the grantee, and a subsequent delivery of the deed by
such agent would make the conveyance a valid one.^^ In South
Berwick v. Huntress,^"^ the court ruled that ,a party executing a bond
in blank as to the penal sum, and delivering it to another, must be
held as agreeing that the blank may be filled after he has executed it.
The court, in discussing the old rule that such authority could not
be given by parol, said: "But the rule has never been universally
accepted in this country; and however the holding of some courts
may be, still the better opinion and the pervading current of author-
ity is that when a deed is regularly executed in other respects, with
a blank left therein for the name of the grantee, parol authority is
sufficient to authorize the insertion of the name of such grantee, and
that when so filled out and delivered, it is a valid deed." And fur-
ther: "The rule was purely technical, and the outgrowth of a state
of affairs and condition of the law which does not now exist. The
reason of the law is the life of it, and when the reason fails, the law
itself should fail. At the present day the distinctions between sealed
and unsealed instruments are fast disappearing, and the courts are
gradually doing away with them. As Judge Eedfield said : 'But it
[the rule] seems to be rather technical than substantial, and to found
=*Van Etta v. Evenson, 28 Wis. 33, ^^ Cribben v. Deal, 21 Ore. 211, 28
9 Am. Rep. 486. Am. St. 746.
"' Owen V. Perry, 25 Iowa 412, 96 ^ 53 Me. 89, 87 Am. Dec. 535.
Am. Dec. 49.
4:
—
Principal and Agent.
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itself either on the policy of the stamp duties or the superior force
and sacredness of contracts by deed, both of which have little impor-
tance in this country. And the prevailing current of American au-
thority, and the practical instincts and business experience and sense
of our people are undoubtedly otherwise.' " But if an agent to whom
is intrusted the filling in of the name of a specified grantee and the de-
livery of the deed to him inserts the name of another grantee and de-
livers the deed to him at the rec^uest of the first grantee, the deed so
delivered is invalid, although it would have been sufficient if the party
thus receiving it had been ignorant of the facts.^^ Where a surety
signed a bond to be delivered as security for a charter party, with the
names of the steamer and managing owner left blank, it was held by
the supreme court of California that the bond was not void in the
hands of an innocent party because the principal had, before the
delivery of the bond, filled in the blank spaces with the names of
such steamer and managing owner.^^^ The same ruling was made
by the Alabama supreme court with regard to the filling of a blank
With the name of the obligee of a bond.^* It remains to be said that in
all cases where parol authority is by the law of a particular jurisdic-
tion regarded as insufficient to render valid the act of the agent
or person who filled the blank, such act is always capable of being
fully ratified by parol.^^ What will be deemed a sufficient rati-
fication of such an act must, of course, be determined by the law of the
jurisdiction in wdiich the c[uestion arises. However, in those jurisdic-
^^Schintz v. McManamy, 33 Wis. 24 Neb. 760, 1 L. R. A. 736. But
299; State v. Matthews, 44 Kan. 596, the contrary was held in DeArguello
10 L. R. A. 308. v. Bours, 67 Cal. 447: and in State v.
''a Dolbeer v. Livingston, 100 Cal. Matthews. 44 Kan. 596, 10 L. R. A.
617. 308. In the case last cited the
=' Boardman v. Gore, 1 Stew, grantee had knowledge of the facts.
(Ala.) 517. For other cases in ^Emerson v. 0pp. 9 Ind. App.
which the courts follow the rule 581; Pelton v. Prescott, 13 Iowa
that parol authority, express or im- 567; Bell v. Mahin, 69 Iowa 408;
plied, is sufficient to authorize the Conable v. Smith, 61 Hun (N. Y.)
insertion of the name of the grantee 185, 15 N. Y. Supp. 924; Woodbury
in a deed in which a blank space v. Allegheny, etc., R. Co., 72 Fed.
has been left for that purpose, and 371; Reed v. Morton, 24 Neb. 760, 8
that this may be done by an agent Am. St. 247, 1 L. R. A. 736; Stanley
or by the grantee himself, see v. Epperson, 45 Tex. 644; Montgom-
Swartz v. Ballou, 47 Iowa 188, 29 ery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 24
Am. Rep. 470; McCleery v. Wake- Am. St. 832, 12 L. R. A. 140.
field, 76 Iowa 529; Reed v. Morton,
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tions in which parol authority in the first instance is held insufficient,
a parol ratification is considered as equally insufficient.
§ 62. The consideration,—Like every other contract, that of the
appointment of an agent must be based upon a favorable consideration,
for otherwise the agreement is nudum pactum and void.^^ It is not
necessary, any more than it is in other contracts, that the considera-
, tion should consist of any specified sum of money or article of value
;
but it may, as in other contracts, consist of a mere promise for an act
performed or to be performed. Thus, if the principal employ the
agent for a remuneration stipulated in the contract, to be paid upon
the performance of the act or acts, it will be sufficient. The re-
muneration is called the agent's compensation, and consists generally
of a sum of money or salary to be paid when the act or acts have been
performed in whole or in part. It is not necessary, however, that the
promise to pay compensation should be express.^^ Thus, if the prin-
cipal employ the agent to do the service for him under circumstances
warranting an implication of an intention to pay, the inference would
be that the principal would pay what the services were reasonably
worth. 'Not is it essential that the promise for compensation should
be stipulated for any definite period of time or any definite amount.
It may be a sum in gross for the particular services to be rendered,
or it may be a commission on a certain amount of money to be realized
on the transaction by the principal; or, as before stated, there may
be no stipulated compensation whatever, but it may be left to be
shown what the value of it is, in the settlement between the parties,
or in the litigation, if such should follow. If there should be an
express agreement as to the amount of compensation, it will, of
course, control. ^^
§ 63. Gratuitous agency—Gratuitous promise not enforceable.—
The circumstances, however, may be such as to leave the inference
that no compensation is expected or is to be paid. Thus, if a person
volunteers to do an act for another, when he is under no obligation
to do so, and fails to do it, no compensation can be collected, as in
such case it is apparent that none is expected. Thus, where an
architect volunteered his services to furnish drawings for a building
under circumstances showing that they were to be furnished for the
^Balfe v. West, 13 C. B. 466; P. 139; Law v. Connecticut, etc., R.
Elsee V. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143; Co., 46 N. H. 284.
Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 84. =*' Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. St. 184.
^'Mansell v. Clements, L. R. 9 C.
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chances of receiving future employment, no recovery could be had
for the services of making such drawings.^" Nor could the principal
in such case recover damages for the failure to perform, if the services
so volunteered were not rendered. But if the services are performed,
in whole or in part, the agent may render himself liable for damages
on account of any negligence in the performance.*'' And, of course,
he would be bound to account to the principal for all the receipts
on account of the agency." Whether the services are regarded as
gratuitous or not must depend on the particular circumstances of the
case. Ordinarily, if one man labors for another, or renders him
services in his business, from which the latter derives a benefit, and
the one who receives the services stands by and sees what is done
without making objection, he is estopped to deny that the services
were rendered at his request.*^ But the master or principal is bound
to pay only when it is his duty to pay, and whether it is his duty or not
is a question for the determination of the court and jury.*^ A con-
tract of this character, whether express or implied, must be based upon
a sufficient consideration. Thus, where one person agrees to build
or repair a house for another by a certain time, nothing being stated
as to the consideration, and he fails to do it, he can not be made re-
sponsible in damages.** In the case just cited it was said by Lord
Kenyon: "No consideration results from his [the contractor's] situ-
ation as a carpenter, nor from the undertaking is he bound to perform
all the work that is tendered to him, and therefore the amount of this
is that the defendant has merely told a falsehood, and has not per-
formed his promise ; but for his non-performance of it no action can be
supported." But if in that or a similar case the contractor had built
the house unskillfully, an action would lie against him ; for when once
he enters upon the performance of his employment, he must perform
in the manner proposed.*^
§ 64. Voluntary and gratuitous services—Presumption of gratu-
ity—Members of same family.—Where there is an express appoint-
ment, and the consideration is stipulated in the agreement, there can
^=' Scott v. Maier, 56 Mich. 554. « Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall. (U.
*'Tliorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) S.) 123.
84; Passano v. Acosta, 4 La. Ann. " Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143.
28, 23 Am. Dec. 470. "^Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.;*
"Spencer v. Towles, 18 Mich. 9. 84. See also. Salem Bank v. Glou-
^ Trustees of Farmington Acad- cester Bank, 17 Mass. 1.
emy v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172; Guild
v. Guild, 15 Pick, (Mass.) 129.
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be no difficulty in determining what the sum is to be, or whether there
is in fact a consideration at all upon which the appointment is found-
ed. And when the circumstances of the appointment are such in
themselves as to raise a presumption of a promise to pay for the
services, the appointment can not be said to be without consideration,
but the same will be inferred from such circumstances. This is the
case of a ^Mflsi-contract. The mere fact, however, that services have
been rendered by the agent for the principal will not of itself raise
a presumption that compensation is to be paid for the same. As was
well said in the case of ChadwicJc v. Knox:^^ "It is settled that no
man can do another an unsolicited kindness, and make it a matter of
claim against him; and it makes no difference whether the act was
done from mere good will or in the expectation of compensation.
Unless the party benefited has done some act from which his assent
to pay for the services may be fairly inferred, he is not bound to pay."
And "if a man humanely bestows his labor and even risks his life, in
voluntarily aiding to preserve his neighbor's house from destruction by
fire, the law considers the services rendered as gratuitous, and it there-
fore forms no ground of action."*''^ Of course, the fact that the agent
or employe is not entitled to recover compensation in an action by him
against the principal may not always be conclusive evidence that
the agency was gratuitous in the sense of being without consideration,
and void. But as a general rule this fact will be a criterion, and the
agency will be considered gratuitous in such cases; so that the prin-
cipal can not insist upon a performance unless the circumstances indi-
cate a different intention. There are some cases, indeed, in which it is
held that there must be an express promise to pay a compensation
before it will be presumed that any was intended; as, in dealings be-
tween relatives or members of the same family. These are cases in
which it is held that the law presumes that the performance of the
service was prompted by motives of affection, or other considerations
than those of a pecuniary nature ; and to rebut this presumption there
must be some clear proof of an express promise or agreement to pay
for the service rendered.^^ Only enough need be proved, however,
«31 N. H. 226, 64 Am. Dec. 329. lone, 62 Iowa 208; Hall v. Finch, 29
"' Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Wis. 278, 1 Am. Rep. 559.
Johns. (N. Y.) 28, 17 Am. Dec. 237. ^' Murdock v. Murdock, 7 Cal. 511
See also. Seals v. Edmondson, 73 Friermuth v. Friermuth, 46 Cal. 42
Ala. 295, 49 Am. Rep. 51; Tascott v. Keegan v. Malone, 62 Iowa 208
Grace, 12 111. App. 639; Lange v. Brown's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 18
Kaiser, 34 Mich. 317; Doane v. Morris v. Barnes, 35 Mo. 412; Price
Badger, 12 Mass. 65; Keegan v. Ma- v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543.
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to show that there was to be compensation, and that the services were
not to be gratuitous or without other compensation than that which
a member of the family usually received ; as, board, clothing, school-
ing, etc. And so, where there was a promise that if a young girl
would live with and render service for a childless couple, they would
make her their heir, and, at their death or the death of the survivor,
would will her their entire estate, and the girl, in pursuance of such
arrangement, carried out her part of the agreement,—although no
action would lie for damages for the breach of such contract, it would
nevertheless be sufficient to rebut the presumption that the services
were to be gratuitously performed; and it was held that she was
entitled to recover the value of her services, even though the contract
itself could not be literally performed.*^ According to these latter
authorities, therefore, an express promise need not be proved to rebut
the presumptions of gratuity: such promise may be inferred from
the circumstances.
§ 65. The legality of the subject-matter of the agency—Contracts
in violation of positive law—In violation of public policy—What
contracts are illegal.—As pointed out in a previous chapter, the
agency must be for a lawful purpose. In this respect a contract of
agency stands upon the same footing as a contract for any other pur-
pose. All contracts based upon an illegal consideration, or having
for their object the accomplishment of some illegal purpose, are void
and can not be enforced. A contract may be illegal Ijecause: (1)
it is in violation of some positive law; (2) it is contrary to public
morals; or (3) it is in violation of public policy. A contract of the
first class, as applied to the doctrine of agency, would be where a per-
son employs an agent or servant to commit an assault and battery,
or a theft, robbery, arson or other offense ; and it is immaterial whether
it be malum prohibitum or malum in se.^^ It is not essential, how-
ever, that some public statute be violated or that there should be an
*»Taggart v. Tevanny, 1 Ind. App. Friend v. Porter. 50 Mo. App. 89;
339; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522; Penn v. Bornman, 102 111. 523; In-
Jessup v. Jessup, 17 Ind. App. 177; gersoll v. Randall, 14 Minn. 400;
Wood Master and Serv., § 72. Seneca Co. Bank v. Lamb. 26 Barb.
'"See Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas (N. Y.) 595; Lindsay v. Rottaken. 32
Co., 130 U. S. 396; Gardner v. Ta- Ark. 619; Snoddy v. Bank, 88 Tenn.
turn, 81 Cal. 370; Cooper v. Grif- 573; Reynolds v. Nichols, 12 Iowa
fin, 13 Ind. App. 212; Clay v. Clay's 398; Steele v. Curie. 4 Dana (Ky.)
Heirs, 35 Tex. 509; Puckett v. Alex- 381; Bensley v. Bignold. 5 B. & Aid.
ander, 102 N. C. 95; Holt v. Green. 335, 7 E. C. L. 121; Watts v. Brooks,
73 Pa. St. 198, 13 Am. Rep. 737; 3 Ves. Jr. 612.
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indictable offense, in order to render such contract void. It would be
sufficient if the employment contemplated the perpetration of an act
amounting to a civil injury or the commission of a fraud upon some
third person, or some act of corruption having an evil tendency.^^
Cases of the character last mentioned, however, would fall more
appropriately within the third class above enumerated, as being con-
trary to public jDolicy. Indeed, it may be truly said that all such
contracts, in whatever class we may place them, whether they be in
violation of public law, or contrary to public morality, or whether by
reason of their natural evil tendency in general they be injurious to
the public welfare, are condemned by the courts as being "against
public policy ;" although it is true that some courts have not hesitated
to disapprove, as loeing "judicial legislation," the authority assumed
by judicial tribunals to declare any contract illegal for reasons of
public policy, unless it is in plain violation of some positive law.^-
But the great weight of authority, in this country at least, is to the
effect that when the upholding of such contracts would undoubtedly
tend to result in public injury they will be held illegal and void.°^
If, however, the contract has the positive approval of the legislature
by some statutory enactment not unconstitutional, the courts can not
declare it illegal as being against public policy ; for the policy of the
government may be declared in such instances by its legislative
branch, and the judicial branch has no power then to interfere with
it.^^
^'Ray v. Mackin, 100 111. 246; ^^ Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa
Bennett v. Tiernay, 78 Ky. 580; 487; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Den. (N. Y.)
Knight v. Linzey, 80 Mich. 396; Ad- 434, 49 Am. Dec. 282; McNamara v.
ams V. Outhouse, 45 N. Y. 318; Piatt Gargett, 68 Mich. 454; Elkhart
V. St. Clair, 6 Ohio 227; Buchtella v. County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238;
Stepanek, 53 Kan. 373; Moody v. Stropes v. Board of Com'rs, 72 Ind.
Newmark, 121 Cal. 446; Marcy v. 42; Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 137
Crawford, 16 Conn. 549; Gray v. Ind. 655; Teal v. Walker, 100 U. S.
McReynolds, 65 Iowa 461; St. Mary's 242; Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y.
Benev. Ass'n v. Lynch, 64 N. H. 213; 147; Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N.
Harrington v. Victoria Graving Y. 348; Davis v. Commonwealth, 164
Dock Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 549, Mass. 241; Curran v. Galen, 152 N.
Although the act or contract is not Y. 33; Edwards v. Randle, 63 Ark.
declared void in terms, yet where 318; Richardson v. Scott's Bluff
a penalty is prescribed for doing it, County, 59 Neb. 400.
this is sufficient to render it illegal: "U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Milton V. Haden, 32 Ala. 30; Ass'n. 106 U. S. 290; Davis v. Com-
Wheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 258. monwealth. 164 Mass. 241; Enders
^'^ Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. v. Enders, 164 Pa. St. 266; Lyman
229, 9 E. C. L. 391. v. Townsend, 24 La. Ann. 625.
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§ 66. The effect of illegality upon the contract—When money
illegally paid may be recovered.—Whether a particular contract is
in violation of public policy or not is always a question of law for
the decision of the court, if the facts are undisputed.^^ If the con-
tract belongs to a class prohibited by law, as being in violation of
public policy, the courts will not hesitate to declare it illegal, because
in the particular instance no actual harm or injury would result if
the law were upheld. In such cases it is the evil tendency rather
than the actual result that forms the test.^'' If, however, the act to
be performed is capable of being done in a lawful manner, the fact
that one of the parties to the contract violated the law in its perform-
ance will not of necessity render the contract illegal, but the breach
of the law may be made the subject of an action.^^ If the act or acts
to be performed are of a character necessarily involving turpitude,
the contract of appointment can not become the basis for a suit by
one of the contracting parties against the other.^® If, in the case
of a contract of agency, the agent is apprized of the turpitude of the
purpose, as when the act is on its face immoral or unlawful, he can
not recover compensation or otherwise enforce the contract against
the principal. If, however, the act is on its face not unlawful, and
the turpitude depends upon extrinsic facts of which the agent is
ignorant, he can not be charged with the turpitude, and as to him
the purpose of the agency can not be said to be illegal.^* "And this
doctrine not only applies to suits founded upon matters of account
or receipts of money or non-fulfillment of contracts by the agent in
'^ Smith v. DuBose, 78 Ga. 413, 6 ^' Thus, a woman can not recover
Am. St. 260; Tallis v. Tallis, 72 E. for services performed for a man
C. L. 391. with whom she lived as his mis-
'" Brown v. First Nat'I Bank, 137 tress : Walraven v. Jones, 1 Houst.
Ind. 655; Elkhart County Lodge v. (Del.) 355; McDonald v. Fleming, 12
Crary, 98 Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep. 746; B. Mon. (Ky.) 285. But the woman
Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. may nevertheless recover, in such
348; Drexler v. Tyrrell, 15 Nev. 114; case, for work and labor done for
Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. the man under an express contract:
(Pa.) 315, 40 Am. Dec. 519; Mills v. Rhodes v. Stone. 63 Hun (N. Y.)
Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Fireman's 624, 17 N. Y. Supp. 561. And past
Charitable Ass'n v. Bei'ghaus, 13 La. illicit cohabitation may form a valid
Ann. 209; Richardson v. Scott's consideration for a deed where the
Bluff County. 59 Neb. 400. grantee is in possession under the
" Pape v. Wright, 116 Ind. 502; deed: Bivins v. Jarnigan, 50 Tenn.
Jones V. Davidson, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 282.
447; McDearmott v. Sedgewick, 140 ''Wharton Ag., §§ 25, 26.
Mo. 172.
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the course of such illegal transactions or flowing therefrom, but it
applies equally to the recovery back of the property which has been
intrusted to him when it has been actually employed in such illegal,
fraudulent or immoral purposes. Thus, if goods are intrusted to
an agent to be smuggled into a countr}', and sold there against its
laws, the principal will be equally disabled to maintain a suit against
the agent in the courts of that countrj^ for the goods themselves, as
he will be to maintain a suit for the proceeds of the goods if sold.
The rule in all such cases is, 'Melior est conditio possidentis.' "^^
Not only is the appointment for such illegal purposes void, but the
act itself when performed, being illegal, can not form the basis for
an action thereon. In such cases the law does not so much consider
the individual interests of the parties concerned as the effect which
such transaction would have upon the public. It leaves the parties
in the exact position in which they have placed themselves, and the
courts will not lend their aid to extricate them from the situation
in which they have thus been placed by their own conduct. Thus,
it was said by Devens, J., in a Massachusetts case: "Xo one can be
permitted to found rights upon his wrong, even against another also
wrong. A promise made to one in consideration of doing an unlaw-
ful act, as to commit an assault or to practice a fraud upon a third
person, is void in law; and the law will not only avoid contracts the
avowed purpose or express object of which is to do an unlawful act,
but those made with a view to place, or the necessary effect of which
is to place, a person under wrong influences, and offer him a tempta-
tion which may injuriously affect the rights of third persons. Xor
is it necessary to show that injury to a third person has actually re-
sulted from such contracts, for in many cases where it had occurred
it would be impossible to be proved. The contract is avoided on
account of its necessarily injurious tendency.""^ And in a somewhat
noted English case the court of common pleas, by Chief Justice Wil-
mot, decided that a contract by which it is attempted to delegate
illegal authority is void by the common law; and the reason why the
common law says such contracts are void is for the public good. '"'You
shall not stipulate for iniquity. All writers upon our law agree
in this:—no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice.
Whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he hath once paid the
money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, he shall not have
^ Story Ag., § 235. "' Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18
Am. Rep. 459.
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the help of a court to fetch it back again. You shall not have a
right of action when you come into a court of justice in this unclean
manner to recover it Ijack."*'^
§ 67. Immoral contracts not enforced on either side.—If a con-
tract be immoral or illegal, as between the parties to it, at least, it is
void and can not be enforced. While it seems inconsistent with hon-
esty and fair dealing to permit a defendant to set up his own wrong,
it is now generally allowed in such cases for defendant to plead the
illegality. The law does not come to the defendant's relief for his
sake, but for the sake of public justice and sound policy, the prin-
ciple of which is that no court will lend its aid to a man who founds
his course of acting upon an immoral or illegal act. If the parties
were to change sides the result would be the same. The courts will
not assist either of them.*'^
§ 68. Dealings in "futures," "margins," etc.—Wagering contracts
—Agent in pari delicto can not be compelled to account.—It is well
settled by the authorities that a contract for the sale of goods to be
delivered in the future is valid, although the seller has not the goods
at the time of such contract and has to go into the market to procure
them, provided it is the bona fide intention of "the parties that the
goods be actually delivered and paid for. But if such contract be
made with a view of speculating in the rise and fall of prices, and
there is no intention to deliver the goods, but one party is to pay the
other the difference between the contract price and the market price
of the goods at the date fixed for executing the contract, the whole
transaction is nothing more than a wager, and is null and void.®*
Such a contract being void on the ground of public policy, it follows
that an agency created for the purpose of dealing in such "futures,"
—
as, the purchase and sale of "margins," that is, speculating in the rise
and fall of such articles as grain without any intention of an actual
delivery of the goods,—is likewise void. Hence, a broker who is privy
to the unlawful design of the parties as to the nature of the transac-
tion is particeps criminis, especially if he brings them together for
the very purpose of entering into such an illegal agreement, and can
not recover for his services. But unless it be shown that the broker
had knowledge of such unlawful design on the part of the principal
"- Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341, "* Benjamin Sales, §§ 541, 542, and
1 Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.) 646. notes to 7th Am. ed.. by Bennett;
«'=' Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499.
77, 78.
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at the time of the negotiations, he may recover his compensation; as,
for money advanced by one of the parties at his request. In such a
case, the suit' not being on the illegal contract itself, the parties are
not in the same position as they would be if the suit were on such
contract.*'^ As a general rule, all wagering contracts are held void
by the courts of this country, even at common law, though in England
they are not considered illegal.*"' Such contracts as have for
their object the purchase and sale of "margins" or "options" are
gambling contracts, and can not be enforced in law, nor can dam-
ages be recovered for their breach ; and no action will lie by an agent
to recover for his services if he was a party to the transaction or had
knowledge of the unlawful design of such contract."'' The applica-
tion of the rule to the law of agency is well recognized. If I employ
an agent to assist me in gambling transactions, such as speculating
in "futures," and the agent succeeds in making profits out of the
transaction, which, if realized in a legitimate enterprise, would be-
long to me, and for which the agent would then be legally bound to
account to me,—if the agent is tainted with the vice of the transac-
tion from the beginning, standing with me in pari delicto, and doing
the business in his own name, the whole transaction is illegal ; and I
can not compel the agent to render an account to me of my share of
the business any more than he could force me to account to him for
commissions or other compensation,—to which he might be entitled
were the transaction legitimate. Nor would the courts in such
cases compel the agent to perform the unlawful act or acts forming
the subject-matter of the agency, or mulct him in damages, any more
than they would hold the principal liable in damages for a breach
of the contract of agency. In such cases the party sued always has
"^Roundtree v. Smith, 108 U. S. Rumsey v. Berry, 65 Me. 570;
269. Yerkes v. Saloman, 11 Hun (N. Y.)
"'Thacker v. Hardy, L. R. 4 Q. B. 471; Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass.
D. 685. But, even in that country, 145; Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Pa.
such contracts have been declared St. 155; Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J.
illegal by the statutes of 8 and 9 Eq. 219, 48 Am. Rep. 308; Plank v.
Vict., ch. 109, § 18. Jackson, 128 Ind. 424; Bishop v.
®' See Barnard v. Backhaus, 52 Palmer, 146 Mass. 469; Gibbs v. Con-
Wis. 593; Gregory v. Wendell, 39 solidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396
Mich. 337; Stewart v. Schall, 65 Md. Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336
299, 57 Am. Rep. 327; Bigelow v. Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71
Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202; Whitesides Davis v. Davis, 119 Ind. 511; State
V. Hunt, 97 Ind. 191, 49 Am. Rep. v. Tumey, 81 Ind. 559.
441; Wolcott V. Heath, 78 111. 433;
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the advantage; for the machinery of the law will never be set in
motion to redress an alleged wrong -based upon so rotten a founda-
tion. The law does not regard one of the parties as being in any
better situation than the other, and it will only look to the good of
the public.*^^ In such eases there is really no agency in contempla-
tion of law, as there can be no such thing as an agency in the per-
petration of crimes or unlawful acts, all persons engaged therein
being regarded as principals.^®
§ 69. When agent must account.—It is not to be understood, how-
ever, that the agent may in all cases involving wagering transactions
shield himself from responsibility to the principal for the proceeds
or profits received by him, on account of the illegality of the contract
out of which said profits or proceeds were derived. Thus, if two
parties should enter into a wagering contract, and one of the parties
should pay the wager to his agent to be delivered to the other party
to such wagering contract, the party for whose benefit the agent re-
ceived the money could recover from the agent in an action against
him. Or, if there has been an honest endeavor to comply with the
law, but by mere unintentional omission, and without moral turpitude,
the transaction is rendered illegal, and as a result of the transaction
money belonging to the principal comes into the hands of the agent,
the former may recover it ; because to require the agent to account for
the money would not in such a case be sanctioning the original illegal
transaction, and it would be unconscionable to allow the agent to
retain that which does not belong to him.'°
§ 70. Lobbying contracts—Corrupt acts of public officers.—In line
with the principles stated in the preceding obscn-ations are the
declarations of legislatures and courts against the validity of what
is known as "lobbying contracts." An agent employed for the pur-
pose of procuring the passage or defeat of legislative enactments by
means recognized as being opposed to public policy can not collect
compensation for such services; nor can an action be maintained
against him for failure to perform such contract.""* The same is true
of contracts to procure the performance or omission of an act on the
part of a public officer. If procured either by the use of corrupt
means, or by the exercise of personal influence or persuasion, the con-
tract is condemned by the law. The means by which the result is
•^'Nave V. Wilson, 12 Ind. App. 38; '» Nave v. Wilson, 12 Ind. App. 38.
Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336. ""a Richardson v. Scott's BlufE
*" Pearce v. Foote, 113 111. 228. County, 59 Neb. 400.
61 HOW AGENCY MAY BE CREATED AND PROVED. § 71
obtained may in themselves be harmless or void of direct evil ; it is
sufficient if the employment tends to corruption and is therefore con-
trary to public policy. The public good requires that even appear-
ances of evil shall be avoided in the public service. Of course, if
corrupt or fraudulent methods are employed, and the agent's compen-
sation is contingent upon the success of the enterprise for which he is
employed, the evil is so much more flagrant, and the law is that much
more emphatic in its condemnation. Within this class of prohibitions
fall the awarding of public contracts, such as contracts for the erection
of buildings, bridges or other structures of a public nature, to particu-
lar individuals; contracts for the location of public offices, such as
postoffices, railroad depots, etc.'^^
§ 71. Contracts rendered void by federal statutes.—The act of
congress of 1853, ch. 81, "to prevent frauds upon the treasuiy of the
United States," annuls all ehampertous contracts with agents of pri-
vate claims ; it forbids all .officers of the United States to be engaged
as agents or attorneys for prosecuting claims against the government,
and prohibits them from receiving any gratuity or interest in them in
consideration of having aided or assisted in the prosecution of them,
under penalty of fine and imprisonment in the penitentiary; it for-
bids members of congress, under like penalty, to act as agents for
any claim in consideration of pay or compensation, or to accept any
gratuity for the same; it subjects any person who shall attempt to
bribe a member of congress to punishment in the penitentiary, and
the party accepting the bribe to the forfeiture of his office. The
federal supreme court, in commenting upon this, act, and in discus-
sing the practice thereby sought to be prohibited, speaking through
Mr. Justice Grier, says: "If severity of legislation be any evidence
of the practice of the offenses prohibited, it must be the duty of
courts to take a firm stand, and discountenance, as against the pol-
icy of the law, any and every contract which may tend to introduce
" See further, as to the invalidity 37 Cal. 168; Fuller v. Dame, 18
of "lobbying contracts." Mills v. Pick. (Mass.) 472; 1 Story Eq. Jur.,
Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Clippinger v. § 293; Goodrich v. Tenney, 144 111.
Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 315; 422, 36 Am. St. 459; Milbank v.
Powers V. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274; Carle- Jones. 127 N. Y. 370, 24 Am. St.
ton V. Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196; Nich- 454; Spaulding v. Ewing, 149 Pa.
ols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546; Haas v. St. 375, 34 Am. St. 608; Houlton v.
Fenlon, 8 Kan. 601; Martin v. Wade, Nichol, 93 Wis. 393, 37 Am. St. 928.
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the offenses prohibited."'"- And in the same opinion it is further
said: "Legislators should act from high considerations of public
duty. Public policy and sound morality do therefore imperatively
require that courts should put the stamp of their disapprobation on
every act, and pronounce void every contract, the ultimate or prob-
able tendency of which should be to sully the purity or mislead the
judgments of those to whom the high trust of legislation is confided."
In the same case the court calls attention to the fact that American
courts have steadfastly condemned such contracts by refusing to give
relief to the party or parties seeking to profit by them, or to en-
force their provisions. "The sum of these cases is," says the learned
judge: "1. That all contracts for a contingent compensation for ob-
taining legislation, or to use personal or any secret or sinister in-
fluence on legislators, are void by the policy of the law. 2. Secrecy,
as to the character under which the agent or solicitor acts, tends to
deception, and is immoral and fraudulent; and where the agent con-
tracts to use secret influences, or voluntarily, without contract with
his principal, uses such means, he can not have the assistance of a
court to recover compensation. 3. That which, in the technical
vocabulary of politicians, is termed 'log-rolling,' is a misdemeanor
at common law, punishable by indictment." And in another case,
Mr. Justice Swayne, in delivering the judgment of the court, says:
"The prohibition of the law rests upon a solid foundation. A pri-
vate bill is apt to attract little attention. It involves no great public
interest, and usually fails to excite much discussion. Xot infre-
quently the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is to investigate,
vouched for by them, and the passage of the measure is thus secured.
If the agent is truthful, and conceals nothing, all is well. If he
uses nefarious means with success, the springhead and the stream of
legislation are polluted. To legalize the traffic of such service W'ould
open the door at which fraud and falsehood would not fail to enter
and make themselves felt at every point. It would invite their pres-
ence and offer them a premium. If the tempted agent be corrupt
himself, and be disposed to corrupt others, the transition requires
but a single step. He has the means in his hands, with every
facility and a strong incentive to use them. The widespread sus-
picion which prevails, and charges openly made and hardly denied,
lead to the conclusion that such events are not of rare occurrence.
Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the 'hope of a reward
"Marshall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 16 How. (U. S.) 314.
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contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a percentage upon
the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form
is greatly increased. It is by reason of these things that the law is
as it is upon the subject. It will not allow either party to be led into
temptation where the thing to be guarded against is so deleterious to
private morals and so injurious to the public welfare. In expressing
these views wo follow the lead of reason and authority."''^
§ 72. Actual fraud need not be shown—Evil tendency sufficient.—
Actual fraud or corruption in procuring the enactment of a law or
the performance of a deed by an officer need not be proved in order
to invalidate the contract of agency in such a case. It is not even
necessary to show that evil was done by the performance of the con-
tract. It is sufficient if it tends to the injury of the public. The
courts will not inquire into the motives of those engaged in the
transaction. If the contract is contrary to public policy, it can not
be enforced in a court of justice. "The law looks to the general
tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to the tempta-
tion by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the coun-
try."'^* In a case decided by the supreme court of Indiana, some per-
sons who were the owners of real estate adjacent to a building suit-
able for a postoffice entered into a combination for the purpose of
securing the location of the postoffice in such building, so as to en-
hance the value of their own properties ; and as part of the plan the
parties undertook that certain individuals of their number should
use their influence with the government officials to effect the purpose
of the combination, for which services they were to receive pay in
the event of success. The office was located as desired and the parties
to whom compensation had been promised, upon failure of the others
to pay the same as agreed, brought suit. The trial court decided
against the validity of the claim on the ground that such contracts
are contrary to public policy. Elliott, C. J., in the course of the
opinion affirming the judgment, said: "Where the general public
has an interest in the location of an office, a railroad station, or the
like, a contract to secure its location at a particular place is held to be
against public policy and not enforceable. There are many cases
holding that an agreement to locate a railroad station at a designated
"Trist V. Child, 21 Wall. (U. S.) pinger v. Hepbaiigh, 5 W. & S. (Pa.)
441. 315; Mills v. Mills. 40 N. Y. 543;
'^ Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Fireman's Charitable Ass'n v. Berg-
Wall. (U. S.) 45. See also, 'ciip- haus, 13 La. Ann. 209.
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place is not enforceable because against public policy." The prin-
ciple upon which these cases proceed is that the public good, and
not private interests, should control in the location of railroad depots
;
and this principle certainly applies with full force to an office of a
purely public character, such as a postoffice. We find in these railroad
cases, and there are very many of them, a principle which supplies a
rule governing such a case as the present. It is true that there is
some difference in the views of the courts upon the question whether
an agreement for the location of a depot is valid when it does not
restrict the location to the place named, and no other, but upon the
general principle there is entire harmony. * * * ^ wholesome
rule of law is that the parties should not be permitted to make con-
tracts which are likely to set private interest in opposition to public
duty or to public welfare. * * * It is not necessary that actual
fraud should be shown, for a contract which tends to the injur}- of the
public service is void although the parties entered into it in good
faith. The courts do not inquire into the motives of the parties in
the particular case to ascertain whether they were corrupt or not, but
stop when it is ascertained that the contract is one which is opposed
to public policy. Nor is it necessary that an evil was in fact done
by or through the contract. The purpose of the rule is to prevent
persons from assuming a position where selfish motives may impel
them to sacrifice the public good to private benefit."^®
§ 73. Contracts to procure office
—
To electioneer
—
To appoint to
office.—All contracts having in view the procurement of office in the
public service by methods other than those approved by law are con-
trary to public policy and void, though they be not intrinsically
immoral. Thus, if a candidate for a public office at an election
should employ an agent to advocate his claims before the people and
otherwise use his influence for him in obtaining the office, in con-
sideration of a promise to share the salary or emoluments with such
agent, the promise can not be enforced and no compensation can be
"Citing St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. well, 86 Cal. 542; Burney v. Lude-
Mathers, 104 111. 257; Williamson ling, 47 La. Ann. 73. 16 So. 507;
V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 53 Iowa 126, Spalding v. Ewing. 149 Pa. St. 375.
39 Am. Rep. 206. 15 L. R. A. 727; Bermudez Asphalt
'"Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary, Paving Co. v. Critchfield. 62 111. App.
98 Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep. 746. See 221; Fearnley v. De Mainville, 5
further, on this point, Houlton v. Colo. App. 441; Woodman v. Innes,
Dunn, 60 Minn. 26; Foltz v. Cogs- 47 Kan. 26.
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collected for the services thus rendered." The same doctrine ap-
plies, of course, to an appointive office. All public appointments to
office should be made upon considerations of the public interest solely
;
and all other considerations, involving the one of corrupt means,
such as the payment of money or other improper means, are regarded
as contrary to public policy, as holding out temptations to appoint
persons who are unfit or improper.'^* In a case decided in Xew
York,^» one of the parties had agreed to withdraw his application for
an office and aid the other in securing the appointment, in considera-
tion of which the former was to allow the other one-half of the fees
and emoluments of the office as long as he held it. The court said:
"I think that this contract was void, because it stipulated that Hook
should have a pecuniary compensation for withdrawing his applica-
tion, by which he had probably driven off all competition and con-
tributed to reduce the number of applicants to himself and Gray. I
have no doubt it is void, because it is stipulated that Hook should
have pecuniary compensation for aiding Gray to obtain the appoint-
ment. And I have no doubt that any agreement between two citi-
zens by which one stipulated to pay the other a portion of the fees
and emoluments of a public office which he is seeking, in considera-
tion that the other will aid him in obtaining it, is against public
policy and void."^*' And so is an agreement to pay another to work
and canvass among the voters in order to secure a nomination or elec-
tion to an office.^^ This is true also of an agreement by a candidate
"Gaston v. Drake, 14 Nev. 175, 38 La. Ann. 634. But there are
33 Am. Rep. 548; Martin v. Wade, 37 many items of legitimate expense
Cal. 168. connected with a public election for
"Robertson v. Robinson, 65 Ala. which liability may be incurred by
610, 39 Am. Rep. 17; Blatchford v. one who is a candidate for an office
Preston, 8 T. R. 89. at such election. Thus, it has been
'"Gray v. Hook, 4 Comst. (N. Y.) held that a promise to compensate
449. one for making speeches and advo-
^ See also, Liness v. Hesing, 44 eating the election of the promisor
111. 113, 92 Am. Dec. 153; Filson v. to office is not void at common law:
Himes, 5 Pa. St. 452, 47 Am. Dec. Murphy v. English, 64 How. Pr.
422; Outon v. Rodes, 3 A. K. Marsh. (N. Y.) 362. And that compensa-
(Ky.) 432, 13 Am. Dec. 193; Hager tion may be recovered for erecting
V. Catlin, 18 Hun (N. Y.) 448; and taking down a tent in which
Faurie v. Morin, 4 Mart. (La.) 39, political meetings are held during a
6 Am. Dec. 701; Keating v. Hyde, campaign: Hurley v. "Van Wagner,
23 Mo. App. 55; Foley v. Speir, 100 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 109.
N. Y. 552; Woodworth v. Wilson, *' Keating v. Hyde. 23 Mo. App.
11 La. Ann. 402; Glover v. Taylor, 555; Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill (N.
5
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for office that he will appoint another as his deputy, if elected.®^
All such agreements are against public policy and void.
§ 74. Contract with attorney to divide fees.—Where one as the
agent and contidential adviser of a business firm agrees with an at-
torney that, in consideration of a division of fees which the latter
may receive of the firm, he, the confidential agent, will procure the
discharge of another competent attorney and have him, the attorney
Avho makes the agreement, appointed in his stead, and succeeds in hav-
ing the old attorney discharged and the new one appointed, public
policy forbids the recovery of any portion of such fees by such con-
fidential agent and adviser.*^ An agency to secure a contract from
the head of a department of the general government at Washington, in
consideration that the agent should receive all the government should
pay on such contract above a certain sum, was held to fall within the
prohibition of the law.^*
§ 75. Claims against government—Contracts to locate buildings
at certain points.—A party has a right, however, to employ legal
counsel to assist him in prosecuting claims against the government in
any of its departments where the same may be pending ; and an attor-
ney or agent thus employed may recover his compensation for pro-
Y.) 27; Robertson v. Robinson, 65 unlawful and Improper influences,
Ala. 610, 39 Am. Rep. 17. In the all such agreements will be con-
case last cited the court had under demned." Indeed, it may be stated
consideration the validity of an as the law that any promise for the
agreement between two parties by appointment of his deputy, by an
which one promised the other that officer, at a future time, is void,
if he, the promisor, were elected to though based on a sufficient consid-
the office of tax assessor, he would eration: Hager v. Catlin, 18 Hun
appoint the other party his chief (N. Y.) 448; Conner v. Canter, 15
deputy at a salary of $2,500, to be Ind. App. 690.
paid from fees and perquisites of "Stout v. Ennis, 28 Kan. 706;
the office, etc. The court held the Robertson v. Robinson, 65 Ala. 610,
agreement void, saying: "No judi- 39 Am. Rep. 17; Groton v. Waldo-
cial tribunal, so far as we can dis- borough, 11 Me. 306, 26 Am. Dec.
cover, has ever given countenance 530.
to any such agreement; and if pop- *'^ Byrd v. Hughes, 84 111. 174, 25
ular elections are to be kept free Am. Rep. 442.
from the taint of selfishness and ^ Providence Tool Co. v. Norrls, 2
corruption—if public offices are to Wall. (U. S.) 45; Oscanyan v. Win-
be dignified as public trusts, and the Chester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.
performance of official duty pre- S. 261.
served from the contamination of
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fessional services thus rendered for preparing the claim and present-
ing its merits before the proper officials, if the services be free from
any taint of fraud, misrepresentation or unfaimess.^^ And no good
reason can be conceived of why the employment of an attorney would
not be legitimate for the purpose of presenting to the members of a
legislative body, or public officials having the measure in charge, the
merits of a bill introduced for passage, or the advantages of the loca-
tion of a building or office, if the agent who is employed for such pur-
pose uses no improper means in making such presentation. If he
gives the members or officers to understand the attitude in which he
appears ; if his compensation does not depend upon the success of the
scheme; if he does not bring to bear any corrupt or other improper
influences, but employs only open and honorable methods to con-
vince their understandings,—the employment can not be said to violate
public policy, and he can recover compensation for such services.**'
In the case of Beal v. Polhemus,^*^^ the Michigan supreme court held
that a note given in consideration that the payee would erect a build-
ing near the payer^s place, to be occupied as a postoffice by a given
date, is not void as opposed to public policy, it appearing that the
payee used no improper or corrupt means or influence to secure the
location. But an agreement very similar to the one upheld in this
case was condemned by the Indiana supreme court as being against
public policy.**^
§ 76. Procuring pardons.—The employment of an attorney or
agent to procure the pardon of a convict stands upon the same footing.
If the means used before the governor or pardoning board are open
^ Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548. disapproved. A distinction, too, is
'" Keating v. Hyde, 23 Mo. App. made between cases of interference
555; Oscanyan v. Winchester Re- with legislative action, appointment
peating Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261. to oflSce, or executive clemency,
See also. Barber Asphalt Paving where personal and political influ-
Co. V. Botsford, 56 Kan. 532; Rus- ences are brought to bear, on the
sell V. Burton, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 539; one hand, and a case of the sale of
Winpenny v. French, 18 Ohio St. property to the government, on the
469. But the rigor of the old doc- other, in which latter case the agent
trine on this subject has been some- openly professes to be acting upon
what modified by the more recent commercial principles,
decisions, and in Lyon v. Mitchell, ^a 67 Mich. 130.
36 N. Y. 235, 93 Am. Dec. 502, the " Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary,
doctrine of the case of Providence 98 Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep. 746.
Tool Co. V. Norris was expressly
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and honest, and if tho capacity in which the agent acts is disclosed to
tlie executive or officers of the l)oard, the employment can not be held
illegal or in violation of public policy, and the agent may recover
proper compensation.'*^ "For the purpose of procuring such pardon,
the person employed may present the case to the executive with such
petitions, memorials, statements of facts and evidence as are suitable
to satisfy the pardoning power of the propriety of the relief desired,
and we think no censure to any person for his exertions in such a
case if the measures adopted are consistent with the facts of the case
and with the truth and honesty of all parties concerned, while any
effort to obtain such a pardon by falsehood and misrepresentation,
or by any species of fraudulent contrivance, or by prostituting the
influences resulting from official station, or from personal relation
to the pardoning power, is entirely forbidden by law."*^
§ 77. Immoral contracts.—All contracts against public morality,
that is to say, those of an immoral tendency or that are based upon
an immoral consideration, are void. Hence, the employment of an
agent for the purpose of selling or circulating literature of an in-
decent character is not enforceable, and the agent can not legally
recover compensation.^" Within this rule fall contracts for the pro-
curing of illicit sexual intercourse. °^ The invalidity of such con-
^Chadwick v. Knox. 31 N. H. 226, »»Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 96. 3 E.
64 Am. Dec. 329; Thompson v. Whar- C. L. 337.
ton, 7 Bush (Ky.) 563, 3 Am. Rep. "'Walker v. Gregory. 36 Ala. 180;
306; Bremsen v. Engler, 49 N. Y. Potter v. Gracie, 58 Ala. 303, 29 Am.
Super. Ct. 172; Moyer v. Cantieny, Rep. 748; Walraven v. Jones, 1
41 Minn. 242; Timothy v. Wright, 8 Houst. (Del.) 355; McDonald v.
Gray (Mass.) 522; Bird v. Meadows, Fleming, 12 B. Men. (Ky.) 285;
25 Ga. 251. Winebrinner v. Weisiger, 3. T. B.
*''BeIl, J., in Chadwick v. Knox, Mon. (Ky.) 32; Vincent v. Moriarity,
supra. Where improper or corrupt. 52 N. Y. Supp. 519, 31 App. Div. (N.
means are to be employed to secure Y.) 48^; Cusack v. White. 2 Mill
the pardon, such as dishonest in- (S. C.) 279, 12 Am. Dec. 669. The
fluences or the suppression of any fact that the man contracts with a
facts as to the character in which third person as trustee for the
the agent is to appear, etc., the woman will not render such a con-
agency is void; that is to say, the tract valid: Benyon v. Nettlefold,
agreement can not be enforced on 17 Sim. 51. 15 Jur. 209; Smyth v.
either side: Adams Express Co. v. GriflBn, 14 L. J. Ch. 28. But the fact
Reno, 48 Mo. 264; Hatzfield v. Gul- that a man and a woman live to-
den, 7 Watts (Pa.) 152, 32 Am. JDec. gether illicitly will not prevent them
750; Haines v. Lewis, 54 Iowa 301, from entering into contracts with
37 Am. Rep. 202. each other which have no connec-
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tracts is based upon their immoral tendency, and not upon the theory
that illicit sexual intercourse is not a sufficient consideration.
§ 78. Contracts hindering public justice—To procure false testi-
mony.—Any and all contracts tending to interfere with the course
of public justice, without reference to the motives of the parties enter-
ing into such contracts, are inhibited."- And likewise, contracts to
procure false testimony or to suppress legal evidence in any criminal
or civil cause are illegal.®^ Agreements to procure testimony that
is true have been upheld, however, and compensation for such services
may be recovered in a proper case.^*
tion with the unlawful intercourse:
Winebrinner v. Weisiger, 3 T. B.
Mon. (Ky.) 35. And while, as a
general rule, there can be no re-
covery by the woman against
the man, on an implied contract
,ior household services or work
and labor during the existence of
the illicit cohabitation, yet an ex-
press contract to pay for such labor
or services will be upheld, if the
illicit relations do not form a part
of the contract or constitute the con-
sideration in whole or in part; but
there must be proof of an express
contract: Rhodes v. Stone, 17 N. Y.
Supp. 561; Cooper v. Cooper, 147
Mass. 370. And it seems that where
certain immoral practices are
licensed by law, contracts made with
reference thereto may be enforced:
Baumeister v. Markham, 101 Ky.
122; Lyman v. Townsend, 24 La.
Ann. 625; Chateau v. Singla, 114
Cal. 91, 55 Am. St. 63. And a sale
of furniture on monthly payments
evidenced by notes, the furniture to
be used in a house of prostitution,
and the title to remain in vendor
till price was paid, was held void,
and the notes not collectible, being
based on an illegal consideration:
Reed v. Brewer, 90 Tex. 144, 36 S.
W. 99, 37 S. W. 418.
^^'Selz V. Unna, 6 Wall. (U. S.)
327; Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 137
Ind. 655, 24 L. R. A. 206; Bates v.
Cain, 70 Vt. 144; Goodrich v. Ten-
ney, 144 111. 422, 36 Am. St. 459, 19
L. R. A. 371.
^^ Haines v. Lewis, 54 Iowa 301;
Nicholson v. Wilson, 60 N. Y. 362;
Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387;
Hoyt V. Macon, 2 Colo. 502; Cobb v.
Cowdery, 40 Vt. 25; Goodrich v. Ten-
ney, supra; Quirk v.* Muller, 14
Mont. 467, 43 Am. St. 647; Lyon v.
Hussey, 82 Hun (N., Y.) 15, 31 N. Y.
Supp. 281. A contract whereby a
justice of the peace, with whom a
charge for larceny has been filed,
agrees to secure the arrest of the
thief and the return of the stolen
property for a percentage thereof, is
against public policy and void:
Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, supra.
And an agreement with an attorney
for a certain fee in case he would
secure the release from jail of a
witness against his client in a crimi-
nal case, in order that such witness
might be gotten away, discloses an
illegal contract on which there can
be no recovery: Crisup v. Gross-
light, 79 Mich. 380.
"Cobb V. Cowdery, 40 Vt. 25;
Quirk V. Muller, 14 Mont. 467, 43
Am. St. 647; Willington v. Kelly, 84
N. Y. 543.
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§ 79. Bribery of officers.—Other contracts for the employment of
agents besides those mentioned have been declared invalid by reason
of their illegality ; such as contracts for services in bribing or attempt-
ing to bribe or influence judicial or other officers and others against
performing their duties under the law f^ in influencing or attempting
to influence the servants or agents of others in the discharge of their
duties j'''^'^ contracts with agents to sell lottery tickets in violation of
law ,^'''^ to carry on illegal trades, etc. In all such cases, however, the
agent must have participated in the unlawful purpose from the be-
ginning, as the contract will not be illegal unless the parties are
in pari delicto.^^ If, however, the agent transacts the illegal business
in his o^\Ti name without disclosing the agency, and he receives the
money in his own right, he can not be compelled to account for it to
the principal, for the reason that the principal ought not to be per-
mitted to show his title to the property through the illegal contract.^^
§ 80. Marriage brokage contracts.—Marriage brokage contracts, or
contracts with agents having for their purpose the procuring of a
husband or a wife for the principal, though recognized as valid by the
civil law, are regarded as illegal at common law, and absolutely void
in equity.''^
§ 81. Defendant may plead illegality.—As has been seen, the de-
fendant may set up the defense of the illegality of the contract, and
thus escape liability; and this is so not from any compassion of the
law with one of the wrongdoers any more than the other, but from
considerations of public welfare.®**
'^Willemin v. Bateson, 63 Mich, knowledge of the illegality of the
309; Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 transaction lays out money for his
Ind. 655; State v. Cross, 38 Kan. 696. principal he can not compel the
fsa Morgan v. Ballard, 1 A. K. principal to reimburse him for such
Marsh. (Ky.) 558. outlay: Bibb v. Allen. 149 U. S.
"^b Lanahan V. Pattison, 1 Flip. (U. 481; Leonard v. Poole, 114 N. Y.
S.) 410. 371.
^'^ Daniels v. Barney, 22 Ind. 207; '» See the following further au-
Hovey v. Storer, 63 Me. 486; Willson thorities: Mutual Ben. Ass'n v.
v. Owen, 30 Mich. 474; Fairbanks v. Hoyt, 46 Mich. 473; Beach v. Kezar.
Blackington. 9 Pick, (Mass.) 93. 1 N. H. 184; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H.
"Floyd v. Patterson, 72 Tex. 202; 253, 9 Am. Rep. 205; Jacobs v. Mitch-
Wooten v. Miller, 7 S. & M. (Miss.) ell, 46 Ohio St. 601; Ohio Life. etc..
380. Co. V. Merchants', etc., Co., 11
"'Bispham Eq. Jur., § 224; 1 Story Humph. (Tenn.) 1, 53 Am. Dec.
Eq. Jur., § 262. When an agent with 742; Sprague v. Rooney, 104 Mo.
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§ 82. Defense of illegality can not be waived.—It has been held
that a party to an illegal contract can not, at the time of entering
into it or afterwards, waive the defense of illegality, as this would be,
like the contract itself, an infringement of public policy. Nor will
he be estopped to plead such illegality in any case.^*"' Under this
rule it is likewise held that the defendant need not plead the illegality
specially, and that the court is in duty bound to take notice of it
whenever it is made to appear by the evidence.^"^ The courts also
hold that oral evidence may be introduced to prove the illegality of
the contract. This rule is not a violation of the doctrine that parol
evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict a written contract,
but it is founded upon the principle that an illegal contract being
held void ab initio, it is the same as if no contract had ever been en-
tered into.^"^
II. By Implication of Law.
§ 83. Assent of principal generally required—Fiction of a quasi-
contract.—x4.s a general rule, all contracts, to be valid and binding
on the parties, must receive their assent in the manner required by
349; Eldorado County v. Davison, 30
Cal. 521; Hertz v. Wilder, 10 La.
Ann. 199; Ellsworth v. Mitchell, 31
Me. 247; Worcester v. Eaton, 11
Mass. 368; Hanauer v. Doane, 12
Wall. (U. S.) 342; Collins v. Blan-
tern, 2 Wils. C. P. 341; Lightfoot v.
Tenant, 1 B. & P. 551; Holman v.
Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341.
''"'Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S.
336; Dunham v. Presby, 120 Mass.
285; Cardoze v. Swift, 113 Mass. 250;
Shenk v. Phelps, 6 111. App. 612;
Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 Ind.
655; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Central Transp. Co., 171 U. S. 138;
Faircloth v. DeLeon, 81 Ga. 158;
Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating
Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261; Tyler v.
Larimore, 19 Mo. App. 445. In some
of the states, however, the courts,
perhaps by reason of statutory pro-
visions, hold that the defense of
illegality will not avail a party un-
less it be specially pleaded: Riech
V. Bolch, 68 Iowa 526; McDermott v.
Sedgwick, 140 Mo. 172; Collier v.
Davis, 94 Ala. 456.
'"' Libby v. Downey, 5 Allen
(Mass.) 299; Johnson v. Hulings, 103
Pa. St. 498; Wright v. Rindskopf,
43 Wis. 344; Scott v. Brown, L. R.
(1892) 2 Q. B. 724; Oscanyan v.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103
U. S. 261; Schmidt v. Barker, 17 La.
Ann. 261, 87 Am. Dec. 527; Prost v.
More, 40 Cal. 347; Morrill v. Night-
ingale, 93 Cal. 452; Richardson v.
Buhl. 77 Mich. 632; Fowler v. Scully,
72 Pa. St. 456; Keith v. Fountain, 3
Tex. Civ. App. 391.
"-Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. I. 389;
Bell V. Leggett, 7 N. Y. 176; Brown
V. Brown, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 533;
Sprague v. Rooney, 82 Mo. 493, 52
Am. Rep. 383; Newsom v. Thighen,
30 Miss. 414; Murphy v. Trigg, 1
T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 73; First Nat'l
Bank v. Oskaloosa Packing Co., 66
Iowa 41; Paxton v. Popham, 9 East
408: Cooper v. Southgate, 63 L. J.
Q. B. 670.
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law. Without such assent the act has no efficacy whatever.^''^*
This doctrine is applicable to the law of agency; for it has been
truly said that "it is a rule of law that no one can become the
agent of another except by the will of the principal ;"i"^ to which
might be added, that no one can become the principal of another
except by the will of the agent. But while these propositions are
true, as general rules, they are subject to some well-known qualifica-
tions. There are jural relations between parties in which they
are held to certain liabilities and to have certain rights of a con-
tractual nature without any express or even implied contract. The
remedies afforded in these instances are the same as in cases of con-
tracts, although in point of fact no agreement was ever entered into
between the parties. Persons laboring under legal or natural dis-
abilities, such as married women, infants and insane persons, may not
be capable of making express contracts that will bind them, and yet it
is but justice that their estates or those upon whom they are legally
dependent should be responsible for those necessaries of life that are
essential to their physical and moral welfare. In some instances,
moral obligations exist between parties which public policy requires
they should not be permitted to escape. In such cases, the law or
equity has invented the fiction of a contract to secure remuneration
to those who have, under proper circumstances, furnished them the
articles necessary to supply their reasonable wants. These fictitious
contracts are distinguished from ordinary contractual agreements by
the name of contracts created by law, or ^i^zsi-contraets.^"^^ The
doctrine just stated applies with equal force to the law of agency,
which, in its contractual aspects, is but a portion of the law of con-
tracts. Agencies of this kind are spoken of and have come to be
regarded as agencies arising by implication of law.
w2a Great Western R. Co. v. Grand claim of the plaintiff is to be estab-
Trunk R. Co., 25 U. C. Q. B. 37; lished, but the source of the obliga-
Barber v. Burrows, 51 Cal. 404; Gi- tion itself. It is a term used to
rard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co., 123 cover a class of obligations where
Mo. 358, 45 Am. St. 556. the law, though the defendant did
103 Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) not intend to assume an obligation,
30. imposes an obligation upon him. not-
103a Keener Quasi-Conts., Ch. i. withstanding the absence of inten-
"The term 'contract implied in tion on his part, and in many cases
law,'" says that learned author, "is in spite of his actual dissent:"
used, however, to denote, not the Ibid., p. 5.
nature of the evidence by which the
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§ 84. Wife's agency to purchase necessaries on husband's ac-
count.—The best illustration of an agency of this character is the
case of a wife purchasing necessaries for herself and children, in case
the husband fails to supply them himself. If the goods are purchased
by the wife on the husband's account by his consent, the agency will
be of the class created by the agreement of the parties. But in the
absence of such consent, and even in the face of his direct and posi-
tive opposition, the wife may successfully pledge his credit and render
him liable for her necessaries. The theory upon which this liability
is generally based by the courts is that of a compulsory agencj^ or
agency by implication of law.^^* The liability is, however, sometimes
based upon the broader ground of his marital obligations,^"^ although
the theory of a compulsory agency is the one generally accepted by
the courts.
§ 85. Medical and surgical assistance in cases of personal inju-
ries.—Another class of cases, to which the doctrine of agency by impli-
cation of law may be properly applied, is that of medical or surgical
assistance in cases of injuries received in railroad accidents. If a
servant or passenger of a railroad company sustain an injury in such
an accident which requires immediate attention at the hands of a med-
ical practitioner, and the general superintendent, or other highest offi-
cial of the railroad there present, call a physician or surgeon to render
necessary professional aid to the injured party, such medical attendant
can, under this rule, recover the reasonable value of his services from
the railroad company, although there be no evidence that such officer
had any express authority to make such employment, it being con-
clusively presumed to be within the scope of his powers as such officer.
While the courts generally adopt the view that those superior officers
and agents of such a company who possess a general power of making
contracts for it may bind the company by the employment of a
physician or surgeon, it can not be assumed that the inferior officers
of a railroad corporation are clothed with sufficient general authority
to employ medical or surgical aid and bind the company. But
there may be special cases of great emergency when the dictates of
both justice and humanity will so extend the scope of the temporary
power of an agent or servant in charge, though he occupy an inferior
rank, as to authorize him to employ a physician or surgeon to care
'"* Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Ind. 375; Watkins v. DeArmond, 89
Mass. 418; Johnston v. Sumner, 3 Ind. 553.
Hurl. & N. 261; Lane v. Ironmonger, '"^ Keener Quasi-Conts. 22, 23.
13 M. & W. 368; Eiler v. Crull, 99
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for the serrant injured in the employment of the compan}', or even a
passenger who was injured while traveling on the company's train.^^^^
Such a duty, however, can only arise with such an emergency, and
will not continue after it has ended. The authority does not extend
to a case of protracted illness or suffering, though incurred in the
company's service or on its train, and the company could be rendered
liable in such case only by a ratification of the emplojTnent. There
must, however, be a request by some officer or agent of the company to
perform the services, as there is no duty resting on the company to pay
for such services when rendered without any authority from them
whatever.^"^ In the case of Toledo, etc., B. Co. v. Rodrigues, just
cited, a brakeman in the employment of the road was run over and in-
jured by a locomotive engine ; and the station agent at the point where
the injury occurred employed a nurse to care for the injured person,
and assured him that the company would pay him for the services. The
station agent informed the general superintendent of the road by let-
ter, making a full statement of what had been done, although there
was no evidence that the superintendent had ever received the letter.
The superintendent subsequently, upon receiving the bill for the
services, said he would pay the amount if the charges were reason-
able, and made no objection at the time. It was insisted that these
agents had no authority to bind the company, and that the latter
was not bound, nor indeed authorized by the terms of its charter, to
pay for such services. The court, however, held the company liable,
saying: "If, from the necessary hazards of the employment, a per-
son devoting his energies in promoting the interests of the company
at a moderate compensation, without fault on his part, is severely
injured, and for a length of time whoU}^ disabled, humanity, if not
strict justice, would say that when the company have employed others
to take the care and incur the expense of his cure, they should be
compelled to observe their contract, and meet the expense." And
later on, the opinion says: "^Vliether the station agent had such
power or not, the general superintendent was clothed, and necessarily
must be, with large specific as well as discretionary powers. As his
title implies, he has a general superintendence of the business affairs
of the road, and we deem it but a reasonable inference to conclude
i<Bai Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), here under consideration is applica-
§§ 546-548. ble only to railroad corporations:
^'^l Elliott Railroads. § 222; To- Chaplin v. Freeland. 7 Ind. App. 676;
ledo, etc., R. Co. v. Rodrigues. 47 New Pittsburgh Coal, etc., Co. v.
111. 188. It seems that the doctrine Shaley, 25 Ind. App. 282.
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that this was within the scope of these powers, and when exercised,
that the company must he held liable. The company is governed,
within the limits of its charter, by the adoption of rules and regula-
tions for the purpose. These regulations govern the actions of its
officers. By them they confer powers and impose duties on their
various agents and officers, and by these means they exercise their
franchises. These regulations are private and not accessible to the
public, and hence the difficulty of other persons showing, except by
inference or circumstantial evidence, that an officer performs any act
within the scope of his authority. That fact must be left to proof
as in other cases. And when it is known that the general superin-
tendent arranges all the business of the road within his department,
and binds the company by contracts on its behalf, in regard to its
general business, it may be safely inferred that such a contract as
this was within the scope of his authority." Although this case
seems to place the liability of the company on the ground of actual
authority presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, other
cases go still further and hold that the presumption of such agent's
authority is conclusive.^*''^ The Indiana cases place the liability of
the company on the emergency of the situation and the conclusive pre-
sumption of the employment of the surgeon by the highest officer
in charge at the time of the accident on the authority of the company.
It must be remembered, however, that the employment of a surgeon
by a minor officer of the company is warranted only in cases of great
emergency, and in such a case the highest officer present alone can
act.^"* Even when there is not an emergency, and the employment
of the surgeon is general, it is not ultra vires if made by the general
officers of the company.^"^
'"" See Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 121
Morris, 67 111. 295; Terre Haute, etc., Ind. 353. The power of employing
R. Co. v. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98; surgeons to attend their employes
Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. McMur- when injured by accident in the
ray, 98 Ind. 358; Evansville, etc., R. course of employment is inherent in
Co. v. Freeland, 4 Ind. App. 207; corporations that carry on a hazard-
Swazey v. Union Mfg. Co., 42 Conn, ous business: 1 Thompson Corps.,
556. § 58; 1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.),
"'Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Mc- §§ 544-548.
Murray, 98 Ind. 358; Louisville, etc., '"'' Bedford Belt R. Co. v. McDon-
R. Co. v. McVay. 98 Ind. 391; Terre aid, 17 Ind. App. 492. It is gener-
Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Stockwell, 118 ally held, however, that the doctrine
Ind. 98; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. of the power of employment of sur-
Davis, 126 Ind. 99, 9 L. R. A. 503; gical aid, in an emergency, to at-
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§ 86. The doctrine in England—Supreme court of Michigan di-
vides evenly on doctrine.—The doctrine of the liability of a corpora-
tion in such cases for the services of a surgeon employed in an emer-
gency by the superintendent of the company to attend an injured
employe, whose injuries were received in the course of his employ-
ment, is upheld by the courts of England.^^" In Michigan the judges
were evenly divided as to the soundness of the doctrine that an agent
of even the highest rank may render a railroad corporation liable in
an emergency for the services of a surgeon employed by such agent
to attend an employe who sustained a severe injury in the service
incident to such employment. Gray and Campbell, JJ., taking the
tend an injured employe of the cor-
poration, is limited to railroad cor-
porations, and does not apply to
other corporations. Thus, it was
held in Godshaw v. Struck (Ky.),
58 S. W. 781, 51 L. R. A. 668, that
it does not apply to the employment
of a physician or surgeon by the
foreman of a building in process of
erection to treat an employe who
was injured by the falling of a
brick from the building. Nor does
it apply to a laundry business:
Holmes v. McAllister, 123 Mich. 493,
48 L. R. A. 396. Nor to a factory:
Chaplin v. Freeland, 7 Ind. App. 676.
Nor to a milling plant: Swazey v.
Union Mfg. Co., 42 Conn. 556. In
the following recent cases the high-
est officer or representative of the
railroad company present was held
to have sufficient authority to em-
ploy a surgeon and bind the com-
pany in case of great emergency:
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 98
111. App. 54; Arkansas, etc., R. Co.
V. Loughridge, 65 Ark. 300, 45 S. W.
907; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Mylott,
6 Ind. App. 438; Toledo, etc., R. Co.
V. Rodrigues, 47 111. 188; Ohio, etc.,
R. Co. V. Early, 141 Ind. 73; Terre
Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 107
Ind. 336; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
Smith, 121 Ind. 353. Contrary hold-
ing: Sevier v. Birmingham, etc..
R. Co., 92 Ala. 258, 9 So. 405. See
also, the elaborate note to Ohio, etc.,
R. Co. V. Early, 141 Ind. 73, in 28
L. R. A. 546. See also. Union Pa-
cific R. Co. v. Beatty, 35 Kan. 265;
Hanscom v. Minneapolis St. R. Co.,
53 Minn. 119, 54 N. W. 944. It is
the master's duty to procure med-
ical assistance, at the ports where
ship touches, for injured seamen:
The Vigilant, 30 Fed. 288; Scarff v.
Metcalf, 107 N. Y. 211. In Cairo,
etc., R. Co. V. Mahoney, 82 111. 73,
the Illinois supreme court decided
that while a railroad company is
not legally bound ordinarily to fur-
nish medical attendance to its em-
ployes in case of injury, "yet where
a day laborer has, by an unforeseen
accident, been rendered helpless,
when laboring to advance the prop-
erty and success of the company,
honesty and fair dealing would seem
to demand that it should furnish
medical assistance;" and slight evi-
dence of ratification was held suf-
ficient to bind the company.
""See Walker v. Great Western
R. Co., L. R. 2 Exch. 228. A rail-
road company is not bound to fur-
nish medical and surgical aid to a
passenger injured through its fault:
Cox v. Midland, etc., R. Co., 3 Exch.
268.
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view that the power of the superintendent to make such employment
must be proved, and Coole}', J., and Christiancy, C. J., holding that
"it is within the general scope of the employment of a railroad super-
intendent to make such a contract" with a surgeon, "and that no evi-
dence to prove a special authority is requisite."^^^ In the Illinois case
just cited, the station agent employed the surgeon and reported the
ease to the superintendent. The court said that "although a railway
company is under no legal obligation to provide medical attendance
for persons injured in its service, yet this would be so reasonable a
thing to do, where the wounded employe is dependent upon his daily
labor for support, that a jury will generally find, even upon somewhat
slight evidence, that the act of the station agent in employing the
surgical skill necessary to save human life was ratified by his su-
perior.""2 It is believed that the weight of authority is in favor
of the doctrine, although there is respectable authority against it.^^^
§ 87. Master of ship—His implied authority.—The master of a
ship has much authority not expressly conferred upon him. This
may, perhaps, be properly said to arise from custom long acquiesced
in, but there are incidents in the course of his employment when he
can act only in cases of the highest emergency. Thus he may,
while in a foreign port, hypothecate the vessel for her necessaries or
for the money with which to purchase such necessaries; and such
authority thus arbitrarily assumed is said to be confirmed by necessity,
and binds the owner. But if the goods or money can be. otherwise
obtained, as by consent of the owner, an agency by necessity will not
be deemed to have been established.^" The authority of the master
is likewise extended, in cases of great emergency, to the cargo carried
on his vessel, although he is ordinarily a mere stranger to such cargo.
In "cases of instant and unforeseen emergency the character of agent
and supercargo is forced upon him, not by the immediate act and
appointment of the owner, but by the general policy of the law."^^^
And so he may, in case of a jettison becoming necessary, order a por-
"' Marquette, etc., R. Co. v. Taft, Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Reecher, 24
28 Mich. 289. See also, Toledo, etc., Kan. 228.
R. Co. V. Prince, 50 111. 26. ''^ Tucker v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co.,
"=See also, Sloan v. Central Iowa 54 Mo. 177; Sevier v. Birmingham,
R. Co., 62 Iowa 728; Fox v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 92 Ala. 258.
etc., R. Co., 86 Iowa 368; Atlantic, "* Story Ag., § 116.
etc., R. Co. V. Reisner, 18 Kan. 458; • "^ Story Ag., § 118.
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tion or all of the cargo thrown overboard, he being the sole judge as
to which of such goods will be selected for that purpose, and how
many, in order to save the ship and the lives of the passengers and
crew. He may also sacrifice a portion or all of the cargo for the
ransom of the ship, and may even sell the ship and cargo, or hypothe-
cate the same, for repairs,, or to enable the sliip to perform the voyage.
If there is an abandonment of the ship or cargo to the underwriters
for a total loss during the voyage, "the master becomes the agent of
the underwriters by the operation of law, with the same general rights
and authorities as he would have in regard to the owner.""®
§ 88. Father's liability for necessaries of children.—Some of the
American courts place the liability of a father for necessaries fur-
nished his infant child of tender years upon the theory of agency
by necessity or operation of law, as in the case of a husband's liability
for necessaries of the wife.^^^ WTiether the liability in such cases
rests upon the theory of an agency on the part of the child or upon
the legal obligation of the parent to support the child seems not to
have been clearly settled by the authorities, nor is it a matter of much
consequence. In England and many of the American states, in the
absence of any actual authority in the child to pledge the father's
credit, or statutory obligation on the part of the parent, it is held
that there can be no liability whatever.^^^ In cases of extreme emer-
gency, as where the father drives his infant children of tender age
away from home, and they are cared for by another, the legal liability
of the father seems to be clear, although in instances where there is
no such emergency, according to some of the cases, the obligation
may be a moral one.^^^
"« Story Ag., § 188. See also, "« Motimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W.
Gaither v. Myrick, 9 Md. 118; Pike 482; Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187;
V. Balch, 38 Me. 302; Butler v. Mur- Carney v. Barrett, 4 Ore. 171; Free-
ray, 30 N. Y. 88. man v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383, 20
"'Watkins v. DeArmond. 89 Ind. Am. Rep. 399. The authority, how-
553; Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292; ever, is often inferred from very
Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb, slight circumstances: Jordan v.
(N. Y.) 558; Porter v. Powell, 79 Wright, 45 Ark. 237.
Iowa 151; Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. "'Watkins v. DeArmond, 89 Ind.
350; Allen v. Jacobi, 14 111. App. 553; Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J.
277; 1 Parsons Conts. 306; Keener L. 383, 20 Am. Rep. 399; Pidgin v.
Quasi-Conts. 23. It is said to be a Cram, 8 N. H. 350; Allen v. Jacobi,
principle of natural law: 1 Black- 14 111. App. 277.
stone Com. 447; 2 Kent Com. 189.
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^ 89. Vendee of goods failing to receive them—Vendor's authority
as agent to sell.—Another instance of agency by implication of law-
is found in the case of one who has sold goods to another when the
latter fails or refuses to receive and pay for them. In that event the
vendor, if the title of the goods has passed to the purchaser, but the
goods are in possession of the vendor by force of the relation between
him and the purchaser, may act as the agent of the purchaser and
sell the goods to satisfy, in whole or in part, the equitable lien which
the law gives him for the purchase money. True, the seller in such
case may retain the goods for the benefit of the purchaser and sue
him for the entire purchase price, but he is not compelled to adopt
this remedy. He may treat the property as that of the vendee and
resell it as his agent, having first given him notice of his intention
to do so. When he elects to resort to this latter remedy, he is en-
titled, as the purchaser's agent, to reimburse himself out of the pro-
ceeds of the resale to the extent of the price agreed upon between
him and the original purchaser; and if on the resale the property
does not bring enough to pay such original purchase price, he may
recover the balance in an action for damages against the defaulting
purchaser.^-"' "Such resale,'' says Mr. Sutherland, "is made on the
theory that the property is that of the vendee, retained by the vendor
as a means of realizing the contract price ; he acts as the agent of the
vendee, and deducts from the proceeds all the expenses incurred."^-^
///. By Estoppel.
§ 89a. What is an estoppel.—In discussing the subject of agency
by implication of law, we found that the relation may sometimes be
formed without the actual assent of the principal.^^- In addition to
the instances there mentioned, such a relation will often be implied
from the acts or conduct of the principal. This rule is founded on
the well-known doctrine of estoppel. By force of this doctrine a
person is precluded from asserting a fact which he has previously
denied or from denying what he has previously admitted, either ex-
pressly or by implication, and whereby he has induced another, to his
'-^•^Dustan v. McAndrew, 44 N. Y. Peacock, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 209;
72; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Heck, Young v. Mertens, 27 Md. 114; Bag-
50 Ind. 303, 19 Am. Rep. 713; Ridg- ley v. Findlay, 82 111. 524; 1 Suther.
ley v.,Mooney, 16 Ind. App. 362; land Dam. (2d ed.). § 647.
Benjamin Sales (Corbin's Amer. >-' 1 Sutherland Dam., § 647.
ed., 1889), § 1165, and note 3; Pollen ^" Ante, § 83.
V. LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549; Westfall v.
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prejudice, to believe and act or to rely upon the truthfulness of the
matter that he now deuies.^-^
§ 90. Holding out as agent—Illustration.—If one person hold an-
other out as his agent, and thus induce a third person to deal with
him as such, to the prejudice of such tliird person, the person holding
him out as such agent should not, and will not, in justice and equity,
be heard to say that there really was no agency. In other words, he
is estopped to deny the existence of the agenc}', and that without
reference to what may have been the fact as to whether there really
was such an agency or not. The holding out may have been by express
language, written or oral, admitting that there was such a relation;
or by words unquestionably capable of such construction; or by acts
and conduct calculated to induce a reasonable man to believe in the ex-
istence of such agency. "The rule of law is clear," says Lord Den-
man, "that where one, by his words or conduct, willfully causes an-
other to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces
him. to act on that l^elief, so as to alter his previous position, the for-
mer is concluded from averring against the latter a different state
of things as existing at the same time."^^* Doubtless the most con-
vincing illustration of holding one out as an agent is where the
assumed principal, by letter or other writing, introduces the bearer as
his agent for a certain purpose, or informs a third party that such a
relation exists. Such instances, however, are not numerous, for ordi-
narily a person who has gone thus far in admitting his principalship
will not afterwards deem it probable that he may be able to over-
come the presumption arising from such an admission. The holding
out of the party as his agent is generally committed by the conduct
of the supposed principal and not by his express admission.^-^ And
the liability of the party who thus holds another out as his agent is
not based upon the theory of an intention to create an agency, but he
is held liable without reference to the question of his intention. It
must be shown, however, that the principal knew that the party was
'-^Bigelow Estoppel, Ch. xvii; Tex. 460; Western Land Ass'n v-
Reynolds v. Collins, 78 Ala. 94; Banks. 80 Minn. 317.
Burke v. Taylor, 94 Ala. 530; Hub- ^=* Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. 469.
bard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. St. 291, 10 ''' Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Ber-
Am. St. 585; Hoppe v. Saylor, 53 ryman, 11 Ind. App. 640; Gilbraith
Mo. App. 4; Collins v. Cooper, 65 v. Lineberger. 69 N. C. 145; Story
Ag.. §§ 54, 55; Wharton Ag., §§ 40. 44.
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undertaking to act in his behalf, and intended that he should so
act.126
§ 91. Estoppel by silence—Third person's knowledge of want of
authority of alleged agent—Illustrations of estoppel.—The mere
silence of the assumed principal may in certain circumstances be
sufficient to create an estoppel. It is the duty of a person who
knows that another is acting for him as agent in any given transac-
tion to notify the party with whom the supposed agent is dealing
that he does not represent him; and if he fails to do this, when
occasion demands it, he will be held liable as principal.^^^ Thus,
if I allow one, in my presence, to sell my property, as my agent, and
raise no objection, the purchaser will receive a good title, and I will
be estopped to deny the authority of the one who has sold it to repre-
sent me, for it was my duty to speak and not to stand by and suffer the
innocent purchaser to be imposed upon.^^^ But in such cases, if the
third person had knowledge of the want of authority of the person
acting as agent, and could not, therefore, have believed in the exist-
ence of the agency, or relied upon it, there will be no estoppel. The
person who claims that he was imposed upon must himself have acted
in good faith.^2^ If one carries on a business in the name of another
in order to avoid the payment of the debts of the real owner, the
latter is estopped to deny the ownership of the former as against a
third party, who deals with the person in possession in good faith.
And the circumstance of allowing one's name to stand over the door
of a shop, or permitting his name to be used on letter-heads, bill-
heads, etc., may be considered in determining the question of whether
the one in charge of the business transacted there is the agent of him
who thus allows his name to be used, or is himself the principal."**
Where the son of a grocer and saloon keeper was allowed by his father
to order a lot of cigars and ale in the father's name, but which the
son himself used, it was held that the father was estopped to deny that
his son was his agent for the purpose."^ An agency may sometimes
be presumed from a single transaction.^^- But the law will not raise
an inference from a special agency, involving but a single transaction,
""Bigelow Estoppel, 528-552, 555, "^Norton v. Richmond, 93 111. 367.
556, 573. i^» Gilbraith v. Lineberger, 69 N.
^'' Story Ag., §§ 89, 91; Bigelow C. 145.
Estoppel, 500-527. '" Thurber v. Anderson, 88 111. 167.
'' 1 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 385-395. »^ Story Ag., § 94.
6
—
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that the agency extends to other transactions, occurring years after-
wards.^-''-^ The most numerous instances of estoppel, however, arise
from a series of transactions, or "from the usual habits of dealing
between the parties,"^^* Thus, where a husband generally managed
the business affairs of his wife, she living in the country and giving
the matter no attention, while he w^as transacting business in the city
where the real estate was located, and he had previously sold portions
of her property with her consent, this was held sufficient evidence to
warrant a conclusion that he was her agent for the purpose of em-
ploying a real estate broker who effected a sale of her property.^^^
Where an insurance company had provided one with blanks and
papers relating to the business, and approved his acts in giving per-
mits of removal, and paid his rents, the company was held liable as
his principal.^^^ In all such cases, however, the principal is liable
only for acts within the real or apparent scope of authority of the
assumed agent. The party who deals with the agent may safely act
upon appearances, but beyond that any confidence placed in him must
be upon his own credit and at the peril of the third party. This is
especially true if the act performed is in violation of the law, as there
can be no presumption that authority was delegated for such pur-
pose.^^^ The doctrine of estoppel as applying to agency may, there-
fore, be summarized that where a party holds out another as his
"^Malburn v. Schreiner, 49 111. 69; McCoun v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
Reed v. Baggott, 5 111. App. 257. 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 338. And where
^^* Story Ag., § 95; 2 Kent Com. the principal allows the wife of an
(12th ed.) 613-615; Bryan v. Jack- authorized agent to receive payment
son, 4 Conn. 288; Smith v. White, 5 on Its behalf, such principal is
Dana (Ky.) 376; Weaver v. Ogle- estopped to deny that she was au-
tree, 39 Ga. 586; Anderson v. Su- thorized to receive such payments:
preme Council, 135 N. Y. 107; Doan Anderson v. Supreme Council, 135
v. Duncan, 17 111. 272. N. Y. 107. And a father is bound
^=^Barnett v. Gluting, 3 Ind. App. by the acts of his son, as clerk,
415; Parker v. Freeman, 11 Colo, when he allows the latter to stand
576. behind the counter in his (the
'=• Hardin v. Alexandria Ins. Co., father's) shop, and deal with the
90 Va. 413. And that one is the customers, such acts being binding
agent or servant of a railroad or on the father so long as they are
steamship company may be inferred in the line of his duty: Eisner v.
from his dress as well as from the State, 30 Tex. 524.
services performed by him: Hughes "'O-wings v. Hull, 7 Pet. (U. S.)
V. New York, etc., R. Co., 36 N. Y. 607; Empire State Nail Co. v.
Super. Ct. 222; Sevenson v. Atlantic Faulkner, 55 Fed. 819.
Mail Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 108;
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agent, or has knowingly allowed such person to act for him in one
or more similar transactions without objection, he will, as a general
rule, be estopped to deny the agency, whether it in fact existed or not,
if a third party, without knowing the real state of the matter, and
acting in good faith, and as a reasonable man would act from the
' appearance of things as created by the supposed principal, relies upon
', the existence of the agency and deals with the supposed agent as such,
' if the transaction be within the real or apparent scope of the authority
exercised.^^®
§ 92. Third party must exercise prudence and care.—It must not
be forgotten, however, that the third party, in order to be entitled to
the protection afforded by this rule, must exercise the care of an ordi-
narily prudent man, and hence must not rely too implicitly upon mere
surface appearances. Where he is in a position to ascertain the exact
truth and does not avail himself of the opportunity, he will not be
protected.^^'' Xor will the mere acceptance of the benefits of an
unauthorized agency warrant the presumption of the continuation
of the relation as to future transactions. Much depends upon the
nature of the act or acts relied upon. It has been held that if a friend
' or near relation merely gives some information or advice in a land
/ trade, this will not make him the agent of the one to whom the in-
formation or advice is given. ^^^
1 § 93. Principal not responsible for agent's acts outside of scope of
apparent authority.—Of course, if the assumed agent goes outside the
apparent scope of authority, the principal will not be responsible for
his acts. Thus, if one should hold out another as his agent whose
business it was to sign receipts for goods actually received at a wharf
boat, the principal could not be held responsible for the act of the
agent in signing a receipt for goods before they were received.^*^
Here the party dealing with the supposed agent must have known
that he had no authority to sign receipts in advance of the delivery
of the goods, as this is not the usual manner of conducting business
of this character, and could not, therefore, be said to be within the
j
"* Commonwealth v. Holmes, 119 "" Pole v. Leask, 33 L. J. Eq. 155.
Mass. 195; Croy v. Busenbark, 72 "" McNamara v. McNamara, 62 Ga.
Ind. 48; Thurber v. Anderson, 88 200.
111. 167; Farmers', etc., Bank v. "'Coleman v. Riches, 24 L. J. C.
Butchers', etc.. Bank, 16 N. Y. 125; P. 125.
Bronson v. Chappell, 12 Wall. (U.
S.) 681.
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apparent scope of the agent's authority. The third party may safely
rely npon the acts of the agent, if within the apparent scope of au-
thority, though they he beyond his real authority or his private in-
structions. So, where it is a rule -of a railroad company not to check
the baggage of a passenger until he has procured a ticket, yet if a
baggage master, whose duty it is to receive and check the baggage of
passengers, does so in violation of such rule, and the baggage is lost,
the company will be liable, if the passenger was ignorant of the rule
or regulation referred to, especially if baggage had been previously
received from the passenger under like circumstances.^^- In this
kind of a case, the receiving of baggage is the duty for the perform-
ance of which the agent is held o'ut by the company to the public, and
this is the general scope of his authority. Persons dealing with him
in his especial employment may assume, in the absence of knowledge
to the contrary, that he may receive baggage both before and after
tickets have been purchased by the passenger, as certainly the com-
pany would have the right so to receive and check the baggage. It
is, therefore, within the apparent scope of the agent's authority to
receive baggage l^efore the fare has been paid, and the company can
not be heard to say that the rules and regulations were binding upon
the passenger under the circumstances.
§ 94. Estoppel manifest by external indicia.—In like manner an
estoppel may arise from the external indicia of property; as, where
a broker has possession of goods, with the owner's consent, for the
apparent purpose of brokerage, a purchaser would be protected in
buying them in due course of trade whatever might be the private in-
structions of the broker.^*^
§ 95. The burden of proof.—Inasmuch as the burden of proof is
always upon him who seeks to hold another responsible for the acts
of an alleged agent to establish such agency, it follows that the onus
is likewise upon him who seeks to establish the relation by an estoppel,
to prove the facts relied upon as constituting such estoppel. The
reason for this rule is clearly stated by Lord Cranworth in an English
house of lords case, where he says : "Unless this principle is strictly
acted upon, great injustice may be the consequence, for any one deal-
ing with a person assuming to act as agent for another can always
1*2 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Fos- "= Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
ter. 104 Ind. 293. 200.
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save himself from loss or difficulty by applying to the alleged prin-
cipal to learn whether the agency does exist, and to what extent. The
alleged principal has no similar mode of protecting his interest; he
may be ignorant of the fact that any one is assuming to act for him,
or that any other jDersons are proposing to deal with another under
the notion that the other is his agent. It is, therefore, important
to recollect constantly where the burden of proof lies.""*
IV. By Ratification.
§ 96. Assent may be obtained after act of agency performed.—
It has been heretofore stated that there can be no agency except with
the assent of the principal, unless the relation has been created by
implication of law or by estoppel. It is not necessary, however, that
the principal's assent or sanction be given in advance of the per-
formance of the transaction which constitutes the subject-matter or
purpose of the agency. If his assent be obtained after the transac-
tion by a confirmation of the assumed relation, it is equally binding
and efficacious. Such a confirmation of the authority of the sup-
posed agent is called a ratification.
§ 97. Definition of ratification.—"To ratify is to give sanction and
validity to something done without authority."^'*^ It means to con-
firm.^*® To ratify the authority of an agent is to adopt the act or
contract entered into by the alleged agent on behalf of the alleged
principal without previous authority.^*^ When the party on whose
behalf an act has been done by another without previous authority is
informed of the same, he may either repudiate or affirm it. If he
chooses the former course, he can not be held as a principal, and as to
him the act will be null. If he elects to adopt the act as his own, he
will be bound by it the same as if he had authorized it prior to its
performance.
(fl) Essential Elements of Ratification.
§ 98. Acts that may be ratified.—An act, to be capable of ratifica-
tion, must be voidable or defeasible only, and not void. That an act
which could not have been authorized in the first instance can not
**^Pole V. Leask, 33 L. J. Eq. ^«' Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
155. See also, Johnson v. Hurley, 90.
115 Mo. 513. "• Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa. St.
'"Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) 217.
90.
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be ratified seems clear, and upon tliis point the adjudications are in
full accord. It is a pertinent question, then. What is a void act?
or, When is an act void and when is it only voidable? In the first
place, it may be stated, truly, we think, that an act which is illegal,
in the sense of being an indictable offense, or as being opposed to the
public welfare, and therefore to public policy, is void; and as such
an act, for reasons heretofore mentioned, could not have been au-
thorized, it can not be ratified. "Two rules," says Evans, "may be
laid down with certainty. In the first place, there can be no ratifica-
tion of an indictable offense, or an offense against public policy; in
the second place, the doctrine of ratification is only applicable to
cases where the conduct of the parties on whom it is to operate, not
being referable to any agreement, can not in the meantime depend on
whether there is subsequent ratification. The rules which determine
whether an act is void or not for the purposes of ratification have
been summed up by a learned writer in terms consistent with the
above statement of the law, in Fisher v. Cuthell.'^*''^ Wliere an act
is beneficial to the principal and does not create an immediate right
to have some other act or duty performed by a third person, but re-
mains simply to the assertion of a right on the part of the principal,
the maxim 'Omnis ratihabitio retrotraJiitiir et mandato priori aequi-
paratur' applies.^*^ But if the act done by such person would, if
authorized, create a right to have some act or duty performed by a
third person so as to subject him to damages or losses for the non-
performance of that act or duty, or would defeat a right or an estate
already vested in the latter, there the subsequent ratification or adop-
tion of the unauthorized act by the principal will not give validity to
it so as to bind such third persons to the consequences."^*^
§ 99. Illegal contracts.—We have heretofore seen that a contract
to create an agency for a purpose in itself illegal, as being contrary
to public policy, or as being in violation of some known law, is void,
and not voidable merely. We need not repeat here what we said in
respect to illegal contracts. It is sufficient to remark here that no
such contract is capable of being vitalized by ratification. Among
"'^a 5 East 491. extent that it does not prejudice
"^ The import of the maxim is that intervening rights: Broom Legal
if a person assents to what has Maxims 866; Fleckner v. Bank of
been done by another in his name U. S., 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 338.
it is equivalent to a prior command. '" Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
This is true, however, only to the 91, 92.
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this class of case? may be mentioned such indictable crimes as that
of forgery. To forge a note or other written instrument is not only
a crime for which the forger may subject himself to punishment, but
the act is, so far as creating any liability of the feigned maker is con-
cerned, an absolute nullity. It would, therefore, seem that no valid-
ity could be given to such an act by a subsequent ratification. The
English and American cases are a unit in holding that no ratification
can in any way serve to condone the offense so as to give the offender
immunity from punishment.^^"
§ 100. Can a forgery be ratified?—On the question, however, as to
whether the person whose name has been forged can make himself
civilly liable by ratification the authorities are not agreed. On the
one hand, it is held that if the party whose signature has been forged,
knowing all the circumstances and evincing an intention to be bound
thereby, adopts or acknowledges it as his own, there is no good reason
why he should not thereby make himself liable, the same as if the in-
strument had been executed by his authority, even if the conduct con-
stituting the ratification does not amount to an estoppel, unless the
ratification is made on condition that the forger is not to be prose-
cuted criminally.^^^ On the other hand, there are many cases in
England and the United States which take the position that if the act
is a forgery it could not be rendered valid by a' subsequent ratifica-
tion, as this would be in plain conflict with public policy.^°-
§ 101. Estoppel to deny forged instrument.—But whichever of
these divergent views may be regarded as the correct one, it is certain
that the alleged maker of the note or other instrument ma}' render
^='' McKenzie v. British Linen Co., Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen
L. R. 6 App. Cas. 82; Brook v. (Mass.) 447. See also, Forsyth v.
Hook, L. R. 6 Exch. 89; Henry v. Day, 46 Me. 176; Lysle v. Reals, 27
Heeb, 114 Ind. 275; Workman v. La. Ann. 274; Emerson v. Opp, 9
AVright, 33 Ohio St. 405; Union Ind. App. 581.
Bank v. Middlebrook, 33 Conn. 95; ^^ See Owsley v. Philips, 78 Ky.
Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 517; Brook v. Hook, L. R. 6 Exch.
(Mass.) 447. 89; Henry v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275;
^=' Commercial Bank v. Warren, Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. St. 447;
15 N. Y. 577; Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 McHugh v. County of Schuylkill, 67
Mass. 336; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 Pa. St. 391; Workman v. Wright, 33
111. 483; Cravens v. Gillilan, 63 Mo. Ohio St. 405; Negley v. Lindsay, 67
28; Union Bank v. Middlebrook, 33 Pa. St. 217; Clark v. Peabody, 22 Me.
Conn. 95; McKenzie v. British 500.
Linen Co., L. R. 6 App. Cas. 82;
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himself liable by an estoppel in pais. And the person whose name
has been forged may so estop himself by the same acts and conduct
which might, in other cases, constitute a ratification.^^^ The estoppel
may, of course, arise as in other cases, by conduct and acts, or by
silence when the party is required to speak.^^* The distinction made
in many well considered cases seems to be this: "Where the act of
signing constitutes the crime of forgery, while the person whose name
has been forged may be estopped by his admissions, upon which others
may have changed their relations, from pleading the truth of the
matter to their detriment, the act from which the crime springs can
not, upon considerations of public policy, be ratified without a new
consideration to support it."^^^
§ 102. Corporations—^Ratification of ultra vires acts—Can share-
holders ratify?—English and American cases.—Another class of acts
that can not be ratified are acts performed by an assumed agent of a
corporation which the corporation could not have validly performed
or authorized originally. Corporations act only by and through
agents. Such agents may act, of course, either with or without au-
thority. If the act, to perform which the agent has been duly author-
ized, is legal and within the corporate powers of the society, it will, of
course, be the act of the corporation, and the liability is clear. If,
however, the act is unauthorized, but within the scope of the cor-
porate powers of the company, it may be subsequently ratified by the
adoption thereof by the cornpany.^^" An act is not necessarily void
because it is ultra vires. It may be voidable merely. There is a dis-
tinction also between acts ultra vires and acts that are illegal. But
an act may be both idtra vires and illegal, and then it is absolutely
'=" Mather v. Maidstone, 18 C. B. 275, 5 Am. St. 613; Kuriger v. Joest,
273, 86 E. C. L. 373; President, etc., 22 Ind. App. 633 (this case presents
of Bank v. Bank of Ga., 10 Wheat, an exhaustive discussion of the doc-
(U. S.) 333; VanDuzer v. Howe, 21 trine of estoppel, as applicable to
N. Y. 531; Dodge v. National Exch. such cases); Campbell v. Campbell,
Bank, 20 Ohio St. 234; Workman v. 133 Cal. 33, 65 Pac. 134.
Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405; Mayer v. ^=* Reg. v. Smith, 3 F. & F. 504;
Old, 57 Mo. App. 639; Third Nafl Corser v. Paul, 41 N. H. 24, 77 Am.
Bank v. Butler Colliery Co., 59 Hun Dec. 713; Bank v. Keene, 53 Me.
(N. Y.) 627, 14 N. Y. Supp. 21; 103; Lewis v. Hodapp, 14 Ind. App.
Woodruff v. Munroe, 33 Md. 146; 111.
First Nat'l Bank v. Parsons, 19 ^=^ Mitchell, J., in Henry v. Heeb,
Minn. 289; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 114 Ind. 275, 5 Am. St. 613.
176; National Bank v. Fassett, 42 ^^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
Vt. 432; Henry v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 94.
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void and can not be ratified.^^^ Of course, an act that is illegal, and
therefore void, can not become the legitimate subject of ratification,
whether done in the name of a corporation, municipal or private, or
an individual. But if the act is ultra vires by reason of being in
violation of the charter of a private corporation, it may be ratified by
the shareholders.^^^ The question has arisen whether those acts that
are expressly forbidden the corporation by statute can be ratified by
the subsequent approval of the shareholders of the corporation. The
question has received consideration in the English house of lords,
the prevailing opinion there being that no such ratification could
^"Martin v. Zellerbach, 38 Cal.
300; Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow,
63 N. Y. 68; Smith v. Newburgh, 77
N. Y. 130; Highway Commissioners
V. Van Dusan, 40 Mich. 429; Green
V. City of Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45;
City of Indianapolis v. Wann, 144
Ind. 175. But the plea of tcltra
vires can not be set up by a cor-
poration as long as it retains the
benefits of the contract or transac-
tion in reference to which it claims
its want of authority: Wright v.
Hughes, 119 Ind. 324; Louisville,
etc., R. Co. V. Flanagan, 113 Ind.
488; Kelley v. Newburyport, etc., R.
Co., 141 Mass. 496. And neither can
it be invoked by the party who has
contracted with the corporation and
refuses to comply with the contract
because of the absence of authority
on the part of such corporation.
When the latter has complied with
its part of the contract, the other
contracting party can not complain
of its want of authority to make
the contract: Chicago, etc., R. Co.
V. Derkes, 103 Ind. 520; Holmes, etc.,
Mfg. Co. V. Holmes, etc., Mfg. Co.,
127 N. Y. 252. But if the act was
illegal and void, retaining the bene-
fits thereof will not render a muni-
cipal corporation liable: State v.
City of Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 63
Pac. 265; Arnott v. Spokane, 6
Wash. 442.
^=- Kent V. Quicksilver Mining Co.,
78 N. Y. 159; Sheldon, etc., Co. v.
Eickemeyer, etc., Co., 90 N. Y. 607;
Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green, L.
R. 7 C. P. 43; Evans v. Smallcombe,
L. R. 3 H. L. 249; Ohio, etc., R. Co.
V. McPherson, 35 Mo. 13; Des Moines
Gas Co. V. West, 50 Iowa 16. The
power of ratification, however, is not
confined to the shareholders. If the
act is such as could have been au-
thorized by the directors in the first
place the directors have the power
to ratify such act: Fleckner v.
Bank of U. S., 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 338;
Darst V. Gale, 83 III. 136; Reichwald
V. Commercial Hotel Co., 106 111.
439; Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass. 59;
Lyndeborough Glass Co. v. Massa-
chusetts Glass Co., Ill Mass. 315;
Kelsey v. National Bank, 69 Pa. St.
426. Moreover, the company may
estop itself by acquiescence in the
unauthorized act without express
ratification: Morawetz Priv. Corp.,
§ 628. A majority of the sharehold-
ers is generally sufficient for ratifi-
cation, if a majority could have au-
thorized the act originally: Aurora
Agr., etc., Soc. v. Paddock, 80 111.
263; Bank of Columbia v. Patterson,
7 Cranch (U. S.) 299; Arlington v.
Peirce, 122 Mass. 270.
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take place. Lord Cairns, in an elaborate jiulgment, emphatically
concludes that the shareholders of a corporation have no power to
ratify such an act. He reasons that if only the rights of the present
shareholders were involved there might be ground for the contention
that they could make the society responsible for the unauthorized
act. But the law takes cognizance not only of the rights of the j)res-
ent shareholders, but of those also who might become such by succes-
sion; and second, of the rights of the outside public, and more par-
ticularly of those who might become creditors of the company. ^^^
There are some acts, however, which, though not within the scope of
authority which is expressly conferred upon the directors by the
charter of the company, or by the general law under which it was
organized, may yet be binding upon it. Acts of this class are in-
cluded in the powers incident to the existence of the corporation.
The rule is that a corporation, unless restricted by its charter, has
the power to enter into contracts that may be necessary or usual in the
course of the business for which it was created and that are reason-
ably incident thereto. This power, unless excluded by the charter or
general law, is always implied. Such an act, when performed by an
agent without authority, may become valid by ratification.^*'*'
§ 103. Acts restricted by charter—Incidental powers—Rights of
innocent third persons.—There is another class of acts which, though
within the scope of the franchises granted the corporations, are still
beyond the authority granted the officers thereof. Thus, the directors
of a company may by the charter be prevented from the performance
of certain acts, or it may require the votes of three-fourths or some
other proportion of such directors before such act can be per-
^'' Ashbury, etc., Co. v. Riche, L. R. cases, as we have seen, do not in-
7 H. L. 653. It seems, however, that dorse this doctrine, and take the po-
many, if not the majority of the sition that such acts can not legiti-
cases, hold that any contract made mately become the proper subjects
on behalf of a corporation, if not of ratification: Ashbury, etc., Co. v.
originally authorized, may be sub- Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653, per Lord
sequently ratified, except such as are Cairns; Hazlehurst v. Savannah,
illegal or malum prohibitum: Phos- etc., R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; Cozart v.
phate of Lime Co. v. Green, L. R. Georgia, etc., Co., 54 Ga. 379: Barton
7 C. P. 43; Sheldon, etc., Co. v. v. Port Jackson, etc., Co., 17 Barb.
Eickemeyer, etc., Co., 90 N. Y. 607; (N. Y.) 397; Martin v. Zellerbach. 38
Bissell V. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 22 Cal. 300.
N. Y. 258; Kent v. Quicksilver Min- ^'=° Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Keo-
ing Co., 78 N. Y. 159. But other laik, etc., Co., 131 U. S. 371.
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formed. The?o act?, being within the incidental powers of such cor-
porations, may be ratified by the shareholders, and, it seems, can not
be avoided when acted upon by third persons in good faith, though
not formally ratified. ^^'^
§ 104, Acts of assumed agents before incorporation.—It may well
be doubted whether an act performed on behalf of a corporation be-
fore it has acquired a corporate existence can subsequently be ratified
by the corporation. It is a familiar doctrine that there can be no
agency without an existing principal, whose identity must be fixed at
the time of the performance of the act sought to be ratified.^''^ It
is true that a corporation subsequently accjuiring an existence may
make itself liable for acts done on its behalf before the incorporation
by adopting or retaining the benefits of such acts, etc. ; but this liabil-
ity is based upon the theory of a new contract rather than upon that
of ratification of the precedent act.^*'* Whether, strictly speaking,
the adoption by the corporation of an act done for it prior to its incor-
poration might more properly constitute an estoppel or a new contract
is of little consequence. Certainly the company may render itself
liable for such an act by its subsequent adoption or approval and the
retention of the benefits arising therefrom.^*'^
§ 105. Promoters of projected corporations.—Perhaps the most
frec[uent instances of acts performed on behalf of an intended corpora-
tion before it is organized occur in cases in which the promoters of
such corporation undertake by their acts to make it liable for some
'"1 Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., existence when the act was com-
78 N. Y. 159; Hazlehurst v. Savan- mitted. The corporation is, there-
nah, etc., R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; Cozart fore, not liable for their torts:
v. Georgia, etc., Co., 54 Ga. 379; Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Sage, 65
Lucas V. White Line Transfer Co., 111. 328; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Christy,
70 Iowa 541; Taylor v. South, etc., 79 Pa. St. 54; New York, etc., R.
R. Co., 4 Woods (U. S.) 575; Shel- Co. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 170; Frost
don, etc., Co. v. Bickemeyer, etc., v. Belmont, 6 Allen (Mass.) 152.
Co., 90 N. Y. 607; Hollins v. St. ^"^ See Whitney v. Wyman. 101 U.
Paul, etc., R. Co., 9 N. Y. Supp. 909; S. 392; Gent v. Manufacturers', etc..
Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green, L. Ins. Co., 107 111. 652; Western Screw,
R. 7 C. P. 43; Poole v. West Point, etc., Co. v. Cousley, 72 111. 531; Lit-
etc.,.Ass'n, 30 Fed. 513. tie Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Perry, 37
'"'Foster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 226; Ark. 164; Bommer v. American, etc.,
Bullard v. DeGroff, 59 Neb. 783; Co., 81 N. Y. 468.
O'Shea v. Rice, 49 Neb. 893. The '«= McArthur v. Times Printing
promoters are not the agents of the Co., 48 Minn. 319.
corporation, as the latter had no
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contract entered into between the promoters and third persons. In
such cases, there being no existing principal when the contract was
entered into, the company would not be liable in the first instance and
could not be made so by ratification.^^** But, though the company
might not render itself liable by the ratification of the acts of the
promoters, it may nevertheless, for reasons already stated, incur re-
sponsibility for them after the organization is effected, if within the
corporate powers, by entering into a new contract relative to the
same matter. Upon the original contract the promoter or promoters
would doubtless be liable individually. If by an agreement, amount-
ing to novation, the corporation should assume the obligation of such
contract, the third party discharging the agent from liability, the
agreement would doubtless become valid between the parties. What
may be done by express agreement may also be accomplished by im-
plication. Should the corporation, for example, act upon the as-
sumption of its responsibility as the real principal and accept the
profits of the contract, it would incur also the corresponding liabili-
ties, for no one can take the benefit of a contract without, at the same
time, assuming its burdens.^**^ The power of a corporation to render
itself subsequently liable by the adoption of the acts of its projectors
performed prior to its incorporation is sometimes said to be asserted
in courts of equity, but denied by common-law tribunals.^"** The
courts of this country recognize and enforce the rule that a corpora-
tion may assume liability for the acts of its promoters, prior to in-
corporation, if within the corporate powers of the societ}', upon the
theory of a new contract, express or implied.^**"
^*« Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Christy, 79 the law under which it is incorpo-
Pa. St. 54; Western Screw, etc., Co. rated: Tilson v. Warwick Gas Light
V. Cousley, 72 III. 531; Paxtou Cattle Co., 4 B. & C. 961. In this country
Co. V. First Nat'l Bank, 21 Neb. 621; an express agreement after the in-
New York, etc., R. Co. v. Ketchum, corporation will render the company
27 Conn. 170; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. liable: Wood v. Whelen, 93 111. 153;
V. Hart, 31 Md. 59; McArthur v. Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392;
Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, Western Screw, etc., Co. v. Cousley,
31 Am. St. 653; Gent v. Manufactur- 72 111. 531; Rochford, etc., R. Co. v.
ers', etc., Ins. Co., 107 111. 652. Sage, 65 111. 328; Franklin Fire Ins.
^"^ See cases cited supra. Co. v. Hart, 31 Md. 59; MacDonough
>«-' Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) v. Bank of Houston, 34 Tex. 309.
99-103. In England, however, the courts
^''^A corporation may be rendered hold that such a contract (by the
liable for the acts of its promoters promoters) is void as to the com-
by the provisions of its charter or pany and can not be ratified or
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§ 106. Contracts made on Sunday.—Under the common law, a
contract ontercd into on Snnday was as valid as if it had been entered
into on any other day.^"'' Such contracts have, however, been pro-
hibited by statutes in England.^^^ In America similar statutes have
been enacted by the various states. These statutes being in deroga-
tion of the common law, it is held in some states that they must be
specially pleaded when relied upon. According to this view, a party
sued on a Sunday contract may waive the defense allowed by the
statute, and does so waive it if he fails to plead it. A complaint de-
claring on a contract entered into on Sunday is, in those jurisdictions,
not open to demurrer.^" It may be truly said, therefore, that, in
the states holding to this construction, a Sunday contract is not void,
but voidable only.^"'* According to this line of decisions, a contract
entered into on Sunday, being voidable merely, may be ratified on a
secular day thereafter.^^* In many jurisdictions it is held, however,
that a contract made on Sunday is absolutely void, and, therefore,
incapable of ratification. The contract, having been declared illegal
by statute, can not be legalized by subsequent agreement of the par-
ties; what the law has made illegal the parties can not make legal. ^"'^
adopted without a new considera-
tion: Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C.
P. 174; Melhado v. Pd>rto Alegre,
etc., R. Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 503. Even
there it is held, however, that the
original consideration may be a suf-
ficient one in equity: In re Empress
Eng. Co., L. R. 16 Ch. D. 125.
"»Rex V. Brotherton, Stra. 702;
Story V. Elliot, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 27;
Johnson v. Day, 17 Pick. (Mass.)
106; Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts (Pa.)
231; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St.
387.
"^ The principal English statute
on the subject was that of 29 Car.
II, ch. 7, § 1.
"- Heavenridge v. Mondy, 34 Ind.
28; Chlein v. Kabat, 72 Iowa 291;
Nason v. Dinsmore, 34 Me. 391;
O'Shea v. Kohn, 33 Hun (N. Y.)
114. Sunday laws are constitutional
and valid as police regulations:
State V. Nesbit, 8 Kan. App. 104.
"'" Heavenridge v. Mondy, 34 Ind.
28; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Eskridge,
7 Ind. App. 209.
"* Williamson v. Brandenberg, 6
Ind. App. 97; Sargent v. Butts, 21
Vt. 99; Sumner v. Jones, 24 Vt.
317; Russel v. Murdock, 79 Iowa
101; McKinney v. Denby, 44 Ark.
78; Evansville v. Morris, 87 Ind.
269; Kuhns v. Gates, 92 Ind. 66;
Smith V. Case, 2 Ore. 192; Perkins v.
Jones, 26 Ind. 499; Van Hoven v.
Irish, 3 McCrary (U. S.) 444; Sagi-
naw, etc., R. Co. V. Chappell, 56
Mich. 190; Wilson v. Milligan, 75
Mo. 41; Clough v. Davis, 9 N. H. 500;
Harrison v. Colton, 31 Iowa 16;
King V. Fleming, 72 111. 21. Where
one party to a Sunday contract per-
forms his part during week days,
and the other party accepts what is
done, he must pay for what he re-
ceives: Bollin V. Hooper (Mich.),
86 N. W. 795.
"= Day V. McAllister, 15 Gray
(Mass.) 433; Vinz v, Beatty, 61 Wis.
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As a contract appointing an agent is, in this respect, the same as any
other contract, it follows that in jurisdictions where it is held that
such contracts are absolutely void, an agency contract entered into on
Sunday is not capable of ratification. But wherever the courts declare
such contracts voidable only, then they may be ratified the same as
contracts concerning matters other than agencies, and the ratification
may be made in the same way as that of other contracts. It is true,
however, that in all jurisdictions, contracts that have been entered into
on Sunday may be adopted by the parties on a future secular day, as
new contracts, and this may be done by implication as well as ex-
pressly. It seems that retaining the benefits of the property forming
the subject-matter of a contract will not render the promisor liable.^^^
§ 107. Must have been existing principal when act was per-
formed.—As we learned in considering the question of ratification by
corporations of the acts of their promoters, there must be an existing
principal at the time of the commission of the act subsequently rati-
fied. Therefore, it would seem that if A, as agent, undertake to per-
form an unauthorized act for B, who is dead, the personal representa-
tive of B can not validity the act of A, for it is well established that
the person ratifying must be ascertained at the time the act is done;
but if the act is done in behalf of .he estate of the intestate, even
prior to the appointment of an administrator, the latter may legally
645; Cranson V. Goss, 107 Mass. 440; 786; Ryne v. Darby, 20 N. J. Eq.
Reeves v. Butcher, 31 N. J. L. 224; 231; Bradley v. Rea, 103 Mass. 188;
Gwinn v. Simes, 61 Mo. 335; Shippey Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 133; Du-
V. Eastwood, 9 Ala. 198; ^Merri- rant v. Rhener, 26 Minn. 363.
weather v. Smith, 44 Ga. 541; Pope '•'^Catlett v. Methodist Epis.
V. Linn, 50 Me. 83; Tucker v. Mow- Church, 62 Ind. 366; Rogers v. West-
rey, 12 Mich. 379; Kountz v. Price, ern U. Tel. Co., 78 Ind. 169. And
40 Miss. 341; Steffens v. Earl, 40 where this is the defense relied
N. J. L. 137; Bishop Conts. (en- upon, the answer or plea should al-
larged ed.) 542; Hare Conts. lege not only that the note was
296-297. See also, Finn v. Don- signed on Sunday, but that it was
ahue, 35 Conn. 216; Parker v. Pitts, delivered on that day: Conrad v.
73 Ind. 597; Myers v. Meinrath, 101 Kinzie, 105 Ind. 281. An indorser
Mass. 366; Bryan v. Watson, 127 Ind. of a note, when sued, can not set
42; Pillen v. Erickson (Mich.), 83 up a defense that the note was made
N. W. 1023; Riddle v. Keller (N. J.), on Sunday, as he warrants its legal-
48 Atl. 818; Acme Electrical, etc., ity: Prescott Nat'l Bank v. Butler,
Co. v. Vanderbeck (Mich.), 86 N. W. 157 Mass. 548.
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ratify such act ; as the title of the administrator relates back to the
time of the death of the intestate.^'^'^
§ 108. Party ratifying must have been competent as principal.—
A party undertaking to ratify an act or contract made in his behalf
by another must be competent to perform such act or enter into such
contract to the same extent that a principal must be competent to
confer the authority upon the agent in the first instance.^"'* Thus,
as we have already had occasion to observe, an infant, by the great
weight of authority, is not competent to be a principal to a contract
entered into by him by which he undertakes to confer authority upon
an agent, and such contract would be not voidable merely, but ab-
solutely void ; and as a void contract can never become valid by rati-
fication, it follows that an infant can not ratify an act done for him
by any one assuming to act as his agent.^^® And as an agent has no
authority, as a general rule, to delegate the power conferred upon
him by a principal, the agent could not in such case legally ratify an
act which was performed for him without authority. Having no
power to delegate authority conferred upon him, he has not the power
to ratify that which he could not have authorized.^®" Likewise an
idiot, lunatic or other person of unsound mind, and a feme covert,
under the common law, could not, while laboring under such disability,
render an act done for him or her valid by ratification ; though such
incompetent person might ratify the act after the removal of the
incompetency and disability.
§ 109. Party ratifying must know all the facts or willfully or
carelessly ignore them.—It is further essential to a valid ratification
that the party undertaking to ratify must have knowledge of all the
material facts concerning the performance of the act to be ratified,
"' Foster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 226. Ind. 591; Campbell v. Kuhn, 45 Mich.
But if the decedent was non compos 513.
mentis, though not judicially so de- "*Taymouth v. Koehler, 35 Mich,
clared, his contracts, being only 22.
voidable, may be disaffirmed or rat- *'" Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich,
ified after his death by his represen- 124; Trueblood v. Trueblood, 8 Ind.
tatives, either personal or real, ac- 195, 65 Am. Dec. 756. But see co«tra.
cording to whether the contract con- Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457, 7
cern real estate or personal prop- Am. Dec. 229; Patterson v. Lippin-
erty: Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. cott, 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am. Rep.
458; Fay v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433; 178.
Ashmead v. Reynolds, 127 Ind. 441; '«> O'Conner v. Arnold, 53 Ind.
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Herr, 135 203.
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or must ratify with an intention to assume the risk, notwithstanding
the want of such kuowledge.^-^^ Unless the party undertaking to
ratify knew that he was not liable without such ratification, he will
not be bound.^^^ The principle recognized by the authorities cited
was clearly set forth in an English case decided by the court of ex-
,chequer in 1845. In that case a landlord had authorized his bailiffs
to distrain for rent, but instructed them to take only such articles
as they might find on the demised premises. The bailiffs, in viola-
tion of their instructions, took certain cattle found by them beyond
the boundaries of the premises. The cattle were sold and the money
was paid over to the landlord. In an action of trover against the
landlord, the court decided that he could not be held liable in this
action unless he had ratified the seizure of the cattle with knowledge
that they were taken beyond the boundaries, *^or unless he meant to
take upon himself, without inquiry, the risk of any irregularity which
they might have committed, and to adopt all their acts."^*^ If the
assumed principal makes a deliberate ratification upon such facts as
are within his knowledge, without caring to make further inquiry,
he will be bound.^^* If the act performed by the agent consisted of
entering into a contract for the assumed principal, the party ratifying
must, in order to become liable, have knowledge of the nature and
consideration of the contract made for liim.^'^^ But deliberate, or
even careless ignorance, will not exeuse.^^^ It is not necessary that,
in addition to a knowledge of all the facts, the principal should also
have knowledge of the legal effect of such facts.^*'
'"Lewis V. Read, 13 M. & W. 834; man v. Rosher, L. R. 13 Q. B. 780;
Smith V. Cologan, 2 T. R. 188, n.; Gauntlett v. King, 3 C. B. N. S. 59.
Ritch V. Smith, 82 N. Y. 627; Combs '** Kelley v. Newburyport, etc., R.
V. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.) 493; Co., 141 Mass. 496.
Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291; '^Dickinson v. Conway, 12 Allen
Proctor V. Tows, 115 111. 138; Ban- (Mass.) 487; Mathews v. Hamilton,
non V. Warfield, 42 Md. 22; Bryant 23 111. 417; Woodbury v. Larned, 5
V. Moore, 26 Me. 84; "Wright v. Bur- Minn. 339; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.
bank, 64 Pa. St. 247; Spooner v. v. Gazzam, 32 Pa. St. 340; Manning
Thompson, 48 Vt. 259; Pittsburgh, v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399: Bank of
etc., R. Co. V. Gazzam, 32 Pa. St. Owensboro v. Western Bank. 13
340; King v. MacKellar, 109 N. Y. Bush (Ky.) 526, 26 ^m. Rep. 211.
215; Manning v. Leland, 153 Mass. '^ Miller v. Board of Education, 44
510. Cal. 166; Lewis v. Read. 13 M. &
'^- Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Gaz- W. 834.
zam, 32 Pa. St. 340. ^^ Kelly v. Newburyport, etc., R.
"^ Lewis V. Read, 13 M. & W. 834. Co., 141 Mass. 496.
See also, to the same point. Free-
97 HOW AGEXCY MAT BE CREATED AND PROVED. § 110
§ 110. Assumed agent must have acted for ratifying party.—
Another confirmed rule in relation to the doctrine of ratification is
that the person assuming to act as agent must have acted in behalf of
the person undertaking to ratify, and not on his own or some other
person's account.^** This doctrine is as old as the year books. And
it was consequently held that if a bailifl^ took a heriot in which he
claimed property himself, the subsequent adoption by the lord of his
act would not amount to a ratification ; but if he should take it as the
bailiff of the lord, the subsequent assent of the latter would amount
to a ratification of the bailiif's act. The same doctrine holds good
in the case of goods distrained without authority.^^'' Therefore, if a
person purchase goods in his own behalf, the transaction can not be
adopted by another as principal; and the relation of agency and its
nsual consequences can not result from such transaction.^^''
§ 111. Mistake or fraud.—The doctrine enunciated in the cases
referred to is based upon the fundamental principle that a contract
can not be enforced if it be tainted with fraud or entered into through
a mistake as to the facts out of which such contract arises. Courts
of equity will always relieve a person from liability when such con-
tract was obtained by means of fraud or by reason of mistake which
proper care could not have guarded against.^''^
§ 112. Ratification must be in toto.—Another essential requisite
of a valid and binding ratification is that the act must be ratified
in toto, and not in part only. This is but another statement of the
doctrine that a person can not avail himself of the benefits of a con-
tract without at the same time taking upon himself its corresponding
burdens. ^''^
"'Crowder v. Read, 80 Ind. 1; 450; Hatchings v. Ladd, 16 Mich.
Wilson V. Tumman, 6 M. & G. 236; 493; Krider v. Trustees of Western
Eoby V. Cossitt, 78 III. 638. College, 31 Iowa 547; Eberts v. Sel-
"'^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) over, 44 Mich. 519; Widner v. Lane,
96, 97. 14 Mich. 124; Crans v. Hunter, 28
""Ballock V. Hooper, 6 Mackey N. Y. 389; Crawford v. Barkley, 18
(D. C.) 421; Fellows v. Commission- Ala. 270; Bristow v. Whitmore, 9
ers, etc., of Oneida Co., 36 Barb. (N. H. L. Cas. 391; Smith v. Hodson, 4
Y.) 655. T. R. 211; Rader v. Maddox, 150 U.
'" Combs V. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.) S. 128; Cornwal v. Wilson, 1 Ves. Sr.
493; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 509; 1 Parsons Conts. (7th ed.) 49-
607. 52; Burke Land, etc., Co. v. Wells,
•'-Billings V. Mason, 80 Me. 496; Fargo & Co. (Idaho), 60 Pac. 87;
Brigham v. Palmer, 3 Allen (Mass.) Loomis Milling Co. v. Vawter, 8 Kan.
7
—
Principal and Agent.
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§ 113. Different aspects of ratification-—Question for jury.—It is
important to note the different aspects in which the doctrine of rati-
fication may be considered. The party acting as agent may be wholly
unauthorized,—that is, he may be a mere volunteer ; or the relation of
principal and agent may in reality exist between him and the person
for whom he acts, but the agent may, in performing the act, exceed
his authority. In the latter case, it always being presumed that the
agent promptly informs his principal of what has been done in con-
nection with all matters concerning the agency, not as much evidence
would be required in order to constitute a ratification as where
the relation did not already exist. Hence, in case the unauthorized
act is merely in excess of the authority actually conferred, mere si-
lence on the principal's part may be sufficient to authorize an in-
ference of ratification. ^^^ The question of ratification is, however,
one of fact for the jury, and the burden of proof is upon the party
alleging it. But if the facts are uncontradicted, ratification may
become a question of law solely.^^*
(h) Manner of Ratification.
§ 114. May be express or implied.—A ratification may be either
express or implied. An express ratification is made with the same
degree of solemnity and formality with which an express appointment
of an agent is made. An implied ratification is showm by proof of
acquiescence on the part of the principal, which is usually inferred
from the conduct of the latter. Whether the ratification be express
or implied, however, it must not rest upon mere probability or con-
jecture, but must be shown to have been made deliberately.^®^
§ 115. Form of express ratification.—Where a written instrument
is relied upon to furnish the proof of express ratification, the form
of such instrument, except as hereinafter stated, is of little conse-
quence. It may, as in case of express appointment, consist of cor-
App. 437; Martin v. Humphrey, 58 834; Gimon v. Terrell, 38 Ala. 208;
Neb. 414, 78 N. W. 715; German Heath v. Paul, 81 Wis. 532; Burr v.
Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 Howard, 58 Ga. 564; Robinson v.
Neb. 7, 80 N. W. 48; Citizens' State Chapline, 9 Iowa 91; Storkes v.
Bank v. Pence, 59 Neb. 579, 81 N. Mackay, 140 N. Y. 640; Bryant v.
W. 623. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96;
^''=' Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) Garrett v. Gonter, 42 Pa. St. 143.
111. "= Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
^»* See Lewis v. Read, 13 M. & W. 106.
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respondence between the parties or simply a letter of memorandum
from the principal. The exception referred to is in cases in which
a particular form of authority was required in the first instance. In
such cases, under the rules of the common law, the ratification must
be in the same form and manner as were required of the original in-
strument. At common law, authority to execute a deed could only
be conferred in writing, under seal, and hence the unauthorized ex-
ecution of such a deed by an agent could only be ratified by an in-
strument under seal.^^®
§ 116. Ratification of sealed instrument by parol.—In some cases
it is held, however, that a sealed instrument executed without pre-
vious authority may be ratified by parol. This ruling has generally
been confined to those cases in which one partner, without previous
authority from his copartners, executed a deed in the name of the
firm. It is held that such act, though unauthorized originally, may
be ratified by the remaining partners orally.^''^
§ 117. The Massachusetts rule.—In Massachusetts the courts apply
the rule governing in partnerships to other cases. In that state it is
held that an unauthorized instrument under seal, executed by an
agent, may be legally ratified by parol in any case.^^^ The rule thus
extended seems to be applied in Indiana.^^^ In Indiana and many
other states, however, the requirement of the common law for a seal
has been abolished. In those states, of course, no seal is necessary in
the ratifying instrument, and, generally, the ratification may be by
'"* Despatch Line v. Bellamy Mfg. Vt. 154, 60 Am. Dec. 303; McNaugh-
Cc, 12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203; ten v. Partridge, 11 Ohio 223, 38
Spofford v. Hobbs, 29 Me. 148; Blood Am. Dec. 731; Fichthorn v. Boyer,
V. Goodrich, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 68; 5 Watts (Pa.) 159, 30 Am. Dec. 300;
Taylor v. Robinson, 14 Cal. 396; Deckard v. Case, 5 Watts (Pa.) 22,
Pollard & Co. v. Gibbs, 55 Ga. 45; 30 Am. Dec. 287; Robinson v. Crow-
Ragan v. Chenault, 78 Ky. 545. der, 4 McCord (S. C.) 519, 17 Am.
'"Mclntyre v. Park, 11 Gray Dec. 762; Hart v. Withers, 1 P. &
(Mass.) 102; Swan v. Stedman, 4 W. (Pa.) 285, 21 Am. Dec. 382.
Mete. (Mass.) 548; Holbrook v. '""Mclntyre v. Park, 11 Gray
Chamberlin, 116 Mass. 155, 17 Am. (Mass.) 102; Swan v. Stedman, 4
Rep. 146; Smith v. Kerr, 3 N. Y. Mete. (Mass.) 548; Holbrook v.
144; Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. Chamberlin, 116 Mass. 155. 17 Am.
(N. Y.) 515, 10 Am. Dec. 286; Drum- Rep. 146; Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick,
right v. Philpot, 16 Ga. 424, 60 Am. (Mass.) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379.
Dec. 738; Peine v. Weber, 47 111. 41; "Touch v. Wilson, 59 Ind. 93;
Pike V. Bacon, 21 Me. 280, 38 Am. approved in Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99
Dec. 259; McDonald v. Eggleston, 26 Ind. 28.
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parol, or by implication. The courts are growing more disposed
constantly to disregard the useless formalities implied in the employ-
ment of seals, and the tendency doubtless is toward more liberality
in the requirements for ratification of what are known as sealed in-
struments executed by agents without formal authority under seaL^""
§ 118. Ratification of deed by estoppel.—It does not always re-
quire a specific ratification of an unauthorized sealed instrument, even
in jurisdictions where a seal is required, to render it binding on the
principal ; for he may estop himself to deny its execution by his acts
and conduct. It has consequently been decided that where an agent
undertakes to make a sale of land which is unauthorized, and the
principal, with a full knowledge of the facts, adopts the sale and ac-
cepts the purchase money, he is estopped from denying the agent's
authority.-"^ But before the party will be estopped it must be shown
that he had been informed of the facts and that the purchaser was
misled to his prejudice.^"- And one who accepts rent as the pro-
ceeds of an unauthorized lease will be estopped to deny the authority
of the agent to execute such lease.^**^ An instrument executed in the
presence of the principal, and with his assent or by his direction, need
not be authorized in writing under seal.^*'*
§ 119. Statute of frauds.—A contract required to be in writing, by
virtue of the statute of frauds, must be authorized in writing, where
the statute is so framed as to render the contract invalid unless
signed by the party or his agent thereunto legally authorized. This
being true, such a contract made by an agent, it is held by some
courts, requires a written ratification in order to be binding.^"^ Ac-
cording to this rule, an unauthorized lease for nine years made by
parol was declared invalid as such, and it was held that such lease
could be ratified only in writing, but that a parol ratification would
give the tenant an estate at will. In a ease decided by the supreme
court of Illinois, the facts were that the agent had written authority
to sell certain lots belonging to his principal at a fixed price and upon
certain terms. The agent sold the lots at a less price and on terms
='""' Adams v. Power, 52 Miss. 828; ="* Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Gush.
Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374; (Mass.) 483; King v. Longnor, 4
Dickerman v. Ashton, 21 Minn. 538. B. & Ad. 647; Jansen v. McCahill, 22
-"' Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. St. 504. Cal. 563.
2<^ Palmer v. Williams, 24 Mich. '"' M'Dowell v. Simpson, 3 Watts
328. (Pa.) 129.
^3 Hyatt V. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563.
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more favorable to the purchaser, and informed the principal of these
facts, who assented to the same and verbally directed the agent to
execute the contract, which he did. The court ruled that, as the
agent's authority to sell on these terms was not in writing, the sale
was invalid and the principal was not bound by it. A new writing
was necessary to constitute a valid ratification.^"'^ In a Michigan
case, however, the supreme court of that state, in an opinion by its
distinguished Judge Cooley, decided that a parol ratification of such
contract is binding.-°^^ In that case the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the defendant for breach of contract to sell and con-
vey to the plaintiff a parcel of land. The contract was in writing
and was signed and sealed on behalf of the defendant, a married
woman, by her husband, who had oral authority to do so. The con-
tract being for the sale of an interest in land, it was insisted that it
was void under the statute of frauds. A parol ratification was,
however, held to be sufficient, and the plaintiff was awarded judgment.
The court, in support of its ruling, cites some English cases, a New
York case, and a decision of the United States supreme court.^**^
In these cases, the doctrine that a contract required to be in writing
by the statute of frauds, when made in writing by an agent, without
authority from his principal, may be ratified by parol, is adhered to.
The statute requires thai the contract be signed by the party or his
duly authorized agent. How the agent shall be authorized is not
stated; a resort must therefore be had to the common law. The
signing by the agent takes the contract out of the statute; and the
parol sanction of his act by the principal is a valid ratification, the
same as in the case of any other instrument.-"^ These cases seem to
be in direct opposition to each other. The better rule appears to us
to be enunciated in those cases which hold that no writing is neces-
sary, either to make a valid appointment of an agent to execute such
a written instrument, or to ratify the execution of a written instru-
ment by the agent without previous authority. In either case the
statute is satisfied when the agent has made the instrument in writing,
and signed his principal's name to the same. The statute only re-
quires that, in case the instrument is executed by an agent, he shall
be "thereunto legally authorized." That authority, it appears to us,
'°«Cozell V. Dearlove, 144 111. 23. Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; Bank
^a Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich, of Metropolis v. Guttschlick, 14 Pet.
374. (U. S.) 19.
''"Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722; ="* See also, Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bed-
Hunter V. Parker, 7 M. & W. 322; ford's ed.) 54, n. 1, 55.
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may be legally conferred by parol; and if this may be done, the act
of the agent may be ratified by parol also.
§ 120. Ratification of written instruments.—In just what par-
ticular form an instrument, sealed or unsealed, may be ratified, when
ratification is required to be in writing or under seal, can not be de-
termined by any unvarying rule. It has been held that the unau-
thorized execution of a bond for a principal, by an attorney appointed
by parol, may be ratified by a power of attorney being dated back to
a time before the execution of the bond.^*'^ And in another case,
where a sale of land, in which a party to a suit in chancery had an
interest, was claimed to have been ratified, the court held that where
the answer filed in the suit by such person admitted the sale of the
land, such an admission was a sufiicient ratification of the sale, as
to the interest of such person.^^" But in Kentucky it was held that
an agent, without written authority to do so, can not bind his prin-
cipal as surety for another, and the principal's ratification of such an
act is not binding upon him unless it is in writing.^^^ In other states
also, the courts hold that an agenfs unauthorized act in executing a
bond or other sealed instrument can be ratified only by a written in-
strument under seal.^^-
§ 121. Implied ratification—Intention.—But the most common
instances of ratification are those arising by implication from the
conduct of the supposed principal. The ratification of an act is but
a retroactive grant of authority, and this, as we have seen, may be
effected in the same manner as the granting of authority prior to the
act. Hence, as the delegation of authority may be proved by cir-
cumstances from which an inference may be drawn that such author-
ity had in fact been bestowed, an inference may likewise be gathered
from circumstances from which the ratification is commonly implied,
or the acts and conduct of the principal with reference to the transac-
tion performed for him. One who conducts himself in such a man-
ner as to lead an ordinarily prudent man to believe to his prejudice
that an act, though done without authority, has received the approval
of him for whom it was performed, can not in justice and good con-
.
science be permitted to say that he really never assented to the act,
='^ Milliken v. Coombs, 1 Greenl. -" Ragan v. Chenault, 78 Ky. 545.
(Me.) 343, 10 Am. Dec. 70. "= Ingraham v. Edwards., 64 111.
'""Stoney v. Shultz, 1 Hill Ch. (S. 526; Pollard v. Gibbs, 55 Ga. 45.
'O 465, 21 Am. Dec. 429.
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or that he did not intend his words and conduct to have the effect
of siich assent. It is not material, therefore, what the actual in-
tention of the ratifying party may have been, as to whether he would
affirm the act or reject it. The old and familiar rule that a person
must be held to have intended the natural and ordinary consequences
of his act is fully applicable; and if his language, his silence or his
acts were such as would naturally cause another to believe that he
had assented, and to act upon such belief, it will be conclusively pre-
sumed that his intention was consistent with his conduct, and he will
be held responsible the same as if he had manifested his assent by
express ratification.
§ 122. What will amount to ratification.—Xo positive rule can
be laid down by which the fact that an implied ratification has taken
place may be established. If one man write to another, "I have
this day sold your wife a set of diamonds for five hundred dollars
and charged them to your account,'^ the silence of the person thus
addressed may be taken as conclusive evidence of the approval of the
act of the wife by the husband ; and in such case the silence would be
sufficient to warrant the inference that the wife was the agent of
the husband for the purpose of the sale ; or, in other words, it would
be sufficient proof of the ratification, even if the act had not been
authorized originally. Under different circumstances, however, the
silence of the husband might not be any evidence whatever of the
ratification. Thus, if the wife had been dealing with the merchant
on her own account, and he had simply notified the husband that he
had shipped to him a bill of goods purchased by the wife, the failure
of the husband to disaffirm liability would not of itself amount to
the ratification of a sale to the husband through the wife. In all
such cases, where there is a conflict in the testimony, the question of
ratification, implied as well as expressed, is for the jury; but in the
absence of any dispute as to the facts, the question is one of" law for
the court. In the first supposed case the circumstances were un-
doubtedly such that an ordinarily prudent man would naturally infer
from the mere silence of the principal that he approved of the act
done for him, and, in the absence of other facts, it would be con-
clusive upon him as a matter of law. In the latter case, however,
the jury would have no right from the mere silence of the husband to
infer a ratification ; for the circumstances would not warrant an
ordinarily prudent man in concluding that it was the husband's con-
tract, instead of that of the wife. And so every case must of neces-
sity stand upon its own merits, and be determined by its own peculiar
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circumstances. Only general rules can be laid down in such cases,
and not rules that will fit every case. A few of the most common
illustrations may, indeed, be given, in which the courts have held
that certain acts or conduct on the part of the principal is sufficient
to constitute a ratification. But there are numerous other cases
where the line of demarcation is so finely drawn that it would be a
matter of greatest difficulty to determine upon which side of the line
the cases should fall.
§ 123. Accepting benefits.—It is an invariable rule that if one ac-
cepts the benefits of an unauthorized contract made in his behalf by
another, he is bound by its terms the same as if he had entered into
the contract in person or had expressly ratified it
;
provided, of course,
that he had full knowledge of all the facts. Hence, if an agent has
procured from a third person a note payable to his principal on con-
dition that the note is to be used for a certain purpose, the accept-
ance of the note by the principal amounts to a ratification of the
terms and conditions upon which it was given, and the maxim "Qui
sentit commodum sentire debet et onus"—"He who receives the benefit
ought also to bear the burden"—applies.-^^
§ 124. Corporations—Stockholders receiving benefit of loan.—
Even though the directors of a private corjDoration have not authority
to borrow money and execute a mortgage on its real estate to secure
the loan, yet if the stockholders acquiesce therein, by approving the
minutes of their proceedings before the loan was effected, and after-
ward receiving the benefit of such loan and paying interest thereon,
the company can not be heard to say that the directors had no author-
ity to mortgage the property for the loan.-^*
^^ Wheeler v. Aughey, 144 Pa. St. etc., Co. v. Halter, 58 Neb. 685;
398. See also, Strasser v. Conklin, Piano Mfg. Co. v. Millage (S. D.), 85
54 Wis. 102; Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. N. W. 594; State Bank v. Kelly, 109
Y. 563; Fairchild v. McMahon, 139 Iowa 544; Bissell v. Bowling. 117
N. Y. 290; Murray v. Mayo, 157 Mich. 646; Wright v. Vinej'ard M. E.
Mass. 248; Pattison v. Babcock, 130 Church, 72 Minn. 78; Moody, etc.,
Ind. 474; Wilder v. Beede, 119 Cal. Co. v. Trustees of M. E. Church, 99
646; Avakian v. Noble, 121 Cal. 216; Wis. 49; Hassard v. Tomkins, 108
Witcher v. Gibson (Colo. App.), 61 Wis. 186, 84 N. W. 174; Des Moines
Pac. 192; Marks v. Taylor (Utah), Nat'l Bank v. Meredith (Iowa), 86
63 Pac. 897, 65 Pac. 203; Owens v. N. W. 46.
Swanton (Wash.), 64 Pac. 921; Bur- =" Aurora Agr., etc.. Soc. v. Pad-
lington, etc., R. Co. v. City of Colum- dock, 80 111. 263. See ante, § 102, n.
bus Junction, 104 Iowa 110; Blakley 157.
v. Cochran, 117 Mich. 394; Henry,
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§ 125. Wife accepting benefit of husband's contract made for
her.—Where a wife had authorized her husband to sell her property,
but upon different terms from those agreed upon between him and the
purchaser, and she accepted the benefits of same, she must be pre-
sumed to have ratified the transaction.^^^
§ 126. Corporation retaining benefits.—A corporation sent its em-
ploye with an officer to find property of one of its debtors to attach
upon a note it held against him. The employe settled the claim with
the debtor by taking a horse at an agreed price and a bill of sale to
himself of the wagon, which he was to sell, retain a certain amount
to extinguish the balance of the debt out of the proceeds of such sale,
and turn the remainder over to the debtor. The employe informed
the president of the company of the particulars of the arrange-
ment, and the latter expressed no disapproval, but withdrew the suit
against the debtor and turned the note over to the employe. The
wagon proved to be the property of a stranger, who demanded it of
the corporation, and, having met with a refusal, brought suit against
it in trover for the value of the wagon. The court held that the acts
of the employe would be regarded as ratified by the company, and
his possession of the wagon regarded as that of the company.-^*^
§ 127. Agent's act in excess of authority.—If an agent acts in ex-
cess of the authority delegated to him, and the principal, with the
knowledge of all the facts, receives and retains the advantages of
such act, he thereby ratifies the transaction.-^'^
§ 128. Accepting services of attorney at law.
—
"Where parties
knowingly accept the services of an attorney and act upon and enjoy
the fruits thereof, they will be held liable for the fee of such attor-
ney, such acceptance and enjoyment of the benefits of the services
being a sufficient ratification of the employment in their behalf of
='^ Parish v. Reeve, 63 Wis. 315. Brong v. Spence, 56 Neb. 638; Sokup
See also, Barnett v. Gluting, 3 Ind. v. Lettelier, 123 Mich. 640; Fairchild
App. 415. V. McMahon, 139 N. Y. 290; Murray
"" Dunn V. Hartford, etc., Horse R. v. Mayo, 157 Mass. 248; Avakian v.
Co., 43 Conn. 434. Noble, 121 Cal. 216; Pattison v. Bab-
'^' Bacon v. Johnson, 56 Mich. 182. cock, 130 Ind. 474; Dort v. Nicken,
See also, Wright v. Vineyard M. E. 130 N. Y. 637; Witcher v. Gibson
Church, 72 Minn. 78; Fleishman v. (Colo. App.), 61 Pac. 192; Marks v.
Ver Does, 111 Iowa 322; State Bank Taylor (Utah), 63 Pac. 897, 65 Pac.
of Tabor v. Kelly, 109 Iowa 544; 203.
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the attorney by other clients jointly liable in the litigation or transac-
tion in wliich the services were rendered.^^^
§ 129. TJnauthorized warranty by agent for principal.—Upon the
same principle, if one accepts the proceeds of a sale made by an agent
employed to make such sale, but not authorized to make a warranty,
the principal will be bound by the warranty upon the ground of ratifi-
cation.^^® But this rule will not hold in a case where the agent had a
mere special authority to sell a certain kind of property which is not
usually sold with a warranty. In this latter case the principal will
not be bound by the mere receipt of the proceeds of the sale, unless
he had knowledge of the nature of the undertaking at the time of the
receipt of the money.^^"
§ 130. Bringing action on unauthorized contract.—If an assumed
principal, with full knowledge of the facts, brings an action on a con-
tract made for him by the agent without authority, there is a suffi-
cient ratification to warrant the jury or court in holding the principal
liable, and that without reference to whether the action is against the
third person on the contract, or against the agent for the proceeds
collected by him and arising out of the contract.^^^ And where an
agent sold a piano for his principal at an agreed price, to be paid for
in services to the agent by the purchaser, and the principal, with full
knowledge of the facts, sued the purchaser for the agreed price, it
was held that he thereby affirmed the contract, both as to the sale
and as to the mode of payment.-^^ After suit and judgment for the
"'' Hauss V. Niblack, 80 Ind. 407. "' Cochran v. Chitwood, 59 111. 53.
See also, Viley v. Pettit, 96 Ky. 576; See Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cow.
Felker v. Haight, 33 Wis. 259; Ho- (N. Y.) 354; Cooley v. Perrine, 41
gate v. Edwards, 65 Ind. 372; Shel- N. J. L. 322.
ton v. Johnson, 40 Iowa 84; Mc- ==" Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79.
Crary v. Ruddick, 33 Iowa 521; 2 -'^ Bank of Beloit v. Beale, 34 N. Y.
Parsons Conts. 46. But the mere 473; Benson v. Liggett, 78 Ind. 452;
performance by an attorney of a Frank v. Jenkins, 22 Ohio St. 597;
service resulting in a benefit to the Ogden v. Marchand, 29 La. Ann. 61.
one for whom it is performed is not -- Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn,
sufficient, in itself, to render such 42, 14 Am. St. 88. See, on the point
party liable for the services: Rose- that suit on the unauthorized con-
lius V. Delachaise, 5 La. Ann. 481, tract is a ratification of its execu-
52 Am. Dec. 597; Chicago, etc., R. tion, Bailey v. Pardridge, 134 111.
Co. V. Larned, 26 111. 218; Savings 188; Bissell v. Bowling, 117 Mich.
Bank v. Benton, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 240; 646; Osborn Co. v. Jordan, 52 Neb.
Jones V. Woods, 76 Pa. St. 408; In re 465, 72 N. W. 479.
Borkstrom, 71 N. Y. Supp. 451.
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purchase money, in such case, the principal can not disavow the
agency and sue in replevin for the possession of the goods.^^^
§ 131. Giving unauthorized contract in evidence.—Even the giv-
ing of an unauthorized contract in evidence by the principal may be
construed as a ratification, when it is introduced as a defense in a
suit brought contrary to its terms.^^*
§ 132. Unauthorized sale of goods and embezzlement of proceeds
—
Accepting satisfaction.—In a Louisiana case, an agent had effected
an unauthorized sale and embezzled the money. The principal after-
ward accepted from the agent something in satisfaction of the wrong
;
and it was held that he could not, after such acceptance, follow up
the property and take the same in satisfaction of his claim, inasmuch
as the acceptance was a ratification of the sale.^^^
§ 133. Compromise of suit.—Where an attorney at law effects a
compromise in a suit, without authority of his client, the principal
or party in whose behalf the compromise was made may, of course,
proceed with the suit at Jiis pleasure and thereby repudiate the settle-
ment; but if he abandon the suit, the abandonment may be taken
as a ratification of the compromise.--*'
§ 134. Assenting to alteration of terms of written contract.
Where a party had signed a subscription paper, in which he agreed to
contribute a certain sum to the building of a church, and the paper
was subsequently altered in a material respect, but at a meeting of
the congregation the paper as altered was read and the subscribers
asked whether any one of them did not intend to pay his subscrip-
tion, and, if so, to give his reasons for not paying, the objecting sul)-
scriber being then present and making no objection, it was held that
the failure to object to the alteration was a sufficient ratification of
the contract in its changed state. --^
§ 135. Promise to pay unauthorized note.—The mere oral prom-
ise, after maturity, to pay an unauthorized note without knowledge
of the material facts in relation thereto, when made without consid-
''^ Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawie (Pa.) --" McClure v. Evartson, 14 Lea
273. (Tenn.) 495.
^^ Smith v. Plummer, 5 Whart. '" Landwerlen v. Wheeler, 106 Ind.
(Pa.) 89. 523.
^ Ogden v. Marchand, 29 La. Ann.
61.
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eration, and without injury to the holder, is not a sufficient ratifica-
tion to render the alleged maker liable; neither does it create an
estoppel; although, if the alleged maker had adopted the note before
maturity and thus assisted in its negotiation, he might be estopped
from setting up forgery.^-*
§ 136. Ratification by silent consent.—Wliere a young man, eight-
een years of age, exchanged his father's horse for another, and after
the exchange took the horse obtained by the exchange home to his
father's barn, informing his father of the exchange, who neither
approved nor forbade the act, but retained the horse received in ex-
change for two or three months, and then tendered him back, demand-
ing his own horse in return, the court held that the jury were fully jus-
tified in treating the father's silence, under the circumstances, as a
ratification. "An old and just legal maxim may well be applied to the
plaintiff here," said the court, "which says, 'If he keeps silent when
duty requires him to speak, he shall not be allowed to speak when duty
requires him to keep silence.' "--^
§ 137. Promise to make loss good.—Where a broker sold the stock
of a customer without authority, and afterwards presented an ac-
count to the customer showing the sale and the resultant loss, and the
customer, without objection, promised to pay the balance shown to be
due, thus making good the loss, it was held to be a ratification of the
unauthorized sale.^^*'
§ 138. Retaining fruits of compromise.—^Yhere an agent without
authority accepted a conveyance of land, in payment of a debt, the
creditor, by retaining the land, was held to have ratified the arrange-
ment.^^^ And where an agent without authority, professing to act
for another, buys goods for him, and the goods come to the principal,
and the latter, after being notified of the facts, retains the goods, the
seller may maintain an action against the principal for the price of
the goods, the latter having ratified the transaction by the retention.-^-
"'Barry v. Kirkland (Ariz.), 40 without authority, and the landlord
L. R. A. 471. so notified the agent, and repudiated
"' Hall v. Harper, 17 111. 82. the lease, but authorized the tenant
"° Gillett v. Whiting, 141 N. Y. 71. to remain in possession of the prem-
"^ Miles v. Ogden, 54 Wis. 573, 24 ises as tenant from month to month.
Am. Rep. 617. the acceptance of rent from the ten-
"=Ketchum v. Verdell, 42 Ga. 534. ant by the landlord, at the rate
But where a lease was made by an specified in the lease, was held not
agent of the landlord to a tenant, to constitute a ratification of the
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§ 139. Ratification after express repudiation.—Even after a trans-
action of this kind has been expressly repudiated by the alleged prin-
cipal, he may still render liimself liable by his subsequent conduct.^^^
§ 140. Ratifying party's knowledge of facts.—Of course, in all
such cases, where ratification is claimed by reason of receiving the
benefits of the transaction, it must appear that the principal had
knowledge of the facts constituting the transaction, or that he had
failed or refused to inform himself when he had opportunity to do
so. If not so informed, he will not be bound by the receipt of the
property, if he makes timely restitution as far as possible.'^* Where
an agent sold goods and warranted them, when he had authority to
sell, but not to warrant, the mere fact that the owner, in ignorance
of the warranty, received the proceeds of the sale, would not amount
to a ratification, as the owner would have a right to the proceeds with-
out the warranty.^^^ And where one without authority sold the
plaintiff's chattel, receiving in payment a bank check which the holder
indorsed to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the debt he owed him, and
the agent collected the money on the check, and applied it to the ex-
tinguishment of the debt, the court, in an action against the defend-
ant for the value of the chattel, held that the receipt of the proceeds
of the sale was not an indorsement thereof, inasmuch as the plaintiff
was not in possession of the facts under which the check was re-
ceived.^^^
§ 141. Accepting proceeds of sale of land.—Where the owner of
real estate makes a power of attorney to an agent to sell the land of
the owner, but does not by such power of attorney authorize the agent
to make conveyance thereof, and the agent, in excess of his authority,
makes such a conveyance thereof, as well as sale,—the principal, upon
being informed, may reject such sale; but if he approves what has
been done in his name, and accepts notes and mortgage given by the
lease: Owens v. Swanton (Wash.), must be clearly the intention of the
64 N. W. 921. principal to ratify such contract:
"^ City of Findlay v. Pertz, 66 Fed. Kennedy v. Roberts, 105 Iowa 521.
427. But if the principal sign a contract
"* Schutz V. Jordan, 32 Fed. 55. for the sale of land previously unau-
The ratifying party must know or thorized, without reading over such
understand the contract he is ap- contract, he will be bound by its
proving: Williams v. Hamilton, 104 provisions: Liska v. Lodge, 112
Iowa 423. And in case of the rati- Mich. 635.
fication of a contract, the execution "=* Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79.
of which was secured by duress, it "^ Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291.
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purchaser, and insists upon their payment after being informed of
the conveyance, he thereby ratifies the conveyance and the effect of
the power of attorney to convey as executed by the agent.^^^ And
upon the same principle, where a third person sold land in the name
of the owner, but without authority, the transaction was held to be
ratified by showing that the landowner accepted without objection in-
stallments of the purchase money, and gave his receipts in which he
acknowledged that such installments were made in part payment of
the land in question.^^®
§ 142. Silence when speech required.—It is a familiar rule, as we
have seen, that where one who ought to speak remains silent, he may
be held responsible for the consequences. If, by his silence, he per-
mits third persons to become involved so that they would suffer loss,
which they would not have incurred but for his inaction, he ought not
to be heard to say that he did not authorize the transaction which he
has failed to disavow, and which will cause the loss to such third per-
son, if permitted. In such a case, it is his duty to give notice of the
repudiation of the act that was performed without his assent, and
such notice must be given within a reasonable time, and upon his
failure so to give it he will be held to have ratified the act.^^^ What
is a reasonable time within which the act should be repudiated is to be
determined by the surrounding circumstances of each case.^*" Some
courts hold that the principal must act at once as soon as knowledge
of the matter comes to him.^*^ In this, as in all other matters in
which the rights of third persons are involved, the parties concerned
must act with proper diligence. They must not sleep upon their
rights, lest others suffer loss through their negligence.^*^
(c) Effects of Ratification.
§ 143. Purpose.—Having now considered the essential require-
ments of a valid ratification, and the manner in which it may be
2" Delano v. Jacoby, 96 Cal. 275, 31 Cowell, 28 Pa. St. 329, 70 Am. Dec.
Am. St. 201. 128.
^^^ Murray v. Mayo, 157 Mass. 248. =" Ward v. Williams, 26 111. 447,
='^' Parish v. Reeve, 63 Wis. 315; 79 Am. Dec. 385; Foster v. Rockwell,
Hamlin V. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327; Meyer 104 Mass. 167; Kelsey v. National
V. Morgan, 51 Miss. 21, 24 Am. Rep. Bank, 69 Pa. St. 426; Hart v. Dixon,
617; Gold Mining Co. v. National 5 Lea (Tenn.) 336; Kehlor v. Kern-
Bank, 96 U. S. 640; Mobile, etc., R. ble, 26 La. Ann. 713.
Co. V. Jay, 65 Ala. 113; Wright v. =" Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431;
Boynton, 37 N. H. 9. Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78
=" Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. N. Y. 137.
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brought about, it is proper to notice the effects that will result from
such ratification, both upon the immediate and upon third parties.
§ 144. Relates back to time of performance of act.—And first, it
may be laid down as a well established general rule that one of the
most sweeping effects of a ratification, and one which changes at
once the entire relationship from one of mere usurpation to one of
authorized representation, is that it relates back to the time of the
performance of the unauthorized transaction, and gives to it the same
sanctity and character that it would have had if authorized in the
inception. This general rule is subject to the single exception that
if the rights of innocent third persons would be injuriously affected
by the ratification, it will not be permitted to operate. As between
the assumed principal (the ratifying party) and the third person
(the one with whom the assumed agent has dealt) the effect is in all
respects as if the agent had received full authority in the beginning.
Here the maxim applies: "Omnis ratihahitio retrotrahitur et maii-
dato priori aequiparatur"—"Every ratification relates back and is
equivalent to a prior authority."-*^
§ 145. No locus poenitentiae.—It is an equally well established
rule that the moment a principal ratifies or adopts as his own the
unauthorized act of an agent done in his, the principal's, behalf, he
is bound by it. He can not afterward recant, as it were, and avoid
the results of his ratification. In other words, there is no locus
poenitentiae. The ratification can never afterward be revoked, so
far as the principal is concerned.-** As already remarked, the revo-
cation relates back to the commission of the act, and is the same as
though it had been expressly authorized at that time. If, after the
revocation, some new rights are acquired by reason of the same, third
parties to wdiom such rights have accrued can not be deprived of the
benefits thereof.
§ 146. Eatification disturbing vested rights.—On the other hand,
if, between the time of the performance of an unauthorized act and
that of ratification, third parties have acquired rights based upon the
assumption that the act was unauthorized, a ratification can not be
invoked to serve as a divestment of such rights or to disturb the
2" Lynch v. Smith, 25 Colo. 103. res gestae: Marks v. Taylor (Utah),
When a contract, though unauthor- 63 Pac. 897, 65 Pac. 203.
ized, was subsequently ratified by =" Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
the principal, all that was said and 107; Smith v. Cologan, 2 T. R. 188,
done at the making of the contract n.; Brock v. Jones, 16 Tex. 461.
becomes proper evidence as of the
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same in any particular; nor will it, to the extent of its interference
with such vested rights, relate back to the performance of the un-
authorized act. Thus, the subsequent ratification of a deed of con-
veyance made to a creditor by a debtor through the agent of the cred-
itor, and in payment of a debt, will not relate back to the time of the
conveyance so as to defeat the lien of attachment levied on the prop-
erty after the conveyance but before the ratification, although the
deed was recorded before the levy of attachment.^*^ And if an agent
without authority should make a sale and conveyance of land for
another, the principal could not, by ratification, defeat the results of
another sale made by himself between the time of the agent's un-
authorized act and the time of the sale made by himself.^*®
§ 147. Superior equities.—While it is true, as a general rule, that
the ratification can not be given effect as against intervening rights of
third persons, it will nevertheless be applied to cases in which the
equities of the party claiming the benefit of the ratification are su-
perior to those of the opposing party. So, where persons, on the faith
of an apparent partnership, give credit to the concern, though in
fact the formation of such alleged partnership was but the result
of the unauthorized act of the agent of one of the parties to it, if
the transaction is subsequently ratified, the act of forming the part-
nership becomes valid from the time of its performance; and cred-
itors having claims against the firm will be preferred to individual
creditors of the other partner, although execution had been levied
for the individual debts when the act of ratification occurred.^*^
(d) Parties Affected by Ratification.
§ 148. Effect as between principal and agent.—The unauthorized
act, when ratified by the principal, becomes his own act the same as
if he had previously authorized it.^*^ He now becomes a principal,
and the relation is as fully established as though it had been entered
into by express agreement. And it is immaterial whether the ratified
act is a benefit or detriment to the ratifying party : he will be bound
by it just the same; nor is it material whether it be founded on con-
tract or tort.^*^
'^'Kempner v. Rosenthal, 81 Tex. "*U. S. Express Co. v. Rawson, 106
12; United States Express Co. v. Ind. 215; Drakely v. Gregg, 8 Wall.
Rawson, 106 Ind. 215. (U. S.) 242.
^ McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 "" Wilson v. Tumman, 6 M. & Or.
Cal. 591, 624. 236; Hovil v. Pack, 7 East 164.
"'Williams v. Butler, 35 111. 544.
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§ 149. Public agents—Ratification by state and general govern-
ments.—As a general rule, a public agent can act only witliin the
scope of authorit}' conferred upon him by statute. But the unau-
thorized act of such an agent may be ratified by the enactment of a
statute for that purpose, and the effect of such an enactment will be
the release of the agent as in other cases of ratification.-^*^ In case
of ratification of a trespass or other tort by the crown, the party
injured can no longer sue the trespasser, but must look for redress
to the crown, if he has any remedy at all. Thereafter the trespass-
ing party is exempt from all liability.^^^
§ 150. Position of agent after ratification.—If the principal has
ratified the unauthorized act with a full knowledge of the facts, he is
bound by the act, as we have seen, to the same extent as if he had
originally authorized it. The agent is thereafter discharged from
all liability, unless, indeed, he would have been liable had the act
been done by authority of the principal originally. The agent may
still be liable, however, to the principal in damages, if he has misled
the latter as to the true condition of the matter ratified. If the agent
informed the principal wrongly, he will be accountable to him in
damages whether the information was given fraudulently or in good
faith.252
§ 151. Deviation from instructions—Ratification of.—If the agent
has deviated from his principal's instructions he will be liable for the
consequences primarily. Thus, if a collecting agent, contrary to his
principal's direction to remit money by express, purchases exchange
of parties then in good standing, and the principal endeavors to col-
lect the exchange, but it is dishonored, the drawers having become in-
solvent meanwhile, the agent is liable to the principal for the loss;
and the attempt of the principal to collect it before he discovers- the
insolvency is not a ratification of the act of sending the money by
exchange.^^^
§ 152. Liability for torts.—Where a tort has been committed by the
agent, either by authority of the principal previously conferred, or
without such authority, but subsequently ratified, the agent will be
'=" State V. Torinus, 26 Minn. 1. ="' Walker v. Walker, 5 Heisk.
='"Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch. 167. (Tenn.) 425.
"^ Bank of Owensboro v. Western
Bank, 13 Bush (Ky.) 526.
8
—
Principal and Agent.
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liable as well as the principal. The effect of ratification in such case
is not the substitution of tlie principal's liability for that of the
agent, but it renders the principal liable to third parties in addition
to the ao^ent.^^^
=5* Perminter v. Kelly, 18 Ala. 716;
Richardson v. Kimball, 28 Me. 463;
Burnap v. Marsh, 13 111. 535. Mr.
Justice Holmes, in the case of
Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330,
in discussing the doctrine of the
ratification of torts, speaking for
the court says:
"If we were contriving a new code
to-day we might hesitate to say that
a man could make himself a party
to a bare tort, in any case, merely
by assenting to it after it had been
committed. But we are not at lib-
erty to refuse to carry out to its
consequences any principle which
we believe to have been part of the
common law simply because the
grounds of policy on which it must
be justified seem to us to be hard to
find, and probably to have belonged
to a different state of society.
"It is hard to explain why a mas-
ter is liable to the extent that he
is for the negligent acts of one who
at the time really is his servant,
acting within the general scope of
his employment. Probably master
and servant are feigned to be all
one person, by a fiction which is an
echo of the patria potestas and of
the English frankpledge: Byington
V. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 170;
Fitz. Abr., Corone, pi. 428. Possi-
bly the doctrine of ratification is
another aspect of the same tradi-
tion. The requirement that the act
should be done in the name of the
ratifying party looks that way:
New England Dredging Co. v. Rock-
port Granite Co., 149 Mass. 381, 382;
Fuller & Trimwell's Case, 2 Leon.
215, 216; Sext. Dec. 5, 12, De Reg.
Jur., Reg. 9; D. 43, 26, 13; D. 43, 16,
1, § 14, glossary. See also cases next
cited.
"The earliest instances of liability
by way of ratification in the English
law, so far as we have noticed, were
where a man retained property ac-
quired through the wrongful act of
another: Y. B. 30 Ed. I, 128 (Rolls
ed.); 38 Lib. Ass. 223, pi. 9, s. c. 38
Ed. Ill, 18, Engettement de Garde.
See Plowd. 8, ad fin., 27, 31; Bract,
fol. 158b, 159a, 171b; 12 Ed. IV, 9,
pi. 23. But in these cases the defend-
ant's assent was treated as relating
back to the original act, and at an
early date the doctrine of relation
was carried so far as to hold that,
where a trespass would have been
justified if it had been done by the
authority by which it purported to
have been done, a subsequent rati-
fication might justify it also: Y. B.
7 Hen. IV, 34, pi. 1. This decision is
qualified in Fitz. Abr., Bayllye, pi.
4, and doubted in Bro. Abr., Tres-
pass, pi. 86; but it has been followed
or approved so continuously, and in
so many later cases, that it would be
hard to deny that the common law
was as there stated by Chief Justice
Gascoigne: Godbolt, 109, 110, pi.
129, s. c. 2 Leon. 196, pi. 246; Hull
V. Pickersgill, 1 Brod. & Bing. 282;
Muskett V. Drummond, 10 B. & C.
153, 157; Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch.
167, 188; Secretary of State in Coun-
cil of India v. Kamachee Boye Sa-
haba, 13 Moore P. C. 22, 86; Cheet-
ham V. Mayor, etc., of Manchester.
L. R. 10 C. P. 249; Wiggins v. United
States, 3 Ct. of CI. 412.
"If we assume that an alleged
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§ 153. Can third party recede?—After the ratification the third
party may enforce the contract against the principal the same as if
the latter had authorized or entered into it on his own behalf,^^^
Suppose, however, that the third party desires to recede from the
agreement before the ratification by the supposed principal. As to
whether this may be done or not the authorities are not fully agreed.
principal, by adopting an act which
was unlawful when done, can make
it lawful, it follows that he adopts
it at his peril, and is liable if it
should turn out that his previous
command would not have justified
the act. It never has been doubted
that a man's subsequent agreement
to a trespass done in his name and
for his benefit amounts to a com-
mand, so far as to make him an-
swerable. The ratihabitio mandato
comparatur of the Roman lawyers
and the earlier cases (D. 46, 3, 12,
§ 4; D. 43, 16, 1, § 14; Y. B. 30 Ed.
I, 128) has been changed to the
dogma aeguiparatur ever since the
days of Lord Coke: 4 Inst. 317. See
Bro. Abr., Trespass, pi. 113; Co. Lit.
207a; Wingate's Maxims 124; Com.
Dig., Trespass, C, 1; Eastern Coun-
ties R. Co. V. Broom, 6 Exch. 314,
326, 327, and cases hereafter cited.
Doubts have been expressed, which
we need not consider, whether this
doctrine applied to the case of a
bare personal tort: Adams v. Free-
man, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 117, 118; An-
derson and Warberton, JJ., in Bish-
op V. Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824. If a
man assaulted another in the street
out of his own head, it would seem
rather strong to say that, if he mere-
ly called himself my servant, and I
afterwards assented, without more,
our mere words would make me a
party to the assault, although in
such cases the canon law excommu-
nicated the principal if the assault
was upon a clerk: Sext. Dec. 5, 11,
23. Perhaps the application of the
doctrine would be avoided on the
ground that the facts did not show
an act done for the defendant's ben-
efit: Wilson V. Barker, 1 Nev. &
Man. 409, s. c. 4 B. & Ad. 614, et seq.;
Smith V. Lozo, 42 Mich. 6. As in
other cases, it has been on the
ground that they did not amount
to such a ratification as was neces-
sary: Tucker v. Jerris, 75 Me. 184;
Hyde v. Cooper, 26 Vt. 552.
"But the language generally used
by judges and text-writers, and such
decisions as we have been able to
find, is broad enough to cover a case
like the present when the ratifica-
tion is established: Perley v.
Georgetown, 7 Gray (Mass.) 464;
Bishop V. Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824;
Sanderson v. Baker, 2 W. Bl. 832,
s. c. 3 Wils. 309; Barker v. Braham,
2 W. Bl. 866, 868; s. c. 3 Wils. 368;
Badkin v. Powell, Cowper 476,
479; Wilson v. Tumman, 6 M.
& G. 236, 242; Lewis v. Read,
13 M. & W. 834; Buron v. Denman.
2 Exch. 167, 188; Bird v. Brown, 4
Exch. 786, 799; Eastern Counties R.
Co. V. Broom, 6 Exch. 314, 326, 327;
Roe V. Birkenhead, etc., R. Co., 7
Exch. 36, 41; Ancona v. Marks, 7 H.
& N. 686, 695; Condit v. Baldwin, 21
N. Y. 219, 225; Exum v. Brister, 35
Miss. 391; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v.
Donahoe, 56 Tex. 162; Murray v.
Lovejoy, 2 Clif. (U. S.) 192, 195. See
Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. (U. S.)
1, 9; Story Ag., §§ 455, 456."
-'"'^ Szymanski v. Plassan, 20 La.
Ann. 90, 96 Am. Dec. 382.
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The American courts generally hold that the third party is at liberty
to recede at any time before the ratification by the principal, inas-
much as there is, up to the period of ratification, no mutuality be-
tween the principal and the third party.^^^ After ratification by the
assumed principal the third person will not be bound unless he does
some act signifying his affirmance; as, by bringing suit or otherwise
attempting to enforce the contract. The right to repudiate the
transaction, unless it be a case where he is required to speak and has
not done so, remains in the third party until he has by his express
or implied affirmation signified his intention to abide by it.^^''
§ 154. The English doctrine.—But the English doctrine is that the
third party can not recede, but is bound by the contract the same
as if it had been originally authorized by the principal. According
to this rule the element of mutuality is not wanting when there
is a ratification. If the contract does not originally bind the prin-
cipal, it does bind the one who has undertaken to act for him, the
latter and the third person being mutually liable inter sese. If the
agent's act is ratified by the person for whom it was done, the ratifi-
cation relates back to the time of the performance, and the principal's
liability becomes a substitute for the liability of the agent, while the
third party has no greater than he assumed in the beginning.-^*
The third person ma}"", indeed, be released from liability by the agent,
but this must be done before ratification.^^^ Thus, in the case cited
in the note, a person assuming to act as agent for another paid a
portion of a debt for him, expecting to be reimbursed by the debtor.
Afterwards the money was returned to the person who paid it, and
the trial court held that the debtor could avail himself of the benefit
of the payment made for him, and, when sued for the debt, plead
payment by his agent. But the court of exchequer decided other-
wise. The debtor might have ratified the payment, even after suit
against him, by pleading the payment as a defense, had the money
been retained by the creditor. But if, before such ratification, the
creditor and the assumed agent, apart from the debtor, agree to
cancel what had been done between them, and the money is refunded,
=^*Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. See also, State v. Torinus, 26
43; Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686; Minn. 1.
Townsend v. Corning, 23 Wend. (N. =" In re Portuguese, etc.. Mines, L.
Y.) 435. R. 45 Ch. D. 16.
=*" Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686. "''" Walter v. James, L. R. 6 Ex.
124.
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it is competent for them to do so, and the transaction between the
debtor and the agent becomes a nullity. "When a payment is not
made by way of a gift for the benefit of the debtor, but by an agent
who intended that he be reimbursed by the debtor, but who had not
the debtor's authority to pay, it is competent for the creditor and the
person paying to rescind the transaction at any time before the
debtor has affirmed the payment and repaid the money, and there-
upon the payment is at an end and the debtor again responsible."^*'^
§ 155. Discharge of agent from liability except in cases of tort.—
As has already been stated, and as we shall have occasion to discuss
more fully hereafter,^**^ one who, without authority, undertakes to
perform an act for another becomes personally liable to him with
whom he deals for his alleged principal. But when the act has been
ratified by the party on whose account it has been performed, the
agent is discharged from any liability to the person with whom the
transaction has been had. This is for the sufficient reason that the
agent has performed all he engaged to perform. He entered into
the contract—if such it was—not on his own behalf, but for another.
This assumption of authority he has fully made good by procuring
the principal's approval. He is now no longer a factor in the trans-
action. He could only be liable, in the event of having no authority,
for assuming to act without it. He can not become liable for this
because the authority has become real. And, having no personal
interest in the matter, he can not himself assert any right of action.-**-
If, however, the matter ratified is a trespass, or other tort, the rule
is different. In that case, as we have seen, both the principal and
the agent are responsible to the third party. What was previously
the wrong of one is now the wrong of both. The agent and the
principal become joint tort-feasors, and are jointly and severally
responsible for the injury done.^**^
280 pgj. Martin, B., in Walter v. 54 Am. Dec. 177; Burnap v. Marsh,
James, supra. 13 III. 535; Thorp v. Burling, 11
'''Post, § 309. Johns. (N. Y.) 285; Josslyn v. Mc-
="= Story Ag., § 244. Allister, 22 Mich. 300.
2"= Perminter v. Kelly, 18 Ala. 716,
CHAPTEE IV.
HOW AGENCY MAY BE TERMINATED.
168.
169.
170.
Section
155a. General statement of the law.
I. Termination hy Agreement of
Parties in Original Contract.
156. By expiration of time or hap-
pening of event.
157. By accomplishment of ob-
ject for which agency was
created.
//. Termination by Act of Party.
158. By subsequent agreement of
parties.
159. By revocation of principal or
renunciation of agent.
160. Revocation may be express or
implied.
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to the stipulation of the contract, the agency is to continue, and
also the happening of some event upon which it is to be terminated,
as well as the matter of performance of the object or objects for
which the agency was created. And under the head of "act of party"
may be brought the method of revocation of the agency by the prin-
cipal or its renunciation by the agent. In the term "operation of
law" may be included termination by death of the principal, by death
of the agent, by bankruptcy of the principal, by bankruptcy of the
agent, by marriage (under the common-law rules) of a feme sole
principal, by insanity of the principal, by insanity of the agent, and
by destruction of the subject-matter.^
/. Termination hy Agreement of Parties in Original Contract.
§ 156. By expiration of time or happening of event.—An agency,
being generally but the condition or relation created by a contract
between the parties to it, will, of course, become dissolved by its
own terms whenever the time expires for which it has been created
or the event happens at which it was to end. In this particular
a contract of agency is precisely like any other contract. If by
its terms it is to remain in force for a year, it will expire at the
end of that period ; and so as to any other time. Hence, if A employ
B as a commercial traveler to sell goods for him, or as a clerk in his
store, or in any other capacity, the relation will cease to exist with
the expiration of the term of employment ; unless, indeed, the employe
should continue to act without any new arrangement, in which case
the presumption would be that he continued upon the old terms.^
This question often becomes important where a bond is given, with
sureties, by an agent or employe, for the faithful performance of his
duties ; or where the question arises whether the agent has earned
his compensation. In case a bond is given by the agent, with sureties,
conditioned upon the faithful discharge of the agent's duty, the
sureties are, of course, discharged from liability for any act done by
him after the period of employment expires, and are no longer
liable for the conduct of the agent thereafter.^ In this class of
contracts there can be but little difficulty when once the time is de-
termined for which the employment is to continue, or the event is
1 Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) Poor, 58 Mich. 503; Tatterson v. Suf-
119, 120. folk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56.
= Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84 ^Gundlach v. Fischer, 59 111. 172.
Ga. 714; Sines v. Superintendent of
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ascertained at the happening of which it is to cease. If the agency
is to terminate upon the happening of some event, as, for example,
the return of the principal to the place where the business is to be
transacted or the subject of the agency is located, and from which
the principal was about to depart, leaving certaiji business manage-
ment to his agent during his absence, the agency is limited to the
time of the principal's absence.* And so, the parties may also pro-
vide in their agreement that the agency may be terminated at the
will of either party, or by giving the other party written notice to
that effect, or by giving such notice for a certain length of time ; and
the employment will terminate, of course, when the event happens,
or ther notice has been given for the length of time provided for, and
the agent can not, generally, recover compensation thereafter.^ If
the agency is to be terminated at the option of either party, or if
no time has been agreed upon when it shall expire, the principal has
the right, as well as the power, to revoke the appointment at any
time. Thus, in the case of an insurance agency, where the contract
contained no limitation as to the time during which it was to con-
tinue, but did contain a stipulation that it might be terminated
upon the neglect or refusal of the agent to account for moneys of
the company, or for dishonesty, or noncompliance with the rules
and instructions of the company, it was held that the company might
discontinue the agency at any time and for any reason it deemed
proper, there being nothing in the contract to prevent.^ An agree-
ment for the employment of an agent for a certain time, provided
<
* Danby v. Coutts, L. R. 29 Ch. D. N. Y. Supp. 769. But where it was
500. provided that the authority might be
" Doyle v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 25 N. revoked at the principal's written re-
Sc. 436; Witherell v. Murphy, 147 quest, a written demand for securi-
Mass. 417. Where, according to the ties coming into the hands of the
original contract, the principal had agent by reason of the agency, made
given the agent three months' writ- by a party claiming to be an attor-
ten notice of revocation, which was ney of the principal, without a writ-
explicit and unequivocal, the agency ten order or other evidence of au-
was at an end; and the mere fact thority, was held not sufficient proof
that the agent continued to do busi- of revocation to enable the principal
ness for the principal, such as he to maintain a suit for the securities:
had done before, did not necessarily Tingley v. Parshall, 11 Neb. 443.
amount to a waiver or withdrawal " Stier v. Imperial Life Ins. Co.,
of such notice: Clover Condensed 58 Fed. 843; Willcox, etc., Co. v.
Milk Co. V. Cushman Bros. Co., 52 Ewing, 141 U. S. 627.
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he prove satisfactory, may be terminated at the will of the principals
Such a contract is in the nature of an unilateral agreement, being an
agreement on the one hand to serve or perform, but no agreement on
the other to employ for any definite time. Such contracts terminate
whenever the principal chooses to withhold employment.^ .The fact
that an agent or servant was hired at so much per year might con-
stitute proof that he was employed for a year, but not necessarily so,
if circumstances indicate the contrary intention.® Of course, much
must be left to be determined from the circumstances of each indi-
vidual case, it being impossible to lay down any definite rule for
deciding the question as to when the employment was to end where
the terms of the contract are not explicit. Thie general rule appli-
cable to all classes of contracts, that the courts will aim to ascertain,
from all the facts and circumstances of the transaction, what were
the intentions of the parties, will, of course, govern here also.
§ 157. By accomplishment of object for which agency was cre-
ated.—If, however, no specific time has been fixed, but the agency is
created simply for the accomplishment of some particular object,—as,
for example, the sale of certain lands, or the purchase of a horse, or
the collection of a debt,—the relation will terminate with the accom-
plishment of the object ; that is to say, with the sale of property, or the
purchase of the animal, or the collection and payment of the debt.^**
Therefore, where the owner of a parcel of land employed a broker
to sell the same, under an agreement that if the agent would obtain
a purchaser the owner would pay him a certain sum of money for
his services, the court ruled that the agency came to an end as soon
as the purchaser was procured.^^ And the duties of the agent are
discharged and the relation is ended with the delivery of the title
papers and the payment of the purchase price, when the agent was
employed to sell the property.^^ Where a real estate broker was
''Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) its will by a repealing act: Walker
280. V. Walker, 125 U. S. 339.
^ See Burton v. Great Northern R. " Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co.,
Co., 9 Exch. 507; Aspdin v. Austin, 106 Mass. 56. For a more extended
L. R. 5 Q. B. 671; Dunn v. Sayles, discussion of this subject, see post,
L. R. 5 Q. B. 685. Where an attor- § 278.
ney employed by the state fund com- "Ahern v. Baker, 34 Minn. 98;
missioners to prosecute claims Walker v. Derby, 5 Biss. (U. S.)
against the United States was to re- 134; Moore v. Stone, 40 Iowa 259.
ceive commissions for his services, " Short v. Millard, 68 111. 292.
the state could revoke the agency at "Walker v. Derby, 5 Biss. (U. S.)
134.
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employed to find a purchaser for land owned by the principal, at a
certain price, it was held that when this service was performed the
agent was at liberty to engage in the service of the purchaser in
securing a conveyance for the same land, and that there was no
longer any conflict between these s'ervices.^^ Generally, whenever a
real estate broker, employed for the purpose of selling land, has
found a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy, upon the terms
specified in his employment, his duties have been fully performed,
and the agency is ended.^* Where the owner of property placed the
same in the hands of a real estate broker for sale upon certain
terms, agreeing that the broker should be the exclusive agent for
the next six months, and that the agency should not be revoked except
upon payment of commission, it was held that the agency expired at
the end of six months, and that the agent was not entitled to collect
commissions when, long after the expiration of the six months, the
owner sold the property himself without consulting the agent, and
that the clause as to the revocation of authority must be held to mean
a cancellation within six months from the time the contract was
entered into.^^ And if no terms are stipulated, the duties of a real
estate agent are ended when he has produced a purchaser to whom
a sale is actually made by the principal. ^^ In an Illinois case, where
an agent was employed to secure a debt due the principal, and
the agent in settlement took notes indorsed by the debtor to the
.
principal, the court decided that the agency did not cease until the
notes had been delivered to and accepted by the principal, and that
until then the declarations of the agent were competent testimony
against the principal. ^^ ^Miere an agent is emplo3'ed to accomplish
a certain object, and the object is accomplished otherwise than by
his instrumentality, the agency is at an end. So, where a town
treasurer was authorized to borrow money for the payment of a
certain tax, and the tax was paid by other means, it was held that
the agent's authority to borrow money ceased when the tax was paid.^*
'^ Short v. Millard, 68 111. 292. ^^ Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush
"Fischer v. Bell, 91 Ind. 243; (Ky.) 358; Desmond v. Stebbins, 140
Neilson v. Lee, 60 Cal. 555; Monroe Mass. 339; Sibbald v. Bethlehem
V. Snow, 131 111. 126; Duclos v. Cun- Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378.
ningham, 102 N. Y. 678. ^' Wallace v. Goold, 91 111. 15.
" Learned v. McCoy, 4 Ind. App. ^^ Benoit v. Inhabitants of Conway,
238, 30 N. E. 717. 10 Allen (Mass.) 528.
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II. Termination hy Act of Party.
§ 158. By subsequent agreement of parties.—The parties may, of
course, agree at any time to dissolve the relation between them, and
thus end it, whatever may have been their contract as to its duration.^^
This may amount to a rescission of the original contract by agree-
ment, or it may be only a construction of its terms as to the time of
expiration. It would be rescission if, by its terms, the original con-
tract had not expired, and the agreement to dissolve were based upon
a sufficient consideration. If the original contract is ambiguous as
to its duration, the parties can agree to dissolve the relation, and
thus give a construction to its meaning which the courts will uphold.
§ 159. By revocation of principal or renunciation of agent.—
Either party to such a contract also has the power, though not always
the right, to revoke or renounce it before the expiration of the time
during which it is to run. Thus, the principal may at any time
revoke the authority of the agent, unless it is coupled with an
interest, or unless it is necessary to effectuate any security.^"
True, this would constitute a breach of the contract, for which, if
the agent were not in default, the principal would be liable to him in
"Wharton Ag., § 93. irrevocable, and it is not necessary
==" Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) that the authority be given in writ-
126; Story Ag., § 463; Montague v. ing: Terwilliger v. Ontario, etc., R.
McCarrolI, 15 Utah 318, 49 Pac. 419. Co., 149 N. Y. 86, 43 N. E. 432. TC
See Woods v. Hart, 50 Neb. 497, 70 the same effect, see American Loan,
N. W. 53; Kolb v. Bennett Land Co., etc., Co. v. Billings, 58 Minn. 187, 59
74 Miss. 567, 21 So. 233; Marbury v. N. W. 998. But an agreement to
Barnet, 40 N. Y. Supp. 76; Smith v. pay an attorney a percentum on col-
Dare, 89 Md. 47, 42 Atl. 909. It is lections to be made by him for the
not always easy to determine what client is not irrevocable as being an
is an authority coupled with an in- authority coupled with an interest:
terest. The subject will be fully con- Burke v. Priest, 50 Mo. App. 310.
sidered in a subsequent portion of And where a power of attorney was
this book. See post, § 181, et seq. given an agent to collect rents of a
Where the interest was merely con- farm, with directions to "advance
tingent upon the sale the agent was no rents before due," it was held
to make, it was not such as would this implied that there was no obli-
prevent a revocation: Hall v. Gam- gation to make any advances to the
brill, 88 Fed. 709. Under the rule principal, and hence, that the latter
that an authority is irrevocable when could revoke the power at will de-
coupled with an interest, it has been spite the fact that such advances
held that an authority to sell per- had been made: Smith v. Dare, 89
sonal property to satisfy a claim is Md. 47, 42 Atl. 909.
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damages. The question of remedy for a wrongful revocation will
be more fully considered hereafter, when we come to discuss the duties
of the parties to each other. On the other hand, the agent may re-
nounce the contract, and thus terminate the relation, and he may do
so without cause. This, too, is but a naked power, without a right.
It is not the policy of the law to force the parties to continue in the
relation contrary to their own volition. There is, therefore, no power
anywhere by which the parties may be kept together in the relation.
They are not without remedy, however, as we shall hereafter see.^^
As we have observed, the authority of the agent may be terminated
at any time by the principal's act of revocation. The authority, being
predicated upon the assent of the principal, is at an end when he
withdraws it, unless it be coupled with an interest or is necessary for
the purposes above mentioned, and this is true although it is stipulated
in the contract of appointment that the authority is irrevocable. --
§ 160. Revocation may be express or implied.—The authority may
be revoked expressly or by implication. If done expressly, the revoca-
tion may be in writing under seal, by an instrument in writing not un-
der seal, or by parol. If by implication, it may be inferred from the
conduct of the principal. In the absence of a statute, or a stipulation
in the contract of appointment to that effect, no writing or other
formality is necessary, although the appointment was made by a
-^ Post, § 269. See Chambers v. been notified, as such a proceeding
Seay, 73 Ala. 372; Blackstone v. But- savors of bad faith: Michael v.
termore, 53 Pa. St. 266; MacGregor Nashville Mut. Ins. Co., 10 La. Ann.
v. Gardner, 14 Iowa 326; ^tna Life 737. Where a person is appointed
Ins. Co. V. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347. An agent to sell the principal's property
agent or employe can not enforce and apply the proceeds to the pay-
specific performance of a contract of ment of his debts, the arrangement
employment, though wrongfully dis- being subject to the approval of the
charged, unless his agency was principal's creditors, it was held
coupled with an interest: Elwell v. that until such acceptance the
Coon (N. J. Eq.), 46 Atl. 580. creditors have no legal interest in
"Chambers v. Seay, 73 Ala. 372; the matter, and the principal may
Walker v. Denison, 86 111. 142; Hunt revoke the direction without their
V. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 174, consent. A demand of the property
201. But an agency can not be re- by the principal, in such case, oper-
voked when it is done for the sole ates as a revocation: Comley v.
purpose of depriving a court of ju- Dazian, 114 N. Y. 161. An agency
risdiction, so as to enable a foreign may be made irrevocable by special
insurance company to avoid the ef- contract, if based upon a good con-
fects of prospective judgment sideration: Wharton Ag., § 95.
against it for a loss of which it has
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sealed instrument.-^ If the conduct of the principal is such as to
lead clearly to the inference that he intended a revocation, it will be
implied. This may be done by his delegation of authority to another
agent when the first appointment was exclusive.^* Thus, where the
owner of land employs a broker to negotiate a sale of the land,
and the appointment is exclusive, the subsequent appointment of
another broker to sell the same land may be taken as a
revocation of the authority of the first. But if the authority is
not exclusive it will not be deemed revoked by the subsequent ap-
pointment of another agent to do the same thing. Custom has much
to do with this. If it is customary, for instance, among -real estate
brokers, to give the property to be sold into the hands of several
agents or brokers, it will be implied that such conduct is to be pur-
sued in the given instance. If the principal, after conferring such au-
thority upon the agent, sells the property himself, or if it is destroyed
by fire or otherwise, the agent's authority is revoked.^^ But an em-
ployment to collect a sum of money is not necessarily revoked by the
**Brookshire v. Brookshire, 8
Ired. (N. C.) 74, 47 Am. Dec. 341.
Where an agent was appointed by
two joint principals, it was held that
upon a severance of the joint in-
terest of the principals the agency
was terminated, even though the ob-
ject of his appointment was not yet
fully accomplished: Rowe v. Rand,
111 Ind. 206. The marriage of a
feme sole also has the effect of re-
voking an agency by her to another
to lease her lands; and a lease by
the agent subsequent to such mar-
riage is void: Linton v. Minneapo-
lis, etc., Co., 2 N. D. 232, 50 N. W.
357.
^ Copeland v. Mercantile Ins. Co.,
€ Pick. (Mass.) 198. Where the
agent has employed a subagent, the
revocation of the agent's authority
carries with it the revocation of the
authority of the subagent: Jack-
son Ins. Co. V. Partee, 9 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 296. But it is otherwise if
the subagent derived his authority
from the principal: Smith v. White,
5 Dana (Ky.) 376. Where an old
lady had authorized the defendant
in her suit to dismiss the same, but
afterward, and before such dismis-
sal, had executed a power of attor-
ney to her counselor to prosecute
the action to its conclusion, it was
held that the power of attorney con-
stituted a revocation of the author-
ity to dismiss: Aiken v. Taylor
(Tenn.), 62 S. W. 200. And so,
where a power of attorney was ex-
ecuted to convey lands, but the prin-
cipal conveyed the land by subse-
quent deed to the agent as trustee
of his son, it was held that the deed
from the principal to the agent, as
trustee, was a revocation of the
power of attorney, and a conveyance
by the agent under such power of
attorney was void: Chenault v.
Quisenberry (Ky.), 56 S. W. 410, 57
S. W. 234.
==Bissell V. Terry. 69 111. 184; Gil-
bert V. Holmes, 64 111. 548.
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engagement of another agent to do the same thing.^^ Instances of
revocation by implication are too numerous to warrant an attempt
at specification of any considerable number in this treatise. Where
the principal himself disposes of the subject-matter,^^ or where there
is a dissolution of a partnership which has an agent who had been
previously appointed,^® or where the agent was appointed by the joint
act of two principals and there is a severance of their interests,-^—any
of these or similar instances will be sufficient to authorize the con-
clusion that the principal has terminated the authority of his agent.
In some of the states, statutes provide how an authority conferred in
writing shall be revoked.
§ 161. Consequences of revocation—Between principal and
agent.—Having considered some of the methods by which an agency
may be revoked by the principal, it is proper that we should ascertain
what are the consequences that may flow from such revocation. And
first, as between the principal and the agent. When a principal dis-
charges his agent, he may do so for several reasons: 1. He may dis-
solve the relation because the agent was employed for no specific
period, but only during the will of the principal, until he should see
proper to discharge him. 2. He may revoke the authority because of
the misconduct of the agent, although by the contract the period of
service has not yet expired. 3. He may discharge the agent without
any good reason, and in violation of his contract; but in the latter
case a distinction must be made, as we have already seen, between the
power of the principal to discharge his agent and the right to do so.
If the revocation is prompted by the first and second causes above
enumerated, the principal has the right as well as the power to re-
voke ; and the agent has no remedy unless it be the recovery of com-
pensation up to the time of his discharge, if any be due him. But if
the principal revoke the authority without cause, he will be liable to
the agent for all damages that the latter may sustain by reason of the
wrongful act of the principal.^''
^ Davol V. Quimby, 11 Allen sequently sold by the principal, the
(Mass.) 208. sale is a revocation of the broker's
^^Ahern v. Baker, 34 Minn. 98. authority: Walker v. Denison, 86
Thus, the assignment of a judgment 111. 142; Torre v. Thiele, 25 La. Ann.
has been held to be a revocation 418. See also. Hale v. Kumler, 85
of the authority of plaintiff's attor- Fed. 161, 166, 167.
ney to control it: Trumbull v. =*Whitworth v. Ballard, 56 Ind.
Nicholson, 27 111. 149; Wilson v. 279.
Harris, 21 Mont. 374, 54 Pac. 46. =" Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206.
And where property is placed in ^- Lewis v. Atlas, etc., Ins. Co., 61
the hands of a broker, but is sub- Mo. 534.
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§ 162. When either party may terminate relation as of right.—
As has been seen, when the contract of employment contains no stipu-
lation or provision that the agent shall continue in the principal's
employment for a definite time, the relation may be dissolved, as of
right, by either party, at any time.^^ The contract of employment
may provide, as heretofore stated, that either party shall have the
right to dissolve the relation at any time he becomes dissatisfied with
it. When such is the contract, the dissatisfaction is a sufficient cause
for termination of the relation.^- Under the second specification
given in the preceding section, the principal may revoke the authority
when the agent is unfaithful in performing the services or executing
the authority conferred upon him; for it is the duty of the agent to
serve his principal with fidelity and diligence, and to perform properly
the services for which he is employed.^^
^Kirk V. Hartman, 63 Pa. St. 97.
*- Adriance v. Rutherford, 57 Mich.
170.
^Dieringer v. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311.
In this case it was said by Lyon, J.,
speaking for the court: "It is well
settled that if a servant, without the
consent of his master, engage in
any employment or business for
himself or another which may tend
to injure his master's trade or busi-
ness, he may lawfully be discharged
before the expiration of the agreed
term of service. This is so be-
cause it is the duty of the servant
not only to give his time and atten-
tion to his master's business, but, by
all lawful means at his command,
to protect and advance his master's
interests. But when the servant en-
gages in a business which brings
him in direct competition with his
master, the tendency is to injure
or endanger, not to protect and pro-
mote, the interests of the latter. It
was said by Lord Ellenborough, in
a discussion of this subject in
Thompson v. Havelock, 1 Camp. 527,
that 'no man shall be allowed to
have an interest against his duty.'
Manifestly, when a servant becomes
engaged in a business which neces-
sarily renders him a competitor and
rival of his master, no matter how
much or how little time and atten-
tion he devotes to it, he has an in-
terest against his duty. It would
be monstrous to hold that the mas-
ter is bound to retain the servant in
his employment after he has thus
voluntarily put himself in an atti-
tude hostile to his master's inter-
ests. The fact may be, in certain
cases, that, notwithstanding the
servant has engaged in a rival busi-
ness, still he has given his whole
time and attention to the business
of his master. An attempt was
made to show that this is such a
case. But the existence of that fact
will not take a case out of the rule
above stated, for the reason that the
servant would yet have an interest
against his duty. The cases which
sustain or tend to sustain the doc-
trine here laid down are very nu-
merous. For convenience we cite a
few of them: Singer v. M'Cormick,
4 W. & S. (Pa.) 265; Jaffray v. King,
34 Md. 217; Adams Express Co. v.
Trego, 35 Md. 47; Lacy v. Osbaldis-
ton, 8 C. & P. 80; Read v. Dunsmore,
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§ 163. Consequences of dissolution as between principal and third
persons—Notice.—The effect of the dissolution of the relation between
the principal and agent would naturally be the same upon third per-
sons as upon the immediate parties, provided such third party received
timely notice of the dissolution. But as the scope of authority of
some agents is often very extensive, and the persons with whom they
deal for their principals are very numerous, it frequently happens
that without some action on the part of the principal or agent appris-
ing them of the fact that the relation has ceased, third persons re-
main in ignorance of the change, and are in danger of becoming
injured by it, unless protected by the law. If a third party should
continue to deal with an agent in ignorance of the dissolution and
in continued reliance upon the credit of the principal, it is obvious
that he should not be made to suffer from the result of the condition
in the creation of which he had no part. Such a person should, from
considerations of justice and equity, have a right to expect that if
any "change occur in the situation between the principal and the
agent, and the former desire to be no longer responsible for the acts
of the latter done in his behalf, due and sufficient notice of such
change will be given him by the principal, in order that he may
be placed upon his guard as to any further dealings with the agent.
Hence, the courts have ruled that when it is established that general
authority has been delegated to the agent, the party who has been
dealing with him upon such authority may justly presume that the
relation still exists, and that if a revocation takes place the principal
will give him timely notice thereof ; and if, without such notice, and
9 C. & P. 588; Nichol v. Martyn, 2 at the latter, as well as to decrease
Esp. 732; Gardner v. M'Cutcheon, 4 the defendant's business interests.
Beav. 534; Ridgway v. Hungerford And it was equally hostile, even
Market Co., 3 A. & E. 171; Amor though the plaintiff conducted it en-
v. Fearon, 9 A. & E. 548; Horton tirely by agents, and gave his whole
v. McMurtry, 5 Hurl. & N. 667. See time and attention to the business
also, Wood on Master and Servant, of the defendant." That the agent
§ 116, and cases cited in notes. If eats morphine, which tends to in-
the plaintiff became engaged in a capacitate him for the performance
business which necessarily made of his duties, is not a sufficient
him a competitor of his employer ground to give the principal the
in the purchase of wood at New right to discharge him in the ab-
Cassel, or in selling the same at sence of a showing that it actually
Fond du Lac, such business had a incapacitates him: Jakowenko v.
direct tendency to raise the price Des Moines Life Ass'n, 21 Ohio C. C.
at the former place and depress it 199, 11 Ohio C. D. 576.
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iu good faith, he continues to deal with the agent as such, the acts of
the agent in behalf of the principal will bind the latter.^''
§ 164. Termination by act of agent—Renunciation.—The relation
between the principal and agent may be terminated, as has been seen,
by the agent's act of renouncing or abandoning the service of the
principal. A distinction must be observed here also, as in the case
of revocation by the principal, between the power of the agent to re-
nounce or abandon and his right to do so. His power to dissolve
the relation is as ample as that of the principal ; for, as before stated,
it is not the policy of the law to coerce the parties to continue the
relation, and specific performance will not generally be decreed in
order to continue the agency. Hence, even though the agency was,
by the contract, to continue for a definite time, and the contract was
based upon a sufficient consideration, the agent has the power to re-
nounce it before the expiration of the time ; subject, of course, to
the rights of the principal accruing to him by reason of the wrong-
ful renunciation.^^ If the relation was, by the terms of the con-
'* Fellows v. Hartford, etc., Co., 38
Conn. 197; Hatch v. Coddington, 95
U. S. 48; Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind.
206; Murphy v. Ottenheimer, 84 111.
39; Rice v. Barnard, 127 Mass. 241;
Tier v. Lampson, 35 Vt. 179; Mc-
Neilly v. Continental Life Ins. Co.,
66 N. Y. 23; Baltimore v. Eschbach,
18 Md. 276; Perrine v. Jermyn, 163
Pa. St. 497, 30 Atl. 202. Where a
power of attorney to sell and convey
land is duly recorded, a purchaser
without notice from the attorney
named in such instrument obtains a
better title than does a purchaser
from the grantor, whose deed was
executed before that of the attor-
ney, though not recorded: Gratz v.
Land and River Imp. Co., 82 Fed.
381, 40 L. R. A. 393. See also,
Johnson v. Christian, 128 U. S. 374;
Quinn v. Dresbach, 75 Cal. 159, 7
Am. St. 138; Murphy v. Ottenheimer,
84 111. 39, 25 Am. Rep. 424; Fanning
V. Cobb, 20 Mo. App. 577; ^tna
Life Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 81 Tex. 487;
9
—
Principal and Agent.
Smith V. "Watson, 82 Va. 712; Foel-
linger v. Leh, 110 Ind. 238. The no-
tice may be by oral or written state-
ment, or by course of dealing: Per-
rine v. Jermyn, supra.
^=U. S. V. Jarvis, 2 Daveis (U. S.)
278; Story Ag., § 478. If the agency
is based upon a valuable consider-
ation, the agent can not renounce it
without subjecting himself to lia-
bility for such damages as the prin-
cipal may sustain: See White v.
Smith, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 5; Case v.
Jennings, 17 Tex. 661. If the au-
thority of the agent is based upon
a sufficient consideration, the princi-
pal will have his remedy in dam-
ages. In case of a purely gratuitous
agency no damages can be collected
by the principal. If, however, the
agency were in part executed and
then renounced, the principal would
be entitled to such damages as might
be sustained by him. In all cases of
renouncement, however, the agent is
bound to give notice to the princi-
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tract, to continue at the will of the parties, or either of them, or
of the agent alone, the latter may, as of right, terminate it at any
time by giving reasonable notice.^*'
§ 165. How renunciation may be effected.—The renunciation, like
the revocation, may be express or implied. It is express when the
agent informs the principal, orally or in writing, that he will not
continue longer in his service, or uses words tantamount to these.
But the agent may accomplish the same result 1)y his conduct, without
an}^ express declaration. Thus, he may abandon the agency, in which
case the principal may treat the act as a renunciation and appoint
a new agent. ^^ The acts and conduct of an agent which may author-
ize the principal to regard the agency as abandoned are too numerous
to justify the statement of more of them than will be sufficient to
serve as an illustration. Thus, if the agent write to the principal
threatening to leave his work or sell oiit the subject-matter of the
agency, or do acts inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his
duties, this may be treated by the principal as an abandonment of
the agency.^^
Til. Termination hy Operation of Law.
§ 166. Derivative authority expires with the original authority.—
"A revocation by operation of law," says Story, "may be by a change
of condition or of state, producing an incapacity of either party.
This proceeds upon a general rule of law, that the derivative authority
expires with the original authority, from which it proceeds. The
power of constituting an agent is founded upon the right of the prin-
cipal to do the business himself ; and when that right ceases, the right
of creating an appointment, or of continuing the appointment of an
agent already made, for the same purpose, must cease also. In short,
the derivative authority can not generally mount higher or exist
longer than the original authority.'^^®
pal: Story Ag., § 478; Barrows v. ^ Stoddart v. Key, 62 How. Pr.
Cushway, 37 Mich. 481; Hitchcock v. (N. Y.) 137.
Kelley, 18 Ohio C. C. 808, 4 Ohio C. D. =' Stoddart v. Key, supra. Where
180. When the principal breaks his one who was authorized to sell a
contract with the agent the latter is slave attempted to run him off and
generally justifiable in abandoning conceal him, it was held that the
the agency: Duffield v. Michaels, 97 agent's conduct warranted the prin-
Fed. 825. cipal in treating the agency as aban-
=*> Barrows v. Cushway, 37 Mich, doned: Case v. Jennings, 17 Tex.
481; Conrey v. Brandegee, 2 La. Ann. 661.
132. '" Story Ag., § 481.
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§167. Death of principal—Is notice of required?—A naked au-
thority, by which is meant an authority not coupled with an interest, is
always revoked by the death of the principal.'*" Hence, the power
of a married woman to bind her husband for necessaries is not con-
tinued after the demise of the husband so as to bind his estate.*^ And
the death of the principal likewise terminates the authority of the
substitute, if there be one.*^ The rule of the common law, that the'
death of the principal terminates the agency unless the authority
is coupled with an interest, is too well settled to admit of contro-
versy, and it is not necessary even that the party who deals with
the agent should have notice of the fact. At least this is the
weight of authority. Those who deal with the agent do so at the
risk that his authority may be terminated by death without notice
to them.*^
§ 168. The rule of civil law and in equity—Holdings in some
states.—By the civil law the rule is different, and the authority of
the agent, as in the case of revocation by act of party, ceases only
from the time of notice. The civil law rule was followed in a
Pennsylvania case, where it was held that an act done by an attorney,
after the death of his principal, and in ignorance thereof, is binding
upon the parties."** In some states the rule of the common law has
^''Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S. 520, not revoked by the death of the
and note in 37 L. ed. 1167; Connor v. principal: Deweese v. Muff, 57 Neb.
Parsons (Tex.), 30 S. W. 83; Sol- 17, 42 L. R. A. 789.
tau V. Goodyear Vulcanite Co., 33 N. ^ Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167.
Y. Supp. 77; Krumdick V. White, 107 " Peries v. Aycinena, 3 W. & S.
Cal. 37, 39 Pac. 1066; In re Kern's (Pa.) 64, 79.
Estate, 176 Pa. St. 373, 35 Atl. 231; "Story Ag., § 488; Hunt v. Rous-
Tusch V. German Sav. Bank, 46 N. manier, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 174; John-
Y. Supp. 422; Pacific Bank v. Han- son v. Wilcox, 25 Ind. 182; Lincoln
nah, 90 Fed. 72; Brown v. Cushman, v. Emerson, 108 Mass. 87; Weber v.
173 Mass. 368, 53 N. E. 860; Duck- Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600; Clayton
worth v. Orr, 126 N. C. 674, 36 S. v. Merrett, 52 Miss. 353; Farmers'
E. 150; Triplett v. Woodward, 98 Loan, etc., Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y.
Va. 187^35 S. E. 455; Tuttle v. Green 284, 34 N. E. 784, 19 N. Y. Supp. 142;
(Ariz.), 48 Pac. 1009. See Daggett Jenkins v. Atkins, 1 Humph,
v. Simonds, 173 Mass. 340, 46 L. R. (Tenn.) 294, 34 Am. Dec. 648; Rigs
A. 332; Farmer V. Marvin (Kan.), 65 v. Cage, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 350;
Pac. 221. If, however, the subject- Lewis v. Kerr, 17 Iowa 73; Gait v.
matter of the agency is the collec- Galloway, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 332, 334;
tion of a note, and the agent has the Peries v. Aycinena, 3 W. & S, (Pa.)
same in his possession at the time of 64.
the principal's death, the agency is " Cassiday v. M'Kenzie, 4 W. & S.
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been modified bv statute.*^ Sometimes the right of a third person
to notice of the death of the principal is asserted upon equitable
grounds, the general rule at law that death terminates the agency-
being conceded.'*'^ But by the great weight of authority the death
of the principal immediately terminates the agency, and all dealings
with the agent thereafter are void, though the parties are at the
time ignorant of the principal's death.*^
§ 169. Exception—Where principal is a partnership firm.—An
apparent exception to the rule that death revokes the agent's author-
ity may be found in cases where the principal was a partnership
firm, and only one of the partners died. In such cases the authority
of the agent continues in qualified form after the death of the prin-
cipal.*^ But, generally speaking, the death of one of two or more
joint principals revokes the agency.*® The fact that the power of
attorney or instrument of appointment expressly provides that the
power is irrevocable makes no difference, unless the power is coupled
with an interest. Such a stipulation would doubtless prohibit the
principal from revoking the authority if he were alive, but death
will have the opposite etfect.^°
§ 170. A further exception—Where agency is coupled with in-
terest.—The rule that the death of the principal revokes the agency
(Pa.) 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76. See also, Davis v. Davis, 93 Ala. 173, 9 So.
Carriger v. Whittington, 26 Mo. 311, 756.
72 Am. Dec. 312. And where the '' See Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N.
matter to be done is in pais, and not Y. 600, 605.
by deed, and where it need not be *® See Cassiday v. M'Kenzie, 4 W. &
done in the name of the principal, S. (Pa.) 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76.
it has been held that if done by the *' Davis v. Windsor Sav. Bank, 46
agent after the principal's death, if Vt. 728; Companari v. Woodburn, 15
within the apparent scope of his au- C. B. 400; Saltmarsh v. Srfith, 32
thority, and in ignorance of the Ala. 404; Travers v. Crane, 15 Cal.
principal's death, it is valid; and 12; Carriger v. Whittington, 26 Mo.
the representatives of the principal 311; Lincoln v. Emerson, 108 Mass.
are estopped to deny such apparent 87; Houghtaling v. Marvin, 7 Barb.
authority: Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. (N. Y.) 412. See cases in note 40,
520. Where an agent, in pursuance supra.
of authority, ordered goods for his *^ Bank of New York v. Vander-
principal by mail, and the principal horst, 32 N. Y. 553; Merry v. Lynch,
died the next day, and before the 68 Me. 94; Primm v. Stewart, 7
order was filled, and the third party Tex. 178; Fereira v. Sayres, 5 W. &
filled the order in ignorance of the S. (Pa.) 210, 40 Am. Dec. 496.
principal's death, the contract was " Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206.
lield binding as of the day on which ^" Story Ag., § 488.
the order was deposited in the mail:
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does not apply to agencies in which an authorit}^ is coupled with an
interest, or in which the act may be performed in the name of the
agent himself. "Where the act, notwithstanding the death of the
principal, can and may be done in the name of the agent, there
seems to be a sound reason why his death should not be deemed to be
a positive revocation under all circumstances, and the subsequent
execution of it may be valid/'^^
§ 171. Death of agent.—The consequences resulting from the
death of the principal upon the relation between the parties are the
same in case of the death of the agent. To constitute an agency
there must be both an existing principal and an existing agent, and
the agent must be the person designated by the principal or his duly
authorized substitute. Moreover, it must be assumed that the agent
was selected by the principal on account of his peculiar fitness and
ability to perform the duties involved in the authority delegated to
him. The contract between the parties is a personal one, and can
be performed, as a general rule, only by the person appointed.
There is, therefore, no right of inheritance of the agent's position
by the representatives of the latter.^^ To this rule there is, however,
the usual exception existing in other cases of revocation, thai the
authority is not revoked by the agent's death if it be coupled with
an interest in the subject-matter. Hence, it has been held that
when a mortgage has been executed which contains a power to sell
the mortgaged property, the death of the mortgagee does not neces-
sarily revoke the authority to sell, but it may be executed by his
representatives or assigns.^^
§ 172. Death or severance of interest of one of two or more joint
principals or agents.—When there is a severance of the interest of one
of two or more joint principals in the subject-matter of the agency,
the authority of the agent is terminated. The same is true when
one of the joint principals dies: the death of the one has the effect
"Story Ag., § 495; Ish v. Crane, Hennessee v. Johnson, 13 Tex. Civ.
8 Ohio St. 520, 13 Ohio St. 574, 576, App. 530, 36 S. W. 774; Carleton v.
611. See also, Dick v. Page, 17 Mo. Hausler, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 49
234; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. S. W. 118; Grapel v. Hodges, 112 N.
(U. S.) 174; Davis v. Windsor Sav. Y. 419, 20 N. E. 542.
Bank, 46 Vt. 728. If the authority == Adriance v. Rutherford, 57 Mich,
is coupled with an interest it is not 170.
revoked by the principal's death: ''^Collins v. Hopkins, 7 Iowa 463.
Kelly v. Bowerman, 113 Mich. 446;
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of severing the joint interest; and hence the agency becomes re-
voked.^* And, likewise, the death of one of two or more joint pri-
vate agents has the effect of terminating the relation. The reason
for this rule is found in tlie requirement that a joint commission
of a private agency must be jointly executed, and the absence of one
of the agents renders it impossible to fulfil this requirement.^^
§ 173. Insanity of principal.—As a general rule it may be stated
that whenever the principal is rendered incapable of exercising an
intelligent control over his affairs, his capacity to appoint an agent
ceases; and, being thus incapable of making such an appointment, he
likewise becomes incapable of maintaining such a relation as that
of principal by his after-occurring insanity. But it is a more serious
question as to whether or not the insanity in itself will bring about
a dissolution of the relation, or whether it must be first established
by an inquest of lunacy. Chancellor Kent has indeed given it as
his opinion that the better rule would be that the existence of lunacy
must first be established by inquisition before it could control the
operation of the power.^^ But "by the weight of authority, as well
as sound reasoning, we would conclude that the after-occurring in-
sanity of the principal operates, per se, as a revocation or suspension
of agenc)'', except in cases where a consideration has previously been
advanced in the transaction of the subject-matter of the agency, so
that the power became coupled with an interest, or where a considera-
tion of value is given by a third person, trusting to the apparent
authority in ignorance of the principal's incapacity."^^ In an early
New York case the court held that the lunacy of a person who has
executed a power of attorney does not operate to revoke, at least
^Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206; vost, 35 111. App. 126. -Misconduct
Travers v. Crane, 15 Cal. 12; Marlett of an agent in conspiring with one
v. Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass.) 287. See of several joint principals against
also, Bank of New York v. Vander- the others will have the effect to re-
horst, 32 N. Y. 553; Tasker v. Shep- voke his agency, though nothing
herd, 6 Hurl. & N. 575. was done pursuant to the con-
^= Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wil- spiracy: Cotton v. Rand, 93 Tex. 7,
cox, 57 111. 180; Story Ag., § 42. 51 S. W. 538.
But where the principal recognized ^ 2 Kent Com. 645.
the surviving agent as the proper °^ Per Depue, J., in Matthiessen,
person to execute the authority, etc., Co. v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L.
without objection, it was held the 536. See also, Hill v. Day, 34 N. J.
case was taken out of the rule that Eq. 150; Bunce v. Gallagher, 5
the death of one joint agent termi- Blatchf. (U. S.) 481; Hunt v. Rous-
nates the agency: Davidson v. Pro- manier, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 174.
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until the fact has been established by an inquisition.^® The fact
that a principal was put under guardianship for insanity was held
in Yermont not necessarily sufficient proof that an agency previously
created by him had been terminated. To prove this it would have
to be shown by other evidence that the principal was disqualified.^® It
is believed to be the general rule, however, that the lunacy operates,
ipso facto, as a suspension of authority until the recovery of the
lunatic, the burden being on the third party to show he had no notice
of it; and if the latter then fails to dissent when informed of the
acts of his agent, his assent to the same may be inferred.*'" In ac-
cordance with this general rule, the supreme court of New Hamp-
shire, in a case where a party, previous to his death, held a note
against another, and on the day of "his death, and when he was
entirely senseless and no hopes were entertained of his recovery, his
wife, who had been his general agent for years past, and who had
been authorized to settle this concern in the manner she did, turned
the note over in settlement of a debt owing by the husband,—held
that the agency of the wife was revoked by the situation; the court
saying : "An authority to do an act for and in the name of another
presupposes a power in the individual to do the act himself, if
present. The act to be done is not the act of the agent, but the act
of the principal; and the agent can do no act in the name of the
principal which the principal might not himself do, if he were per-
sonally present. The principal is present by his representative, and
the making or execution of a contract or acknowledgment of a deed,
is his act or acknowledgment. But it would be preposterous, where
the power is in its nature revocable, to hold that the principal was,
in contemplation of law, present, making a contract or acknowledging
a deed, when he was in fact lying insensible on his deathbed, and
this fact well known to those who undertook to act with and for him.
The act done by the agent, under a revocable power, implies the
existence of volition on the part of the principal. He makes the
contract,—he does the act. It is done through the more active in-
strumentality of another, but the latter represents his principal and
uses his name. Farther, upon the constitution of an agent or attor-
ney to act for another, where the authority is not coupled with an
interest and not irrevocable, there exists at all times a right of super-
vision in the principal, and the power to terminate the authority
o'Wallis V. Manhattan Co., 2 Hall Bunce v. Gallagher, 5 Blatchf. (U.
(N. Y.) 495. S.) 481; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8
>' Motley V. Head, 43 Vt. 633. Wheat. (U. S.) 174.
«°Hill v. Day, 34 N. J. Eq. 150;
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of the agent at the pleasure of the principal. The la^r secure? to
the principal the right of judging how long he will be represented
by the agent and suffer him to act in his name. So long as, having
the power, he does not exercise the will to revoke, the authority con-
tinues. When, then, an act of Providence deprives the principal of
the power to exercise any judgment or will on the subject, the au-
thority of the agent to act should thereby be suspended for the time
being; otherwise the right of the agent would be continued beyond
the period when all evidence that the principal chose to continue the
authority had ceased; for after the principal was deprived of the
power to exercise any will upon the subject, there could be no assent,
or acquiescence, or evidence of any kind to show that he consented
that the agency should continue to exist. And, moreover, a confirmed
insanity would render wholly irrevocable an authority, which, by the
original nature of its constitution, it was to be in the power of the
principal at any time to revoke."®^ Seemingly at variance with the
generally accepted rule is the decision of the queen's bench division
in a case where a husband, who had held out his wife as his agent
to a tradesman and others, subsequently became insane, and during
the insanity the wife ordered goods of the tradesman, the latter iDeing
ignorant of the husband's insanity. The court ruled that the hus-
band's insanity did not dissolve the agency, and that his estate was
liable for the goods.®- The turning-point in this case, however, was
the third party's want of knowledge of the insanity.
§ 174. Insanity of agent.—As was stated in a previous chapter,
an idiot, lunatic, or other person non compos mentis, is generally
incapable of becoming an agent."^ The after-occurring insanity, if
of such nature as to render the agent incapable of performing the
duties imposed upon him, would seem to operate as a termination,
per se, of the relation, whether there has been a judicial declaration
of insanity or not; for in such a case the principal can not be pre-
sumed to have authorized the act done for him by one incapable of
performing it, the exercise of sound judgment and discretion being
required at all times, it would seem, as preliminaries to the due
execution of the authority conferred.^*
§ 175. Notice of agent's insanity.—If, however, the insanity be of
such a character as not to be readily apparent, and the third party
«' Davis V. Lane, 10 N. H. 156. <'^ Ante, § 38.
«= Drew v. Nunn, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. «* Story Ag., § 487.
661.
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deal with the agent in good faith, and in ignorance of the mental
unsoundness, and the parties can not be restored to their original
situation*, an executed transaction will not become invalid b}^ reason
of the agent's mental unsoundness."^ A judicial determination of
the agent's lunacy, however, will be sufficient notice to third parties;
and subsequent dealings with him will be at their peril.
§ 176. Insanity of one of two or more joint agents.—A joint
private agency must be executed by the agents jointly; and hence, if
one of them becomes incompetent by insanity or otherwise, the au-
thority will thereby be revoked, the same as in case of the death
of the joint agent. *^"
§ 177. Bankruptcy of principal.—A party who has been adjudged
a bankrupt is thereby rendered incompetent, until discharged, to
apply the funds or property in his hands to the payment or adjust-
ment of his obligations, that power being transferred to his trustee.
Being incapacitated to transact such business himself, he could not
legally authorize an agent to do so for him, as otherwise the deriva-
tive and implied authority would be stronger and more extensive
than the original and principal authority of the party himself, which
can not be. The consequence is that the bankruptcy of the principal
revokes the power of the agent, and such power ceases with the trans-
fer of the principal's effects to the trustee in bankruptcy.®^ This
rule does not apply, however, to cases in which the agent's authority
is coupled with an interest. "^^ While the proceedings in bankruptcy
are pending, the power of the agent to act is suspended, but third
persons dealing with the agent in good faith will not be affected by
such proceedings until after the adjudication in which the bank-
ruptcy is judicially declared."® Nor is an agenc}^ affected by the
bankruptcy where it does not involve the bankrupt's control over the
subject-matter of the agency. '^°
§ 178. Bankruptcy of agent.—Whether or not the bankruptcy of
an agent will revoke his authority depends on the nature of the
agency. When the agency is such as to render the agent's solvency
8=Mechem Ag., § 260. Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206; Story
"'Salisbury v. Brisbane, 61 N. Y. Ag., § 482.
617. '^ Hall v. Bliss, 118 Mass. 554.
''Parker v. Smith, 16 East 382; ""Ex parte Snowball, L. R. 7 Ch.
Minett v. Forrester, 4 Taunt. 541; App. 548.
" Dixon v. Ewart, Buck 94.
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necessary to a due and faithful performance of the act, as where he
is authorized to receive the principal's money, or to sell his propert}',
the authority will generally be terminated by the agent's bank-
ruptcy.'^ Other and mere formal acts, passing no interests, such
as the execution and delivery of a deed, may still be performed by
the agent when he has obtained the previous authority to do so from
his principal. "-
§ 179. Breaking out of war.—Another cause for the termination
of the relation is the occurrence of war between the country of the
principal and that of the agent. 'When hostilities break out between
two states, all commercial intercourse between them is, by the rules
of international law, forbidden.^^ But, as was observed in the cjiap-
ter on competency of parties, when the agency existed prior to the
breaking out of hostilities, and the parties consent to its continua-
tion, it will not necessarily be dissolved by reason thereof, unless the
agency involves communications across the line of hostilities.'^* An-
other exception to the general rule that war terminates the agency
is in cases where debts are paid to the agent of the alien enemy,
when such agent resides in the state of the debtor, and the principal
and agent assent in good faith that this may be done."^
§ 180. Marriage of feme sole.—If the principal be an unmarried
female, under the common law she will become incompetent when
she contracts marriage, and a power of attorney executed by her while
a feme sole will be revoked by the marriage. This rule is still in
force in some jurisdictions to the extent that the common-law dis-
abilities of a married woman have not been removed by statute."*'
In some instances the power of attorney of a man executed while
single will become inoperative by his marriage. Thus, where an un-
married man kad executed a power of attorney to an agent to sell his
homestead, is was held to be revoked by his marriage ; inasmuch as the
"Audenried v. Betteley, 8 Allen 656; Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S.
(Mass.) 302; Hudson v. Granger, 5 425.
B. & Aid. 27. "* Kershaw v. Kelsey, supra. See
""Audenried v. Betteley, 8 Allen also, Clark v. Reeder, 158 U. S. 505;
(Mass.) 302; Story Ag., § 486; 2 Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55.
Kent Com. (4th ed.) 644, 645, Lect. "Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S.
XLi. 425; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
'^ Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. Statham. 93 U.' S. 24.
561; U. S. V. Grossmayer, 9 Wall. ""Wambole v. Foote, 2 Dak. 1.
(U. S.) 72; Lyon v. Kent, 45 Ala.
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wife, by virtue of the marriage, became entitled to an inchoate interest
in the homestead, of which she could not be deprived without her
consent, manifested by joining her husband in a conveyance.'^^
§ 181. Authority coupled with interest.—It has been seen that
an agency can not be revoked by the act of the principal, nor will
it be revoked by operation of law, where the authority of the agent is
coupled with an interest. Just what is such an interest is sometimes
difficult to determine. As a general rule, we think it may be safely
stated that when the interest is merely in the power, and not in the
subject of the agency ;, it is not sufficient to prevent a revocation.
§ 182. Illustrations of insufficient interest.—The interest must be
such as to survive the principal in case of death, or in that and other
eases of revocation, must be such as the agent is authorized to execute
in his own name and not in the name of the principal. Thus, if
the interest is merely by way of compensation out of the proceeds of
the sale of property forming the subject of the agency, no matter
how great the proportion to the principal sum, it is not sufficient to
prevent a revocation.'^® The power and interest must coexist. If the
interest be only in the proceeds collected under the power, and the ex-
ercise of the power would operate as an extinguishment of the power,
it is not a sufficient interest to satisfy the rule.'^^ A bare power is
always revocable. Hence, if a debtor deposit money with another
to be paid by him to a creditor, the money deposited will remain the
property of the debtor until paid over to the creditor, and the agency
will ]ye revoked either by the act of the parties or by operation
of law. A power of attorney may indeed be irrevocable by its terms,
but to uphold such an agreement there must be a consideration or
independent compensation to be rendered for the services to be per-
formed.*" If there is merely a power to a creditor to receive a debt
expressly for the purpose of liquidating the claim of the creditor,
unaccompanied by an actual assignment of the debt, or by any
security to which the power might have been ancillary, it is revoked
"Henderson v. Ford, 46 Tex. 627. v. Harsha, 7 Kan. App. 794, 54 Pac.
"Chambers v. Seay, 73 Ala. 372. 21. See ajite. § 159, note.
To constitute a power of agency " Hartley & Minor's Appeal, 53 Pa.
coupled with an interest, both the St. 212; Blackstone v. Buttermore,
agency and the interest must be de- 53 Pa. St. 266; Frink v. Roe, 70 Cal.
rived from the same source: Black 296.
'" Blackstone v. Buttermore, supra.
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by the death of the prineipal.^^^ And a power of attorney to confess
judgment in favor of a third person, unless based upon some special
consideration or given to secure a debt, may be revoked at the will
of the prineipal.^^ Where authority is conferred to sell land and
apply the proceeds to the extinguishment of a debt owing to the
principal, it has been held that the interest is in the proceeds merely,
and not in the subject, the land; and the power is, therefore, revoca-
ble.^* But in other cases such an interest as that has been suffi-
cient to render the power irrevocable.**
§ 183. Illustrations of sufficient interest—Revocation where agent
would suflter loss.—Generally speaking, if the interest of the agent
is in the thing itself that constitutes the subject of the agency, and
not merely in the proceeds or avails thereof,—that is, "a power en-
grafted on an estate in the thing,"—it is sufficient to render the power
irrevocable.**^ Some instances of this kind are:—Where the power
conferred is that the agent may reimburse himself for advances made
in- the course of the agency ;'*^ where it is given to secure a debt or de-
mand ;*" or to reimburse a factor for prior advances f"^ or to indemnify
a surety against loss;** or where a note has been indorsed and deliv-
ered by the principal to the agent for collection, thus transferring the
legal title and enabling the agent to sue in his own name ; -® or where a
mortgagor has empowered the mortgagee to sell the property for the
purpose of paying an indebtedness."" In all such cases the agent
or party to whom the power is delegated acquires not merely the
right to exercise that power, but also a quasi title in the thing itself
concerning which the agency is formed. It is not merely an interest
in that which has to be produced by the exercise of power, but an
interest in the thing out of which it is to be produced.®^ It is some-
times stated that an agency is irrevocable where the revocation would
result in injury or loss to the agent by way of damages to third per-
sons. Thus, where a debtor intrusts money to his agent to deliver to
^ Houghtaling v. Marvin, 7 Barb. "= Posten v. Rassette, 5 Cal. 467.
(N. Y.) 412. *« Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat.
'-Evans v. Fearne, 16 Ala. 689, 50 (U. S.) 174; Beecher v. Bennett, 11
Am. Dec. 197. Barb. (N. Y.) 374, 380.
^^ Frink v. Roe, 70 Cal. 296. " Raleigh v. Atkinson, 6 M. & W.
^Gaussen v. Morton, 10 B. & C. 670.
731; Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609; ^ Hynson v. Noland, 14 Ark. 710.
Watson v. King, 4 Camp. 272. '^ Moore v. Hall, 48 Mich. 143.
**a-Hunt V. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. '"' Conners v. Holland, 113 Mass.
(U. S.) 174; Smart v. Sandars, 5 50.
C. B. 895. "^ Hunt v. Rousmanier, supra.
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a creditor, in payment of a debt, and the agent promises the
creditor to pay the debt, the agent is liable to the creditor for
the payment of the debt to the extent of the funds received, and in
case of failure to pay, the agent will be liable in damages. The
agency can not, therefore, be revoked by the act of the principal or
by operation of law in such a case, as that would render the agent
personally liable without being reimbursed by the principal; hence,
such an agency becomes irretocable by reason of the receipt of money
by the agent and his promise to pay the same.^^ This is, however,
after all, nothing but an authority coupled with an interest.^^
»* Goodwin v. Bowden, 54 Me. 424. '^ Anson Cents. (Tth ed.) 358.
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§ 184. Purpose of this chapter.—\Ye have heretofore seen that
the power which is delegated to an agent by his principal, or
is exercised by him, is denominated the agent's authority; that it
may be express,—as when conferred by a writing under seal, or by a
writing not under seal, or by word of mouth ; that it may be implied
from the surrounding circumstances and the acts, declarations and
conduct of the principal; or that it may simply be assumed by the
agent without any previous appointment, and subsequently ratified
by the principal; or that it may exist by operation of law.^ We
have also seen that such authority may be universal, general or
special ; thus constituting a universal agency, a general agency or a
special agency.- It is the purpose of this chapter to ascertain what
authority may and what authority may not be delegated; the nature
and extent of the agent's authority ; how such authority is determined,
interpreted and construed in particular cases ; its effect, generally,
and by custom and usage of trade; its operation on various classes
of agencies; and how such authority is executed by the agent.
§ 185. Delegation of authority.—And first it will be proper to
give a somewhat more extended presentation of the subject of the
delegation of authority than that already given. " 'Delegation,' in
the sense assigned to the term at the common law," says Evans,
"means the act of investing one or more persons with authority to
do some act or acts. The term is applicable not only to cases where
"Ante, §9. ^ Ante, §§18, 19.
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the person who delegates has himself authority in his own right to do
the act the performance of which he delegates to another, but also
to those cases where the person who delegates has only a delegated
and not an original authority to do that which he delegates to an-
other. In other words, the appointment of a subagent by an agent,
no less than that of an agent by a principal, involves a delegation
of authority. An authority or power, then, is either original or it is
delegated. Where the authority is original, the general maxim of
the law of England applies, that whatever a person may do of his
own right he may do by another. Where, on the other hand, the
authority in question is a delegated authoritj^ the well known rule
is that such authority can not be delegated."^
§ 186. What acts can not be performed for one by another.—The
maxim just stated implies that even original authority is not always
capable of being delegated ; for one may not legally delegate authority
to do what one can not himself legally perform. Therefore, as we
have heretofore explained, a person can not legally delegate the
performance of an illegal or immoral act. But there are some things
which a man may do himself and yet can not do by another. Thus,
he can not delegate authority to perform an act of a personal nature
;
that is, an act which, to be valid, must be performed by the party
himself. Therefore, a person could not render homage or fealty by
another, as such service was personal. "So the lord might beat his
villain, and if it were without cause the villain had no remedy; but
the lord could not authorize another to beat him without cause."*
And a married woman can not delegate to another person the power
to acknowledge an instrument for her, as that comes within the
class of acts that must be personally performed.^
§ 187. Delegated authority can not be delegated.—It is a well
established general rule, though not without its exceptions, that dele-
gated authority can not be redelegated. The maxim is, "Delegatus
non potest delegare." The rule is founded upon solid grounds. An
^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) Fargo v. Cravens (S. D.), 70 N. W.
75-76; Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis. 409, 1053.
50 L. R. A. 600, 83 N. W. 647; Spring- ^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
field, etc., Ins. Co. v. DeJarnett 78; Combe's Case, 9 Co. 75a.
(Ala.), 19 So. 995; Ladonia Dry = Dawson v. Shirley, 6 Blackf.
Goods Co. V. Conyers (Tex. Civ. (Ind.) 531; Holladay v. Dailey, 19
App.), 58 S. W. 967; Dingley v. Mc- Wall. (U. S.) 606.
Donald. 124 Cal. 682, 57 Pac. 574;
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agent, or one to whom is intrusted the performance of an act by an-
other, is supposed to be selected by the principal with reference to his
peculiar fitness for and adaptation to the principal's business. The
undertaking may require a certain kind of ability, skill, judgment and
discretion; and the person whom the principal selects as his agent is
supposed to possess these qualities. He is, therefore, delectus per-
sonae, and he alone can legally perform the business intrusted to
him ; unless, indeed, the principal's assent be obtained to the appoint-
ment of a substitute.^ Hence, we have the further rule that, in the
absence of any authority, either express or implied, to employ a sub-
agent, the trust committed to the agent is personal, and can not be
delegated by him to another so as to affect the rights of the principal.
In such cases, if the agent employs a substitute, he does it at his own
risk and upon his own responsibility.' The principle enunciated
above is well illustrated in a recent case decided by the supreme
court of Indiana.'^ In that case, a party had made application for
a license to sell intoxicating liquors at retail, under a statute of that
"Lynn v. Burgoyne, 13 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 400; Warner v. Martin, 11
How. (U. S.) 209; Darling v. St.
Paul, 19 Minn. 389; Alexander v.
Alexander, 2 Ves. Sr. 640; McClure
v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co., 4
Mo. App. 148; Titus v. Cairo, etc.,
R. Co., 46 N. J. L. 393; Connor v.
Parker, 114 Mass. 331; Emerson v.
Providence Hat Co., 12 Mass. 237;
Planters', etc., Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank, 75 N. C. 534; Waldman v.
North British, etc., Ins. Co., 91 Ala.
170, 24 Am. St. 883; Fairchild v.
King, 102 Cal. 320; Tynan v. Dullnig
(Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. 465; At-
lee y. Fink, 75 Mo. 100, 43 Am. Rep.
385; Hunt v. Douglass, 22 Vt. 128;
Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 13
Am. Rep. 716; Loeb v. Drakeford, 75
Ala. 464. Duties of public oflficers
which are judicial or discretionary,
or governmental in their nature, can
not be delegated: Maxwell v. Bay
City Bridge Co., 41 Mich. 454; Peo-
ple v. Bank of North America, 75
N. Y. 547; Commonwealth v. Smith,
10
—
Principal and Agent,
143 Mass. 169; Bradley Fertilizer
Co. V. Taylor, 112 N. C. 141; Sey-
mour Woollen Factory Co. v. Brod-
hecker, 130 Ind. 389; Pressley v.
Lamb, 105 Ind. 171; McGuffie v.
State, 17 Ga. 497; Jackson v.
Buchanan, 89 N. C. 74; Lyon v. Je-
rome, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 485, 37 Am.
Dec. 271.
^ Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4
Gray (Mass.) 518. See also, Mc-
Croskey v. Hamilton, 108 Ga. 640,
34 S. E. Ill; Springfield, etc., Ins.
Co. V. DeJarnett (Ala.), 19 So. 995.
But in some cases,—where, for ex-
ample, from the nature of the busi-
ness it is apparent that subagents
are required,—the power to appoint
these is often inferred from the
character of the duties and general
authority of the agent: McKinnon
V. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 17 Am. St.
178; Lingenfelter v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 19 Mo. App. 252.
'Cochell V. Reynolds, 156 Ind. 14,
58 N. E. 1029.
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state. It was provided in the statute that if a majority of the legal
voters of a township or ward of a city should sign a remonstrance and
file it with the county auditor, it should be unlawful for the county
board to grant the license.® It was shown that a remonstrance was
filed in this particular case to which a number of names had been
signed by an agent under a power of attorney authorizing him to
sign the names of the principals to any remonstrance against the
granting of a license to any person lie might see fit to remonstrate
against 'receiving such license, and to file the same in the auditor's office
at any time he might see fit ; such power to cover a period of two years
from the time it was granted to such agent. Unless the names signed
by the agent under this power of attorney could be legally counted,
it was agreed that the remonstrance did not contain the required
number of signatures. The court held that the power to remon-
strate in such a case was one that had been delegated by the legisla-
ture to the voters of the townships and wards, thus committing
to each voter the right to decide whether or not he would approve any
or all applications; that the right of the voter to remonstrate, being
a delegated right, could not be redelegated by him unless such power
to redelegate had been expressly conferred by the legislature, which
had not been done in this instance.®^
§ 188. Exceptions to the rule.—There are, however, certain well
known exceptions to the general rule. One of these is that when the
act to be performed by the agent is purely mechanical or ministerial
in its nature, and does not require the exercise of Judgment, discretion
or skill, or has in it no element of trust, the agent may lawfully au-
thorize another to perform it.^" Illustrations of agencies requiring
the performance of mere mechanical or ministerial acts are found in
= Burns' Jl. S. Ind. 1901, § 7283i. North America, 75 N. Y. 547; Star
^a But where no discretion was Line v. Van Vliet, 43 Mich. 364;
conferred upon the agent, but he was Drum v. Harrison, 83 Ala. 384;
instructed to remonstrate against Grinnell v. Buchanan, 1 Daly (N.
"any applicant," such delegation of Y.) 538; McEwen v. Mazyck, 3 Rich.
power to sign the remonstrance was (S. C.) 210; Yates v. Freckleton, 2
held valid: Ludwig v. Cory (Ind.), Doug. 623; Crooke v. Kings County.
64 N. E. 14. See also, White v. 97 N. Y. 421; Kohl v. Beach, 107
Furgeson (Ind. App.), 64 N. E. Wis. 409, 50 L. R. A. 600, 83 N. W.
49. 647; McCroskey v. Hamilton, 108 Ga.
^"Johnson v. Osenton, L. R. 4 640, 34 S. E. Ill; Dingley v. Mc-
Exch. 107; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Donald, 124 Cal. 682, 57 Pac. 574;
Mon. (Ky.) 648, 662; Achorn v. McConnell v. Mackin, 48 N. Y. Supp.
Matthews, 38 Me. 173; Chase v. Os- 18, 22 App. Div. (N. Y.) 537; and
trom, 50 Wis. 640; People v. Bank of cases cited in note 9a, supra.
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eases in which an agent is authorized by his principal to bind him
by signing accommodation paper, acceptances, etc. In such caseS'
the agent, having first made up his mind as to the propriety of the
act, may delegate the writing or signing of the paper or papers to
another." And an agent appointed to sell land may authorize a
subagent to find a purchaser.^- The same principle is applicable to
cases where agents are authorized to issue insurance policies, the
authority to do the mere clerical part, such as filling out, and even
signing the policies, being such as may be exercised by subagents or
clerks.^^ And likewise, an insurance agent may employ clerks, au-
thorizing them to contract for risks, deliver policies and renewals, and
collect premiums ; and the acts of such clerks are regarded as the acts
of the company and will bind the latter.^'*
§ 189. When authority to redelegate will be implied—Banks and
their correspondents—Conflict in the decisions.—When custom or
usage sanctions the redelegation of authority to subagents or
assistants, the power to redelegate will be implied; and it is not
necessary that express power to do so be shown.^^ Instances of this
kind occur where paper is intrusted to banks for collection. Thus,
if a note or a draft payable at a distant point is left with a local
bank for collection, it can not, according to one line of cases, be re-
quired of the bank that collection be made by it or its emploj'es
directly, it being deemed permissible in such eases that the bank
only send the paper to one of its correspondents for that purpose,
and the owner or depositor of the paper is presumed to have assented
thereto. jSTecessity, it would seem, prompts this course of dealing;
for it might be a matter of extreme hardship, if not of impossibility,
"Commercial Bank v. Norton, 1 15 Ind. App. 623; May v. Western
Hill (N. Y.) 501. Assiir. Co., 27 Fed. 260; ArfC v. Star
'- Renwick v. Bancroft, 56 Iowa Fire Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 57, 21 Am.
527. St. 721; McGonigle v. Susquehanna.
'^ Grady v. American, etc., Ins. Co., etc., Ins. Co., 168 Pa. St. 1; Phoenix
60 Mo. 116, 120. See Insurance Co. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 7 Tex. Civ. App.
v. Thornton (Ala.), 30 So. 614; 13; Goode v. Georgia Home Ins. Co.,
Springfield, etc., Ins. Co. v. DeJar- 92 Va. 392, 53 Am. St. 817.
nett (Ala.), 19 So. 995. "Combe's Case, 9 Co. 75a; Wilson
"Bodine v. Exchange Fire Ins. v. Smith, 3 How. (U. S.) 763; Mayer
Co., 51 N. Y. 117; Eclectic Life Ins. v. McLure, 36 Miss. 390; Lynn v.
Co. V. Fahrenkrug, 68 111. 463; Lin- Burgoyne, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 400;
genfelter v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. Lamson v. Sims, 48 N. Y. Super.
App. 252; Indiana Ins. Co. v. Hart- 281; Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass.
well, 123 Ind. 177; German Fire Ins. 396; Smith v. Sublett, 28 Tex. 163.
Co. v. Columbia Encaustic Tile Co.,
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for the bank in sucli a case to be required to do the collecting in
person or become an insurer thereof, for the small commission usually
charged. And as an agent's authority generally includes the power
of employing all the means that are usual and necessary to execute
the trust, the agent bank should have the implied authority in such
cases to send the paper to a correspondent, without whose assistance
it could not effectually carry out its employment.^® On the other
"Harralson v. Stein, 50 Ala. 347;
Strong V. Stewart, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
137; Bank of Washington v. Trip-
lett. 1 Pet. (U. S.) 25; Siner v.
these cases is that where the first
bank has used due diligence in se-
lecting a correspondent and forward-
ing the claim to it, it has done all
Stearne, 155 Pa. St. 62; Masich v. that it is required to do. Thus, in
Citizens' Bank, 34 La. Ann. 1207; the case of East-Haddam Bank v.
East-Haddam Bank v. Scovil, 12 Scovil, 12 Conn. 303, it was said by-
Conn. 303; Kavanaugh v. Farmers' Huntington, J., speaking for the
Bank, 59 Mo. App. 540; Daly v. court: "The plaintiff's place of busi-
Butchers', etc.. Bank, 56 Mo. 94, 17 ness was East-Haddam. The bill was
Am. Rep. 663; Planters', etc., Bank payable in New York. It was neces-
V. First Nat'l Bank, 75 N. C. 534; sary that it should be transmitted to
Second Nat'l Bank v. Cummings, 89 the latter place for collection. These
Tenn. 609; ^tna Ins. Co. v. Alton facts were known to the defendant.
City Bank, 25 111. 221; Guelich v. who must also have known that the
National State Bank, 56 Iowa 434; plaintiffs could do no more than
Jackson v. Union Bank, 6 Harr. & transmit it to the city of New York,
J. (Md.) 146; Bank of Louisville v. to a reputable correspondent, accord-
First Nat'l Bank, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) ing to their usual course of business,
101; Stacy v. Dane Co. Bank, 12 to be collected. All this was done
Wis. 629; Fabens v. Mercantile by the plaintiffs. Under such cir-
Bank, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 330; Dor- cumstances it can not justly be
Chester, etc., Bank v. New England claimed that the plaintiffs should
Bank, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 177; Drovers' have become insurers against the
Nat'l Bank v. Anglo-American, etc., defaults of their correspondents.
Co., 117 111. 100; Merchants' Nat'l Such a doctrine would be as inequi-
Bank v. Goodman, 109 Pa. St. table as it might be oppressive and
422; Bedell v. Harbine Bank (Neb.), ruinous to banks, who are merely
86 N. W. 1060; Davis v. King, 66 the medium through which the
Conn. 465; Planters', etc.. Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank, 75 N. C. 534;
holders of bills and drafts payable
in other states transmit them for
Blakeslee v. Hewett, 76 Wis. 341. collection. If they act in good
Where this view prevails it is faith, in the selection of an agent
made applicable only to such to protect the interests of the holder
collections as require to be
sent to a distance; it does not ap-
of the bill, in cases where it is ob-
vious an agent must be selected for
ply to collections at the home of such purpose, what principle of jus-
the bank. See also, American Exch. tice or commercial policy requires
Nat'l Bank v. Thuemmler. 94 111. that they should be held liable for
App. 622. The general holding of any neglect of duty on the part of
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hand, there is a strong line of cases holding that in such a contract
there is no privity between the depositor of the collection and the
correspondent bank, and that the latter is but the servant or agent
of the bank to whom the paper has been intrusted, that bank occupy-
ing the position of a principal that is responsible for the acts of its
agents or servants. According to this view, the first bank must
account to the owner or depositor of the paper, and is responsible
for the conduct of its correspondent without reference to the question
as to whether or not it exercised diligence in the selection of such
correspondent. This view is based upon the theory of public policy,
and that the consideration paid to the first bank will warrant the
presumption that such bank has undertaken to do the collecting and
can not shift the responsibility upon any one else. "The distinction,"
said the supreme court of the United States, "between the liability
of one who contracts to do a thing and that of one who merely re-
ceives a delegation of authority to act for another is a fundamental
one, applicable to the present case. If the agency is an undertaking
to do the business, the original principal may look to the immediate
contractor with himself, and is not obliged to look to inferior or dis-
tant under-contractors or subagents, when defaults occur injurious
to his interest." Whether the paper is to be collected in the place
where the bank is situated or elsewhere, the court says is immaterial.
"In either case, there is an implied contract of the bank that the
proper measures shall be used to collect the draft, and a right, on
the part of its owner, to presume that proper agents will be em-
ployed, he having no knowledge of the agents. There is, therefore,
such agent? To impose this liabil- ble he should assume the risk of the
ity would make a special contract defaults of the collecting agent,
excluding it necessary in all cases, rather than the bank, who merely
or it would render the collection of transmits its bills and selects the
bills of this description extremely agent, with the consent of the
difficult. It would tend very much to holder, and with a perfect knowl-
destroy the facilities which at pres- edge on his part that such selections
ent exist, of making collections must be made; and when the power
through the agency of banks, and is exercised in good faith, and with
subject the holders of bills to incon- reasonable care, and according to
venience.and expense, and probably, general usage. The views we have
in many cases, to serious loss. The thus expressed, so eminently just,
mode now adopted and in general and so well calculated to protect the
use is well calculated to insure col- rights of all concerned, are sanc-
lections with promptitude, at a tri- tioned by many adjudications of
fling expense, and without trouble high authority."
to the holder. It is highly reasona-
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no reason for liabilit}^ or exemption from liability in the one ease
which does not apply in the other. And while the rule of law is thus
general, the liabilitj' of the bank may be varied by consent, or the
bank may refuse to undertake the collection. It may agree to re-
ceive the paper only for transmission to a correspondent, and thus
make a different contract and become responsible only for good faith
and due discretion in the choice of an agent. If this is not done, or
there is no implied understanding to that effect, the same responsi-
bility is assumed in the undertaking to collect foreign paper and in
that to collect paper payable at home. On any other rule, no prin-
cipal contractor would be liable for the default of his own agent,
where, from the nature of the business, it was evident he must em-
ploy subagents. The distinction recurs, between the rule of merely
personal representative agency and the responsibility imposed by the
law of commercial contracts. This solves the difficulty and recon-
ciles the apparent conflict of decision in many cases. The nature
of the contract is the test. If the contract be only for the immediate
services of the agent and for his faithful conduct as representing
his principal, the responsibility ceases with the limits of the personal
services undertaken. But where the contract looks mainly to the
thing to be done, and the undertaking is for the due use of all proper
means to perform it, the responsibility extends to all necessary and
proper means to accomplish the object, by whomsoever used."^^
" Per Blatchford, J., in Exchange Bank v. State Nat'l Bank, 128 N. Y.
Nat'l Bank v. Third Natl Bank, 112 26; Commercial Bank v. Union
U. S. 276. The English cases sup- Bank, 11 N. Y. 203; Ayrault v. Pa-
port the doctrine of the liability of cific Bank, 47 N. Y. 570; Allen v.
the first bank for the actsi or omis- Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend. (N. Y.)
sions of the correspondent bank: 215; Corn Exch. Bank v. Farmers'
Mackersy v. Ramsays, 9 CI. & F. Nat'l Bank, 118 N. Y. 443; Castle v.
818; Van Wart v. Woolley, 3 B. & Corn Exch. Bank, 148 N. Y. 122;
C. 439, 10 E. C. L. 145, 5 D. & R. Simpson v. Waldby, 63 Mich. 439;
374; Cobb v. Becke, 6 Q. B. 930, 51 Streissguth v. National, etc., Bank,
E. C. L. 930. This doctrine is recog- 43 Minn. 50, 19 Am. St. 213; Davey
nized in the federal courts of the v. Jones, 42 N. J. L. 28, 36 Am. Rep.
United States and the courts of New 505; Titus v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank,
York, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jer- 35 N. J. L. 588; Reeves v. State
sey, Ohio. Montana, Colorado, In- Bank, 8 Ohio St. 465; Power v. First
diana, and perhaps other states: Nat'l Bank, 6 Mont. 251; German
Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308; Dodge Nat'l Bank v. Burns, 12 Colo. 541,
V. Freedman's, etc., Co., 93 U. S. 379; 13 Am. St. 247; Tyson v. State Bank,
Montgomery Co. Bank v. Albany 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 225, 38 Am. Dec.
City Bank, 7 N. Y. 459; St. Nicholas 139; American Express Co. v. Haire,
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§ 190. Express contract governs—Collecting agencies.—Of course,
if the parties have expressly contracted that the first bank shall be
responsible for the collection, even if undertaken b}^ its foreign agents
or correspondents, the courts will hold such bank liable.^^ Or if
the first bank has been guilty of negligence in the selection of its cor-
respondent, it will undoubtedly be liable.^^ The solution of the
question may, however, depend upon the usage or custom of banks
in the place where the first bank is situated. "If the law has not
been already settled by judicial determination, so as to exclude any
subsequent evidence of usage to subvert it, the bank may absolve
itself from liability for the acts of agents other than itself, or the
customer may fix such liability upon the bank, by showing, re-
spectively, that such is the established usage and understood custom
in the place where the bank, the extent of whose duty and liability is
in question, is situated. But the evidence must show a usage having
the strictly legal traits; it must be a real, bona fide usage, an actual
practice, a general understanding, not the mere opinion of either
merchants or bankers."^''^ The circumstances of each particular case
must, of course, be consulted before determining whether it comes
under aiiy particular rule of law of those above stated and discussed.
It can not be denied, however, that, as to the main question,—the lia-
bility of the first bank for negligence or other misconduct of its
correspondents or other agents,—there is a hopeless conflict in the
decisions. We can only refer the reader to the cases. It seems to
us, however, that the better rule is to treat the bank as the agent of
the owner or depositor of the paper. Considering that when the
collection is to be made at a distant place the immediate agents or
employes of the bank, at the place of its own locality, could not give
the matter the attention that would be expected of them in case of a
21 Ind. 4, 83 Am. Dec. 334. While ent. The supreme court of that
Indiana is generally classed as state does not seem to have passed
among the states holding that the upon the precise question; nor is
first bank is liable, the cases cited the appellate court unanimous in
do not seem to support the doctrine the position it assumes: See the
fully, as the exact point does not dissenting opinions of Robinson, C.
seem to have been presented. See J., and Comstock, J.
also. Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Third '** Mechanics' Bank v. Earp, 4
Nat'l Bank, 19 Ind. App. 69. And Rawle (Pa.) 384.
in Irwin v. Reeves Pulley Co., 20 " Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23
Ind. App. 101, the appellate court Pick. (Mass.) 330; .^tna Ins. Co. v.
holds that the first bank is only Alton City Bank, 25 111. 221.
bound to exercise reasonable care '•'a 1 Morse Banks and Banking,
and skill in selecting the correspond- § 270.
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collection at its home place, it appears to us that when the deposit
is made, if nothing was said upon the subject, the depositor
contracts with a view to the custom of the bank to send the paper
to a correspondent at or near the place of residence of the debtor.
In other words, the implication is that the creditor consents that the
collection may be made by others than the home officers and employes
of the first bank. Just as an insurance company tacitly consents that
a large portion of the business intrusted to its general agents may
be transacted by subagents. The small compensation collected for
the labor of collecting such claims can not be supposed to cover the
risk of insuring the conduct of the bank's agents or correspondents
at distant points. As to collecting agencies other than banks,
—
agencies which hold themselves out as specially engaged in that
business, and who advertise "Collections made in all parts of the
United States," etc., as their special business, exacting a special com-
pensation therefor in proportion to the risk,—they are doubtless to be
held liable as having undertaken the risk by their contract. How-
ever, even upon this question there seems to be a conflict of authority.^"
§ 191. From what the power to appoint subagents may be in-
ferred.—From the character of the transaction for which an agency
has been established it may often be inferred that a general agent
has the power to employ subagents. Thus, the person employed to
charter a ship may employ a ship broker to assist him in the per-
formance of his duty.^^ An auctioneer may employ an assistant
under his immediate direction to make outcry and use the hammer.^^
Much depends, of course, upon the usages of trade. If custom or
usage sanctions the practice to employ a subagent, the principal will
usually be bound by such appointment.-^ These cases serve suffi-
ciently to illustrate the rule that an authority, though not original,
may sometimes be delegated.
§ 192. Principal bound by apparent as well as implied and inci-
dental authority—Special and general authority.—The authority
which an agent exercises in the performance of an act or acts may
="866 1 Morse Banks & Banking, Bradshaw, 6 Dana (Ky.) 383; Bils-
§§ 267, 270. borrow v. James, 25 Hun (N. Y.)
=1 Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431. 18; Nugent v. Martin. 1 Tex. App.
"Commonwealth v. Harnden, 19 Civ. Cas., § 1175; Laussatt v. Lippin-
Pick. (Mass.) 482. cott, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 386, 9 Am. Dec.
-' Trueman v. Loder, 11 Ad. & E. 440.
589, 39 E. C. L. 178; Wallace v.
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have been actually conferred, or it may be apparent only. If actu-
ally conferred, third persons will, of course, be justified in dealing
with the agent, and the principal will be liable for his acts. But
if the authority is only apparent, or was not conferred to the full
extent to which it was exercised, the question often arises how far
third persons will be protected in relying upon appearances. If
authority of some kind has been conferred, but not to the extent
exercised, the question occurs whether the agent has acted within the
apparent scope of his authority. In such cases the principal will be
bound—if the agent has been held out to possess general powers—by
all the acts done within the apparent scope of such power, though in
fact the agency was limited by private instructions. In other words,
the principal will be held to the performance of such of the agent's con-
tracts as he permitted him to appear to possess authority to make.^^^
But if the agency be special, it is said to be the duty of a third
party to inquire into the nature and extent of the authority conferred
by the principal and to deal with the agent accordingly.^* It would
"a Merchants' Bank v. Central
Bank, 1 Ga. 418, 44 Am. Dec. 665;
Towle V. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55
Am. Dec. 195; Munn v. Commission
Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 44, 8 Am. Dec.
219.
"Towle V. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360,
55 Am. Dec. 195; Denning v. Smith,
3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 332, 344; Snow
V. Perry, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 539, 542;
Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757; Con-
gar V. Galena, etc., R. Co., 17 Wis.
477; Luse v. Isthmus Trans. R. Co.,
6 Ore. 125; Cairo, etc., R. Co. v. Ma-
honey, 82 111. 73; Stewart v. Wood-
ward, 50 Vt. 78; Davis v. Talbot, 137
Ind. 235; Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Rose,
3 Ind. App. 269; Robinson v. An-
derson, 106 Ind. 152; Blackwell v.
Ketcham, 53 Ind. 184; Metzger v.
Huntington, 139 Ind. 501; Reed v.
Ashburnham R. Co., 120 Mass. 43;
Holt V. Schneider, 57 Neb. 523. 77
N. W. 1086. Thus, an agent who has
power to sell property for his prin-
cipal may be presumed to have au-
thority to warrant the same, al-
though, in fact, he is expressly pro-
hibited by his instructions from so
doing, unless the third party has
notice of such instructions: J. I.
Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Mc-
Kinnon, 82 Minn. 75, 84 N. W. 646.
And so, where an agent was author-
ized on one occasion to accept part
payment of a mortgage debt before
it was due, the mortgagors were
warranted in believing he had au-
thority to accept the balance before
it was due: Harrison v. Legore, 109
Iowa 618, 80 N. W. 670. But where
one was authorized to lease property
it does not warrant the lessee in as-
suming that such person was au-
thorized to cancel such lease: Fa-
ville V. Lundvall, 106 Iowa 135, 76
N. W. 512. And authority to collect
a debt does not carry with it au-
thority to accept the debtor's note:
Holt V. Schneider, 57 Neb. 523, 77
N. W. 1086. Neither does a travel-
ing salesman, in the absence of cus-
tom, have implied authority to col-
lect money: Brown v. Lally, 79
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thus seem that the effect of the apparent scope of authority is different
in the case of a special agency from what it is in that of a general
agency. In the former case, the principal has only held out the
agent as possessing the authority that agents of a like class usually
exercise. The very nature of the power exercised by a special agent
is supposed to be such as should place the party dealing with him
on his inquiry, and it will be no great hardship for him to ascertain
the real authority; whereas, in the case where an agent is held out
as possessing extended powers, the appearance of things is such as
will warrant the implication of the principal's assent to its exercise.
But the difference is more apparent than real; for it may be truly
said that in either a general or special agency there' is a scope of
authority beyond which third parties can not safely go, and that,
in either case, they will be confined to appearances rather than the
actual power conferred.^^ And whenever, in either case, the agent
acts within the limits in which he is held out to third parties by his
principal, or in which it is usual for agents of that class to act, he
will, iji the absence of notice to such third parties of his real powers,
bind his principal, notwithstanding he acted without authority or
exceeded that which he possessed; for it is well settled that, in such
a case, where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he ought to
suffer who misled the other by holding out the agent as competent
to act, and as apparently enjoying his confidence.^®
Minn. 38, 81 N. W. 538. In such inquire, and if he trusts without in-
cases the third party can not as- quiry, he trusts to the good faith of
sume the existence of authority the agent and not of the principal:"
which is not necessarily included in Citing Story Ag., § 133. So, where
that actually conferred. An agent a party authorizes another to sign
employed to drive stock from place his name to a note for a specific
to place would have no authority sum, the authority is a special one,
to sell such stock in case it become and the payee of the note is charge-
foot-sore and unable to travel: able with knowledge of the extent
Reitz V. Martin, 12 Ind. 306. "The of the authority: Blackwell v.
general rule is," said the court in Ketcham, 53 Ind. 184.
this case, "that the authority of the "Hodge v. Combs, 1 Blatchf. (U.
agent, of whatever description, must S.) 192; Lister v. Allen, 31 Md. 543.
be strictly pursued; otherwise the ='^ Story Ag., § 443. The principal
principal, if his agent be a special is bound by the exercise of all the
one, will not be bound. . . . And if authority necessarily implied by and
the principal has never held the incident to that actually conferred;
agent out as having any authority and an authority always carries
whatever in the premises it is the with it the requisite means for its
duty of one purchasing from him to exercise, except such as are express-
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§ 193. Custom or usage.—In every agency the law presumes, fur-
thermore, that the authority was conferred in contemplation of the
usage that prevails in such matters ; and hence, persons dealing with
the agent in good faith will be protected if the power has been exer-
cised in accordance with such usage, unless the limitations of power
were known to those who dealt with the agent." The particular
custom or usage must, however, be a reasonable one, and must have
existed long enough to have become generally known, so that the
parties must have acted with a view to it.-^ If the usage is a mere
local one, and not generally known, the presumption that otherwise
prevails as to the principal's knowledge of the same may be over-
come by him, by proving that he had in fact no notice or information
of the same.-'' But the mere fact that the principal had no actual
knowledge of the custom or usage, if general, does not excuse him
from being charged with notice thereof.^" It would be difficult,
if not impossible, for the parties to an agency contract to pro-
vide for every contingency that may arise in the execution thereof.
Many questions may come up as to which no provision has been or
can well be made in the specification of the .power conferred by the
principal. In all such cases the usage of trade is the criterion by
ly forbidden: Adams v. Pittsburgh =* Knowles v. Dow, 22 N. H. 387,
Ins. Co., 95 Pa. St. 348, 40 Am. Rep. 35 Am. Dec. 163; Buyck v. Schwing,
663. 100 Ala. 355, 14 So. 48. Whether a
-Wharton Ag., §§ 134, 676; custom is reasonable or not is a
Greeves v. Tegge, 12 Exch. 642; question of law for the decision of
Russell V. Hankey, 6 T. R. 12; the court; while usage, which is the
Brady v. Todd, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 592, evidence of custom, is a question of
99 E. C. L. 591; Sutton v. Tatham, fact for the jury: Bourke v. James
10 Ad. & E. 27, 37 E. C. L. 25; Young & Kneeland, 4 Mich. 336; Chicago
V. Cole, 3 Bing. N. C. 724, 32 E. C. Packing Co. v. Tilton, 87 111. 547;
L. 334; Frank v. Jenkins, 22 Ohio St. Randall v. Smith, 63 Me. 105, 18 Am.
597; Randall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. 37, Rep. 200.
11 Am. Rep. 167; Willard v. Buck- == Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. (U.
ingham, 36 Conn. 395; American S.) 383; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y.
Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanathan, 11 464, 10 Am. Rep. 407.
Kan. 533; Taylor v. Bailey, 169 111. '" Bailey v. Bensley, 87 111. 556;
181; McKee v. Wild, 52 Neb. 9, 71 Samuels v. Oliver, 130 111. 73; Union
N. W. 158; Gehl v. Milwaukee Pro- Stock Yard, etc., Co. v. Mallory, etc.,
duce Co., 105 Wis. 573, 81 N. W. 666; Co., 157 111. 554, 41 N. E. 888; Sleght
McMasters v. Pennsylvania R. Co., v. Hartshorne, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 531;
69 Pa. St. 374, 8 Am. Rep. 264; Tal- Cole v. Skrainka. 37 Mo. App. 427;
cott V. Smith, 142 Mass. 542; Bailey Blin v. Mayo, 10 Vt. 56, 33 Am. Dec.
v. Bensley, 87 111. 556; Samuels v. 175.
Oliver, 130 111. 73.
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which the agent's authority is to be measured; and this is SO, as we
have observed, although the principal and agent have agreed in their
contract that things are to be done which are directly in conflict
with the usages and customs of trade, provided the usage is general
and reasonable, and the third party had no information concerning
the agent's limitations.^^ Thus, the ordinary usages and customs of
the officers of a bank in the transaction of their business are so well
and generally known that the parties to a contract of this nature
are always presumed to have contracted with reference to them; and
in the absence of knowledge of contrar}^ instructions on the part of
third parties, the bank will be bound by the acts of such officers, if
the authority exercised by them was within the scope of such usage
or course of business.^^ Accordingly, the courts will give effect to
the customs of shipmasters in charge of vessels at river ports to insure
their vessels and give premium notes therefor, and such notes will
bind the owners of such boats.^^ Upon ihe same principle, where a
customer had given a broker an order for a quantity of stock, the
broker, it was held, might, in accordance with custom, direct his cor-
respondents in another state to purchase the stock.^* Of course, as
between principal and agent, the latter will never be justified by
custom or usage in departing from his plain instructions.^*^ More-
over, usage can never be relied upon to violate a positive law;^^ nor
can it be invoked to change the intrinsic character of a contract as
between the parties thereto.^"
^'See Upton v. Suffolk Co. Mills, properly excluded: Western Union
11 Cush. (Mass.) 586, 589. Cold Storage Co. v. Winona Produce
^ Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. Co., 94 111. App. 618; Barnes v. Zet-
(U. S.) 46. tlemoyer (Tex. Civ. App.), 62 S. W.
^ Adams v. Pittsburgh Ins. Co., 95 111. Nor can the existence of a cus-
Pa. St. 348, 10 Am. Rep. 662. tom be established by evidence of a
^* Rosenstock v. Tormey, 32 Md. single act. custom being the result
169. of a series of acts; or, in other
'*a Day v. Holmes, 103 Mass. 306; words, custom is the result of usage,
Hutchings v. Ladd, 16 Mich. 493. and must be proved by usage:
^ Healey v. Mannheimer, 74 Minn. Shields v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co.,
240, 76 N. W. 1126; McKee v. Wild, 87 Mo. App. 637.
52 Neb. 9, 71 N. W. 958; Hopper v. ^ Mollett v. Robinson, L. R. 5 C.
Sage, 112 N. Y. 530, 8 Am. St. 771. P. 646, 7 C. P. 84, 7 H. L. 802; Brown
No custom or usage which will re- v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136; Meloche v.
lieve a party from a just legal obli- Chicago, etc., R. Co., 116 Mich. 69,
gation will be recognized by the 74 N. W. 301; Burnham v. City of
courts; and this being true, evidence Milwaukee, 100 Wis. 55, 73 N. W.
tending to prove such custom is 1014; McKee v. Wild, 52 Neb. 9, 71
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§ 194. Custom or usage, how established
—
Summary of authority
agent may exercise.—Wliether a custom or usage exists or not is a
question of fact to be proved as any other fact is proved ; courts do
not take judicial notice of customs or usages.^'^ To summarize, then,
the nature and extent of the authority an agent may exercise and
bind his principal by, it may be stated that the authority may con-
sist of: 1. Such as has been expressly delegated to him by the
act of the principal; 2. Whatever powers are reasonably implied in
those actually conferred and are reasonably necessary to carry into
effect the powers actually delegated; 3. Such powers as the principal
has by his conduct led third persons to believe he has conferred;
4. Such powers as the usage or custom of the country or community
adopts or sanctions with reference to the transaction of the business
for the performance of which the agent is actually employed; o. Such
powers as, though not delegated originally, are subsequently approved
by ratification on the part of the principal.
§ 195. Interpretation and construction of authority.—The author-
ity of an agent, except where established by implication of law, being
contained in the contract between him and the principal, whether
such contract be express or implied, it is obvious that the rules as to
interpretation and construction of contracts generally must be looked
to in cases involving the interpretation and construction of contracts
by which authority is conferred upon agents.^'^ The student should
not lose sight of the distinction between the interpretation of the
words, phrases and sentences in a contract, and its construction.
This distinction is thus lucidly expressed by Dr. Lieber: "Inter-
pretation is the act of finding out the true sense of any form of
words ; that is, the sense which the author intended to convey. * * *
Construction is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that
N. W. 958; Swadling v. Barneson, Dec. 363; Ward v. Everett. 1 Dana
21 Wash. 699, 59 Pac. 506; Allen v. (Ky.) 429; Bentley v. Doggett, 51
Dykers, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 593, 7 Hill Wis. 224; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.
(N. Y.) 497; Hopper v. Sage, 112 S. 548; Ahern v. Goodspeed, 72 N. Y.
N. Y. 530, 8 Am. St. 771; Pickering 117; Talmage v. Bierhause, 103 Ind.
v. Weld, 159 Mass. 522. 270. The burden of proving a cus-
^^ Sullivan v. Jernigan, 21 Fla
264; Chicago Packing, etc., Co. v
Tilton, 87 111. 547; Pardridge v. Bai
ley, 20 111. App. 351; Haas v. Hud
mon, 83 Ala. 174; Eager v. Atlas Ins
Co., 14 Pick. (Mass.) 141, 35 Am
torn or usage is upon him who as-
serts it: The John H. Cannon, 51
Fed. 46; Thomas v. Hooker, etc..
Pump Co., 28 Mo. App. 563; Hall v.
Storrs, 7 Wis. 253.
'' Wharton Ag., § 221.
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lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from elements gathered
from and given in the text—conclusions which are in the spirit
though not within the letter of the text."^^ In general, questions
of interpretation are for the Jury, while questions of construction
are for the court. There may be instances, however, where a ques-
tion as to the proper construction of a contract becomes a mixed
question of law and fact, to be determined by the jury, under the
instructions of the court. Questions of this character usually arise
when the contract is in parol, or partly in writing and partly in
parol. When the contract is entirely in writing, its construction is
for the court; unless there is such a latent ambiguity as to require
parol evidence in explanation, when it may become a mixed question
of law and fact. Where there is, in a written contract of agency, no
such ambiguity as to require parol testimony to explain, or where
the contract is oral and undisputed, the court is the proper tribunal
for its construction.**' In such case, if there be ambiguity, the court
should charge the jury liypothetically, as to the true interpretation.*^
When written words are illegible or in a foreign language, the ques-
tions as to what they are and what they mean is generally one of fact
to be submitted to the jury. When the language of the contract is
unwritten, that is, rests in parol, and there is any dispute as to what
the language really is, the question is for the jury to decide,—it being
a question of interpretation. In other wdrds, the question is as to
what the contract really is or whether there is in fact one at all or not.
When the jury has once found the language of the contract, then its
construction will be for the court.
§ 196. Intention of parties.—As the authority of an agent rests
mainly upon the assent of the parties, the court will aim to ascertain
the character of the contract by their intention as manifested by the
language of the contract. As in all other contracts, the intention must
govern ; and if that may be ascertained by the text of the instrument
or the language of the authority, in whatever form it may exist, the
court will give it effect. The intention of the principal, therefore,
as to the nature and extent of the powers to be conferred upon the
agent, is an all-important factor, where the existence of such au-
^' See Wharton Conts., § 628, n. 1. Continental Jersey Works, 85 Ga.
** Loudon Savings Fund Society v. 27; Dobbins v. Etowah Mfg., etc.,
Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498, 78 Am. Co., 75 Ga. 238, 243; Millay v. Whit-
Dec. 390; Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J. ney, 63 Me. 522.
L. 463, 97 Am. Dec. 728; Claflin v. "1 Beach Conts., § 743
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thority depends upon the contents of the contract solely.*- The
powers conferred must be construed with a view to their object and
design, as gathered from the contract ; or if there was no express
contract, or none was known to the party affected, the intention
must be gathered from the circumstances of the case.'*^
§ 197. Authority in writing—Construction of.—When the author-
ity of the agent is conferred by written power of attorne}", and the
C[uestion of the extent of the agent's authority arises in a contro-
versy between the principal and agent, or between the principal and'
a third party,
—
provided the latter had knowledge of the written
contract,—the construction must, as a general rule, be limited to
the contents of the written instrument. In such cases the construc-
tion of the contract, as to the nature and extent of the authority
conferred, is always a question of law and must be made by the court.**
And the instrument itself must be introduced in evidence, or its
absence accounted for."*^ And while the court will not, as a general
rule, permit such instrument to be varied or explained by parol testi-
mony, if additional authority has been conferred subsequently to
the execution of the power of attorney, it may be proved by evidence
aliunde.^^ Thus, where an agent w^s authorized by power of attorney
to sell or procure a purchaser for certain real estate at a fixed price,
in cash, and execute a contract of such sale; and the agent made the
sale at the price named, but partly on credit,—it was held that parol
testimony was properly admitted to prove that the agent, subse-
quently to the execution of the power of attorney, was authorized by
parol to make the sale in the manner in which it was executed by
him.*^
" Marr v. Given, 23 Me. 55, 39 Am. of one who deals with an agent
Dec. 600; Holladay v. Daily, 19 whose authority is in writing to
Wall. (U.S.) 606; Spect v. Gregg, 51 inspect it, and he is chargeable
Cal. 198; Brantley v. Southern Life with knowledge of its legal effect:
Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 554. North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill
'-Vanada v. Hopkins, 1 J. J. (N. Y.) 262. If the authority is by
Marsh. (Ky.) 285, 19 Am. Dec. 92. parol he must learn its language as
"Loudon Savings Fund Society v. best he can: North River Bank v.
Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498, 78 Am. Aymar, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 262.
Dec. 390; Berry v. Harnage, 39 Tex. ^^ Stadleman v. Fitzgerald, 14 Neb.
638; McCreery v. Garvin, 39 S. C. 290.
375; Claflin v. Continental Jersey ^^ Williams v. Cochran, 7 Rich. (S.
Works, 85 Ga. 27; Equitable Life As- C.) 45; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wil-
sur. Soc. V. Poe, 53 Md. 28; Millay v. cox, 57 111. 180.
Whitney, 63 Me. 522. It is the duty " McGill v. Stoddard, 70 Mo. 75.
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§ 198. Rules of construction.—"When an authorit}^ is conferred
upon an agent by a formal instrument, as a power of attorney, there
are two rules of construction to be carefully attended to: 1. The
meaning of general words in the instrument will be restricted by the
context, and construed accordingly. 2. The authority will be con-
strued strictly, so as to exclude the exercise of any power which is
not warranted, either by the actual terms used, or as a necessary
means of executing an authority with effect."*^ The authority given
an agent by power of attorney is never extended by intendment or
construction beyond that which is given in terms or is absolutely
necessary to carry such authority into effect.*® The construction,
however, must not be such as to defeat the intention of the parties
in the accomplishment of the object, if such intention fairly appears
from the language used.^" Under the rules of construction above
stated it has been held that a power of attorney under seal, authoriz-
ing an agent to sign the principal's name to a contract, authorizes
him to execute a contract under seal;^^ and that authority to cite a
principal confers authority to defend suit brought by or against the
principal ;^^ but that a power of attorney to execute an injunction
bond according to the order of the court does not authorize the execu-
tion of a bond that the principal will pay the damages that may be
awarded against him on the dissolution of the injunction, where that
is not required by the statute ;^^ nor will an authority to confess a
judgment described authorize the confession of another judgment, at
a different time from that authorized in the instrument;^* but he
may confess judgment with a stay of execution ;^^ and a general
power of attorney has been held sufficient to authorize the agent to
execute a general release in the principal's name.^^ The words of
an instrument should always be construed with reference to the object
to be accomplished ; and where a power is given to do some particular
*' Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) "Wickham v. Knox, 33 Pa. St. 71.
203; Gouldy v. Metcalf, 75 Tex. 455, '^-Miller v. Marmiche, 24 La. Ann.
16 Am. St. 912. 30.
*^ Gilbert v. How, 45 Minn. 121, 22 " Dehart v. Wilson, 6 T. B. Mon.
Am. St. 724; Ashley v. Bird, 1 Mo. (Ky.) 577.
640, 14 Am. Dec. 213; Brantley v. " Rankin v. Eakin, 3Head(Tenn.)
Southern Life Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 554; 229.
Bissell V. Terry, 69 111. 184; Craig- ^ Calwells v. Sheilds, 2 Rob. (Va.)
head v. Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279, 305.
28 Am. Rep. 150. ^ Quesnel v. Mussy, 1 Dall. (Pa.)
'"Hemstreet v. Burdick, 90 111. 449.
444.
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act, followed b}- general words, such word? will not be extended be-
yond what is necessary for the accomplishment of such act.^^ Thus,
a power of attorney to collect debts due, and to compromise, settle
and arrange them, either in law or otherwise, as the attorney may see
fit, does not authorize such attorney to forgive the debt or postpone
or discharge the security, except in fulfillment of some arrangement
for its satisfaction.^^ And a power of attorney to transact all busi-
ness of the principal, with certain books and accounts for profes-
sional services "for settlement," was held not to authorize the trans-
fer of such books and accounts to the surety of the principal to in-
demnify him for being such surety.^® Nor will an authority consti-
tuting another the principal's "general and special agent to do and
transact all manner of business," authorize the agent to sell stocks
or other property.®"
§ 199. Ambiguity in authority of agent.—\Miere the author-
ity conferred is ambiguous and capable of more than one con-
struction, it should be construed according to the usual course of
dealing in such matters.®^ If, however, the agent has in good faith
done an act upon one construction, the principal will be bound. ®-
A power to . collect a note does not include authority to bind the
principal by an expression of the agent's opinion as to the correct
reading of a doubtful word.''^ Authority to draw a bill of exchange
does not authorize the agent to bind the principal by receiving notice
of dishonor;"* nor will a power of attorney authorizing an agent
to represent the principal's interest in the settlement of certain
claims authorize the attorney to bind the principal for the debts of
third persons;"^ nor will an authority to negotiate an exchange of
"Luke v. Griggs, 4 Dak. 287; "Pole v. Leask, 28 Beav. 562;
Wood v. Goodridge, 6 Gush. (Mass.) Ireland v. Livingston, L. R. 5 H. L.
117, 52 Am. Dec. 771; Craighead v. 395; Mattocks v. Young, 66 Me.
Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279, 28 Am. Rep. 459; Mann v. Laws, 117 Mass. 293.
150; Rountree v. Denison, 59 Wis. ''-See Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet.
522; Billings v. Morrow, 7 Gal. 171, (U. S.) 479; Mechanics' Bank v. Mer-
68 Am. Dec. 235. chants' Bank. 6 Met. (Mass.) 13.
"Ghilton V. Willford, 2 Wis. 1, 60 "''Van Vechten v. Smith, 59 Iowa
Am. Dec. 339. 173.
'^"Wood V. McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42 •" Hockaday v. Skeggs, 2 Phila.
Am. Dec. 612. (Pa.) 268.
""Hodge V. Combs, 1 Blatchf. (U. "* Hart v. Dixon, 5 Lea (Tenn.)
S.) 192. 336.
11
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lands authorize a binding contract to exchange or receive a deed to
be given the principal on exchange;"*^ nor will an authority to ex-
change a mule for other property bind the principal to the payment
of a sum of money as the estimated difference in value ;®^ nor will
an authority to receive money authorize the agent to pay it out.^*
§ 200. How intention of parties is ascertained.—The intention of
the parties to such a contract, as in the case of any other, is to be
sought in the language used by them, if that be possible. The par-
ties will be held to the legal effect of their written agreement, although
their real intention may have been otherwise; unless, indeed, there
has been a mutual mistake, in which case the court will give relief
by the reformation of the instrument. But courts will not usually
relieve parties from their mistaken views of the law ; and hence, if
the legal effect of a contract is different from that contemplated by
one of the parties, he will nevertheless be bound by it.®^ In ascertain-
ing the intention of the parties, the courts will consider the instrument
as an entirety, and not in single isolated portions, and will take into
account every word and sentence and the situation and surrounding
circumstances of the parties at the time of the making of the con-
tract, so as to place itself as nearly as may be in their position and
probable frame of mind, in case the words and phrases chosen by
them are at all ambiguous or doubtful. Instruments under seal
are always strictly construed with reference to the subject-matter,
and in powers of attorney the same rule is applied. No enlarged
meaning beyond the subject-matter will be given the general words
employed, unless it expressly appears from the instrument that such
was their unquestionable intention. Thus the term "to transact all
business" is construed to mean only all such business as is necessary
to perform the task that has been intrusted to the agent. ^"^ And so,
where a bond was executed to secure the faithful performance of all
^ Swain v. Burnette, 89 Cal. 564. may be able to pay) has authority to
" McMillan v. Wooten, 80 Ala. 263. receive an order for money about to
«*Knowlton v. School City of Lo- become due to the debtor: Ruthven
gansport, 75 Ind. 103. Authority to v. Clarke, 109 Iowa 25, 79 N. W. 454.
collect the principal and interest of "" Loudon Savings Fund Society v.
a debt is not authority to receive Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498, 78 Am.
either the principal or the interest Dec. 390.
before it becomes due: Park v. ™ Hay v. Goldsmidt (Eng. K. B.),
Cross, 76 Minn. 187, 78 N. W. 1107. mentioned in Hogg v. Snaith, 1
An agent authorized to receive Taunt. 349.
money (such amounts as the debtor
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the official duties of an office, the condition of the bond is held to
refer only to the term of office for which the officer was chosen, and
will not cover loss resulting from failure to perform duties subse-
quently to the expiration of the term.'^ But the liability on an
official bond continues until the officers successor is appointed and
qualified, where the statute provides that the officer shall so long
continue in office.^^ A power of attorney "to negotiate, compromise,
determine, settle and arrange all differences between them [partners]
and the bank of Vincennes and all persons whatever; to execute and
sign their names to any lease, covenant, or conveyance of all or any
part of their joint estate, whether real or personal; and to give and
receive discharges, receipts/' etc., was held not to authorize the agent
to confess judgment.'^^ Neither will a power of attorney to "demand,
sue for, recover, and receive all moneys, debts, and dues, and to give
discharges,'' authorize the agent to indorse paper in the name of the
principal^*
§ 201. Collateral writings, when may enter into construction.—
The court, in determining what the authority of the agent is in a
given case, may resort to collateral writings between the parties in
reference to the same matter, such as letters, memoranda, agree-
ments, etc., as all these together may constitute but one contract, or
may serve at least to disclose the real intention of the parties as to
the particular matter in dispute."^
§ 202. Interpretation as distinguished from construction.—It must
be remembered, however, that these rules apply only to the construc-
tion of contracts. Words themselves may have an ambiguous or even
an unknown meaning, and may require, therefore, not construction,
but interpretation. When this is the case, witnesses may be called
who are familiar with the meaning of the words to interpret the
same. A foreign word or phrase may be used in a contract, and a
linguist may be required to translate it; terms of art may be ex-
plained by specialists; terms of business by evidence of business
usage; technical terms may be explained by competent witnesses;
ciphers, abbreviations, signs, informal memoranda, etc., may be ex-
" Lord Arlington v. Merricke, 2 " Lagow v. Patterson, 1 Blackf.
Wms. Saunders 403, 411a. See also, (Ind.) 252.
Rooke v. Lord Kensington, 2 K. & J. "* Murray v. East India Co., 5 B. &
753; Jenner v. Jenner, L. R. 1 Eq. Aid. 204.
361; Moore v. Magrath, 1 Cowp. 9. "Bishop Conts., § 382.
"Akers v. State, 8 Ind. 484.
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plained b}^ parol testimonj^ and their interpretation should always
be with reference to the purpose for which, as well as the time when
and locality where, they were employed. The rule with reference to
the construction of an ambiguous contract, that where it is capable
of more than one construction, that construction which the agent
or third party has adopted will be enforced, is applicable also to
some cases of interpretation. In such cases the interpretation which
the parties have adopted and acted upon as the true meaning will
be adopted by the court. But while latent ambiguities may thus be
explained by parol, there is no rule of law that permits a party to
show that he understood a word or sentence to mean something out
of the ordinary or accepted signification, unless there was a mutual
mistake between the parties or a fraud perpetrated by one of them
upon the other. Rules of interpretation are, therefore, not to be
confounded with rules of construction. The former appeal solely
to the critical, the latter to the logical faculties. But the rules of
interpretation are nevertheless important in dealing with the work
of construction, both because there can be no construction without
previous interpretation of the elemental parts, and because the rules
of interpretation also bear more or less directly upon those appli-
cable to construction.'^®
§ 203. Construction of unwritten authority—What authority,
written or oral, carries with it.—When the authority of the agent
is unwritten, it may be an express oral authority or it may
be implied from the acts and circumstances, in which latter case
it is called authority by implication. Wlien it is unwritten, but
express, the same general rules of construction are applicable that
apply to written authority, provided the contract has been duly
established, \\nien authority is to be determined by implication or
inference from the facts and circumstances surrounding the trans-
action, the rules of construction are necessarily more liberal ; since,
in such cases, it is just to innocent persons dealing with the agent,
and who may possibly be misled by appearances, to give such persons
the benefit of any doubt that may arise, and construe the authority
most strictly against the principal, who had it in his power to set a
limit to it by conferring it only in positive terms. However the
authority may have been conferred, it always carries with it the
necessary and usual means to execute it effectually."^ Thus, if an
'» See 2 Wharton Cents., Ch. XIX. Shackman v. Little, 87 Ind. 181;
"Pole V. Leask, 28 Beav. 562; Michigan Slate Co. v. Iron Range.
Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 618; etc., R. Co., 101 Mich. 14; Craighead
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agent has authority to issue policies of insurance, he may bind his
principal by any act, agreement, representation or waiver within the
ordinary scope and limit of the insurance business not known by the
insured to be outside of the authority actually granted the agents*
And where the agent of a building and loan association had authority
to solicit applications for stock and to effect loans, he was held to
have the implied power to bind the association by an agreement that
the money advanced to a borrower should be used in improving the
mortgaged premises. ^^ So, it has been held that an agent having
authority to deliver policies and collect premiums has incidental
power to waive a cash payment of the premium, even though there
is a stipulation in the policy to the contrary, unless it is avoided
by bad faith or collusion.^" But an architect, who is the agent of
v. Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279, 28 Am.
Rep. 150; McAlpin v. Cassidy, 17
Tex. 449; Rogers v. Kneeland, 10
Wend. (N. Y.) 218; Banner Tobacco
Co. v. Jenison, 48 Mich. 459; Briden-
becker v. Lowell, 32 Barb. (N. Y.)
9; Baldwin v. Garrett, 111 Ga. 876,
36 S. E. 966; Smith v. Droubay, 20
Utah 443, 58. Pac. 1112. An author-
ity to an agent to sell flour to be
manufactured for the purchaser car-
ries with it authority to warrant its
equality to certain described brands,
adopted as a sample for the purpose
of such sale: Loomis Milling Co. v.
Vawter, 8 Kan. App. 437, 57 Pac. 43.
An agent who is authorized to col-
lect a certificate of deposit when
due has implied authority to procure
a confession of judgment for the
same: Briggs v. Yetzer, 103 Iowa
342, 72 N. W. 647. One who superin-
tends a stock farm owned by a non-
resident, and who has authority to
sell a horse on such farm, has au-
thority to warrant such horse: Bel-
mont v. Talbot (Ky.), 51 S. W. 588.
And an agent employed to sell prop-
erty has implied authority to make
any declaration regarding the prop-
erty necessary to effect a sale, and
which is usually incidental thereto;
and his principal is bound by his
declarations, though the sale was
not concluded until a subsequent
day: Reynolds v. Mayor, Lane &
Co., 57 N. Y. Supp. 106, 39 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 218. An agent buying and
shipping horses for his principal has
the incidental authority to borrow
money to purchase feed for such
horses, since the exercise of such
authority is necessary to the con-
duct of the business: Rider v. Kirk,
82 Mo. App. 120. See also, John Spry
Lumber Co. v. McMillan, 77 111. App.
280, in which it is held that author-
ity to build a house implies author-
ity to purchase the lumber. See
further on this subject. Singer Mfg.
Co. v. McLean, 105 Ala. 316, 16 So.
912; Keim v. Lindley (N. J.), 30
Atl. 1063; Union Pacific, etc., R. Co.
v. McCarty, 3 Colo. App. 530, 34 Pac.
767; Jones v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
38 N. Y. Supp. 284, 3 App. Div.
341.
" American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Mc-
Lanathan, 11 Kan. 533.
" Wayne, etc., Ass'n v. Moats, 149
Ind. 123.
™ Western Assur. Co. v. McAlpin,
23 Ind. App. 220; Insurance Co. v.
Colt, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 560; Painter
v. Industrial Life Ass'n, 131 Ind. 68.
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the owner of a building in process of construction under such archi-
tect's supervision and direction, has no power to waive an agree-
ment by the owner as to the terms on which payment is to be made.*^
The power to sell and convey lands for cash carries with it authority
to receive the purchase money.^- And the authority to purchase
grain is held to include the power to modify or waive a contract
made by the agent in respect to grain.^^ The authority, however,
can not be extended by implication beyond what is fairly warranted
by the facts of the particular transaction and the purpose of the
agency. The authority should never be construed as extending be-
yond this legitimate scope. The authority being inferred from the
acts of the agent, passively assented to by the principal, it should
be limited to acts of a like nature; and where the power is inferred
from the general custom of dealing between the parties, it must be con-
fined to dealings of like character; while if it arises from the fact of
previous employment in a particular business, it should b'e limited
to such business. Hence, authority of the agent to loan money for
his principal and take security on unincumbered land does not
authorize the loan with security on incumbered land; and the agent
will be liable in damages to the extent of the loss to the principal by
reason of such incumbrance.^*
§ 204. Implied authority of auctioneer to pay duty on goods.—
The agent is presumed to have authority to perform every act and
obligation incident to the purpose of the employment. Thus, where
the law imposes a duty upon goods and makes it incumlDent upon an
auctioneer into whose possession the goods may come to pay such
duty, it is held that the auctioneer has full authority to pay such
duty upon goods left with him for sale, and that he may recover such
expenditure of the owner of the goods, as being a necessary conse-
quence of and incident to the end for which he is emplo3^ed, whether
the owner knows of such payment or wishes to have it made or not.^^
§ 205. Execution of authority by agent—Manner of.—Having
now discussed in a general way the nature and extent of the authority
of an agent, it becomes proper to notice for a time the manner in which
"Leverone v. Arancio (Mass.), 61 ** Welsh v. Brown, 8 Ind. App. 421.
N. E. 45. 85 Brittain v. Lloyd, 14 M. & W.
'- Peck V. Harriott, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 762; Brown v. Hodgson, 4 Taunt.
146; Rice v. Groffmann, 56 Mo. 434. 189.
*^ Anderson v. Coonley, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.) 279.
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such authority may be executed by him. The main purpose of the
agent in entering into all contracts for his principal which he is
authorized to make is so to frame the contract as to carry out the
will of the principal, and not that of himself, and to make the con-
tract binding, not only upon the third party, but upon the principal
as well, as otherwise he might render himself personally liable on
such contract. The transactions which an agent is usually called
upon to perform in the business world for his principal consist
mainly of the execution of contracts or of bringing together for
that purpose the minds of his principal and the third party or parties
with whom the agent deals for such principal; and such contracts
may consist: 1. Of simple contracts not in writing; 2. Of simple
contracts in writing, such as evidences of debt and other contracts not
negotiable by the law merchant; 3. Of bills of exchange and other in-
struments negotiable by the law merchant; 4. Of instruments under
seal, or specialties. We shall consider these in their order.
§ 206. Contracts between agent and third person.—If it be the
purpose of the agent, for and on behalf of his principal, to enter into
a simple contract, not in writing, to do which he is duly authorized,
he may do so without making himself personally liable by informing
the person with whom he deals of the nature and extent of the au-
thority possessed by him for such purpose, and of the nature of the
transaction about to be performed. A safe way for the agent to do
in such cases is always to disclose the relations between him and his
principal fully, and to explain the character of the contract or agree-
ment desired to be entered into. When this is done, no difficulty
can arise out of any consequences that may follow such transaction.
The contract or agreement to be entered into between the agent and
third party may be express or implied, as contracts between other
persons may be ; and an implied contract between the agent and third
party, if duly authorized, or, if not authorized, subsequently ratified
by the principal, will bind the latter as effectually as if entered into
by him personally, and in express language. The difficulty in prov-
ing unwritten contracts consists mainly in the fact that frequently
they are not fully expressed, or not expressed at all, but left to in-
ferences. Hence, the rules of construction applied to such contracts
are usually more liberal than to those that are reduced to writing,
—
the main object being to get at the intention of the parties. If, how-
ever, the exact language of the parties can be established by the
proof, and it is unambiguous, thus constituting an express contract,
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though unwritten, the same rules of construction apply as in simple
contracts in writing: it is for the court to construe, and not for
the jury.^^ But usually, if not always, when an unwritten contract
is in litigation, there is a disagreement between the parties as to
just what was said and done. If this be the case, it of course de-
volves upon the party alleging the existence of the contract to estab-
lish it by evidence as a question of fact; and such a question is
always for the jury, or the court sitting as such. Of course, the best
method for the agent to pursue in such cases is to reduce the con-
tract to writing, but this is not always practicable or perhaps de-
sirable; and as trouble is scarcely ever anticipated, the necessity for
a written agreement is not always apparent. When courts come to
deal with such agreements, they must do the best they can with
them. When the terms of such a contract are in dispute, or are ob-
scure or equivocal, it is for the jury to determine their meaning, from
all the circumstances of the transaction; although the effect of the
agreement, when once established, is for the court as a matter of law.^^
If the contract was partly oral and partly written, as occasionally
happens when negotiations are carried on by correspondence, the
questions of whether there is a contract and what are its terms, are
for the jury.*^ The intention of the parties being the chief purpose
of construction in such and similar cases of unwritten agreements,
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction may be
inquired into in order to determine what was the intention.
§ 207. Contracts in writing between agent and third person.—If
the agent is authorized to enter into a written contract for his prin-
cipal, he may easily do so, and bind the latter without binding him-
self personally. A simple mode of doing this is by putting himself
in the place of the principal and letting the latter speak by and
through him. This he may do by signing the contract in the name
of his principal first and then adding his own signature as agent or
attorney; thus: "John Doe, by Richard Roe, his attorney (or
agent)." He may accomplish the same result by adopting the form,
"Richard Roe, agent for John Doe;" or simply, "Richard Roe, for
John Doe."^^ While it may be desirable for the sake of double clear-
ness to indicate who is the principal in the body of the contract also,
«« Norton v. Higbee, 38 Mo. App. ^'= Story Ag., §§ 274, 278; 1 Par-
467. sons Notes & B. 91; Bank of Gen-
«' Spragins v. White, 108 N. C. 449. esee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 312,
««Scanlan v. Hodges, 52 Fed. 354. 315.
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it is by no means essential if one of the forms above given be ob-
served in the signature. Thus, one may write, "I, John Doe, by
Richard Roe, agent (or attorney), promise to pay;" but it would be
equally as good a promise to state simply, "I promise to pay," con-
cluding with one of the forms of signature above given.
§ 208. Apt words required to bind principal—Mere descriptive
words insufficient.—It must not be supposed, however, that in all cases
in which one promises simply as agent, or signs his name to a contract
followed by the word "agent," or "agent of John Doe," the principal
is bound and the agent is not. Such added words as "agent," "trustee,"
"treasurer," "president," etc., are generally regarded as merely de-
scriptive of the person of the signer, and will not exonerate the agent
from personal liability unless the agency is otherwise revealed.*^^
By reason of this doctrine, which is called the doctrine of "descriptio
personae," or "descriptio personarum," persons duly authorized as
agents and intending to enter into contracts for and on behalf of
their principals frequently render themselves personally liable on
such contracts when it was their real intention to charge only their
principals. Thus, it is well established that a note running, "I
promise to pay," and signed, "Richard Roe, agent," or "Richard Roe,
agent of John Doe," purports to be the note of Richard Roe, and not
that of John Doe ; for the word "agent," or the words "agent of
John Doe," are merely descriptive of the person of Richard Roe, and
do not absolutely indicate that he signed the instrument for and on
behalf of John Doe, or as his representative. ^'^ To make such a
promise, on its face, binding upon the principal, it should purport
to be made by the principal, as "John Doe, by Richard Roe, agent;"
although the word "agent," and indeed the name of the agent also,
may be altogether omitted after the name of the principal.^^ If the
agent's name is used in the signature, it need not stand first in
position, if it can be legally determined from it that the contract is
being executed for the principal or on his behalf. Thus, a note will
bind the principal, and not the agent, if signed, "Richard Roe, agent
for John Doe;" or simply, "Richard Roe, for John Doe;" or "For
John Doe, Richard Roe," with or without the word "agent" added.'-^-
*"» See post § 302. Fairbanks, 98 Mass. 101; Hays v.
'^"Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 44; Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260.
Hobbs v. Cowden, 20 Ind. 310; Ha- "' 1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 300.
verhill Ins. Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen "-Story Ag., § 154; Mechem Ag.,
(Mass.) 130; Tucker Mfg. Co. v. § 432.
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It would thus seem that the simple change of the word "of" to "for"
will render the obligation that of the principal, where before such
change it was only that of the agent. But even the use of "for"
instead of "of," is not always conclusive, unless it be contained in
the signature; for, as held in Massachusetts, where the note runs,
"We,
,
promise to pay for," etc., and the note
is signed by the agent without qualifying words, it is, prima facie at
least, the note of the agent alone.^^ As a general rule, however, the
word "for" standing after the agent's signature and appellation, if
any be used, and before the name of the principal, is held sufficient
to make it the obligation of the principal, on its face; provided, of
course, that the agent have sufficient authority.
§ 209. Construction of simple contracts in writing—Intention of
parties.—In determining who shall be liable on simple contracts in
writing, not negotiable by the law merchant, it is a cardinal rule
that the court will endeavor to ascertain the intention of the parties;
and, when it can be done, such intention will always be gathered
from the face of the instrument itself, by considering it in all its
parts, as an entirety.®* When this can be done, parol evidence can
not be introduced to explain who is the real contracting party. But
a simple contract may be ambiguous as to the real parties. \Vhen
it is so, the court will solve the ambiguity, if possible, from the in-
strument itself, taking into consideration not only the words and
figures in the body thereof, and the signatures and additions thereto,
but any printed or written headings, memoranda in the margin, or
other indicia which may serve to throw light upon the question of
intention.®^ If the ambiguity can not be thus solved, and does not
arise from the meaning to be given to the words employed, but from
the question as to what claims or persons are embraced within the
meaning of certain words or phrases, parol evidence may be intro-
duced to show what the intention of the parties was with regard to
it.®*' And generally, where there is ambiguity as to whether the
principal or agent was intended to be bound, the courts will admit
parol testimony as to such intention.®'^
'^Bradlee v. Boston Glass Manu- ^^ Ginnuth v. Blankenship (Tex.
factory, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 347. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 828; Barbre v.
•>* Bishop Conts., § 384. Goodale, 28 Or. 465, 43 Pac. 378.
"* Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105 U. S. °^ Lerned v. Johns, 9 Allen (Mass.)
416; Carpenter v. Farnsworth, 106 419; Getchell v. Foster. 106 Mass. 42;
Mass. 561; Scanlan v. Keith, 102 111. Cutler v. Ashland, 121 Mass. 588;
634; 1 Beach Conts., § 743. Bean v. Pioneer Mining Co., 66 Cal.
171 THE AUTHORITY OF THE AGENT. § 2113
§ 210. Rules applied to sealed and negotiable instruments less
liberal.—A more liberal rule obtains in the construction of simple
contracts than in that of sealed instruments, owing to the fact that
contracts under seal, or specialties, under the common law, are re-
garded as of such a solemn character that only the parties named or
described therein can sue or be sued upon them.^^ In simple con-
tracts, however, as we have seen, the principal question is as to the
intention of the parties, however informally expressed; and what-
ever that intention may be found to be, the courts will ascertain and
adopt.^® Parol evidence vsdll never be received, however, as to any
written contract, to prove a different intention from that which
plainly appears upon a fair construction from the face of the instru-
ment itself, except in case of fraud or mutual mistake. Hence, if
such an instrument, on its face, discloses an absolute undertaking
by one party, it can not be proved by extrinsic evidence that it was
in fact intended to bind another."" Negotiable instruments, as we
shall presently see, under the law merchant, by reason of their su-
perior character as a circulating medium, also require a stricter
construction than other evidences of debt not under seal. But what-
ever the character of the contract, whether sealed or unsealed, nego-
tiable or non-negotiable, the agent may easily accomplish the purpose
by the employment of apt words, and thus bind his principal without
making himself personally liable, as suggested with reference to
simple contracts.^*^^
§ 211. Personal liability of agent on contract entered into for
principal.—On the other hand, an agent may undoubtedly render
himself personally liable by entering into a written contract, although
it is his purpose to bind only the principal; and this he may do
by neglecting to observe the doctrine of descriptio personae. It is
very clear that if the agent simply contracted in his own name, with-
451; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. App. 516, 43 Pac. 979; Barbre v.
379; Post v. Pearson, 108 U. S. 418; Gk)odale, 28 Ore. 465, 43 Pac. 378.
Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392; ^' Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y.
Swarts v. Cohen, 11 Ind. App. 20; 357.
McNeil v. Shober, etc., Lith. Co., 144 ^ Merchants' Bank v. Central
111. 238; LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Tolu, Bank, 1 Ga. 418, 44 Am. Dec. 665.
14 111. App. 141; Haile v. Peirce. 32 ""Hypes v. Griffin, 89 111. 134;
Md. 327; Hardy v. Pilcher, 57 Miss. American Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 59
18; Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. Iowa 696; Williams v. Second Nat'l
93; Shaffer v. Hohenschild, 2 Kan. Bank, 83 Ind. 237.
'"^Ante, § 207.
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out using the suffix "agent," he would bind himself; for certainly
in such case he has not bound the principal; and no other promisor
appearing in the paper, it must be construed either as his own obli-
gation, or as being a mere nullity.^*'^ But suppose he styles himself
"agent," what effect will this appellation have upon the question
as to whether he is or is not the promisor? The rule is, as we have
seen, that the addition of such word, or of similar words, such as
"president," "treasurer," "trustee," etc., is a mere descriptio personae,
and will be disregarded as surplusage, unless it serves as an earmark
of the transaction. ^°^
§ 212. Negotiable instruments.—In cases of bills of excliange and
other instruments negotiable by the law merchant, a more stringent
rule is applied with regard to construction than in other simple
contracts in writing. In such cases, parties whose names do not
appear on the* face of the instrument can not, as a general rule, be
introduced into the contract by parol. Such instruments are, in
many particulars, on an equality with bank bills and other securities
passing as money; and the rules of the law merchant demand that
persons receiving them in due course of business must be presumed
to take them on the credit of the parties whose names appear thereon
as obligors. "It is a general principle of commercial law that a
negotiable instrument must wear no mask, but must reveal its char-
acter upon its face. And it extends to the liability of parties thereto,
who must appear as distinctly as the terms of the instrument itself,
in order to be bound by those terms."^"^
§ 213. Extrinsic evidence to explain negotiable instruments—Con-
flicting decisions.—All the decisions agree that when a party to a
negotiable instrument has by apt words, on the face of the instru-
ment, made himself a promisor or obligor, he will be bound thereby,
and that extrinsic evidence can not be admitted to show that in fact
such party executed the instrument for another and not for himself.
On the other hand, there is equally unanimous agreement that when
the words of the instrument are sufficiently clear to show that the
contract was in fact made by an agent for and on behalf of his
principal, extrinsic evidence is also inadmissible to prove that the
'^Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. Ohio St. 215; Toledo Agricultural
27. Works v. Heisser. 51 Mo. 128; Avery
^o^Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 44; v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443.
Hall V. Bradbury, 40 Conn. 32; Col- ''^ 1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 300. See
lins V. Buckeye State Ins. Co., 17 post, § 224.
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contract was the personal obligation of him who purports to be an
agent only. The authorities are not harmonious, however, as to
whether certain recitals in the body of the instrument and certain
forms of signature are to be construed as purporting to be the con-
tract of the principal or the personal obligation of the agent. More-
over, some of the authorities are to the effect that the courts will
look only to the recitals in the body of the contract proper, and to
the signature at the foot ; while in others these have been construed in
connection with other indicia,—such as words and phrases contained
in the headings or margins, the corporate seal, etc., printed, written,
or impressed upon the same paper. Still other cases find in such
recitals, headings and other indicia sufficient data to adjudge that
ambiguity exists, which is to be solved either with or without the
introduction of extrinsic evidence, according to the nature of such
ambiguity. While it is impossible to reconcile these conflicting
views, it may not be unprofitable to review some of the leading cases
bearing on the points as to which there is this disagreement.
§ 214. Construction from recitals and signature alone—Illustra-
tive cases.—The first class of cases we shall notice are those in
which the question of the liability of a particular party has been de-
termined by the construction of the recitals in the body of the instru-
ment in connection with the form of the signature, without the aid
of extrinsic evidence.
In an action on a promissory note, in which the recitals were
:
"We, two of the directors of the Ark, etc.. Assurance Society, by
and on behalf of said society, do hereby promise to pay," and the
paper was signed by two persons, without any addition indicating
an agency, the contract was held to be that of the society and not
of the persons signing the same.^°^ Substantially the same conclu-
sion was reached in an Iowa case, where the action was on a note
reading: "We, the undersigned, directors," etc., "promise," etc., and
the signatures of three persons were appended without any addition
to the same. It was held that the signers were not personally
liable.^"*' But where the trustees of a masonic lodge executed to a
bank their promissory note reading: "We promise to pay," the note
being signed: "A, B, C, trustees D lodge," it was held to be the
contract of the signers individually, and not that of the lodge; and
extrinsic evidence to show that the note was in fact that of the lodge
'"'Aggs v. Nicholson, 1 H. & N. ^^ Baker v. Chambles, 4 Greene
165. (Iowa) 428.
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was held improper. The court said : "Knowing the law, they [the
trustees] must be held to have known that the note, in the form in
which it was executed, purported to be the note of the appellants,
and not the note of the lodge. What the parties in fact understood,
supposed, or believed as to the legal effect or meaning of the form
in which they contracted is immaterial. The intention which the
law imputes to their contracts must, in the absence of fraud or mis-
take of fact, be held to be the intention of the parties. They can not
avoid the contract by averring an intention or purpose opposed to
that which the law attaches to their agreement."^"^
In another case in Indiana, the supreme court has held that where
a party is sued upon a promissory note, and desires to escape liability
because he executed such note merely as agent, he should plead non
est factum, thus denying the execution of the note under oath; and
that upon failure to do so, he can not succeed in the defense that
the note sued upon is not his personal contract.^"* In the same
state, a note showing on its face that it was given for money of which
the principal, a civil township, received the benefit, and providing
that it was "to be paid out of the township's funds," and signed by
the maker as "trustee of X township," was held on its face to be the
note of the township, and not of the trustee, personally.^"^
A similar ruling was made by the court of appeals of Kentucky in
a case in which the plaintiff brought suit on a bill reading as follows
:
"Thos. B. Posey, Tr., Grand Division of Kentucky, pay to the
order of A. W. Elder three hundred and twenty dollars, in full of
copies of Kentucky New Era, ordered to be sent D. .G. W. Patricks
at January session of G. Division.
"Geo. W. Williams, G. W. P.
"Attest: L. Hord, G. S."
The answer alleged that the defendant (Williams) drew the order
sued on as the presiding officer of the grand division of the Sons of
Temperance of Kentucky, as grand worthy patriarch, which was sig-
"' Williams v. Second Nat'l Bank, cases of public agents. Such an
83 Ind. 237. agent is not liable personally on a
1^' Fulton V. Loughlin, 118 Ind. 286. contract attempted by him to be
"^Wallis V. Johnson School Town- made in favor of his principal, as
ship. 75 Ind. 368. As to this case it would be against public policy to
it should be noted also that the hold him liable thereon: See Knight
principal was a public school cor- v. Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22, 57 Am. Rep.
poration, which would bring the 534.
trustee within the rules governing
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nified by the letters "G. W. P.'' annexed to his signature; and that
it was drawn upon the grand treasurer of said grand division, and
attested by L. Hord, the grand scribe, which was signified by the
letters "G. S." annexed to his signature; and that the consideration
was for copies of the New Era, a newspaper, as expressed in the instru-
ment; that the said grand division was a corporation, and that the
order was drawn in conformity to the rules of the said grand division,
and was drawn by the defendant in his official character, and not as an
individual, etc. The lower court overruled a demurrer to this answer,
and this ruling was affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals said:
"The doctrine is well established that, in a case like the present, if
it can, upon the whole instrument, be collected that it was intended
to bind the principal, courts of justice will adopt that construction
of it, however informally it may be expressed/^^^**
In Massachusetts, where a note contained a promise in this form:
"I, the subscriber, treasurer of the D. T. Corporation, promise," etc.,
which was signed: "G. L. C, treasurer of the corporation," the
supreme court decided that it was on its face the note of the corpora-
tion and not that of the treasurer personally.^^^
Some of these holdings apparently support the proposition that
where the consideration, on the face of a promissory note, purports
to move to the principal, and the note is signed by one of its officers,
the corporation alone is liable on the contract.
The following forms of notes have been held sufficient to bind the
principal, and not the agent, when construed in connection with the
signatures
:
"We, the trustees of the X Society, promise," etc. ; signed, "Trustees
of the X Society,—A, B, C, D.""^^
"The pastor and deacons of X church promise to pay;" signed,
"S. D. Y., for X church.""^
"The trustees of the X church of Y, as such trustees," etc., "promise
to pay;" signed, "A, B, C, D," etc., "as trustees of the X church
of Y.""*
""Taylor v. Williams, 17 B. Men. "=New Market, etc., Bank v. Gil-
(Ky.) 489. let, 100 111. 254, 29 Am. Rep. 39.
"^Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335. "^Jefts v. York, 4 Cush. (Mass.)
See, to the same effect. McHenry v. 371, 50 Am. Dec. 791.
Duffield, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 41; Rich- "* Little v. Bailey, 87 111. 239.
mond, etc., R. Co. v. Snead, 19 Gratt.
(Va.) 354, 100 Am. Dec. 670.
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"I, as treasurer of the X Society, or my successors in office, promise
to pay ;" signed, "S. K., treasurer."^^^
"The X Association, who execute this note by her directors. A, B,"
etc., "promise to pay;" signed, "A. B., secretary," and others, "direc-
tors X Assn.""«
"We promise to pay;" signed, "A. B., Pres. X Co., C. D., Sec. pro
"We, or either of us, promise to pay in behalf of school district
No. 6," etc.; signed, "A. B., president, C. D., secretary, E. F., treas-
urer."^^®
Where the recital was, "We, as directors," etc., only the corporation
was held liable, the word "as" excluding the idea of individual lia-
bility.i^^
"The H. County Agricultural Association, who execute this note
by her directors, do promise to pay," etc. ; signed "T. M. K., A. L. S.,
secretary, S. F. B. (and ten others), directors H. County Agricultural
Association. , sureties."^-*^
"We promise to pay;" signed, "Warrick Glass Works, J. Price
Warrick, Pres."^^^ In this case the court said: "I do not perceive
any significance in the use of the words 'we promise to pay,' instead
of 'the company promises to pay.' The contention was that the
use of these words raised an implication that it was the joint note of
the corporation and of Warrick. But, as has been remarked in more
than one of the cases cited in which the notes contained a promise in
like form, the word 'we' is often used by a corporation aggregate."
The form of the signature in this ease was considered equally as
significant as if it had been written "Warrick Glass Works,
per J. Price Warrick, agent." A similar ruling was made in Wis-
consin in a case in which the form of the promise was, "We promise
to pay ;" and that of the signature, "X, etc., Milling Company, F. K.,
president."^-^
"* Barlow v. Congregational See, "' Reeve v. First Nat'l Bank, 54
8 Allen (Mass.) 460. N. J. L. 208.
"* Armstrong v. Kirkpatrick, 79 "- Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387,
Ind. 527. 17 Am. St. 171. For further rulings
"^ Farmers', etc., Savings Bank v. to the effect that such a contract is
Colby, 64 Cal. 352. the obligation of the principal, a
"'Harvey v. Irvine, 11 Iowa 82. corporation, see Rendell v. Harri-
"' Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 126, man, 75 Me. 497; Carpenter v. Farns-
137. worth, 106 Mass. 561.
""Armstrong v. Kirkpatrick, 79
Ind. 527.
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"We promise to pay;" signed, "I. Mfg. Co., B. I. B., Pres.. D. B. S.,
Sec'y."i23
"I promise to pay," etc. ; signed, "B., Treas. St. PauPs Parish."^-*
A note reading, "We promise to pay," signed, "The P. G. Co., by
B. F. A., president, C. B. 0., vice-president, C. H. R., secretary, A. B.
T., B. E., J. P. B., directors," was held in Indiana to be, prima facie,
the joint obligation of the makers in their individual capacity, the
word "directors" subjoined to the three last names being but descriptio
personarum,}^^
Where an agreement was entered into for the building of a church
"\)y and between the trustees, and building committee of
Church,—J. M., president, F. L., secretary, J. B., L. X., E. S., mem-
bers, all of the city of D., by authority of the Eight Eev. J. S. F.,
bishop of the diocese of D., parties of the first part, and the mason,
M. L., of the same place, party of the second part," providing that
"the parties of the first part herewith promise and agree for them-
selves, their heirs, executors and administrators," etc.,—it was hel|d
that the persons designated as "parties of the first part" were indi-
vidually liable.^^®
And a note reading as follows: "We promise to pay to the order
of C. & C. I. Co. $7,500, at M. bank, value received ;" signed, "E. H.
C, Treas., J. C, Prest.," the words "E. C. Co." being printed across
the face of the note, was held, in Xew York, to be the personal and
individual obligation of the signers. ^'^ The court said: "The note
does not purport to bind the company. If the addition of the official
character of the signers had not been added, the words 'E. C. Co.'
printed on the side of the note would not bind that company. The
makers expressly promise to pay the note Jointly, and if they are
not liable upon the note, there is no maker who is liable.^^^ The
note must show on its face that it was signed for the principal and
in some way in his name; where an agent fails to designate a prin-
cipal, he will be personally liable."^^^
^" Heffner v. Brownell, 70 Iowa "" Landyskowski v. Lark, 108
591, 75 Iowa 341. Mich. 500, 66 N. W. 371.
^2* Sturdivant v. Hull, 59 Me. 172, "' Casco Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 18 N.
8 Am. Rep. 409. Y. Supp. 887.
"= Taylor v. Reger, 18 Ind. App. '"Citing DeWitt v. Walton, 9 N.
466. See also, Albany Furniture Y. 571.
Co. v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 17 '=' Citing Pentz v. Stanton, 10
Ind. App. 531. Wend. (N. Y.) 271. See Casco Nat'l
12
—
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§ 215. Construction from recitals, together with signatures, head-
ings, marginal notes, etc.—The cases in which the courts have taken
into account, in construing the contract upon the question whether
the principal or the agent was bound, the headings, marginal notes,
corporation seal, etc., on the paper upon which the contract was
written, are not so numerous, but they are sufficiently so to constitute
a distinct class. These are cases in which the ambiguity, if there
could be said to be such, was solved by the court itself, without re-
ceiving parol evidence. Thus, in New Hampshire, it was held that
a note signed "A. G., secretary," with the official seal of the cor-
poration attached, was a corporate and not an individual note.^^'*
And so it has been held in Illinois.^^^ According to the decisions
of some courts, the impression of the corporate seal has the same
effect as if the name of the corporation had been written under the
contract.^^^ A bill of exchange, headed, "Office of the Belleville
Nail Co.," and concluding, "Charge same to account of the Belleville
Nail Co., A. B., Prest., C. D., Sec'y," was held to bind the company,
and not the signers.^^^ And a bill dated at the office of a corporation,
signed by the president with the addition of the title of his office
abbreviated, and directing the sum to be charged "to motive power
and account," according to the decision of the New York court of
appeals, purports to be the contract of the corporation only.^^* How-
Bank V. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307, affirm- is most improbable the plaintiff sup-
ing the decision of the supreme posed he was obtaining the individ-
court. See further, in this class of ual note of the officers. Had it been
cases. Day v. Ramsdell, 90 Iowa 731, so the note would no doubt have
52 N. W. 208, holding that a note been executed without attaching to
reciting, "We, the T. P. Co., promise the signatures of the makers the
to pay," and signed, "J. R., Pres.," name of the corporation. It is still
and "H. E. R., Sec," is the obliga- more unusual that persons making
tion of J. R. and H. E. R. Individ- an individual note or other obliga-
ually. See also the following cases: tion would cause it to be attested by
Chase v. Pattberg, 12 Daly (N. Y.) the seal of the corporation with
171; McClellan v. Reynolds, 49 Mo. which they were connected." But
312; Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Clark, a contrary ruling was made by the
139 N. Y. 314; Tama Water Power English queen's bench: Dutton v.
Co. V. Ramsdell, 90 Iowa 747, 52 N. Marsh, L. R. 6 Q. B. 361.
W. 209. ^^ Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass. 140;
"•' Dow V. Moore, 47 N. H. 419. Means v. Swormstedt, 32 Ind. 87.
'"^ Scanlan v. Keith, 102 111. 634. ^^ Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105 U.
In this case (p. 644) the court said: S. 416.
"Dealing with the corporation and "*01cott v. Tioga R. Co., 27 N. Y.
taking a note made by its officers, 546.
with its corporate seal attached, it
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ever, in this case, no special significance seems to have been attached
to the circumstance that the bill was dated at the office of the com-
pany, further than that given in the opinion of the court, that "there
was clearly sufficient upon the face of the bill to indicate an inten-
tion to bind the company." In a case decided in Massachusetts^^^
the suit was against the acceptor upon two drafts, one of which ran
as follows:
"Office of Portage Lake Manufacturing Co.,
"Hancock, Mich., June 5, 1861.
"E. T. Loring, Agent, 39 State St., Boston
:
"At four months' sight, pay to the order of J. H. Slawson, four
hundred dollars, and charge the same to account of this company.
"$400.00 L. E. Jackson, Agt."
Written across the face of the draft were these words: "Accepted
June 15. E. T. Loring, Agent." The question arose whether Loring
was personally liable as acceptor, and the court held that he, and
not the company, was bound. The court, speaking through Bigelow,
C. J., said: "Being negotiable paper, all evidence dehors the drafts
is to be excluded. It is wholly immaterial that the defendant was
in fact the agent of the company named on the face of the drafts,
and that the plaintiff knew he was so, and that the defendant had
no personal interest in the company.^^® The rule excluding all parol
evidence to charge any person as principal, not disclosed on the face
of a note or draft, rests on the principle that each person who takes
negotiable paper makes a contract with the parties on the face of the
instrument, and with no other person. Taking the signature of the
defendant as acceptor written across the face of the drafts by itself,
without reference to other parts of the instruments, it is clear that it
would bind him personally."^^^ A bill headed with the name of
the office of an express and banking house, directed to be charged to
"account of this office," and signed by a person as agent, was held by
'^ Slawson v. Loring, 87 Mass. Had the suit been against the
340. drawer a different result might have
'^"Citing Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray been reached, as in. that event the
(Mass.) 334; Bank of British North court might properly have consid-
America v. Hooper, 5 Gray (Mass.) ered the headings of the paper as a
567; Draper v. Massachusetts Steam part of the contract. Here the head-
Heating Co., 87 Mass. 338. ings had already served their pur-
'"" It should be noted that in this pose as explanatory of the signature
case it was a question of the liability of the drawer, and could not be used
of the acceptor, and not the drawer, again to qualify that of the acceptor.
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the supreme court of California not to be the personal obligation of
the agent, but that of the house.^^* This ruling has been followed
by the courts of Montana and Nevada. ^^*^ A draft headed "Pompton
Iron Works," directing that the amount of such draft be placed "to
the account of the Pompton Iron Works,"' and signed, "W. Burtt,
Ag't," was held by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts to be
the draft of the company, and not of the agent.^^^ And by the same
court a bank check having the words "^tna Mills" printed in the
margin, and signed "I. D. Farnsworth, treasurer," was declared to
be the check of the ^tna Mills, and not that of Farnsworth.^*" And
so, a draft headed "New England Agency of the Pennsylvania Fire
Insurance Company," with the words "Foster and Cole, general
agents for the New England states," printed in the margin, appearing
on its face to be drawn upon such company in payment of a claim
against it, and signed "Foster and Cole," without any addition to the
signature, was adjudged by the same court to be the draft of the
company, and not of Foster and Cole.^*^
§ 216. Ambiguity in instruments—Parol evidence.—A third class
of cases are those in which it is held that where, upon the face of a
negotiable instrument, there is a doubt or ambiguity as to whether
the contract is that of the principal or of the agent, parol testimony
may be introduced to show what was the intention of the parties with
reference to the matter. A leading case upon this question is that
"^ Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535, 68 signed "John Clark, Prest.," and
Am. Dec. 280. "E. H. Close, Treas.," although the
138a Gerber v. Stuart, 1 Mont. 172, note was given for the debt of the
177; Gillig V. Lake Bigler Co., 2 Nev. ice company, a corporation. The
214, 223. court held that as the note was
13S Fuller V. Hooper, 3 Gray negotiable and in the hands of an
(Mass.) 334. innocent holder, it must be regarded
^*^ Carpenter v. Farnsworth, 106 as the agreement of the ostensible
Mass. 561. maker, and that the appearance in
"1 Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. print, upon the margin, of the name
189. But a contrary conclusion was of the corporation was not a fact
reached by the court of appeals of carrying with it any presumption
New York, where an action was that the note was intended to be
l)rought on a note containing in the that of the company; hence the sign-
margin the printed words. "Bridge- ers were held liable personally:
wood Ice Co.," and running, "We Casco Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y.
promise to pay," and which was 307.
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of Mechanics' Bank v. Banlc of Columbia.^*- It was an action of
assumpsit on a check running as follows
:
"Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria,
"June 25, 1817.
"Cashier of the Bank of Columbia
:
"Pay to the order of P. H. Minor, Esq., ten thousand dollars.
"$10,000.00 (Sig.) Wm. Paton, Jr."
The margin of the paper upon which the check was printed and
written contained the printed words "Mechanics' Bank of Alexan-
dria." The supreme court held that it appeared doubtful on the
face of the check whether it was an official or a private act, and that
parol evidence was, therefore, admissible to show that it was the
official act of Paton, he being the cashier of the Mechanics' Bank.
"The appearance of the corporate name of the institution on the face
of the paper," said the court, "at once leads to the belief that it is a
corporate, and not an individual transaction; to which must be
added the circumstances that the cashier is the drawer, and the teller
the payee [facts which had been given in evidence dehors the check]
;
and the form of ordinary checks deviated from by the substitution
of to order for to bearer. The evidence, therefore, on the face of the
bill, predominates in favor of its being a bank transaction. * * *
But it is enough for the purposes of the defendant to establish that
there existed, on the face of the paper, circumstances from which
it might reasonably be inferred that it was either one or the other.
In that case, it became indispensable to resort to extrinsic evidence
to remove the doubt." In Maryland, the court held, in conformity
to this rule, that where a bill, drawn by a corporation, was addressed
to its treasurer, and accepted by him by signing his name as treasurer
of the corporation after the word "accepted" written across the
face of the instrument, parol evidence was admissible to show that
the acceptance was designed to be only in his official capacity.^" In
a New Jersey case, a bill of exchange signed by one as "President
Elizabethtown and Somerville E. E. Co.," there being nothing in
the body of the instrument to show the nature of the obligation, was
held to be ambiguous, and parol evidence was decided admissible to
determine whether it was the obligation of the company or of the
president individually.^** In a suit by the payee against the drawer
'"5 Wheat. (U. S.) 326. '" Kean v. Davis, 21 N. J. L. 683,
"^Laflin v. Sinsheimer, 48 Md. 411, 47 Am. Dec. 182.
30 Am. Rep. 472.
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of a bill headed "Wetunipka, etc., R. Co., President's Office," and
signed by one as "Pres't," parol evidence was held proper to show
that the company was the real principal. ^^^ Similarly, the supreme
court of Mississippi ruled that a bill of exchange drawn by H. and
accepted by B., "agent of H.," was ambiguous, and that, as between
the parties to the bill, parol evidence was competent to show that
the intent was not to charge B. personally, but to charge H., whose
funds were in B.'s hands. "Ordinarily," said Chalmers, J., "no
extrinsic testimony of any kind is admissible to vary or explain
negotiable instruments. Such paper speaks its own language, and
the meaning which the law affixes to it can not be changed by any
evidence aliunde. One of the few exceptions to this rule is where
anything on the face of the paper suggests a doubt as to the party
bound, or the character in which any of the signers acted in affixing
his name, in which case testimony may be admitted between the
original parties to show the true intent. Thus, where one has signed
as agent of another, while the prima facie presumption is that the
words are merely descriptio perso-nae, and that the signer is individu-
ally bound, yet it may be shown, in a suit between the parties, that
it was not so intended, but that, on the contrary, the true intention
was that the payee should look to the principal whose name was dis-
closed in the signature of his agent, or who was well known to be
the true party to be bound."^*^ In Texas a note which ran: "We,
the trustees of C. H. College, promise to pay," signed by several
persons with their own names merely, was held to be prima facie the
note of the signers ; but extrinsic evidence to show an intention to bind
the corporation was held admissible.^*'' And in Colorado, where the
action was by the drawee against the acceptor of certain drafts,
accepted by "F. D. H., treasurer," drawn on "S. A. E.," and directed
to be charged to account of "S. L. S. N. Co.," a corporation, it was
held that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the plea
which alleged that the defendant was the treasurer of the company;
that the bill was given for an indebtedness of the company to the
plaintiff; that it was his duty as treasurer to pay out all moneys of
the company in his hands on the order of the company, and to
accept, as its treasurer, all orders or bills drawn by the company on
"'Wetumpka, etc., R. Co. v. Bing- "' Traynham v. Jackson, 15 Tex.
ham, 5 Ala. 657. 170, 65 Am. Dec. 152.
^^ Hardy v. Pilcher, 57 Miss. 18, 34
Am. Rep. 432.
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its treasurer and pay the same when due if he had sufficient funds
in his hands, belonging to the company, to do so; that he accepted
the bill as treasurer of the company and not otherwise; that when
the bill became due there was no money of the company in his
hands, and that the plaintiff had knowledge of all the facts before set
out. Said the court: "If a bill of exchange is complete in itself,
free from any latent ambiguity, obviously carrying its passport upon
its face, there is no need of oral testimony to aid in its exposition.
The clear and intelligible terms of such an instrument may not be
explained by extrinsic evidence. This is a familiar rule of constant
application in the interpretation of written contracts. Can it be
said that the drafts in question belong to this class? That upon
their face it is proclaimed to the world that Hayer was acting in
his individual capacity in accepting them? Or rather, would not
the more natural construction be that these drafts were drawn by
the principal, the company (whose name appears on the face of the
instrument), by its president, upon its treasurer, as such? Giving
to each word its appropriate meaning, considering each instrument
in every part, and as a whole, and having reference to well established
commercial usage, as to the mode of ^drawing bills of exchange by
a corporation upon itself, we do not hesitate in our conclusion that
the drafts in controversy must have been understood, especially if
the averments in the third plea are true, as having been accepted
by the treasurer as such, and not as an individual."^*^ In a recent
Indiana case, the supreme court of that state, contrary to many of
its previous decisions, held that a note dated at the office of a cor-
poration, running "We promise to pay," and signed, "R. J. Beatty,
president," was not conclusively the obligation of Beatty, but that it
could be shown by extrinsic evidence that it was a corporate note.^'*®
"'Hager v. Rice, 4 Colo. 90, 34 Magill, 2 Conn. 680; Haile v. Peirce,
Am. Rep. 68. 32 Md. 327, 3 Am. Rep. 139; Rich-
'" Second Nat'l Bank v. Midland mond, etc., R. Co. v. Snead, 19 Gratt.
Steel Co., 155 Ind. 581, 58 N. E. 833, (Va.) 354, 100 Am. Dec. 670; New-
52 L. R. A. 307. And this seems to man v. Greeff, 101 N. Y. 663; Bank
be the tendency of the more modern of Genesee v. PatcHin Bank, 19 N. Y.
decisions: See 4 Thompson Corp., 312; Gillig v. Lake Bigler Co., 2
§ 5141, et seq. See also. Bean v. Nev. 214; Musser v. Johnson, 42 Mo.
Pioneer Mln, Co., 66 Cal. 451, 56 74, 97 Am. Dec. 316; Keidan v. Wine-
Am. Rep. 106; Baker v. Gregory, 28 gar, 95 Mich. 430; Webb v. Burke, 5
Ala. 544, 65 Am. Dec. 366; Brockway B. Mon. (Ky.) 51; Paige v. Stone, 10
V. Allen, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 40; Smith Mete. (Mass.) 160; Barlow v. Con-
V. Alexander, 31 Mo. 193; Hovey v. gregational Soc, 8 Allen (Mass.)
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§ 217. Illustrative cases in which parol evidence was excluded.—
In the list of cases in which parol evidence to explain an alleged
ambiguity has been excluded we note the following:—In Conner v.
Clarh^-''^ it was decided that one who signs a promissory note with
the addition of the word "trustee" to his name is personally liable
thereon ; and testimony can not be admitted to show a contemporane-
ous parol agreement that the signer should not personally be liable,
but that the note was to be paid out of a trust fund. This decision
was, however, based largely upon the principle mentioned by Story,
that trustees, guardians, executors, etc., are generally held personally
liable on notes, because they have no authority to bind, ex directo,
the persons for whom or for whose benefit or estates they act, although
even they might exempt themselves from personal liability by using
clear and explicit words to show that intention.^^^ In Wing v.
Glick'^^^^ the contract was phrased, "We promise to pay," and was
signed by two persons with the additions, "president school board"
and "secretary school board," but without any reference in the body
to any particular school district. It was held to be the personal
contract of the signers, and not variable by parol. In Bartlett v.
Haivleif^"^ and TitcTcer Mfg. Co. v. Fairhanks,^^^ where bills of ex-
change were directed to be paid to "A. B., agent," and indorsed by
"A. B., agent," it was held that the agent was personally liable; and
parol evidence to show that the indorsers were agents of the drawers
was excluded, on the ground that the defendants appeared on the face
of the bills to be themselves the payees and indorsees, the word "agent"
in each case being treated as designatio personarum. In Webster v.
Wra?/^" the supreme court of Xebraska decides that where a person
executes a negotiable instrument in his own name, without disclosing
his principal or his own character as agent, if in point of fact he was
acting as agent for another, the signer will be personally liable on such
instrument, and evidence to show the agency will not be received.^^'
This case does not contravene the proposition, however, that such
evidence might be admitted if the word "agent" or something equiva-
lent had been added to the signature, and the controversy were be-
tween the original parties.^^*'
460; Pratt v. Beaupre, 13 Minn. 187; '" 120 Mass. 92.
Peterson v. Homan, 44 Minn. 166, 20 '" 98 Mass. 101.
Am. St. 564; Baldwin v. Bank of "'19 Neb. 558. 56 Am. Rep. 754.
Newbury, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 234. >" Citing 1 Daniel Neg. Instr.,
'="12 Cal. 168. § 284.
'" Story Prom. Notes, § 63. "* See further, in this line of
"'a 56 Iowa 473. cases, Hayes v. Matthews, 63 Ind.
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§ 218. Cases holding that principal is liable in equity.—Still
another class of cases hold that although such an instrument, signed
by one as "agent" without revealing the name of the principal on
the face thereof, would, in an action at law, bind the agent only,
yet that in a suit in equity it might be enforced against the prin-
cipal,^" or that the instrument might be reformed, in a proper pro-
ceeding for that purpose. ^^'^
§ 219. Construction of negotiable instruments as between original
parties
—
When in hands of innocent third party.—The courts in
this country are disposed to apply the rule against the admission of
parol evidence more strictly in cases where the instrument before
maturity has passed into the hands of an innocent holder for value
than in actions between the original parties, or between the original
maker or drawer on the one hand and a third party who acquired it
with notice on the other.^^'' These decisions and others holding to
the same doctrine have been criticised upon the ground that the
right to introduce parol evidence depends, not upon the actual
knowledge that the interested parties may have of the transaction
upon which the contract is founded, but upon the fact that there is
an ambiguity on the face of the instrument ; and that the ambiguity,
if it exists, will continue until the paper has come into the possession
of the third party, and must be as obvious to him as it is to the judge
who pronounces it ambiguous.^*^" However cogent this reasoning
may appear, we think it must be admitted that the preponderance of
authority in this country is against it. It would seem that there is
412, 30 Am. Rep. 226; Williams v. Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 153;
Second Nat'l Bank, 83 Ind. 237; Baker v. Gregory, 28 Ala. 544, 65
Pi-ather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495; Pentz Am. Dec. 366.
v. Stanton, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 271, '"" Lee v. Percival, 85 Iowa 639.
25 Am. Dec. 558; Anderton v. Shoup, ^=' Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S.
17 Ohio St. 125, 93 Am. Dec. 612; 93; Casco Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 139
Robinson v. Kanawha Valley Bank, N. Y. 307; Mechanics' Bank v. Bank
44 Ohio St. 441; Hypes v. Griffin, 89 of Columbia, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 326;
111. 134; Scanlan v. Keith, 102 111. Smith v. Alexander, 31 Mo. 193;
634, 40 Am. Rep. 624. Brockway v. Allen, 17 Wend. (N. Y.)
'"Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 44; 40; Hardy v. Pilcher, 57 Miss. 18,
Thomson v. Davenport, 2 Smith 34 Am. Rep. 432; Martin v. Smith,
Lead. Cas. 377, and notes; Board of 65 Miss. 1, 3 So. 33; Haile v. Peirce,
Com'rs v. Butterworth, 17 Ind. 129; 32 Md. 327, 3 Am. Rep. 139; Roberts
Davison v. Davenport Gas-Light Co., v. Austin, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 313.
24 Iowa 419; Clarke's Ex'r v. Van "° Huffcut Ele. of Ag., § 190.
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no valid reason for applying a more rigid rule of construction to
negotiable instruments than to other simple contracts in writing,
except that by reason of their negotiable character such instruments
become a kind of circulating medium, and public policy demands
their protection while in the hands of innocent holders. After all,
the question to be decided in construing any simple contract is, What
was the intention of the parties? and if that is not clear, upon the
face of the instrument, or if there are suggestions giving rise to
doubt, parol evidence should be admitted to solve the doubt. This
is the undisputed rule governing informal instruments not negotiable
by the law merchant. A different rule applies with regard to nego-
tiable instruments, it is true, but only when such instruments are
sought to be enforced by third parties who acquire title thereto before
dishonor, in good faith, and for a valuable consideration,^®^ As Dr.
Wharton expresses it, "So far as concerns persons taking such paper
before maturity, for a valuable consideration, we must sweep aside
all questions as to whether those signing the paper occupy other
relations than those which the paper states. The courts must deter-
mine the question of liability by an examination of the terms used,
taking them in their ordinary' commercial sense."^®- This is doubt-
less a correct statement of the rights of innocent holders of such
paper, but as the language of the author plainly imports, it does not
apply to the immediate parties. As to them, the paper is no more
sacred than any other simple contract. Third parties who acquire
such an instrument in the course of business may, of course, also be
affected by an ambiguity upon the face thereof, but it must be so
obvious and apparent as to put them upon inquiry. For example,
in England it is a custom with some agents to sign, "C. D., by pro-
curation of A. B. ;" but this is ambiguous, and the words "by procura-
tion" are held to be an express intimation of special and limited
authority, and sufficient to place the person taking an instrument
so drawn, accepted, or indorsed, upon his inquiry as to the extent
of the agent's author! ty.^''^ The arbitrary doctrine of descriptio per-
sonarum ought not to be extended so as to fasten obligations upon
those who in fact never assumed them, unless absolutely required
by the rules of law. A& was well said by the supreme court of
Michigan: "The rule that rejects words added to the signature is
an arbitrary one. Its reason is not so much that the words are not,
1" 1 Parsons Notes & B. 274. ^^ 1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 299, and
^«- Wharton Ag., § 290. cases cited.
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or may not be, suggestive, but that they are but suggestive, and the
instrument, as a whole, is not sufficiently complete to point to other
parentage. The very suggestiveness of these added words has given
rise to an irreconcilable conflict in the authorities as to the legal
effect of such an instrument. Extrinsic evidence, therefore, is ad-
missible in such cases, Isetween the immediate parties, to explain a
suggestion contained on the face of the instrument, and to carry out
the contract actually entered into as suggested, but not fully shown
by the note itself. The presumption that persons dealing with
negotiable instruments take them on the credit of the parties whose
names appear should not be absolute in favor of the immediate
payee, from whom the consideration proceeds, who must be deemed
to have known all the facts and circumstances surrounding the in-
ception of the note, and with such knowledge accepted a note contain-
ing such a suggestion."^®* The competency of extrinsic evidence in
such cases, as between the immediate parties, is sustained by other
high authority.^*'^ It is a very difficult task, in view of what has been
shown as to the conflicting decisions, to extract from them a satis-
factory rule upon the subject under discussion. It is always safest
for the practitioner to consult the rulings of the courts in the par-
ticular jurisdiction in which the controversy has arisen.
§ 220. Summary of the most approved doctrine as to negotiable
instruments.—The most approved, though by no means universal
doctrine upon this subject may, we think, be stated as follows:
—
1. A negotiable instrument may be drawn, accepted, or indorsed by
an authorized agent so as to bind only his principal when, either by the
recitals or the signature, he discloses the principal and makes it appear
that he, the agent, is "the mere scribe who applies the executive hand
as his instrument;"^®® or that the principal but speaks through him;
as, for example, by employing the form "John Doe, by Richard Eoe,
his agent (or attorney) ;" or "Richard Roe, agent for John Doe;" or
"John Doe, per Richard Roe, agent (or attorney)," or any equivalent
words; or other words clearly showing that it is the intention that
the person for whom the agent is professing to act be bound, and not
the agent himself personally. 2. A negotiable instrument attempted
to be drawn by an authorized agent for his principal will bind the
agent personally, if neither in the recitals thereof, nor in the signa-
'"^McGrath, J., in Keidan v. Wine- '"'1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 418; Me-
gar, 95 Mich. 430. chem Ag., § 443.
'«« 1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 298.
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ture or elsewhere, the principal is named or referred to, although the
signer has described himself by adding to his own name such appella-
tions as "agent," "trustee," "president," "treasurer," etc., such words
being regarded merely as dcscriptio personae; and extrinsic evidence
is not admissible to show that another is the real obligor. 3. If a
negotiable instrument of the description last above given, in addition
thereto contain upon its face, or in the headings or marginal memo-
randa, the name of the principal, so as to indicate that it was the inten-
tion to bind the principal and not the agent, the court will, by constru-
ing the various recitals, memoranda, headings, etc., together, and with-
out extrinsic evidence, declare it to be the obligation of the principal
only, when the controversy is between the original parties. 4. If a
negotiable instrument of the description given in summary 2, in
addition thereto contain upon its face, or in the headings or mar-
ginal memoranda, some suggestion that 'the signer may have been
acting merely as the agent or representative of another, whether his
name appear or not, the instrument, while still prima facie the
personal obligation of the agent, will generally be regarded as suffi-
ciently ambiguous, if the controversy be between the immediate par-
ties, or between the drawer or maker and a holder thereof with notice
or knowledge of the facts, to warrant the admission of parol evidence
to show such facts, in order to exonerate the agent. 5. As to all
negotiable instruments in which the paper, on its face, in respect of
the question as to which of two persons is the real obligor, shows
such ambiguity as to put an ordinarily prudent business man upon
his inquiry, parol evidence is admissible to solve the ambiguity even
as against an otherwise innocent holder, who acquired the paper before
maturity and for a valuable consideration. 6. In the case stated in
summary 5, even though there be no ambiguity, yet if it be asserted
that the principal was in the habit of transacting that class of busi-
ness in the name of the agent, or that the name of the agent was the
principal's trade name, parol evidence is admissible to prove such fact,
either between the immediate parties, or against a third party who
took the paper with notice or knowledge thereof; and to prove that
fact it may be shown that in the course of dealing between the orig-
inal parties the name adopted in the particular contract under dis-
pute had become the common name by which the obligation of the
principal was expressed. ^^^
^"Bank of Rochester v. Monteath, 681; Metcalf v. Williams. 104 U. S.
1 Denio (N. Y.) 402, 43 Am. Dec. 93; Hovey v. Magill, 2 Conn. 680;
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§ 221. Acceptances—Construction of indorsements.—What has
been said in the preceding sections regarding the execution of nego-
tiable instruments and the liabilities of the parties thereon had refer-
ence mainl}' to the makers or drawers of such instruments, although
in some of the cases cited and reviewed the question of liability con-
cerned the acceptors and indorsers of such paper. As to acceptors,
we think it may be stated that there is no appreciable distinction, in
point of liability on their contracts, between them and the makers or
drawers. As a general rule, the doctrine of descriptio persanarum is
as 'applicable to the one as to the other. Whether, in construing the
signature of an acceptor, the court will look to the entire instrument
together with the indicia of the paper, such as headings and mar-
ginal remarks, is not definitely established. In one case, as we have
seen, the court ruled that the acceptance and the signature thereto
alone could be considered, without reference to other parts of the in-
strument, it being a separate and independent contract; that while
headings and other earmarks of the paper might serve to explain the
signature of the maker or drawer, they could not also be used to
qualify that of the acceptor.^^^ This rule, however, can not be deemed
of universal application, we apprehend, for it would be absurd to dis-
regard wholly the nature of the instrument which the party accepts,
in the construction of the contract of acceptance. If a bill is drawn
on John Doe and accepted "John Doe, by Eichard Eoe, his agent,"
it can not be said that the court may disregard the bill itself; for
without looking to its several parts it will he unable to determine
whether the acceptance is valid or not. And when a bill is drawn
on Jolin Doe and accepted by "Eichard Eoe, agent," it would seem
that the court would determine the validity of the acceptance by
construing the acceptance and signature thereto in connection with
the whole instrument; and that, when so construed, the only rational
meaning to be given to the appellation after the signature of Eichard
Eoe must be "agent for John Doe ;" for as John Doe is the drawee,
and he alone can legally accept the bill, there would be no room for
other construction; and this is believed to be the true rule.^"" But
where an instrument, in the form of a bill of exchange, was drawn by
Pease V. Pease, 35 Conn. 131; Gerber '" Slawson v. Loring, 87 Mass.
V. Stuart, 1 Mont. 172; Milligan v. 340; ante, § 215.
Lyle, 24 La. Ann. 144; Melledge v. ""See Souhegan Nat'l Bank v.
Boston Iron Co., 5 Cush. (Mass.) Boardman, 46 Minn. 293.
158; Riimsey v. Briggs, 139 N. Y.
323, 34 N. E. 929.
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H. W. Hardiflg and accepted by "William S. Boiling, agent of H. W.
'
Harding," parol evidence was held admissible between the parties to
show that the intent was not to charge Boiling personally, but to
charge Harding, whose funds were in the hands of Bolling.^^° In this
case, it will be noted, the acceptance was not by a drawee of a bill, but
by the agent of the drawer, which is of course unusual, and at once
suggests an ambiguity, the instrument, though in form a bill of ex-
change, being really a promissory note, and Boiling being an apparent
indorser rather than an acceptor. It was held proper, therefore, to
admit extrinsic evidence to show that Boiling had funds in his hands
belonging to Harding, and that the intention was merely to dedicate
such funds pro tanto to the security of the note, and not to hold
Boiling personally liable in any manner. A similar ruling was made
by the supreme court of Tennessee. There the suit was on a note.
The mother of the plaintiffs, then infants, loaned a sum of money
belonging to them to Partee and Harbut, a firm composed of C. C.
Partee and B. F. Harbut, taking therefor two notes of the firm pay-
able to John Harbut and H. Partee, and indorsed by them severally,
and by James H. French. The suit was against all the parties to the
paper. The court held that the doctrine of descriptio personae was
applicable to indorsers, but that when the indorsement was irregular,
as in this case, parol evidence was admissible, as between the parties,
to prove the real attitude of the apparent indorser to the paper.^'^
That an apparent indorser may thus explain his relation by parol
evidence, when the suit is between the original parties and there is
ambiguity, has been decided in other cases.^^- And when the in-
dorsement is in blank, parol evidence may be received to annex a con-
dition or qualification to the indorsement when the controversy is be-
tween the immediate parties ;^^^ but not when the action is by a re-
mote indorser, who purchased bona fide, for full value and without
notice."^ In suits against indorsers of notes and bills payable to a
corporation by its corporate name and indorsed by an authorized agent
or official, with the suffix of his office or position, it is generally re-
garded that the agent or official acted for the corporation, which can
"" Hardy v. Pilcher, 57 Miss. 18. ''' Davis v. Morgan, 64 N. C. 570.
I'l Taylor v. French, 2 Lea (Tenn.) ^'^ Hill v. Shields, 81 N. C. 250, 31
257, 31 Am. Rep. 609. Am. Rep. 499; Rodney v. Wilson, 67
^"Cole V. Smith, 29 La. Ann. 551, Mo. 123, 29 Am. Rep. 499; Doolittle
29 Am. Rep. 343; Babcock v. Beman, v. Ferry, 20 Kan. 230, 27 Am. Rep.
11 N. Y. 200. 166.
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only act by an agent, and can transfer title only in that manner.^^^
Indeed, the courts are manifesting a disposition to hold that such
words as "agent,'^ "treasurer," "president," "cashier," etc., added to
the signature of an apparent indorser, or even maker or drawer, in-
dicate that the indorsement or execution is as agent of the payee or
principal maker or drawer, and may be so construed prima facie, if
warranted by the appearance of the paper; or that parol evidence
may be adduced to show that such is the case.^'^® Even where the
note was payable to "E. B., treasurer," and indorsed "E. B., treasurer,"
it was held that this indorsement did not necessarily create a personal
liability against E. B., and that parol evidence was proper to show
that the indorsement was made in behalf of the corporation of which
E. B. was treasurer. ^'^
§ 222. Bank cashiers—Rule of descriptio personarum not applica-
ble to.—In respect of bank cashiers it is now generally held that one
who indorses or accepts a negotiable instrument by adding to his signa-
ture the suffix "cashier," or "cash.," or "cas.," is presumed to be acting
for the bank of which he is cashier, and that a note, bill, or other
instrument payable to a person as cashier is payable to his bank.^'^
Such added word is not regarded as a mere descriptive appellation,
but as a valid substitute for the name of the principal, which may
not be disclosed on the face of the paper.^'^
§ 223. Undisclosed principal—Parol evidence to hold liable.—
While extrinsic evidence, except in the instances heretofore pointed
out, will not generally be received to vary or contradict the contents
of a written instrument, such evidence is always admissible to charge
with liability an undisclosed principal, or one who, though disclosed,
is not named in the instrument. The purpose of such evidence is
"^1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 416. 94; Bank of Genesee v. Patchin
"Talk V. Moebs, 127 U. S. 597; Bank, 19 N. Y. 312; Folger v. Chase,
Scanlan v. Keith, 102 111. 634, 40 18 Pick. (Mass.) 63; Houghton v.
Am. Rep. 624; Merchants' Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 26 Wis. 663; Pratt
Central Bank, 1 Ga. 418, 44 Am. v. Topeka Bank, 12 Kan. 570; Stam-
Dec. 665. ford Bank v. Ferris, 17 Conn. 259;
'•• Babcock v. Beman, 11 N. Y. 200. Watervliet Bank v. White, 1 Denio
See also, Vater V. Lewis, 36 Ind. 288. (N. Y.) 608; 1 Daniel Neg. Instr.,
""Nave V. First Nat'l Bank, 87 § 417; Morse Banks & Banking,
Ind. 204; Erwin, etc., Co. v. Far- §§ 158h, 170; Garland v. Dover, 19
mers' Nat'l Bank, 130 Ind. 367; Me. 441.
Hodge V. Farmers' Bank, 7 Ind. App. ""1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 417,
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not, however, to exonerate the agent, but to hold the principal in
addition. This subject will be fully dealt with hereafter.^*"
§ 224. Sealed instruments—How must be executed to bind princi-
pal—Illustrative cases.—Instruments under seal were, by the common
law, regarded as the highest class of written instruments; and al-
though the requirement of a seal has in many states of the Union
been abrogated by statutes, and in those and in many other jurisdic-
tions the importance attached to such instruments has been greatly
diminished by the decisions of the courts, it is still true that deeds and
instruments that were required to be under seal by the rules of the
common law are regarded as being of a much more solemn and im-
portant character than simple contracts, and that many of the com-
mon-law rules as to these are still in force; and as to these the rule
against the admission of parol testimony to vary the writing is still
generally applicable. An agent who is duly authorized to execute
an instrument of this character must be careful to execute it so as
not to render himself personally liable. It is possible that the exe-
cution of such an instrument by an agent may have one of the follow-
ing consequences: 1. It may bind the principal and not himself.
2. It may bind himself and not the principal. 3. It may be void as
to both himself and the principal.^^^ Assuming that the agent was
properly authorized to execute such an instrument on behalf of his
principal, he may do so, without binding himself, by using the name
of the principal as the grantor, or party who contracts, and stating
th'at the act is done by him as his agent; thus: "Know all men by
these presents that John Smith, by William Jones, his attorney (or
agent), does hereby grant, convey," etc. This is the granting clause,
and must purport to be made by the principal. The same is true of
the covenants in the deed, which may be expressed as follows : "And
the said John Smith, by his attorney (or agent) aforesaid, does
hereby covenant, warrant and defend," etc. Then follows the testi-
monium clause, which should likewise be executed in the name of the
principal; thus: "In testimony whereof, the said John Smith, by
his said attorney (or agent), has hereunto set his hand and affixed
his seal, this," etc., giving the date of the execution of the deed.
Lastly comes the signature, which must purport to be that of the
principal, and may or may not be followed by that of the attorney
or agent; thus: "John Smith (seal)," or "John Smith (seal), by
""See post, § 303. "^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
231.
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William Jones, his attorney (or agent )."^^- This will clearly be
binding upon the principal, and him only. It must not be under-
stood, however, that the deed or sealed instrument must be in the
exact form of words above given. It is believed that this form is
most to be commended, but it is by no means the only one that will
stand the test. As said in an English case, "Whether the attorney
put his name first or last can not affect the validity of the act done."^*^
And in the same case it was said by. Lawrence, J. : "But here the
bond was executed by Wilks, for and in the name of his principal,
and this is distinctly shown by the manner of making his signature.
Not that even this was necessary to be shown ; for if Wilks had sealed
and delivered it in the name of Browne, that would have been enough
without stating that he had so done. * * * There is no particular
form of words to be used, provided the act be done in the name of
the principal." "For A. B., by C. D.," is sufficient; and the
order of the words is not material, if the deed purports on its
face to be the deed of the principal. If the mode of execution,
however informal, is not repugnant to such purport, it will be con-
strued to be the deed of the principal, provided the testimonium
clause is that the principal has thereunto set his hand and seal.^^*
In a Missouri case the form was "that the A. B. Co., by S. H., presi-
dent, and T. S. C, secretary, has granted," etc. "In witness whereof
we hereunto subscribe our names and affix our seals." The acknowl-
edgment was that the president and secretary, by name, acknowledged
that they executed and delivered the deed as their voluntary act and
"= Story Ag., § 153. the first part , hath granted,"
183 pgj. Grose, J., in Willis v. Back, etc. "In witness whereof the said
2 East 142. J. C. W., attorney, hath hereunto set
^^ Story Ag., § 153. See also, Ball their hands and seals," etc. "A. B.
V. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313; Bohan- (seal) R. B. (seal)
nons V. Lewis, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) By J. C. W. (seal), their attorney in
376; Wilburn v. Larkin, 3 Blackf. fact." The court said that the deed,
(Ind.) 55; Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn, "while very inartificially drawn,
287; Spencer v. Field, 10 Wend. (N. we have determined, not, however.
Y.) 88. The following form was without a good deal of hesita-
held sufficient to bind the principal tion, should be held operative to
in Butterfield v. Beall, 3 Ind. 203: the extent of the power that had
"This indenture, made be- been legally conveyed to him. It
tween J. C. W , attorney in was Wright's intention to act under
fact for A. B. and R. B.,
,
par- the power granted him, and justice
ties of the first part, and J. B., will be promoted and litigation, per-
of the second part, witness- hqps, saved, by holding the deed
eth, that the said J. C. W., party of operative."
1,3
—
Principal and Agent.
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deed. Each of the names had a seal attached to it, and there was a
fourth seal attached not opposite to any name. The court ruled that
the deed was that of the corporation.^*^ One Daniel King and one
Zachariah King were joint owners of a piece of land; and Daniel
King executed a deed thereto in the following terms: "I, Daniel
King, as well for myself as attorney for Zachariah King, doth (sic)
for myself and the said Zachariah, remise, release and forever quit-
claim the premises described in the deed, together with all the. estate,
right, title, interest, use, property, claim, and demand whatsoever of
me, the said Daniel, and said Zachariah, which we now have, or here-
tofore had at anj time, in said premises. And we, the said Daniel
and Zachariah, do hereby for ourselves, our heirs, and executors,
covenant that the premises are free of all incumbrance, and that the
grantee may quietly enjoy the same without any claim or hindrance
from us, or any one claiming under us, or either of us. In witness
whereof, we the said Daniel for himself, and as attorney aforesaid,
have hereunto set our hands and seals," etc. Signed, "Daniel King ;"
and also, "Daniel King, attorney for Zachariah King, being duly
authorized as appears of record," with seals attached to each signa-
ture. It was held that the covenants of the deed were clearly those
of the principal ; that from the terms used the grant purported to be
that of the principal ; and that the deed, as executed, passed the title
of both Daniel and Zachariah King. The court in the qourse of the
opinion said : "The deed of the attorney, to be valid, must be in the
name and purport to be the act and deed of the principal; * * *
but whether such is the purport of an instrument must be determined
from its general tenor, not from any particular clause. Such con-
struction must be given, in this as well as in other questions arising
on conveyances, as shall make every part of the instrument operative
as far as possible ; and where the intention of the parties can be dis-
covered, such intention should be carried into effect, if it can be done
consistently with the rules of law."^*^" It has been repeatedly held
that no particular set of words is necessary, if the intention to bind
the principal is clearly manifest from the writing. Thus, it was said
by the court of appeals of Kentucky: "The attorney should act in
the name of his principal, and not in his own name merely. There
is no inflexible rule as to the mode in which this is to be done; and
when both names are to be used both in the caption or body and
1^= City of Kansas City v. Hanni- '^' Hale v. Woods. 10 N. H. 470. 34
bal, etc., R. Co.. 77 Mo. 180. Am. Dec. 176.
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signature of the instrument, it is a question of intention and con-
struction, whether the act is done, or the engagement made, in the
name of the principal or of the agent. The terms of the covenant
itself are commonly decisive as to intention. The description in the
caption and the mode of signature are referred to, either as aids in
discovering the intention, or as determining whether the form of the
instrument corresponds with this intention, so that it may be carried
out. If, in view of all its parts, the instrument can be regarded as
the deed or covenant of the party intended to be bound, it must, on
principle, be so regarded. There is, we believe, no difference of
opinion with regard to the propriety of these positions, though there
doubtless may be in their application."^^^ And a lease in which
"Edward F. Lawrence, president of the Northwestern Distilling
Company,'^ described himself as the party of the second part, and in
which the testimonium clause was as follows : "In testimony whereof
the said parties have hereunto set their hand and seals," and which
was signed "Northwestern Distilling Company (seal), by Edward
Lawrence, president,"—was held well executed, and binding on the
compan}^ and not on Lawrence personally.^^^ But an agent or attor-
ney-in-fact can not convey land or otherwise execute authority in
his own name, even though he describe himself as "agent" of the
person for whom he professes to act ; the words "agent of" being con-
strued, in such a case, as merely descriptive of the person of the signer.
Thus, a conveyance which reads: "Know all men by these presents
that I, A. B., as agent of C. D., do hereby grant, sell, convey," etc., is
the deed of A. B. and not of C. D. ; and this is true. Story says,
although he sign the instrument "A. B., for C. D. ;" for while, in
such cases, the testimonium clause and the signature and seal purport
to be those of the principal, the granting clause not purporting to be
that of the principal, it is only the deed of the agent, and not that of
the principal.^^'* And where a deed recited, "Know all men by these
presents that the N. England Silk Co., a corporation, by C. C, their
treasurer," etc., "do hereby grant," etc., and the testimonium clause
was, "Tn witness whereof, I, the said C. C, in behalf of said eompan}^
and as their treasurer, do hereunto set mV hand and seal. C. C,
treasurer of N. England Silk Co.,"—such deed was held not properly
^" Hunter v. Miller, 6 B. Mon. "* Northwestern Distilling Co. v.
(Ky.) 612. See also, Carter v. Doe, Brant, 69 111. 658, 18 Am. Rep. 631.
21 Ala. 72; Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 "" Story Ag., § 148.
Conn. 464, 16 Am. Dec. 70.
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executed and as not being the deed of the corporation.^'*'' The reason
for the requirement that the deed must purport to be executed in
the name of the principal is obvious. It is not sufficient that the
agent have authority to execute the instrument. If he has such
authority and attempts to execute it in his own name, he does not
execute it at all ; for it must be the deed of the principal that is exe-
cuted, and not the deed of the agent, for the agent can not convey
a thing which he himself does not have. In many jurisdictions short
forms of deeds of conveyance and mortgages have been adopted by
statute, and where this is the case, these forms may, of course, be
used.
§ 225. Consequences of defective execution.—If the agent fail to
execute properly the authority of the principal, one of two conse-
quences will follow: 1. The deed may be absolutely void; 2. The
deed may be valid so as to bind the agent, but void as to the principal.
The result depends altogether on the legal effect of the contract.
The only way in which it can bind the agent, of course, is to render
him personally liable in damages; unless his authority be coupled
with an interest, in which case it may have the effect of an alienation
of the subject-matter of the agency j^^o tanto. If an agent under-
takes to execute a deed of conveyance for his principal, to do which
he has been duly authorized, and fails to make an effectual convey-
ance of the land, it is apparent that the deed is entirely void so far
as conveying anything by it is concerned. The title of the land being
in the principal, the personal deed of the agent would not convey it,
of course. Such a deed is therefore void.^®^ However, if the agent
should himself have an interest in the land, it is easily seen that by
his personal deed he would convey at least his own interest, and to
that extent the deed would be a valid conveyance, as to such interest,
but no further. Or if the instrument be a bond for the payment of
money, and the agent has bound himself by apt words, the bond will
be valid so as to bind the agent, as an obligor, although > void as to
the principal. Thus, where an agent undertakes to execute a bond on
behalf of his principal, and in the body of the instrument writes,
''T promise to pay," etc., and signs himself '"John Smith, agent of
William Jones,"—William Jones, the principal, incurs no liability,
as no one purports to act for him ; but Jolin Smith is liable on the
"° Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush. ^^' Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 14;
(Mass.) 337. McNaugbten v. Partridge. 11 Ohio
223, 30 Am. Dec. 731.
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bond, for he has promised to pay."- And the agent may incur lia-
bility upon a deed if the same contain covenants of warranty in his
own name, whether the descriptive words "agent of " be added
or not. If the deed of conveyance in such instrument contain such
covenant, the agent will be individually liable thereon, and an action
in covenant will lie against him individually."^
§ 226. Tendency of courts to relax strict rules of common law as to
sealed instruments—Statutes.—The American courts are constantly
evincing a disposition to relax the rigid rules of the common law in
relation to the execution of sealed instruments, even independently
of statutes. Thus, a deed signed "A. B., by C. D., his attorney in
fact," has been held, by the supreme court of Minnesota to be a suffi-
cient execution, without reciting the grant in the body of the deed.^^*
And it has been held that though an agreement under seal is inoper-
ative in law to convey title for want of a formal execution in the
name of the principal, yet if the agent or attorney was duly author-
ized to make the conveyance, it is binding in equity.^^^ Such a deed,
when executed by an agent, though defective and inoperative to con-
vey title, will be specifically enforced in equity as an agreement to
convey.^®^ By virtue of statutes in many states the rule is less rigor-
ously applied.^''' But in Alabama it is held that the fact that the
common-law requirement of seals on deeds of conveyance of lands has
been abolished does not change the rule as to the execution of such
instruments by agents.^®^ Of course, where an instrument is exe-
cuted under seal when none is required, the rules applicable to sealed
instruments do not apply, and the seal will be treated as surplusage.^®^
§ 227. Rules prevailing in local jurisdictions should be ascer-
tained.—Finally, it is proper to state that the rule of construction
'^2 Fowler V. Shearer, 7 Mass. 14; 56 Am. Dec. 322; Welsh v. Usher, 2
Elwell V. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42. Hill Eq. (S. C.) 167, 29 Am. Dec.
^"^ Mitchell V. Hazen, 4 Conn. 495, 63.
10 Am. Dec. 169; Ogden v. Raymond, ^" See Simpson v. Garland, 72 Me.
22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429. 40, 34 Am. Rep. 297; Warner v.
'"^Tidd V. Rines, 26 Minn. 201. Mower, 11 Vt. 385; Bryan v. Stump,
'»=*Love V. Sierra Nevada, etc., Co., 8 Gratt. (Va.) 241, 56 Am. Dec. 139;
32 Cal. 639, 91 Am. Dec. 602; Mc- Gibbs v. Dickson, 33 Ark. 107.
Naughten v. Partridge, 11 Ohio 223, '"' Jones v. Morris, 61 Ala. 518.
38 Am. Dec. 731; Daughtrey v. '^ Stowell v. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614;
Knolle. 44 Tex. 450; Johnson v. Kirschbon v. Bonzel, 67 Wis. 178;
Johnson, 1 Dana (Ky.) 364. Steele v. McElroy, 1 Sneed (Tenn.)
'^Salmon v. Hoffman, 2 Cal. 138, 341.
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applicable to all contracts is that which prevails in the jurisdiction
where the contract is entered into.'*'° This is, of course, true of a
contract of agency or a contract made by an agent on behalf of his
principal. If the authority is conferred in one place and executed
in another, the presumption, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary, is that it is to be executed according to the law of the place
where it is to be performed ; and of all this the principal is presumed
to have knowledgCo^*^^
^o" 1 Wharton Cents., § 20. ^^ Mechem Ag., § 305.
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§ 228. Purpose of this chapter.—Growing out of the relation be-
tween the principal and the agent, and the execution of the authority
placed in the hands of the latter by the former, are certain reciprocal
duties, obligations, rights and liabilities between the principal and
the agent, which it is our purpose, in due course, to consider. And
first, as to the duties and obligations an agent owes to his principal,
and the corresponding rights accruing from these to the principal,
(199)
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on the part of the agent. These will be discussed in the present
chapter.
§ 229. Duty of agent to enter upon performance of trust.—The
first duty devolving upon an agent after he has assumed the relation
with his principal is to enter upon the performance of the task in-
trusted to him and which he has agreed to perform; unless, indeed,
the time for such performance is postponed to some future date; or
unless he has been released by a new contract, or the principal has
revoked the agency ; or unless the agreement is either illegal, immoral,
contrary to public policy, or impossible.^ It is immaterial that the
commission is a hard one, or that it would subject him to losses. If
the agency is created upon a sufficient consideration, the agent is
bound to execute it, and for failure to do so is guilty of non-feasance,
and is liable to the principal for all damages that the latter may
sustain by reason of such failure. Thus, if an agent whose duty
it is to procure insurance neglects to do so and there is a loss to his
principal, the agent is liable for the full amount of the loss that he
should have insured against.^ The agent must perform the duty in-
trusted to him, and accepted by him, at the time and place and in
the manner wliich his contract and instructions demand; and upon
failure to do this, he will be liable to the principal for negligence,
in such damages as the principal may sustain.^
^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) out it no liability attaches. Such
253; Rechtscherd v. Accommodation promise or undertaking is implied
Bank, 47 Mo. 181; Williamsburg, where the course of dealing has been
etc., Ins. Co. v. Frothingham, 122 such that the agent has been used
Mass. 391. to effect insurances, or where he has
^ Story Ag., § 218; Vickery v. Lan- funds or effects on hand, or even
ier, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 133. Of course, where the bill of lading from which
the undertaking must be founded on he derives his authority contains an
a good consideration. In the case order to insure; and in such case he
cited the court said: "There must is hound at his peril to insure.''^
have been an undertaking or prom- Where an insurance company has di-
ise to insure, made at the time, and rected its agent to cancel a policy
intended as such by the parties, and he fails to use diligence in doing
The party making the request must so, and the company sustains a loss
have had some assurance on which thereby, the agent is liable to the
he had the right to rely, and from company for the damages: Phoenix
which he had the right to expect the Ins. Co. v. Frissell, 142 Mass. 513.
other party would insure; or, in ^Wilson v. Wilson, 26 Pa. St. 393.
other words, there must, in the lan- Hence, if an agent to whom a collec-
guage of all the books, have been tion of negotiable paper has been
an undertaking to that effect. With- intrusted, before maturity, fails to
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§ 230. For what losses of principal agent is liable.—The next
question that natiirall}'' arises is, For what losses is the agent liable
in such cases? In the first place, it may be truh^ stated that the
agent is responsible to the principal only for the real loss or actual
injury sustained by him by reason of the non-feasance, and not
for merely a probable or possible one. Hence, if, in the case supposed
in the previous section, the agent had undertaken to procure insur-
ance in a designated company and the company had become insolvent
before the loss, or the principal had no insurable interest, or the
voyage (if marine insurance), as described in the order, would not
have covered the risk,—there could be no responsibility attaching to
the agent, as there would be no actual injury or real loss resulting from
the neglect.* But loss or injury will always be presumed in such
cases, if a casualty has occurred, and the burden is on 'the agent to
show that no injury has accrued to the principal by reason of the
breach, and even then the latter will be entitled to nominal damages.^
The principal is entitled to recover such damages as are the proximate
results of the agent's non-feasance, or omission. The damages need
not be the direct or immediate consequences of the agent's negli-
gence, though it will not be sufficient if they be merely a remote
result, or an accidental mischief, the maxim being applicable: "Causa
proxima, non remota, spedatur." If the inju^-y is a natural result
of, or is fairly attributable to, the agent's failure or negligence, it is
present the same in due time for * Story Ag., § 222.
acceptance, he is guilty of negli- ^ It is, however, the duty of the
gence; and if the collection is there- principal, when he has ascertained
by lost^ he will be liable to the prin- that the agent has failed to procure
cipal in damages for the amount of the insurance, to take steps himself
such loss: Allen v. Suydam, 20 to effect such insurance; and if,
Wend. (N. Y.) 321; First Nat'l Bank after he has acquired knowledge of
V. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 77 N. Y. 320, the agent's failure to take out sufR-
33 Am. Rep. 618; Merchants', etc., cient insurance to cover any prob-
Bank v. Stafford Bank, 44 Conn, able loss, he fails to do so himself,
565; Warren Bank v. Suffolk Bank, provided he have time and oppor-
10 Cush. (Mass.) 582; Bank of Dela- tunity, he can not recover for the
ware Co. v. Broomhall, 38 Pa. St. loss he may sustain by reason of the
135; Flint V. Rogers, 15 Me. 67. And agent's negligence. This is on the
if specific directions be given as to principle that it is the duty of one
the method of collection, these must, who has suffered a wrong at the
of course, be followed, at the peril hands of another to use proper dili-
of the agent in case of loss: John- gence in preventing loss from such
son V. New York, etc., R. Co., 33 N. wrong: Brant v. Gallup, 111 111.
Y. 610, 88 Am. Dec. 416. 487,
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sufficient to render him liable.® Hence, if an agent is directed to
purchase for the principal and forward to him a certain article, and
the agent fails to do so, the principal can recover what loss he has
sustained, including the profits which he could have obtained on the
sale of the article directed to be purchased." But speculative profits
or gains that might possibly arise in the future can not be allowed.^
And if an agent whose duty it is to collect money for his principal
has failed to do so, he can not be held responsible for all the profits
the principal might have made out of such money, in some specula-
tion or business into which he was prevented from entering owing
to the negligence of his agent. Nor would he be liable if by reason of
such failure to collect, on the part of the agent, the principal should be-
come embarrassed in the payment of his debts, or fail in business, or be
injured in his credit, for these are but remote or accidental conse-
quences of the agent's negligence.® Nor is the agent always liable
'Willard v. Pinard, 44 Vt. 34; Gil-
son V. Collins, 66 111. 136; Whitney
V. Merchants', etc., Co., 104 Mass.
152.
'Bell V. Cunningham, 3 Pet. (U.
S.) 69. But it is held (and this
seems to be the weight of authority)
that mere delay in forwarding,
though due to negligence of a car-
rier, can not be regarded as the
proximate cause of an injury result-
ing from a storm, fire, or other
causes which could not have been
anticipated and for which the agent
is not responsible, although the in-
jury might not have occurred if the
carrier had been diligent in forward-
ing: Hoadley v. Northern Trans.
Co., 115 Mass. 304, 15 Am. Rep. 106;
Dubuque Wood, etc., Ass'n v. Du-
buque, 30 Iowa 176; Michigan, etc.,
R. Co. V. Burrows, 33 Mich. 6; Mc-
Clary v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 3
Neb. 44, 19 Am. Rep. 631; Daniels
V. Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532, 13
Am. Rep. 264; Morrison v. Davis, 20
Pa. St. 171, 57 Am. Dec. 695; La-
ment V. Nashville, etc.. R. Co., 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 58; Davis v. Central
Vermont R. Co., 66 Vt. 290, 44 Am.
St. 852; Raid v. Evansville, etc., R.
Co., 10 Ind. App. 385; Memphis, etc.,
R. Co. V. Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S.)
176; Scott V. Baltimore, etc.. Steam-
boat Co., 19 Fed. 56; McCarthy v.
Louisville, etc., R. Co., 102 Ala. 193,
48 Am. St. 29; O'Brien v. McGlinchy,
68 Me. 552, 557. The holding of the
courts in some states is, however,
directly the opposite of this view.
It is there ruled that the carrier is
liable in such cases, the negligent
delay being regarded as the prox-
imate cause of the injury: Pruitt
V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 62 Mo. 527;
Wolf V. American Express Co., 43
Mo. 421, 97 Am. Dec. 406; Bostwick
V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 45 N. Y.
712; McGraw v. Baltimore, etc.. R.
Co., 18 W. Va. 361; Deming v. Grand
Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 455. See
also, Ruppel v. Allegheny Valley R.,
167 Pa. St. 166. 46 Am. St. 666; St.
Clair V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 Iowa
304.
*Bell V. Cunningham. 3 Pet. (U.
S.) 69.
^ Story Ag., § 220; Evans Pr. &
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for failure to perform his agreement. Xo man can be compelled to
perform an illegal or immoral act, or one that is contrary to public
policy or that is impossible to be performed; nor can the principal
recover any damages for the agent's failure to perform such act.
We have already discussed the classes of contracts that are illegal,
immoral, and opposed to public policy, in another chapter of this
work, to which the student is referred.^" We need only say here
that if the contract of agency belongs within the category of any of
these inhibited transactions, the agent need not, indeed he should
not, perform it ; and he will not be liable to the principal in damages
for his failure to execute the agreement. The first duty of the
parties is to obey the law, and the law will not permit either party to
violate any moral or legal duties. If, for example, the agent's con-
tract requires him to smuggle goods into a country, in violation of
its laws, and he fails or refuses to do so, no recovery can be had by
the principal for such failure to perform, any more than the agent
could recover compensation from the principal if he had performed
the illegal contract. The law will leave the parties in such cases
precisely as it finds them, and will not interfere in behalf of either
of them.^^
§ 231. Gratuitous services.—These observations as to the duty of
the agent to act apply, however, only to agents for hire or compensa-
tion. If the agency is entirely gratuitous, and the agent does not
enter upon the performance of the duty intrusted to him, he will not
incur any liability to his principal for such failure to perform. In
such case, there is no consideration for the promise to perform, and
hence no liability.^- An agent is liable, however, if he undertakes to
execute the business in whole or in part, and any loss or injury re-
sults to the principal from his negligence or from failure to complete
the business or to perform it in accordance with his instructions.
No man can be compelled against his wishes to perform for another
Ag. (Bedford's ed.) 253; Davis v. N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec, 535; Byrd v.
Barger, 57 Ind. 54; City of Indian- Hughes, 84 111. 174; Pearce v. Foote,
apolis V. Wann, 144 Ind. 175. 113 111. 228.
«• Ante, §§ 61-76. ' Morrison v. Orr, 3 S. & P. (Ala.)
"Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 49, 23 Am. Dec. 319; Spencer v.
(U. S.) 258; Brown v. Howard, 14 Towles, 18 Mich. 9; Balfe v. West,
Johns. (N. Y.) 119. See also. 13 C. B. 466, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 506;
Rechstscherd v. Accommodation Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 84;
Bank, 47 Mo. 181; Mills v. Mills, 40 Benden v. Manning, 2 N. H. 289.
§ 232 PKINCIPAL AND AGENT. 204
any act of friendship or service of any kind without compensation;
yet if he undertake the business and fail to perform it in compliance
with his agreement or the instructions of his principal, he will be
liable for the loss occasioned by his negligence, and a relinquishment
of his commission will not release him from damages. ^^ In other
words, a gratuitous agent is not responsible for non-feasance, but he
is responsible for misfeasance.^* When the party undertakes to per-
form the business intrusted to him, he becomes an agent, whether
he does so gratuitously or for pay. His previous promise for a
gratuitous service was not binding upon him, for it was not sup-
ported by any consideration, and was, therefore, nudum pactum. But
by the voluntary undertaking and entering upon the service, such
party becomes subject to the ordinary and usual rules pertaining to
an agency, and is then under obligations to execute the business of
his principal, or suffer the consecjuences for any injury caused by his
negligence.^^
§ 232. Gratuitous bailees and bank directors—Negligence—De-
grees of.—The question then arises. When does a gratuitous agent
become liable to his principal for negligence in the performance
of the latter's business? The classes of agents most generally
affected by this branch of the law of agency are gratuitous bailees
and directors of banks, though these are by no means the only
ones. A bailment, according to Blackstone, is a delivery of goods
in trust, upon a contract, express or implied, that the trust shall
be duly executed on the part of the bailee.^® The party who thus
delivers the goods for bailment is called the bailor, while he who
receives them for the purpose is the bailee. There are three kinds
of bailments; namely: (1) those which are solely for the benefit
of the bailor; (3) those which are solely for the benefit of the
bailee; (3) those which are for the benefit of both the bailor and
bailee.^^ In the first, only slight care is said to be required of the
13 Walker v. Smith, 1 Wash. (U. "Spencer v. Towles, 18 Mich. 9.
S.) 152; Watson v. Union Iron, etc., "2 Bl. Com. 395, 451; Swentzel v.
Co., 15 111. App. 509; Spencer v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. St. 140; Ham-
Towles, 18 Mich. 9; Passano v. mond v. Hussey, 51 N. H. 40, 12 Am.
Acosta, 4 La. 28, 23 Am. Dec. 470; Rep. 41; Grant v. Ludlow, 8 Ohio
Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477, 7 St. 1; Eddy v. Livingston, 35 Mo.
Am. Rep. 548. 487.
"Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) ^^ Story Bailm., § 23; Schouler
84, Bailm., § 15.
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bailee; in the second, it is said that great care and diligence are re-
quired; while in the third, ordinary care is the standard. ^^ It is
only the first kind of bailment above mentioned with which we are
here concerned. Bailments solely for the benefit of the bailor being
gratuitous bailments, the bailee is generally required to use but slight
diligence or care; and the only kind of negligence for which he is
said to be liable to the bailor is "gross" negligence.^^ Special de-
posits in banks come within this class of bailments. They are gen-
erally, if not universally, without hire or compensation. The bail-
ment is for the sole benefit and accommodation of the bailor. Still,
there is an implied contract that the deposit shall be safely kept and
the identical thing returned when the bailment is ended.-" Such a
deposit is a naked bailment, without recompense, and the bailee is
liable only for "gross negligence."-^ Just what is meant by "gross"
negligence is not always easy to determine. One may be guilty of
such negligence in one case when under the same or similar circum-
stances in another case he would be guilty only of ordinary or .slight
negligence. The general rule is that the care must be proportioned t(f
the business undertaken by the agent or bailee,^- and the nature of the
1' Story Bailm., § 23; Schouler
Bailm., § 15.
" Story Bailm., supra; 1 Thomp-
son Neg. (2d ed.), §§ 18-26; 1 Shear-
man & Redf. Neg., §§ 47-49; Persch
V. Quiggle, 57 Pa. St. 247; Shiells v.
Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158; Beardslee
V. Richardson, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 25,
25 Am. Dec. 596; Grant v. Ludlow,
8 Ohio St. 1; Hibernia Bldg. Ass'n
V. McGrath, 154 Pa. St. 296, 26 Atl.
377, 35 Am. St. 826; Burk v. Demp-
ster, 34 Neb. 426, 51 N. W. 976; Ray
V. Bank of Kentucky, 10 Bush (Ky.)
344; Singer Mfg. Co. y. Tyler, 54 111.
App. 97; Tancil v. Seaton, 28 Gratt.
(Va.) 601.
=" State V. Clark, 4 Ind. 315.
^ Whitney v. Brattleboro Bank, 55
Vt. 154, 45 Am. Rep. 598; Patterson
V. Mclver, 90 N. C. 493; Dunn v.
Branner, 13 La. Ann. 452; First
Nat'l Bank v. Rex, 89 Pa. St. 308;
Eldridge v. Hill, 97 U. S. 92; Ray v.
Bank of Kentucky, 10 Bush (Ky.)
344; Henry v. Porter, 46 Ala. 293.
A leading case upon the subject un-
der discussion is Foster v. Essex
Bank, 17 Mass. 479. It is there held
that a bailee or mere depositary of
goods, without any special undertak-
ing and without reward, is not liable
for loss of the goods by theft or
otherwise, without proof of "gross
negligence." See the note to this
case in 9 Am. Dec, at p. 183.
"Eddy v. Livingston, 35 Mo. 487;
Mariner v. Smith, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.)
203; Kirtland v. Montgomery, 1
Swan (Tenn.) 452. It is sometimes
said that where persons volunteer
to render mere friendly services, or
give aid, advice and counsel in cases
of illness or other trouble without
expecting any reward, that only
"gross negligence" will give the in-
jured party a right of action. See
Mechem Ag., § 497. But it is not
necessary, even in these instances,
to employ an epithet with which to
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goods bailed.'^ Many cases hold that a mandatary or bailee who
undertakes without hire or recompense to care for goods intrusted to
his custody, or to perform some duty affecting the subject of the
bailment,—as, by carrying the goods from place to place,—is required
to use such care as men of common sense and prudence, who are not
experts, ordinarily take of their own affairs of that nature, and that
he is guilty of gross negligence only when he fails to do this.-* But
it has been held that if a mandatary who undertakes to carry money
fails to use the ordinary care called for under the particular circum-
stances, and the money is lost in consequence of such carelessness,
he is liable to the owner for such loss.-^ It is also held that money
requires more care at the hands of a mandatary than common
articles of property.^*' But the distinction between gross negligence
and ordinary negligence has come to be regarded as most unsatis-
factory to rely upon, doubtless tending to produce confusion. Xegli-
gence of whatever kind is but the absence of such care as one is in
duty bound to exercise.-" The court, in ^V^son v. Brett,^^ declined
to recognize the legal distinction between negligence and gross negli-
gence, except that the latter has a vituperative epithet added. " 'Gross
negligence,' " said the supreme court of the United States, "is a rela-
tive term. It is doubtless to be understood as meaning a greater
want of care than is implied by the term 'ordinary negligence;' but,
after all, it means the absence of the care that was requisite under
the circumstances."-^ In cases of gratuitous bailments the law re-
characterize the negligence of which 21 Tex. 148; Dudley v. Camden, etc.,
a party rendering these services may Ferry Co., 42 N. J. L. 25; Lobenstein
be guilty. It is, after all, only a v. Pritchett, 8 Kan. 213; Tompkins
question as to whether or not his v. Saltmarsh, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 275.
conduct would amount to negligence " Jenkins v. Motlow, 1 Sneed
for which an action would lie. The (Tenn.) 248; Delaware Bank v.
care required to be exercised in such Smith. 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 351; Colyar
circumstances must be determined v. Taylor, 41 Tenn. 372.
by the duty the one who renders the ^° Storer v. Gowen, 18 Me. 174; An-
service owes to his friend or neigh- derson v. Foresman, Wright (Ohio)
bor whom he volunteers to assist. 598; Graves v. Ticknor, 6 N. H. 537.
And this is the rule in all cases -" Per Willes, J., in Grill v. General
where negligence is charged. Iron Screw Collier Co., L. R. 1 C. P.
^^ Tracy v. Wood, 3 Mason (U. S.) 600.
132. =' 11 M. & W. 113.
^^Kemp V. Farlow, 5 Ind. 462; -^Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Arms,
First Nat'l Bank v. Ocean Natl 91 U. S. 489, 494. And see Preston
Bank, 60 N. Y. 278; Conner v. Win- v. Prather, 137 U. S. 604; Isham v.
ton, 8 Ind. 315; Fulton v. Alexander, Post, 141 N. Y. 100. While there are
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quires the bailee or mandatary, as we have seen, to use such care as a
man of common prudence, not an expert or specialist, ordinarily
exercises over his own affairs in like cases. Whether or not he has
used such care is a question of fact for the jury.^" In the case of
bank directors who serve without pay, the same rule is generally
applied. They, too, are said to be liable only for "gross negligence."^^
But the same degree of care is not required, according to the rulings
of the courts, in all cases of gratuitous bailments. Thus, it was said
in a New York case: "Trustees of savings banks, though receiving
no compensation, are bound to exercise great diligence in the discharge
of their duties. The degree of care required depends upon the sub-
ject to which it is to be applied. Slight care is not enough. One
who voluntarily undertakes the position of director and invites con-
fidence in that relation undertakes, like a mandatary, with those
whom he represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses at least
ordinary knowledge and skill, and that he will bring them to bear in
the discharge of his duty. Such is the rule applicable to public offi-
cers, professional men and mechanics, and must be applicable to every
one who undertakes to act for another in a situation or employment
requiring skill or knowledge; and it matters not that the service
was gratuitous. Hence, trustees of a savings bank are deemed to
undertake to exercise the ordinary skill and judgment requisite for
the discharge of their delicate trust."^-
doubtless different degrees of care etc., R. Co., 112 Mass. 455; Mariner
required in different relations, and v. Smith, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 203;
where the duties and obligations are Steamboat New World v. King, 16
different, the current of modern law How. (U. S.) 469; Storer v. Gowen,
recognizes but one kind of negli- 18 Me. 174.
gence; namely, actionable negli- *' Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S.
gence. Whenever there has been an 604; Rowland v. Jones, 73 N. C. 52;
absence of the exercise of that de- Griffith v. Zipperwick, 28 Ohio St.
gree of care—usually denominated 388; Fulton v. Alexander, 21 Tex.
due care—which the law requires in 148; and see I«ham v. Post, 141 N.
a particular case, whether it be Y. 100; Eddy v. Livingston, 35 Mo.
slight, ordinary, or great care, then 487, 88 Am. Dec. 122.
there is actionable negligence: See ^' Dunn v. Kyle, 14 Bush (Ky.)
1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), §§ 18-26; 134; United Soc. of Shakers v. Un-
Beven Neg. 16, et seq.; Grill v. Gen- derwood, 9 Bush (Ky.) 609; Batch-
eral Iron Screw Collier Co., L. R. 1 elor v. Planters' Nat'l Bank, 78 Ky.
C. P. 600, 612, per Willes, J.; Smith 435; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N.
V. New York, etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. Y. 52; German, etc., Bank v. Auth,
222; McAdoo v. Richmond, etc., R. 87 Pa. St. 419.
Co., 105 N. C. 140; Lane v. Boston, '"Hun v. Gary, 82 N. Y. 65.
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§ 233. Gratuitous agents holding themselves out as possessing pro-
fessional skill, etc.—However, where persons hold themselves out to
the world as possessing the peculiar skill and knowledge of a pro-
fession or occupation which rec|uires such skill or knowledge, they
will be held to the exercise thereof, though the service be rendered
gratuitously, the same as if they received pay therefor.^ ^ If they
profess to be experts, they will be so treated, and held responsible as
such. Thus, a gratuitous agent who undertakes to loan money must
use reasonable prudence in the selection of the security, the exam-
ination of the title to the property by which the loan is to be secured,
the making of the necessary records, conveyances and documents re-
quired, etc.^* In case of loss by a banker, it is his duty to account
for the same, the burden being upon him to show that he exercised
proper diligence and care in connection with the loan.^^ And so, a
physician, or one who holds himself out as such, will be required to
possess and exercise the skill and diligence of such profession.^'' As
no dejfinite rule can be established by which the negligence is to be
measured with exactness, it follows, as observed above, that each
case must be decided upon its own peculiar circumstances and re-
quirements. Thus, in the case of gratuitous bank directors, it is
held that they must exercise that care and prudence which the ordi-
narily prudent bank director exercises.^' Such an agent must exer-
cise that degree of prudence and care which a man prompted by
such interest generally exercises in his own affairs.^^ And so, an
agent to collect a debt, it was held in Pennsylvania, must likewise
exercise that degree of prudence which an ordinarily prudent man
would exercise under the circumstances; and if he takes a note pay-
able to himself, he thereby makes himself liable to the principal for
the entire debt.^^
5' McNevins v. Lowe, 40 111. 209; with interest, must use. due and
Shiells V. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158; proper care in doing so, or he will
Landon v. Humphrey, 9 Conn. 209; be liable for negligence: Samonset
Gill V. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477, 7 v. Mesnager, 108 Cal. 354. 41 Pac.
Am. Rep. 548; Williams v. McKay, 337. See also, Ehmer v. Title, etc.,
40 N. J. Eq. 189, 53 Am. Rep. 775; Co., 89 Hun (N. Y.) 120. 34 N. Y.
Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100. Supp. 1132.
'* Isham V. Post, supra. ^ Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S.
^5 Isham v. Post, supra. 132; Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa.
^•'McNevins v. Lowe, 40 111. 209; St. 140.
Landon v. Humphrey, 9 Conn. 209. =' Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65.
One who agrees to loan money with- ^ Opie v. Serrill. 6 W. & S. (Pa.)
out charge and then to collect it, 264.
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§ 234, Duty of agent to act in principal's name.—As has been
shown in the preceding chapter, the agent, in order to bind his prin-
cipal, should transact the business in the latter's name. He should
do this so as to avoid confusion relative to the respective rights of
the parties growing out of the contract into which the agent has
entered for the principal. If he fail to do so, and by reason thereof
the principal suffer any injury, the agent will be liable to him for
damages resulting therefrom. The agent is but a medium for trans-
ferring to his principal all rights acquired by virtue of any contract
he may make for the principal.*"
§ 235. Agent must generally act in person.—The next rule is that
which requires the agent to execute his authority in person. As
stated and fully explained elsewhere in this work, authority that has
been delegated can not, as a general rule, be redelegated.*^ The
agent has been selected, perhaps, on account of the special confidence
or trust of the principal in the^agent, or of his peculiar skill or fitness
to perform the act in question. But whether this be so or not as an ac-
tual fact, such is the presumption ; and in the absence of countervailing
proof, or circumstances indicating a contrar}- intention, he will be
held responsible for any injury that results which may Ido traced to
the fact that he did not give the business his personal attention.
But if the circumstances are such as to make it appear that the
principal had authorized such redelegation, even though, in fact,
he had not, while the principal might by his conduct have bound
himself to a third party, the agent will be responsible to the prin-
cipal for such unauthorized proceeding, if any loss has been sus-
tained by the latter. The common instances where the agent is
*" Sullivan v. Ross, 39 Mich. 511. being in possession of the note and
.
" See ante, § 187. Thus, an agent mortgage relating to the loan, the
employed to loan money for the payment of the money does not con-
principal can not employ a subagent stitute a payment to the principal
to do the essential parts of such or payee of the note: Kohl v. Beach,
work; though he may appoint such supra. See also, Bartel v. Brown,
subagents to assist him in the mere- 104 Wis. 493; Murphy v. Barnard,
ly ministerial or unimportant de- 162 Mass. 72, 44 Am. St. 340; Joy
tails: Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis. 409, v. Vance, 104 Mich. 97; Wilson v.
81 Am. St. 849; and a subagent in Campbell, 110 Mich. 580; Bacon v.
such a case can not legally collect Pomeroy, 118 Mich. 145; Dexter v.
the money thus loaned; and if the Morrow, 76 Minn. 413, 79 N. W. 394;
debtor pay such subagent the Hollinshead v. Stuart, 8 N. Dak. 35,
amount due on such loan, or any 77 N. W. 89.
portion thereof, such subagent not
14
—
Principal and Agent.
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liable to the principal for a redelegation of the authority are those
iu which, the appointment of the subagent being unauthorized, a
loss or injury has accrued to the principal from the unskillful or
negligent execution of the power on the part of such subagent. There
being in such case no privity between the principal and subagent,
the agent is responsible to the principal for the manner in which the
business of the agency has been transacted.*-
§ 236. Must obey instructions and act within scope of authority.—
It is also the duty of the agent to obey the instructions of his prin-
cipal, and to observe, generally, the terms of the authority under
which he acts. If he disobey, or if he go beyond the scope of the
authority conferred upon him, he will be liable to the principal for
all damages actually sustained on account of the misfeasance. He
must follow the directions given him by his principal ; and this he
must do in good faith and not merely in a perfunctory manner.*'
Thus, where an agent is directed to forward to a person named a
claim for collection, and he forwards it to another, he is liable for
any loss that results from such disobedience.** And an agent who
failed to return promptly a draft upon nonpayment, as instructed
to do, was held liable for the amount of the draft. *^ So, where the
agent's instructions required him to accept in payment nothing but
"undoubted paper" or "first-class collectible paper," and he made no
effort to ascertain the solvency of the parties, or took paper which
he knew to be worthless, he was held chargeable with any loss that
might occur, or he might be held as a guarantor.*^ And an agent in-
structed to remit money by express, but who remits by draft, is liable
for the loss if the drawers afterward become insolvent befor^ pay-
ment.*^ If instructed to remit by draft and he remits by letter, he does
^Barnard v. Coffin, 141 Mass. 37, Am. Rep. 184; Whitney v. Mer-
55 Am. Rep. 443; Loomis, etc., Co. v. chants' Union Express Co., 104 Mass.
Simpson, 13 Iowa 532; Ledoux v. 152, 6 Am. Rep. 207; Butts v. Phelps,
Goza, 4 La. Ann. 160; Sexton v. 79 Mo. 302; United States Mortgage
Weaver, 141 Mass. 273; Exchange Co. v. Henderson, 111 Ind. 24.
Nafl Bank v. Third Nat'l Bank, 112 " Butts v. Phelps, 79 Mo. 302.
U. S. 276. '^Fahy v. Fargo, 17 N. Y. Supp.
^^'Loeb v. Hellman, 45 N. Y. Super. 344, 61 Hun (N. Y.) 623.'
336; Sawyer v. Mayhew, 51 Me. 398; '"Osborne v. Rider, 62 Wis. 235;
Scott V. Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676; Hoi- Clark v. Roberts, 26 Mich. 506.
brook v. McCarthy, 61 Cal. 216; *" Walker v. Walker, 5 Heisk.
Amory v. Hamilton, 17 Mass. 103; (Tenn.) 425.
Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522, 23
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SO at his peril. *^ He must strictly follow the methods of remitting
which he is instructed to pursue ; otherwise he acts at his own risk and
peril.''^ But an agent is only required to use ordinary and reasonable
care and diligence in making remittances to his principal, unless he
has received instructions to remit in a certain way; and when not so
instructed specially, he may remit by mail ; as there is no rule of law
that a postoffice is a less safe or appropriate means of conveyance
' than a private carrier or banker.^° An insurance agent who was
directed by his company to cancel a policy of insurance, but, without
sufficient reason, delayed doing so for several days, during which
time the property insured was destroyed by fire, and the company
suffered loss, was held liable to the company for the loss.^^ And an
agent who is instructed to sell for cash only will be liable for any
loss occurring if he sell on credit, or accept a check in payment,
should the drawer become insolvent before presentation and pay-
ment.^^ In all such cases the agent will be protected if he obey the
instructions of his principal ; but it is no defense for him to say that
he used proper care and prudence in performing the duty intrusted
to him, if he failed to follow his principal's directions: he can not
exercise discretion or choice of means when they are pointed out to
him by his instructions. Whether the motive of the agent is good
or bad is entirely immaterial: he may believe, in good faith, that
his methods are the best, but this will not excuse him.^^
§ 237. Principal's remedies against agent for violating instruc-
tions.—It sometimes becomes important to know in what kind of an
action the agent is liable to his principal for the consequences of his
disobeying instructions. This, of course, depends upon the nature
of the wrong done to the principal. Generally speaking, the action
is upon the contract of agency; but he may be liable in tort, in
an action on the case; or in trover for the conversion of the goods
of the principal, if there has been a conversion. Trover is a proper
remedy if the agent does such acts as in law amount to a conversion
or appropriation of the property to himself.^* In Laverty v.
^'Foster v. Preston, S Cow. (N. ''= Hall v. Storrs, 7 Wis. 217; Har-
Y.) 198. Ian v. Ely, 68 Cal. 522.
*" Kerr v. Cotton, 23 Tex. 411. " Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y.
^'Buell V. Chapin, 99 Mass. 594, 97 522, 23 Am. Rep. 184.
Am. Dec. 58. ^^ Farrand v. Hurlbut, 7 Minn. 477;
''' Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Frissell, 142 McMorris v. Simpson. 21 Wend. (N.
Mass. 513. Y.) 610; Wells v. Collins, 74 Wis.
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Sncthcn,^^ the agent disposed of the principal's goods contrary to his
instructions, and the court held that he was liable for the resulting
loss in an action of trover as for a conversion. But where the agent
is guilty of a mere breach of duty in violating his instructions,—as,
where he is instructed to sell for a certain price, but sells for less,
—
the remedy is an action on the case for damages.^®
§ 238. When agent may deviate from instructions—Ambiguous
instructions.—It is to be observed that there may be instances of un-
foreseen emergency when an agent wall be justified in deviating from
his instructions ; unless, indeed, such emergency is attributable to the
agent's own default.^^ Thus, as pointed out in a preceding portion
of this work,^* the master of a ship may, in cases of instant necessity,
acquire an authority over the ship, and even the cargo, which he does
not ordinarily possess; as, in case of a Jettison becoming necessary
on the voyage, when he may order any or all of such cargo thrown
overboard.^'* And so, a factor or other agent having thp control of
perishable goods ma}', in cases of extraordinary emergency, sell the
goods contrary to his instructions, so as to prevent a total or greater
loss.®" In these and kindred instances, the agent becomes, ex neces-
sitate, excused from the strict performance of the duties devolving
upon him, owing to the impossibility of communicating with his
principal concerning the emergency; and the rule of the particular
agency is, for the time being, suspended by a special contract created
by the law.®^ It is proper to observe, moreover, that substantial
compliance with his instructions is all that the law requires of an
agent; and a mere circumstantial departure, which does not ma-
terially affect the result, will not involve the agent in damages of a
substantial nature.*'^ The burden of proof in such cases is, however,
upon the agent to show that no material injury resulted from the de-
viation from instructions; as the presumption is always against him
341; Bostwick v. Dry Goods Bank, Barb. (N. Y.) 617; Dusar v. Perit, 4
67 Barb. (N. Y.) 449; McNear v. At- Binn. (Pa.) 361.
wood, 17 Me. 434; McCrillis v. Allen, '^ Ante, § 87.
57 Vt. 505; Lindley v. Downing, 2 s'' Story Ag., § 118.
Ind. 418. "» Story Ag., § 141.
"68 N. Y. 522, 23 Am. Rep. 184. ""Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
^•^McDermid v. Cotton, 2 111. App. 254.
297; Sarjeant v. Blunt, 16 Johns. «= Parker v. Kett, 1 Salk. 95; Hunt-
(N. Y.) 74. ley v. Mathias, 90 N. C. 101, 47 Am.
" Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) Rep. 516.
253-254; Harter v. Blanchard, 64
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in such case.^^ Wlien the agent's instructions are ambiguous,—that
is to say, when they are susceptible of two or more constructions, and
the agent construes them in one of these ways,—the principal can
not recover damages of the agent if the latter has pursued the direc-
tions,' in good faith, according to his own construction. The prin-
cipal had it in his power to make the directions clear and specific,
and he can not be heard to say that he meant a construction different
from that placed upon it by the agent.^*
§ 239. Agent's duty to observe good faith.—It is also the duty
of the agent to act in the utmost good faith in executing the authority
of his principal.^^ The agent's position being one of trust and con-
fidence, he must pursue his principal's directions and do everything
necessary and conducive to fairness and honest dealing between him-
self and his principal. He can not speculate on the property of the
latter, nor take advantage of his position to profit by the relation"""'
beyond the legitimate profits or income derived from the relation,
and with the full knowledge of his principal. And if any knowledge
or information come to the agent which the interest of the principal
may require that he should know, the agent will be liable in such
damages as the principal may sustain from the agent's failure to
*^ Milbank v. Dennistoun, 21 N. Y. mit him to be exposed to the tempta-
386; Greenleaf v. Moody, 13 Allen tion, or brought Into a situation
(Mass.) 363. where his own personal interests
" Ireland v. Livingston, L. R. 5 H. conflict with the interests of his
L. 395; Shelton v. Merchants', etc., principal. In dealings without the
Co., 59 N. Y. 258; Minnesota Linseed intervention of his principal, if an
Oil Co. V. Montague, 65 Iowa 67. agent, for the purpose of selling
«5 Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) property of the principal, purchases
255. it himself, or an agent for the pur-
"" Sterling v. Smith. 97 Cal. 343, pose of buying property for the
32 Pac. 320. In this case the court principal buys it from himself,
quotes approvingly the following ex- either directly or through the instru-
tract from Pomeroy's Equity Juris- mentality of a third person, the sale
prudence, § 959: "Equity regards or purchase is voidable; it will al-
and ti'eats this relation in the same ways be set aside at the option of
general manner, and with nearly the the principal; the amount of consid-
same strictness, as that of the trus- eration, the absence of undue advan-
tee and beneficiary. The underly- tage, and other similar features are
ing thought is, that an agent should wholly immaterial; nothing will de-
not unite his personal and his rep- feat the principal's right of remedy,
resentative characters in the same except his own confirmation after
transaction; and equity will not per- full knowledge of all the facts."
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impart to him such knowledge or information."^ In the transaction
of his principal's business, the interest of the agent is the interest of
the principal,—he can have no other ; and he must perform the duties
intrusted to him with the strictest fidelity, with that end in view.
Thus, one can not legally purchase property on his own account
which his duty or trust requires him to sell on account of another,
nor purchase on account of another that which he sells on his own
account. The two interests are antagonistic, and he can not unite
them both in one.^^ Neither can an agent, as a general rule, act for
two principals who have an adverse interest in the same matter, un-
less he have the consent of both.''^ If any advantage accrues from
the business in which he is engaged, it inures to the benefit of the
principal, and not to that of the agent, and he can not use the
authority conferred upon him to further his own pecuniary interest
in any manner."*^ It makes no difference whether his motive be
good or evil in such matters. Good faith does not mean simply an
honest intention; it means that all of the agent's acts in furtherance
of the business intrusted to him shall be in the principal's interest
and for his benefit, and that the results shall inure to the latter's
benefit. Public policy forbids that one acting as the trustee of an-
other should be permitted to enrich himself out of the proceeds of the
trust, even though there be no loss to the principal; and in ijo case
will the law protect an agent in transactions out of which he may
derive a personal advantage. '^^ The law will not tolerate that an
agent shall place himself in a position, where there are such abundant
opportunities to profit by his wrongs. Though the agent may have
the best of intentions, the evil tendencies still remain, and these the
law will not in any manner encourage. '^^
§ 240. Resulting trust in favor of principal—Statute of frauds.—
If the agent fails to perform a duty imposed upon him by his trust,
" Devall V. Burbridge, 4 W. & S. wishes and interest, and the other
(Pa.) 305; Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 hostile to them: Pittsburgh, etc.,
Minn. 6. Iron Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 92 Mich.
'"' Michoud V. Girod, 4 How. (U. S.) 252.
503. " Bunker v. Miles, 30 Me. 431.
'° Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. 348; " Michoud v. Girod. 4 How. (U. S.)
Meyer v. Hanchett, 39 Wis. 419; 503.
Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158. Nor "Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425;
can he act for the principal in the Florance v. Adams. 2 Rob. (La.) 556,
same transaction in two inconsistent 38 Am. Dec. 226; Ely v. Hanford. 65
capacities,—one favorable to his 111. 267.
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he can not profit by such remissness. Tims, wliere a principal has
intrusted money to an agent with which to pay the taxes on the prin-
cipal's property, and the agent neglects to do so, the latter can not
purchase the property at a tax sale and hold the title in his own name,
but in such case he will be held to be a trustee for the principal.''^
And so, where an agent, in violation of his trust, uses the money of
his principal intrusted to him for any purpose, and invests it in
property, the law creates a trust in favor of the principal. In such
a case, even a purchaser from the agent who is either a volunteer or a
fraudulent grantee will be liable to a suit in equity to have such
property subjected to the principal's claim. '^* And where a husband
had money intrusted to him by his wife, out of her separate means,
with which to purchase land for her, and in the performance of the
trust he did purchase lands with such money, but took the title in his
own name, it was held that a trust resulted in favor of the wife that
would be enforced in equity.'^^ IsTeither is it material that the prin-
cipal has not been damnified by such transactions. "Actual injury
is not the principle the law proceeds on in holding such transactions
void. Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at; and as a means of
securing it, the law will not permit the agent to place himself in a
situation in which he may be tempted by his own private interests
to disregard those of his principal."'^® But a trust in land will not
always be decreed in favor of the principal simply because the agent
took the title to the property in his own name, when commissioned
to purchase for the principal. To satisfy the statute of frauds in
such case, the evidence of the purchaser must either be in writing, or
the property must have been paid for with the principal's money.'^^
'" Barton v. Moss, 32 111. 51. Where cipal, and with his principal's
an agent purchased land for his money, and then sell it to another
principal and represented to him than the principal, at a profit, in
that it cost more than it really did, order to obtain a larger commission
the agent thereby making a profit off for making a profit out of it: Run-
of his principal, the court held that dell v. Kalbfus, 125 Pa. St. 123.
it was a breach of good faith for " Riehl v. Evansville, etc., Ass'n,
which the agent would be liable to 104 Ind. 70.
the principal to the extent of the "= Goldsberry v. Gentry, 92 Ind.
profit so received by him: Rore- 193.
beck v. Van Eaton, 90 Iowa 82, 57 '= People v. Township Board, 11
N. W. 694. To the same effect, see Mich. 222.
Duryea v. Vosburgh, 138 N. Y. 621. " Burden v. Sheridan, 36 Iowa 125,
And so, it was held to be bad faith 14 Am. Rep. 505; Kendall v. Mann,
for an agent to buy hay for his prin- 11 Allen (Mass.) 15.
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Where a part of the purchase-money is paid b}' the principal, and
there is no written agreement, the principal can not compel a con-
ve^'ance of the title to himself. '^^ But where even a portion of the
purchase-money has been paid by the principal, and the whole title
is taken by the agent, a resulting trust pro tanto may under some
circumstances be created."® Whether the money was in fact paid by
the principal in person or not is immaterial: if his money was used
in the purchase, it is sufficient f^ but this fact must be made to appear
clearly.^^
§ 241. Want of good faith is fraud upon principal.—"It may be
correctly said, with reference to Christian morals," says Story, "that
no man can faithfully serve two masters whose interests are in con-
flict."*'^ The principal reposes confidence in the agent that he will
act with sole regard to the interests of the principal as far as he law-
fully may. He does not bargain for impartiality, even if such could
be conceived to exist on the part of the agent where the agent's in-
terests are concerned. Impartiality may frequently be the last thing
he would want. Thus, a seller of property must be presumed to de-
sire the highest price he can fairly obtain therefor; while the pur-
chaser must be presumed to desire to buy it as low as possible.^^
What the principal naturally demands of the agent in such case is to
assist him in obtaining that which he most desires, and not to act
impartially between him and the third party. Good faith requires
that the agent should at all times act with a view to the benefit and
advantage of the principal, and not of himself. A departure from
this fundamental rule will be regarded as a fraud upon the rights of
the principal; and the latter may, as between himself and the agent,
always have the transaction set aside, or sue the agent for damages
in case that is not practicable.^* According to this rule, an agent
will not be permitted to assume an attitude of antagonism to his
principal, nor perfomi any acts or discharge any duties incompatible
'^Sugden Vendors (14th ed.) 703. (1893) 1 Ch. 218; Keighler v. Sav-
'"McGowan v. McGowan, 14 Gray age Mfg. Co., 12 Md. 383, 71 Am.
(Mass.) 119. Dec. 600; Young v. Hughes, 32 N. J.
''"Page V. Page, 8 N. H. 187. Eq. 372; Persch v. Quiggle, 57 Pa.
*' Davis V. Wetherell, 11 Allen St. 247; Moore v. Moore, 5 N. Y.
(Mass.) 19, note. 256; Sterling v. Smith, 97 Cal. 343;
" Story Ag., § 210. Palmer v. Pirson, 24 N. Y. Supp.
^Ibid. 333; Hammond v. Bookwalter. 12
«*Lamb v. Evans, 2 Rep. 189, L. R. Ind. App. 177.
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with those implied in his ageney.^^ All dealings between him and
his principal will be closely scrutinized; and this is especially true
of a fiduciary, who is in a position to take undue advantage of those
for whom he is acting, or to overreach them. In all such cases noth-
ing but the highest good faith will excuse the agent. Thus, if by un-
fair means he has exchanged his own land for that of his principal
of greater value, he is liable for such damages as the principal has
sustained.^*
§ 242. Skill required of agent—Members of learned professions.—
The agent is furthermore required to possess and exercise reasonable
skill in the execution of his powers. If he is not possessed of the
skill and capability that he holds himself out as possessing, or if he
possesses and does not exercise such skill, he violates his obligation
to his principal, and is guilty of such negligence as will render him
liable to the latter. What is the degree of skill an agent is required
to possess is a cjuestion not always easy to answer. The skill re-
quired is not necessarily the highest class, but it is reasonable skill
under the circumstances: it is the skill which men engaged in the
same profession, occupation, or business usually exercise. One who
holds himself out as possessing the peculiar skill and ability of a
profession, business, or calling of any kind is required to possess and
exercise such skill as those engaged in such profession, etc., ordinarily
possess and exercise.^^ "Every person who enters into a learned pro-
fession," says Chief Justice Tindal, "undertakes to bring to the
exercise of it a reasonable, fair and competent degree of skill."^^
Says Story, in regard to bailments: "In all cases where skill is
required, it is to be understood that it means ordinary skill in the
business or employment which the bailee undertakes; for he is not
presumed to engage for extraordinary skill, which belongs to a few
men only, in his business or employment, or for extraordinary en-
dowments or acquirements. Eeasonable skill constitutes the measure
*=«Hughes V. "Washington, 72 111. under which a deed is made during
84; Knabe v. Ternot, 16 La. Ann. such a relation must be closely
13; Pittsburgh, etc., Iron Co. v. scanned; and if a reasonable sus-
Kirkpatrick, 92 Mich. 252. picion exists that confidence has
'"'' Palmer v. Pirson, 24 N. Y. Supp. been abused where reposed, the deed
333; Brooke v. Berry, 2 Gill (Md.) should be set aside:" Uhlich v.
83; Rubidoex v. Parks, 48 Cal. 215. Muhlke, 61 111. 499, per Breese. C. J.
"A confidential relation gives cause *' McNevins v. Lowe, 40 111. 209.
of suspicion, and the circumstances •*' Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 C. & P. 475.
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of the engagement, in regard to the thing undertaken."^® This is
doubtless tlie common-law doctrine as applicable to the ordinary
practitioner in the professions of medicine and law. But just what
is meant by "ordinar}^" or "reasonable skill" is not always clear. It
must be true that the standard can not always be the same.®" In
large cities and thickly settled older communities, where the facilities
are far greater for acquiring knowledge and carrying it into execu-
tion, there is always found a much larger number of practitioners of
a very high degree of skill and knowledge, and they impliedly contract
to do more than the ordinary members of the profession who are not
so pretentious. In smaller towns and in sparsely settled or new
communities, where the opportunities are not so great as those en-
joyed in the metropolitan places, the members of the profession can
not be expected to exercise that high degree of skill and practical
knowledge possessed by those having greater opportunities and facili-
ties.®^ The standard of skill ordinarily applied to physicians and
surgeons is that degree of knowledge and science which the leading
authorities have pronounced as the result of their researches and
experiences up to the time or within a reasonable time before the
question to be determined arose.®- As to the degree of skill and
knowledge required of attorneys at law or legal practitioners of vari-
ous kinds, the requirement is the same in England as in America.
The rule as to such a practitioner is thus stated by Tindal, C. J.
:
"He is liable for the consequences of ignorance, for unobservance of
the rules of practice of the courts, for want of care in the preparation
of the cause for trial, or of attendance thereon with his witnesses,
and for the mismanagement of 'so much of the conduct of a cause as
is usually and ordinarily allotted to his department of the profession
;
whilst, on the other hand, he is not answerable for error in judgment
^^ Story Bailm., § 433. man would take under like circum-
"*" Bishop Non Contr. Law, § 439; stances. The degree of care is al-
Cooley Torts (2d ed.) 794. "What ways in proportion to the danger to
is ordinary care in some cases would be apprehended." Meredith v. Reed,
be gross carelessness in others. The 26 Ind. 334, 336. See also, 1 Thomp-
law regards the circumstances sur- son Neg. (2d ed.), §§ 18-26.
rounding each case. . . . Greater ''^ Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060;
care is required to be taken of a Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738;
stallion than of a mare; so, in the Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick. (Mass.)
management of a steam engine, 440; Crooker v. Hutchinson, 1 Vt.
greater care is necessary than in the 73; Holmes v. Peck, 1 R. I. 242; 2
use of a plow. Yet it is all ordinary Greenl. Ev. 120.
care; such care as a prudent, careful '-' Elwell Malpr. 55.
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upon points of new occurrence, or of nice or doubtful construction.''^^
Negligence on the part of a practicing attorney is always redressible
in damages. What is negligence in such a case is not always easy to
determine, however. The adjudicated cases are to the effect that an
attorney must exercise ordinary skill and care in managing the busi-
ness of his client.^* Thus, it is held that he is liable for losing valu-
able papers, such as a deed, when injury results ;^^ and for negligence
in collecting a debt, if there is a loss to the elient.^^ It is said that
one who holds himself out as a practitioner of one of the learned
professions, by implication warrants his possession of the ordinary and
reasonable skill required in the particular case.®^ Thus, it is required
of a physician and surgeon that he possess and exercise the average
degree of skill and care possessed and exercised by members of his
profession practicing in the same vicinity.'*^ But if the patient is
also guilty of negligence contributing to the injury, he can not re-
cover.^^ This rule does not apply, however, where the party who
employs the agent has knowledge of the want of skill of such person
;
for in such case he can not be presumed to have relied upon such
warranty ; and if a principal deems it proper to employ such an agent,
he can blame no one but himself.''^*
'^ Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 460. Malone v! Gerth, 100 Wis. 166, 75
^* Humboldt Bld'g Ass'n Co. v. N. W. 972. See also, Humboldt Bldg.
Ducker (Ky.),,64 S. W. 671. Ass'n Co. v. Ducker (Kj'.), 64 S. W.
''^ Reeve v. Palmer, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 671.
84. "^Kelsey v. Hay, 84 Ind. 189;
=« Wilson V. Coffin, 2 Cash. (Mass.) Becknell v. Hosier, 10 Ind. App. 5.
316. See also, as to attorneys, Var- "^ Young v. Mason, 8 Ind. App. 264;
num V. Martin, 15 Pick. (Mass.) Lower v. Franks, 115 Ind. 334. The
440; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall, law does not require of a surgeon
(U. S.) 178. the utmost degree of skill and care,
*' Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113; but he is required to possess and ex-
Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H. 460, ercise that degree of knowledge,
59 Am. Dec. 388; Howard v. Grover, skill and care ordinarily possessed
28 Me. 97, 48 Am. Dec. 478. An at- and exercised by members of his
torney at law is required to possess profession: Van Skike v. Potter,
to a reasonable extent the knowl- 53 Neb. 28, 73 N. W. 295. The re-
edge and skill requisite to a proper quirement for the qualifications re-
performance of the duties of his lates to the time of his practice and
profession, and is liable for injuries not to times prior thereto: Mc-
to the client resulting as a proxi- Cracken v. Smathers, 122 N. C. 799,
mate consequence from the lack of 29 S. E. 354.
such knowledge or skill or the fail- ""a Felt v. School District, 24 Vt.
ure to exercise the same, but is not 297.
liable for mere errors or mistakes:
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§ 243. Agent must exercise due care and diligence.—According
to the rule enunciated in the last section, the agent must not only
possess the requisite skill and knowledge, but he must use a degree of
care and diligence commensurate with the situation. It is not suffi-
cient that he should know what and what ijot to do, but he must do that
which is reasonably necessary, and refrain from doing what is appar-
ently detrimental and injurious.^"" Hence, an agent whose duty it is
to bring suit or take an appeal in order to have redress from illegal
assessments or duties, is liable in an action for damages if he allows
the time to go by within which suit could be brought to recover the
illegal assessments.^"^ And an agent who is employed to keep a
highway in repair is liable to the town for any damages sustained by
it by having to pay for an injury to one who was injured by reason
of the negligence of the agent in making such repair."- Banks,
brokers, and collecting agents are liable for negligence in the exercise
of the business of their respective agencies. So, a bank is liable if it
accepts depreciated currency in payment of a collection ;^°^ or fails
promptly to present a draft for payment, if injury results."* And so,
a loan agent is liable for accepting insufficient security.^**^ The agent
is not, however, an insurer, and is only required to use ordinary care in
placing the loan on what reasonably appears to be adequate security.^"**
When an agent undertakes to loan money for his principal on first
mortgage security, it is his duty to have an abstract of title prepared or
to have the title of the property examined before he places the loan, or
otherwise to ascertain the condition of the property as to incumbrances,
or he will be guilty of actionable negligence."^ And an agent who
undertakes to loan money has no right to use it himself and pay the
principal with the note of a third party, given for another considera-
tion, without the principal's agreement to that effect.^"^ So, a
factor whose duty it was to collect cotton for his principal was held
liable for failure to do so, for the value of the cotton, with interest."^
^""Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595. Rep. 211; Bronnenburg v. Rinker, 2
'"^ Bowerman v. Rogers, 125 U. S. Ind. App. 391; Welsh v. Brown, 8
585. Ind. App. 421.
"'-Wilson v. Greensboro, 54 Vt. i"" Kennedy v. McCain, 146 Pa. St.
533. 63.
^"^ Waterhouse v. Citizens' Bank, "' Hardwick v. Ickler, 71 Minn. 25,
25 La. Ann. 77. 73 N. W. 519.
"*Meadville First Nat'l Bank v. "* Scott v. Turley, 9 Lea (Tenn.)
Fourth Nat'l Bank, 77 N. Y. 320. 631.
"^ Bank of Owensboro v. Western "' Dickson v. Screven, 23 S. C. 212.
Bank, 13 Bush (Ky.) 526, 26 Am.
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A collecting agent who fails to use due care in pressing the claim,
making the collection, and remitting the proceeds, is liable for a loss
of any or all of the debt through his negligence.^^" He is, however,
required to use ordinary care and diligence only.^^^ When an agent
has a note for collection, he should at once make a demand of the
debtor at the proper place, and if payment is refused, give immediate
notice to the principal in order that the latter may take the necessary
steps for his security.^^^ And if the collection be a bill of exchange,
payable at a certain day and place, the agent is held to a strict vigi-
lance in making presentation of the bill for acceptance.^^^ The
burden of proof in such cases is on the principal to show negligence
on the part of the agent.^^* But where a confidential agent or one
occupying a fiduciary relation to the principal has purchased property
of the latter, the burden is on such agent or person to show that the
bargain was fair and equitable and that there was no suppression or
concealment of facts which might have influenced the principal's con-
duct/^^ As to the kind of payment a collecting agent may receive, it
is generally held that he may take only lawful money, or such as is
generally received by prudent business men for similar purposes.^^**
If the agent accepts a draft or check in payment, the latter is valid if
the drawer has money in bank to cover the amount represented by it.
In such case, the principal is bound by the payment and can not fall
back upon the debtor to collect again.^^^ As a general rule, however,
an agent or officer can accept in payment money only.^^^ And where
an agent accepted Confederate treasury notes, without showing any
necessity therefor, or without making any effort to dispose of them to
the best advantage, he was compelled to bear the loss.^^^ The same
rule as to diligence applies to agents employed to sell property: they
are required not only to make reasonable efforts to effect a sale,
but they must use due diligence to secure a fair price.^^** But
"" Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' "° Rochester v. Levering. 104 Ind.
Bank, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 13, 26; Reed 562.
V. Northrup, 50 Mich. 442. "" Baird v. Hall, 67 N. C. 230.
"' Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. "' Indiana Bond Co. v. Bruce, 13
(U. S.) 426. Ind. App. 550.
""Bank of Mobile v. Huggins, 3 "'Armsworth v. Scotten, 29 Ind.
Ala. 206. 495.
'"Allen V. Suydam. 20 Wend. (N. ""Webster v. Whitworth, 49 Ala.
Y.) 321, 32 Am. Dec. 555. 201.
"* Rand v. Johns (Tex. App.), 15 ""Montgomery v. Pacific Coast
S. W. 200. Land Bureau, 94 Cal. 284; Bigelow
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the agent can only be rGquirod to act fairly and use his best judg-
ment under all the circumstances.^-^ It is a difficult matter to find
illustrative cases for every variety of negligence. It has been held
that no greater diligence is required of an agent than would have
been exercised under similar circumstances by his principal.^-- And
wherever the matter in question has been left to the agent's discre-
tion, he can not be held responsible for a mere error of judgment.^^^
In all snch cases he is liable only for the actual loss sustained by
reason of his negligence.^-* As to the form of action that may be
maintained against the agent by the principal, it may be stated that
the usual remedy for negligence in such cases is either assumpsit on
the contract,^^" or an action on the case for tort.^^® The action of
trover may also lie, but not unless there has been a conversion by the
agent of money or property of the principal, either actual or con-
structive.^-^ The requirements as to the exercise of proper care and
diligence apply with peculiar force to agents who occupy a fiduciary
relation ; such as executors, administrators, guardians, etc.^^*
V. Walker, 24 Vt. 149, 58 Am. Dec.
156.
^Betts V. Planters', etc., Bank, 3
Stew. (Ala.) 18; James v. Borgeois,
4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 345.
"= Blight v. Ashley, 1 Pet. (C. C.)
15.
'"Page V. Wells, 37 Mich. 415;
Steele v. Taylor, 4 Dana (Ky.) 445.
^^ Ryder v. Thayer, 3 La. Ann. 149.
"^ Washington v. Eames, 6 Allen
(Mass.) 417; Greentree v. Rosen-
stock, 61 N. Y. 583; Paul v. Grimm,
165 Pa. St. 139.
"* McMorris v. Simpson, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.) 610.
^•' McMorris v. Simpson, supra.
"The most usual remedies of a prin-
cipal against his agent," said Bron-
son, J., speaking for the supreme
court of New York in this case,
"are the action of assumpsit and spe-
cial action on the case; but there
can be no doubt that trover will
sometimes be an appropriate rem-
edy. That action may be main-
tained whenever the agent has
wrongfully converted the property
of his principal to his own use, and
the fact of conversion may be made
out by showing either a demand and
refusal or that the agent has, with-
out necessity, sold or otherwise dis-
posed of the property contrary to his
instructions. When an agent wrong-
fully refuses to surrender the goods
of his principal or wholly departs
from his authority in disposing of
them, he makes the property his
own, and may be treated as a tort-
feasor."
'-* Executors, administrators, and
other trustees are generally held to
the requirement of exercising ordi-
nary care in managing the trust con-
fided to them. Thus, an adminis-
trator or executor must adopt such
precautions against loss by fire as
ordinarily prudent men are accus-
tomed to exercise under similar cir-
cumstances against casualties: Ru-
bottom v. Morrow, 24 Ind. 202. 87
Am. Dec. 324. He is liable for what-
ever of the assets in his hands may
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§ 244. In what matters agent must keep principal advised.—The
next duty of an agent to his principal that we shall consider is that
of making full disclosure of all matters that come to his knowledge
pertaining to the subject-matter of the agency. What has been said
as to the agent's duty to act in good faith applies in a large measure
to this subject also. An agent, whatever his class may be, must deal
fairly and openly with his principal. Under no circumstances is he
permitted to overreach him by withholding information which might,
if given, lead the principal, who has placed confidence in him, to
regard the transaction in a different light from that in which he does
view it. "Whenever two persons stand in such relation that while
it continues confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain
an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the party so avail-
ing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the advan-
tage, although the transaction could not have been impeached if no
such confidential relation had existed."^^'' Whenever the point is
reached, in the relation between the two, that the agent's duty and
his interest come in conflict, the agent can with propriety adopt but
one of two courses : he must either sever the relation between him and
his principal, or yield implicitly to the demands of duty, making a
full disclosure. As heretofore stated, he is not permitted, in any
case, to make a secret profit out of his dealings as agent. Hence, he
can neither sell to the principal for a higher price than he gave, nor
purchase of him at a lower price than the full value ; and in all such
transactions the court will scrutinize with the utmost vigilance the
conduct of the agent. "W^iere the known and defined relation exists,
the conduct of the party benefited must be such as to sever the con-
nection and to place him in the same circumstances in which a mere
stranger would have stood, giving him no advantage, save only what-
ever kindness or favor may have arisen out of the transaction. Wliere,
be lost through his negligence or 314; Deberry v. Ivey, 55 N. C. 370;
mismanagement; and the fact that Nelson v. Hall, 58 N. C. 32; In re
they were lost will be no excuse if Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts (Pa.)
such loss was occasioned by his own 185; State v. Meagher, 44 Mo. 356,
default: Vreeland v. Schoonmaker, 100 Am. Dec. 298. If, however, he
16 N. J. Eq. 512; Harris v. Parker, retains money after the law requires
41 Ala. 604; Succession of Stone, 31 him to distribute it, he is liable for
La. Ann. 311; Lindsley v. Dodd, 53 it if stolen: Black v. Hurlbut, 73
N. J. Eq. 69. Good faith and ordi- Wis. 126.
nary care, however, are all that are ^^° Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
required of him,—he is not an in- 256.
surer: McCabe v. Fowler, 84 N. Y.
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on tlie other hand, the only known relation between the parties is
that of friendly habits or habitual reliance on advice and assistance,
accompanied with partial employment in doing some sort of business,
care must be taken that no undue advantage shall be made of the influ-
ence thus acquired." ^^^ A principal may, in a proper case, indeed,
waive the protection which the law affords him as such, and he may
deal with the agent as if the relation did not exist; but in order that
the agent may be justified in relying upon such waiver, he must show to
the satisfaction of the court or jury that the principal had been fully
apprised of the facts. Thus, an agent employed to sell will not be
allowed to become purchaser unless he make known to his principal
that he intends to become such and obtain his consent; and if he
purchase without such knowledge and consent, he will become a
trustee of such property for the benefit of the principal.^^^ Xor can
an agent represent two parties having adverse interests in a trans-
action ; and if he does, his acts in that behalf may be avoided by either
principal.^^- But when he is acting for both principals with their
consent, or when each principal knows that the agent is also acting
for the other, and does not object, it has been held that the agent
may properly act for both.^^^ Hence, if the agent would act in con-
formity with his obligations in such cases, he must inform both par-
ties for whom he purposes to act and obtain their consent ; to conceal
the fact that he is acting in the double capacity of agent for both
parties would be a fraud upon both.^'^* The rule under discussion
is intimately related to, if not identified with, the one that he must
act with fidelity to his principal or employer. He can not serve two
masters, whose interests are adverse, at the same time : each relies or is
presumed to rely upon his judgment and discretion; and when their
^^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's terests do not conflict, and loyalty to
ed.) 256. the one is not a breach of duty to
^" Story Ag., § 211; Audenreid v. the other, the maxim that "no man
Walker, 11 Phil. (Pa.) 183; Bain v. shall serve two masters" does not
Brown, 56 N. Y. 285. apply: Nolte v. Hulbert, 37 Ohia
"' Story Ag., § 31, St. 445. And in Fitzsimmons v.
^^^ Alexander v. Northwestern Southern Express Co., 40 Ga. 330, 2
Christian Univ., 57 Ind. 466; Rowe Am. Rep. 577, the court ruled that
V. Stevens, 53 N. Y. 621; Cox v. if a principal employs the agent
Haun, 127 Ind. 325; Helmer v. Kro- knowing that he is also acting for
lick, 36 Mich. 371. It is not in every another, who is adversely interested,
case, however, that the agent is for- he is estopped from pleading the
bidden to act for two principals to agent's adverse employment,
the same transaction. If their in- "* Story Ag., § 31.
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interests are antagonistic he can not faithfully discharge his duty to
each.^^^ This rule is particularly applicable to brokers. The rule is
founded upon public policy. It is immaterial that the transac-
tion was a fair one.^^® ISTor is it any excuse that it is the cus-
tom of brokers to do business in this manner, as such a custom would
be invalid as against public policy.^^'^ But if the broker simply acts
as a middleman between the purchaser and seller, to bring them
together, taking no part in the negotiations between them, the rule
does not apply, and it is immaterial whether each party had knowl-
edge of the employment by the other or not.^^^ The doctrine is, how-
ever, not confined to brokers; the law never tolerates double dealing
by agents of any class; courts of equity will always severely scru-
tinize a transaction in which the agent has not dealt openly and fairly
with his principal, and will relieve the latter of the consequences if
timely application be made. If the agent wishes to escape the avoid-
ance of such dealings, he must make full disclosure of the facts in-
volved and must act in perfect good faith. When he does this, there
is no reason why he may not deal with a competent principal the same
as any other person may deal with him.^^^ When the relation of guar-
dian and ward subsists, the guardian who contracts with the ward will
take the burden of showing that he dealt fairly and took no advantage
from the contract. ^^"^ But whether the trustee be a guardian, execu-
tor, or administrator, a surviving partner, or any party whatever
standing in a fiduciary relation to the other part3% the law will not
tolerate that he deal with him upon an unequal footing. "Such
transactions," as was said by an able judge, "are poisonous in their
tendencies, and violative of the principles of public policy. Thej^ are
declared void, not for the purpose of affording a remedy against ac-
tual mischief, but to prevent the possibility of wrong.""^ As to the
matters of which the agent should give notice to the principal, it may
be stated that it is his duty to keep the principal advised not only as
"5 Farmsworth v. Hemmer, 1 Allen Am. Dec. 416; Knauss v. Krueger
(Mass.) 494; Scribner v. Collar, 40 Brewing Co., 142 N. Y. 70.
Mich. 375. "^ Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind.
">^ Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. St. 25; 562.
Scribner V. Collar, SHpra. "" Wainwright v. Smith, 106 Ind.
'" Farmsworth v. Hemmer, supra. 239.
"«Cox V. Haun, 127 Ind. 325; "' Mitchell, J., in Valentine v. Wy-
Green v. Robertson, 64 Cal. 75; Rupp sor, 123 Ind. 47,
V. Sampson, 16 Gray (Mass.) 398, 77
15
—
Principal and Agent.
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to those in which the agent has an adverse interest, but of everything
in connection with the agency which pertains to the interest of the
principal and of which he should be apprised, so that he be enabled to
take such steps as he may deem necessary to protect himself.^*^ Thus,
if the agent has undertaken to insure property and has failed to do so,
he should notify the principal.^*^ And if he has taken a note in pay-
ment of goods sold by him, and the note is not paid at maturity, it is
his duty to inform the principal.^** If his commission be to sell land
for a certain price, he should inform the principal of any rise in the
market price thereof; and a sale without such notice upon the basis
of the old price, without informing the principal, is a fraud upon the
latter."^
§ 245. Duty of agent to keep and render account.—Another duty
devolving upon an agent by reason of the relation is to keep and ren-
der to his princij)al an account of all receipts and disbursements.^**^
The matters to be accounted for include not only the money and
property received from the principal directly, but all assets, profits
and interests that come into the agent's hands in the course and as a
result of the agency.^*^ The agent may be required to keep accounts
by his contract, but it is his duty to do so whether this is true or not.
When the circumstances admit of it, he should keep regular book
accounts of his receipts and disbursements, preserving all vouchers
and papers that cast any light upon his dealings.^*® Of course, it is
not required in all cases of agency that book accounts be kept; for
there are classes of agents—^notably those between whom and their
principal a strictly fiduciary relation does not subsist—where book ac-
counts would not be necessar}^ for generally such agents do not engage
in monetary transactions. But when the relation is a fiduciary one, the
"^Norris v. Tayloe, 49 111. 17; cock v. Gomez. 58 Barb. (N. Y.)
Clark V. Bank of Wheeling, 17 Pa. 490; Tupper v. Rider, 61 Vt. 69;
St. 322. Wooster v. Neville, 73 Cal. 58; Haas
"'Callander v. Oelrichs, 5 Bing. v. Damon, 9 Iowa 589; McVeigh v.
N. C. 58, 35 E. C. L. 29. Bank of the Old Dominion, 26 Gratt.
"^Harvey v. Turner, 4 Rawle (Va.) 188; Coquillard v. Suydam, 8
(Pa.) 223. Blackf. (Ind.) 24; Lindley v. Down-
'" Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn, ing, 2 Ind. 418.
6, 5 Am. St. 808. '*• Mechem Ag., § 522; Story Ag.,
^^^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's §203.
ed.) 293; Topham v. Braddick, '^' Haas v. Damon, 9 Iowa 589;
1 T^unt. 572; Monitor, etc., Ins. Clarke v. Tipping, 9 Beav. 284;
Co. V. Young, 111 Mass. 537; Han- Clark v. Moody, 17 Mass. 145.
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agent should keep his accounts in such manner as to be able to make
a full showing of his standing with his principal at all times. ^''^ No
designated standard of bookkeeping is demanded, but there should be
no suppression or concealment of anything.^^*' Ever}!' case must, of
course, stand on its own merits; and what is or is not a substantial
compliance with the rules depends wholly upon the particular nature
of the transaction or business of the agency.^^^ The duty of keeping
accurate accounts, moreover, includes an obligation on the part of the
agent to render an account to his principal upon proper occasions.
If his contract, or usage, or the peculiar circumstances, require this
to be done at regular periods, the agent will be obliged to comply with
such requirement without any previous demand. Or if no regular
periods for the accounting be thus provided for, then the agent must
render such accounts at all reasonable times, and when an accounting
is reasonably demanded by the principal.^^- In this, too, the circum^
stances must govern. If the agent is a factor, for instance, and goods
are consigned to him for sale by the principal, he must render an ac-
count within a reasonable time. Such accounting must always follow
a reasonable demand; but when the demand is impracticable or ex-
tremely inconvenient, the agent will be required to render an account
without demand.^ ^^ And in cases of iinreasonable delay, the principal
will even be entitled to collect interest of the agent, whether the
latter has actually received it or not.^^* But if there has been no de-
mand, and the agent has dealt fairly and is free from fraud, or if
the negligence consists merely in failure to deliver accounts, the agent
is not chargeable with interest.^^^ The proper tribunal for instituting
an action for an accounting, when the relation between the parties
is strictly fiduciary, is a court of chancery. This is especially true
when the accounts are so complicated as to bring the case peculiarly
within the jurisdiction of equity, and when fraud is charged in con-
nection with the failure to account. In such case the suit for the
accounting or a bill of discovery may be maintained in a court of
chancery.^^'' But the mere existence of the relation of principal and
agent is not sufficient in itself to make such a case cognizable by a
"'Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) ^" Mechem Ag., § 530.
293. ''"* Story Ag., § 204.
'=^° Story Ag., § 203. ^"Turner v. Burkinshaw, L. R. 2
'" Makepeace v. Rogers, 34 L. J. Ch. App. 488.
Ch. 396. '^' Coquillard v. Suydam, 8 Blackf.
'"Leake v. Sutherland, 25 Ark. (Ind.) 24.
219.
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court of chancery, and a court of law will usual!}' grant an accounting.
If the declaration or complaint charges such misconduct upon the
agent as to amount to a conversion of the property or money, the
action may be in assumpsit, as for a breach of contract, or in trover,
as for a conversion ;^^^ and in a proper case, where the goods are still
in the agent's possession, an action of replevin will lie in favor of the
principal for the recovery of the specific goods, upon a proper tender
being made to the agent for his commission and charges.^"*
§ 246. Agent need account to principal only—Agent can not dis-
pute principal's title.—There are a few rules subordinate to the gen-
eral rule in reference to an accounting, which may well be mentioned
here. In the first place, the agent is never obliged to account to any
one but his principal. ^^'^ Whatever may have been the delinquencies
of the agent, he is not accountable for them in such action, except to
the party who has sustained the direct injury. There is in such case
no privity between him and any third person regarding the relation;
and no one but the j^rineipal himself can maintain an action, whether
it be at law or in chancery. Another well recognized rule is that in
relation to any property constituting the subject-matter of the agency,
the agent will not be permitted to dispute the principal's title.^'"*
Thus, if an agent has been intrusted with the collection of money by
the principal, he is estopped to deny that the money belongs to the
principal, or to assert that some other person has a better title to it.
The very fact that he accepted the commission for such collection
from the principal is sufficient to bring about such estoppel. He ma}'',
however, show in his defense that the principal has been divested of
his title to the property by a paramount title.^*^^
§ 247. Agent can not plead illegality of agency, when.—It is also
a general rule that an agent, in a suit by the principal against him
for an accounting in relation to money or other property that came
""Colt V. Stewart, 50 N. Y. 17; 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 473; Lake Erie,
Coleman v. Pearce, 26 Minn. 123; etc., R. Co. v. Eckler, 13 Ind. 67.
Seidel v. Peschkaw, 27 N. J. L. 427; ^""Von Hurter v. Spengeman. 17
English V. Devarro, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) N. J. Eq. 185; Farrow v. Edmund-
588; Coquillard v. Suydam, 8 Blackf. son, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 605; Collins v.
find.) 24; Knotts v. Tarver, 8 Ala. Tillou, 26 Conn. 368, 68 Am. Dec.
7,43. 398.
158 Terwilliger v. Beals, 6 Lans. (N. '''' Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186;
Y.) 403. Doty v. Hawkins, 6 N. H. 247, 25
"" Attorney - General v. Chester- Am. Dec. 459.
field, 18 Beav. 596; Tripler v. Olcott,
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into his hands for the benefit of the principal, or for a balance due
the principal, or for a conversion, as to any transaction in which he
and the principal were not in pari delicto, will not be permitted to set
up the illegality of the transaction to defeat the principal's claim.^®^
In a previous chapter we discussed at some length the doctrine per-
taining to illegal contracts and how the principal and agent are
affected by the same.^^^ It was^ there shown that neither party to an
illegal contract can invoke the aid of the law to reap the benefit of its
provisions: the principal can not sue the agent for having failed to
keep the contract; and the agent can not recover compensation for
its execution; nor will he even be permitted to recover for advance-
ments and disbursements incurred by him in the carrying out of such
illegal transaction. The maxim is, "In pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis." The courts will leave the parties to such transaction
in the dilemma in which they have placed themselves. If, therefore,
the agent receive money or property from his principal which
he is to use for him in gambling transactions, and he does so use it,
the principal can not generally recover for profits made out of the
transaction, if the parties are in pari delicto}^^ But where the
agency is not tainted with the original illegal contract or undertaking,
and the money or property for which the agent is called upon to ac-
count came into his hands in some transaction collateral to the illegal
one, though remotely connected with it, the defense of illegality will
not avail the agent ; as in the latter case the contract is said to be in a
degree removed from the original illegal agreement, being in itself
an independent contract which ought not to be tainted by the illegality
of the original transaction, notwithstanding the agent had knowledge
of it.^*'^ And the rule is well established that an agent who has re-
ceived money from some third party for his principal can not success-
fully defend a suit for an accounting on the ground that the principal
had no right to engage in the transaction which yielded the money.^*"'
And so, where a tax collector was sued for money collected by him
for taxes, it was held that he could not be heard to say in his defense
that the tax which he had collected was illegally levied, and that he
would therefore refuse to pay it over.^^^ Likewise, where a county
'" Kiewert v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis. '°=> Story Ag., § 347,
481; Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa. St. 163, ''=« Wilson v. Town of Monticello,
34 Am. St. 599. 85 Ind. 10.
""^Anfe, § 65, e^ seg. '"'Placer County v. Astin, 8 Cal.
"^ Story Ag., § 344. 304; Clark v. Moody, 17 Mass. 145.
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treasurer had received from his predecessor United States bonds
belonging to the county, which had been held as county property,
having been purchased by the county board, it was ruled that the
treasurer must, on sale of such bonds, account for all the proceeds,
and that he could not question the county's power to make such pur-
chase on the ground that it was illegal to do so.^^^ "Wliere the illegal
act has not yet been fully consummated, either party may invoke the
power of the courts to prevent its consummation. Many of the Amer-
ican states have enacted statutes enabling the principal to recover
money or other property placed with the agent in furtherance of gam-
bling contracts ; but even in the absence of such statutes, the principal
may revoke such agency and recover the money or property, if the
agent has not paid or turned it over on the principal's loss or losses.^''*
It must be admitted, however, that the authorities are not entirely in
harmony upon this question ; some courts holding that the agent may
set up the illegality of the transaction in defense, either before or after
he has paid out the money or turned over the property upon the loss.^'*^
§ 248. Stakeholders.—A person selected by the parties to a wager
to hold the money or property wagered, and turn it over to the winner,
is denominated a stakeholder.^"^ The stakeholder is a mere depos-
itary or bailee, and is not regarded as a party to the gambling con-
tract; nor is he, strictly speaking, an agent: he can not plead in
defense of a suit for the stake money that he received it in a gambling
contract.^^^ Either party to a wager may disaffirm the contract at
any time before the event is determined upon which the wager is laid,
and recover his deposit ; and in such case the stakeholder is bound to
return it, upon demand.^^^ But if, after the determination of the
event, and before demand is made upon the stakeholder, he pay the
wager to the winner in good faith, the deposit can not generally be
recovered. ^^^ But a demand is generally necessary before suit.^^^
^«' Nixon v. State, 96 Ind. 111. ^'' See Dauler v. Hartley, 178 Pa.
"^ Dauler v. Hartley, 178 Pa. St. St. 23.
23; Walker v, Johnson, 59 111. App. ^'- Jones v. Cavanaugh, 149 Mass.
448; Crandell v. White, 164 Mass. 54. 124.
""Connor v. Black, 132 Mo. 150; "'Taylor v. Moore, 20 Ind. App.
Sowles V. Welden Nat'l Bank, 61 Vt. 654.
375; Cunningham V. Fairchild (Tex. "* Goldberg v. Feiga, 170 Mass.
Civ. App.), 43 S. W. 32. See also, 146; Trenery v. Goudie, 106 Iowa
Bingham v. Scott, 177 Mass. 208, 58 693.
N. E. 687; Lyons v. Coe, 177 Mass. "^ Jones v. Cavanaugh, 149 Mass.
382, 59 N. E. 59. 124.
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Even after the event, if notice had been given the stakeholder before
the wager was paid to the winner, he would be bound to return the
deposit.^^*' Strictly speaking, the law of agency does not apply to
parties engaged in gambling transactions, and they are only treated
under this head for the sake of convenience. A person who assists in
making or executing a gambling contract is not an agent, but a
particeps criniinis}''' Where parties are jointly interested in a gam-
bling contract, neither of them can generally enforce any rights
arising out of the same ; as no party can, strictly speaking, have any
legitimate rights which arise out of such contract.^^^ In some juris-
dictions, however, it is held that an action may be maintained against
the party who has collected the winnings, on an express contract to
pay to his associates their share of the common gains.^'^
§ 249. Failure to keep and render account
—
Effect of upon con-
struction of agent's rights.—It may be stated as a final proposition
regarding the agent's duty to keep and render accounts to his prin-
cipal, that a failure on the agent's part to perform this branch of his
obligation will always result in an unfavorable construction of his
rights, in order that the principal may not be made to suffer by the
negligence or fraud of such agent.^*° Thus, while a factor may,
"'•" Lewis v. Bruton, 74 Ala. 317, 49 ham v. Scott, 177 Mass. 208, 58 N. E.
Am. Rep. 816; Petillon v. Hippie, 90 687. But under a somewhat similar
111. 420; Alexander v. Mount, 10 Ind. statute in Illinois the supi-eme court
161; Morgan v. Beaumont, 121 Mass. of that state decides that the agent
7; Hampden v. Walsh, L. R. 1 Q. B. or broker who receives the money
Div. 189; Frybarger v. Simpson, 11 and pays it over to the winner is
Ind. 59; Storey v. Brennan, 15 N. Y. himself the winner, and may be com-
524. Under a statute of Massachu- pelled to repay the same: Kruse v.
setts a party who has paid money on Kennett, 181 111. 199, 54 N. E. 965;
a bet or gambling contract may sue Pearce v. Foote, 113 111. 228; Jamie-
for and recover "from the other son v. Wallace, 167 111. 388, 47 N. E.
party any payment so made there- 762.
on." By virtue of this statute, the '" Fortenbury v. State, 47 Ark.
loser may, of course, sue the winner 188; Cunningham v. National Bank,
after the money has been paid to the 71 Ga. 400, 51 Am. Rep. 266, 75 Ga.
latter, and recover the amount paid 366.
from him. In such case, however, * "' Shaffner v. Pinchback, 133 111.
it is held that one who received the 410, 38 Am. St. 624; Sampson v.
money as agent and paid it over can Shaw, 101 Mass. 145.
not be made to repay it to the orig- ^'^ Terry v. Olcott, 4 Conn. 442.
inal owner, as the "other party" re- '*** Beaumont v. Boultbee, 11 Ves.
ferred to in such statute clearly 358; Clarke v. Moody, 17 Mass. 145.
means the other principal: Bing-
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especially if usage sanctions such a course, take from a purchaser
one note for goods sold for different persons, payable to himself, and
procure the note to be discounted in his own name; yet the result of
such a course would be that the agent could be held to have made
the note his own, and he might be made liable to the principal for the
proceeds of the goods sold, whether the maker was solvent or not.^^^
And where the agent fails to keep a separate account of stock pur-
chased with his principal's money, but keeps it standing in his own
name, he will be required by a court of equity to make a clear show-
ing under oath as to what portion of the stock was purchased with
the principal's money and what portion with his own; and upon
failure to do so, the court may restrain him from disposing of any
of the stock thus standing in the agent's name.^*^ Another conse-
quence of the agent's failure to keep correct accounts clearly demon-
strating his standing with his principal will be to deprive the agent
of his right to commissions or other compensation otherwise due him
in consideration of the services performed, and in cases of loss will
be to subject the agent to a suit for damages to make the principal
whole. In such case every doubtful circumstance is construed un-
favorably to the agent.^*^
§ 250. Duty of agent to keep principars property separate from his
own.—Finally, it is the duty of an agent having in his hands money
and goods of his principal, to keep them separate from his own, so
that at any time when he may be called upon to do so, he will be able to
show the state of accounts between them correctly.^** This is but
a branch of the rule requiring agents to keep and render accounts of
their receipts and disbursements; for it is obvious that if an agent
commingle the property of his principal with his own, it will
make it more difficult, if not impossible, at times, to render a satis-
factory account, and thus bring about confusion detrimental to his
trust.^*^^ To such an extent has this doctrine been carried that if an
agent allows his property and that of his principal to become so con-
fused as to render them indistinguishable, the courts will hold the
agent liable to turn over all of such property, or will adjudge that the
agent has no interest in the same whatever.^^^ And so, where an
^^ Johnson v. O'Hara, 5 Leigh '** Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
(Va.) 456. 253.
^«2 Story Eq. Jur., § 468. ^^ Clarke v. Tipping, 9 Beav. 284;
'^' Story Ag., §§ 332-333. Greene v. Haskell, 5 R. I. 447.
'^ Story Ag., § 205; Darke v. Mar-
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administrator was ordered to sell the land of his decedent for the
payment of the debts of the estate, and the administrator purchased
the land himself, and afterward sold it at an advanced price, he was
held liable to account to the heirs for the profits. The court ruled
that if uncertainty arise in such case, as to what profits were really
made b}- the agent, the uncertainty will be resolved in favor of the
heirs, and the trustee will be chargeable with the largest amount
which, from the circumstances, he can be presumed to have realized;
the court saying: "The rule both in- law and equity is, that if a
person having charge of the property of another so confounds it with
his own that it can not be distinguished, he must bear all the incon-
veniences of the confusion. If it be a case of damages, damages will
be given against him for the utmost value of the articles."^^^ It is
the duty of an agent who has in his hands trust money collected for
his principal, if impracticable to remit at once, to keep such money
in some solvent bank or other depository, making the deposit either
in the principal's name, or in his own as agent or trustee, or in some
other way to "earmark" such money.^^* Money collected by an agent
for his principal is a trust fund : it belongs to the principal and not
to the agent. The relation of debtor and creditor is not necessarily
created by the receipt of such money; but the agent may, by his
conduct, establish such a relation, at the option of the principal.^^^
If the agent preserve the money in its trust character and exercise
due care and caution in respect of depositing it, etc., he will be pro-
tected in case a loss occur by reason of the failure of the bank or other
depository, or by theft or other mishap. But such agent or trustee
must not so deposit the fund as to authorize him or his assignee or
legal representative to claim rt as his own ; and if he does, he can not
tyn, 1 Beav. 525; Safford v. Gallup, National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104
53 Vt. 292; Lupton v. White, 15 Ves. U. S. 54.
432; Atkinson v. Ward, 47 Ark. ^^ Robinson v. Ward, 2 C. & P. 60,
533; Hart V. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 12 E. C. L. 29; Commercial, etc.,
(N. Y.) 62; National Bank v. Insur- Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. 811; Naltner
ance Co., 104 U. S. 54. v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 500, 58 Am. Rep.
'" Brackenridge v. Holland, 2 61; Mason v. Whitthorne, 2 Coldw.
Blackf. (Ind.) 377. The whole (Tenn.) 242; Norris v. Hero, 22 La.
amount is in such cases taken to be Ann. 605.
the property of the principal, and "^ Strickland v. Burns, 14 Ala.
the burden is on the agent to show 511; Jones v. Gregg, 17 Ind. 84; Coit
how it may be distinguished: Lup- v. Stewart, 50 N. Y. 17; Gordon v.
ton v. White, 15 Ves. 432. See Camp, 2 Fla. 422; Anderson v. First
also, Atkinson v. Ward, 47 Ark. 533; Nat'l Bank, 5 N. Dak. 80.
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throw such loss upon the principal, but it will be his own ; and this is
true without reference to any good or bad intention on his part.^^"
Such an agent is not an insurer ; all he is required to do is to use due
and proper diligence in preserving the fund in its trust character;
and if the money is lost through no fault or negligence of his own,
the loss is the principal's and not the agent's.^'*^ The fact that the
agent deposits the money in his name will be treated as a conversion
thereof by the agent ; and if the bank becomes insolvent, the agent can
not set up the insolvency as a defense to a suit for the money.^^^ In
a New York case, where the agent had so intermingled the money
of his principal with his own as to make it impossible to determine
to whom the money actually belonged, and a portion of it was stolen,
it was held that the loss must fall upon the agent as a penalty for
not keeping the principal's and his own funds separate.^^^ And the
same result will follow if there be a depreciation of the money or
currency collected by the agent: the loss will in all such cases fall
upon the agent and not upon the principal, unless the fund is kept
separate.^''* And where an agent commingles the principal's and his
own money, and the whole can be reached by legal process, the whole
may be taken, in the absence of a showing by the agent as to which
portion belongs to him and which to the principal. ^^^
§ 251. Fiduciaries.—WTiere a strictly fiduciary relation subsists be-
tween two parties,—as, that of guardian and ward,—these rules are
most strictly enforced. Thus, if a guardian would exonerate himself
from liability on account of an insolvent note taken in the course of the
administration of the ward's estate, which he turned over in settlement
with the ward, he must show that he kept the funds of his ward and
those of his own separate, and exercised at least ordinary care in loan-
ing such funds of his ward by taking adequate security. ^^^ "A guar-
dian," said the court, "it is true, is not an insurer of the safety of in-
vestments made by him, nor is he to be held to an extraordinary degree
of care ; but in order that he may be exonerated from loss on account
of insolvent securities, taken in the course of the guardianship, it is
^""•Naltner v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 500; Carpenter, 2 Sweeney (N. Y. Super.)
Norwood V. Harness, 98 Ind. 134. 734.
'"^ Mowbray v. Antrim, 123 Ind. 24. ^** Marine Bank v. Fulton Banlv,
"=Cartmell V. Allard. 7Bush (Ky.) 2 Wall. (U. S.) 252.
482; Mason v. Whitthorne, 2 Coldw. "^Atkinson v. Ward, 47 Ark. 533.
(Tenn.) 242, 245. "•'Line v. Lawder, 122 Ind. 548.
"^ Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v.
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his duty to keep the trust estate separate from his own funds, and to
act in good faith, and observe that sound discretion and prudence
usually exercised by diligent men about their own business. In
making loans of the trust funds it is his duty to take security. A
loan made in good faith, and in the exercise of ordinary care and
prudence, upon security which seemed ample at the time, will not be
at the personal risk of the guardian if, on account of changed circum-
stances or depreciation in values, loss subsequently occurs.^''^ Where
adequate care is observed, and the condition of the estate and the
character of investments are truthfully reported to the court, as the
law requires, a guardian may relieve himself and his sureties by turn-
ing over the estate to his ward, who has attained his majority, in the
condition in which it actually exists at tlie time a settlement is made.
Where a settlement is thus made, and it afterward turns out that
securities so taken and turned over were worthless, in order to justify
a cancellation of the settlement there must appear to have been negli-
gence or bad faith on the part of the guardian.^^^ Where, however,
unsecured notes, the makers of which are of doubtful solvency, have
been taken in the individual transactions of the guardian, in the
manner already described, and where these have been accepted in
lieu of money, upon the faith that they were available solvent securi-
ties, it requires a degree of assurance to insist that the receipt and
release of the ward should be a bar to the opening up of the final
settlement."^''^ The fact that a guardian takes a note for his ward's
property payable to himself has been held to be a sufRcient proof of
conversion of such property to his own use.^''*' It has been decided,
however, on the other hand, that this fact is but prima facie evidence
of conversion, and may be rebutted by proof.-"^ And there are ex-
ceptional cases, no doubt, when a guardian may leave the money of
his ward temporarily with his own papers and money in a separate
package; and in case it is stolen from him, and he uses proper dili-
gence to recover it, he will not be liable as for a conversion.-"- An
administrator who deposited the funds of the estate in his own name
was held to be liable therefor on failure of the bank, even though he
"'Citing State, etc., v. Slevin, 93 =""> State v. Greensdale, lOG Ind.
Mo. 253, 3 Am. St. 526. 364.
"* Citing Hardin v. Taylor, 78 Ky. ="" Sanders v. Forgasson, 3 Baxt.
593. (Tenn.) 249; Slauter v. Favorite,
"» Citing Breneman's Appeal, 121 107 Ind. 291.
Pa. St. 641. "" Schouler Dom. Rel., § 352.
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had no other deposit in the bank.-°^ And generally, an executor or
administrator is held to the same requirement as to keeping the funds
of the estate separate as is a guardian or other fiduciary; and if he
commingles them with his own he is individually liable therefor, as
for a conversion, in case they are lost or he fails to account for them
satisfactorily.-"*
="^ Williams v. Williams, 55 Wis.
300, 42 Am. Rep. 708. But see Hale
V. Wall, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 424.
^"'McElroy v. Thompson, 42 Ala.
656; Henderson v. Henderson, 58
Ala. 582; Raines v. Raines, 51 Ala.
237; Norwood v. Duncan, 10 Mart.
(La. O. S.) 708. But see State v.
Cheston, 51 Md. 352.
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§ 252. Purpose of this chapter.—It is our purpose in this chapter
to set forth and consider the duties and obligations the principal
owes to his agent, and the liabilities growing out of the same, as
well as the corresponding rights and remedies of the agent as against
the principal; the duties and obligations of both principal and
agent to subagents, and their reciprocal rights and remedies ; and the
duties and obligations of the principal to unauthorized agents, and
such rights and remedies as these may have against him. Such
duties, obligations and liabilities and the rights and remedies incident
thereto have reference to: 1. The compensation of the agent for
services rendered his principal; 2. Eeimbursement of the agent for
all necessary and legitimate outlays and expenditures in the course of
the agency; 3. Indemnity of the agent for losses sustained by him
in the course of the agency; 4. Compensation, reimbursement and
indemnity of subagents; 5. Compensation, reimbursement and in-
demnity of unauthorized agents ; 6. Eemedies of agents against their
principals ; including 7. Liens.
§ 253. Compensation of agent—Classification of,—The agent's
compensation may consist of a "salary" or a "commission" or an
"honorarium" or of "wages." "Salary" is a term used to denote
a reward or recompense for services performed, and is usually ap-
plied to public officers with reference to their pay for the perform-
ance of official duties. It is not confined to these, however, and is
often employed to designate the compensation of ordinary agents or
employes who are paid periodically; as, for example, the salary of a
salesman, or Iwokkeeper, or other employe of a mercantile house; or
of the conductor or engineer of a railroad. An "honorarium" is a
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reward given to the most elevated professions for services performed.^
It is in the nature of a gratuity given for services rendered by a
physician, counsellor, advocate, or barrister. These were considered
services of such an exalted character that it was deemed inconsistent
with their dignity to give a remedy for them in a judicial forum.
Such services were considered purely honorary, and whatever com-
pensation was given for them was regarded as a voluntary gift on
the part of the one benefited by the services. In England the com-
mon-law rule still governs, and a barrister or counsellor at law can
not recover compensation from his client in a court of justice; he
must be satisfied with whatever compensation the client voluntarily
renders.^ This rule does not apply, however, even in England, to
ordinary attorneys at law, conveyancers, and others, who discharge
some of the duties devolving upon attorneys in this country.^ While
an advocate or counsel could not, under the common law, recover
compensation for services in an action for that purpose, an ordinary
attorney was entitled to such recovery.* The distinction between
attorneys and barristers, etc., was never generally recognized in the
United States ; and here the rule is, generally, that practicing lawyers
may contract with their clients for compensation and compel pay-
ment by an action in court, the same as other agents;^ or they may
recover on a quantum meruit.^ In Pennsylvania the rule was for-
merly as in England, at least as to all charges in excess of the fees
fixed by statute;'^ but the cases so holding have been overruled, and
the law in that state now permits practicing lawyers to recover com-
pensation.® In Xew Jersey the parties may agree upon a specific fee
for counsel, and this may be enforced by an action at law ; but no fee
can be collected in the absence of such agreement.** In the British
provinces, generally, counsel fees may be collected as in the states.^"
^Bouvier Law Die. ' Mooney v. Lloyd, 5 S. & R. (Pa.)
2 Moor v. Row, 1 Ch. Rep. 21; 3 411.
Bl. Com. 28; Kennedy v. Brown, 13 * Balsbaugh v. Frazer, 19 Pa. St.
C. B. (N. S.) (106 E. C. L.) 677. 95.
^ See authorities in last note. ' Hopper v. Ludlum, 41 N. J. L.
-Van Atta v. McKinney, 16 N. J. 182; Zabriskie v. Woodruff, 48 N. J.
L. 235. L. 610.
= Stevens v. Monges, 1 Harr. (Del.) " Paradis v. Bosse, 21 Can. S. C.
127; Lorilard v. Robinson, 2 Paige 419; McDougall v. Campbell, 41 U. C.
(N. Y.) 276; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Q. B. 332. See Mowat v. Brown, 19
Pick. (Mass.) 415. Fed. 87.
" Quint v. Ophir Mining Co., 4 Nev.
305.
§ 253 . PRIXCIPAL AND AGENT. 240
Even in thi? country it has been held that the presumption obtains that
the common-law rule is in force; and hence, where a suit is instituted
for such a fee for services rendered by an attorney for his client, in
a state other than that in which he sues, he must allege and prove
that under the laws of such other state the action for such services
Avill lie.^^ But even in jurisdictions where counsel fees can not be
collected by suit, an action will lie on a promissory note or bill of
exchange given for such services.^- It has been held that where a
lawyer enters into a contract with his client for counsel fees before
the fiduciary relation between him and the client has commenced,
the contract will govern as to the amount to be paid; but where the
agreement is made after the relation has been entered into and dur-
ing its continuance, no more than reasonable compensation can be
collected, whatever may have been the contract.^^ The question of
what is a fair and reasonable fee of counsel in a given case may be a
question of law for the court to determine, when the services were
performed in the presence of the court which is to fix the compensa-
tion;^* otherwise it is a question of fact depending on the proof,
unless the amount is fixed by the contract. ^^ But in no event can
more be collected than the sum agreed upon, if an agreement was
entered into.^*^ "Commissions" is a term employed to denote the
compensation allov/ed to agents, factors, trustees, receivers and others
who manage the affairs of others, in recompense for their services.
The amount of such commissions is generally a percentage on the
sums paid out or received, and is regulated either by special contract
or by the usage in the particular business, if such there be.^^ A
factor sometimes guarantees the debt growing out of a sale made by
him for his principal, and he is then paid a higher compensation
called a . del credere commission.^* "Wages" is compensation given
to a hired person for his or her services.^^ The term "wages" is
used to denote the pay received by manual laborers at a certain sum
per day, week or month.-*'
" Williams v. Dodge, 28 N. Y. ^^ Montgomery v. .Etna Life Ins.
Supp. 729, 8 Misc. (N. Y.) 317. Co., 97 Fed. 913.
^= Mowat v. Brown, 19 Fed. 87. "3 Chitty Com. L. 221; Story
>' White v. Tolliver, 110 Ala. 300, Ag., § 326.
30 So. 97. "Paley Ag. 88, et seq. See ante,
" Succession of Rabasse, 51 La. § 22.
Ann. 590, 25 So. 326. i'* Bouvier Law Die.
" Wyant v. Pottorff , 37 Ind. 512. -" Standard Die.
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§ 254. Compensation, how measured—Special contract—Quantum
meruit.—The compensation or reward of an ordinary agent, servant
or other employe may, of course, be fixed by the terms of the contract
of employment, if there be such a contract ; and when this is the case,
the amount stipulated will form the exclusive basis of the recovery.^^
TVTiere there is no express contract, or the compensation is not fixed
in the contract, the agent will generally be entitled to receive such
an amount as is reasonable and warranted by the custom of the trade
or business in the community where the services were rendered, or on
a quantum meruit;-- that is, the value of the particular services as it
may be established by the testimony of witnesses who are competent
to give their opinion upon the subject.-^ As a general rule, where
one performs services for another at the latter's request, or under
circumstances indicating an expectation of compensation on the one
hand and an intention to pay on the other, the law will imply a
promise to pay what the services are reasonably worth.-* But it is
not always essential that the principal should expect the agent to
charge for his services.^^
§ 255. Contingent compensation—Rule in England and America.—
The agent's compensation may also be made to depend upon the
happening or not happening of some contingency,—as, that the
agent for the sale of goods realize a certain amount for them, or that
no loss accrue to the principal, etc. ; and if thai be the agreement,
the agent can recover no compensation unless the contingency has or
has not happened, according to the agreement, or unless the agent was
prevented, through the fault of the principal.-*' In a case decided in
Massachusetts, the plaintiff, one Zerrahn, sued the members of an
executive committee for services rendered by him in conducting and
"Bower v. Jones, 8 Bing. 65, 21 Lewis v. Trickey, 20 Barb. (N. Y.)
E. C. L. 224. 387; Roberts v. Swift, 1 Yeates
==Masterson v. Masterson. 121 Pa. (Pa.) 209, 1 Am. Dec. 295.
St. 605; Lockwood v. Robbins, 125 =^ Morrison v. Flournoy, 23 La.
Ind. 398; Krekeler's Succession, 44 Ann. 593.
La. Ann. 726; Spearman v. Texar- ==" Walker v. Tirrell, 101 Mass. 257,
kana, 58 Ark. 348; Baxter v. Knox, 3 Am. Rep. 352; Hinds v. Henry, 36
19 Ky. L. Rep. 1973; Ruckman v. N. J. L. 328; Lewis v. Trickey, 20
Bergholz, 38 N. J. L. 531; Wadleigh Barb. (N. Y.) 387. See Nixon v.
V. McDowell, 102 Iowa 480. Cutting Fruit Pack. Co., 17 Mont.
" Bowen v. Bowen, 74 Ind. 470. 90, 42 Pac. 108.
** Martin v. Roberts, 36 Fed. 217;
16—Principal and Agent.
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superintending the musical performance of the "World's Peace
Jubilee," at Boston. The defendants answered, setting up a special
contract contained in the correspondence between Zerrahn and S. P.
Gilmore, the agent of the management. In his letter to Zerrahn,
Gilmore guaranteed that the former should receive the sum of five
thousand dollars, provided "that the profits of the festival, including
ni}' own benefit, will result in the aforesaid amount being placed to
my credit and under my control ; but it must be distinctly understood
that neither the executive committee nor any person or persons shall
be held responsible for the fulfillment of this contract, which is made
this day in good faith, with an earnest desire that it shall be fulfilled
to the letter and to the entire satisfaction of you and I [sic], who are
the sole contracting parties. It is further understood that, should the
festival result in a loss, you will hold no demand against myself or
anybody else connected with it." To this letter Zerrahn replied his
acceptance. The finding of the court upon trial showed that the
Jubilee enterprise was not pecuniarily successful, but resulted in a
heavy loss to the defendants who carried it on. The court, speaking
by ]\[orton, J., said: "We are of opinion that, in this case, as plain-
tiff has stipulated that in the contingency which has happened he
shall have no demand against the defendants, the law does not imply
a promise by them to pay him any compensation for his services, and,
therefore, that the superior court correctly ruled that he could not
maintain this action."-^ In England and some of the states of the
Union, agreements for contingent fees for professional services, such
as counsel fees depending on the success of a law suit, are held void
for champerty or maintenance; but the courts in a great majority
of the American states have ruled otherwise. While such contracts
are closely scrutinized, they are generally upheld, if made in good
faith.^^
=^ Zerrahn v. Ditson, 117 Mass. 553. ford, 59 Ala. 400; Gilman v. Jones.
"See Moore v. Campbell Academy, 87 Ala. 691; Nixon v. Cutting Fruit
9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 115; Fowler v. Cal- Pack. Co., 17 Mont. 90, 42 Pac. 108
Ian, 102 N. Y. 395; Coughlin v. New Trist v. Child,, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 441
York, etc., R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 U. S. 252
Am. Rep. 75; Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548
St. 475; Perry v. Dicken, 105 Pa. Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 51; Manning
St. 83, 51 Am. Rep. 181; Hilton v. v. Sprague, 148 Mass. 18, 1 L. R. A.
Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432, 36 L. J. Ch. 516; Bayard v. McLane, 3 Harr.
491, 15 W. R. 1105; In re Masters, 1 (Del.) 139; Flower v. O'Conner. 7
H. & W. 348; Robertson v. Furness, La. 194; Martinez v. Succession of
43 U. C. Q. B. 143; Jenkins v. Brad- Vives, 32 La. Ann. 305; Moody v.
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§ 256. Champerty and maintenance.—Champerfy is defined by
Blackstone as ''a bargain witb a plaintiff or defendant campum
part ire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them, if
they prevail at law, whereupon the champertor is to carry on the
party's suit at his own expense."'® Coke says that it is champerty
"to maintain to have part of the land or anything out of the land or
part of the debt or other thing in plea or suit."^** It will be noticed
that in Coke's definition it is not made an essential ingredient of
champerty that the champertor shall maintain the suit or plea at
his own expense, as in Blackstone's. These seemingly inconsistent
definitions have apparently given rise to diversities of ruling on the
part of the courts; some holding that to constitute champerty it is
essential that the champertor must carry on the suit at his ex-
pense, while others rule that this is hot essential, since the contin-
gent agreement for a fee out of the recovery is itself a contribution
toward carrying on the suit or plea.^^ But it is held in many juris-
dictions that in order to constitute champerty, if champerty avoids
the contract at all, the ingredient of an agreement by the attorney
or agent to pay the expenses of litigation, in whole or in part, must
be present also.^- The difference, however, between the respective
Harper, 38 Miss. 599; Chester Coun- 64; Brown v. Beauchamp, 5 T. B.
ty v. Barber, 97 Pa. St. 455; Perry Mon. (Ky.) 413; Rust v. Larue, 4
V. Dicken, 105 Pa. St. 83, 51 Am. Litt. (Ky.) 412; Poe v. Davis, 29
Rep. 181; Nickels v. Kane, 82 Va. Ala. 676; Elliott v. McClellan, 17
309; Sussdorff v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. Ala. 206; Dumas v. Smith, 17 Ala.
319. Contra, Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. 305; Hayney v. Coyne, 10 Heisk.
117; Ackert v. Barker, 131 Mass. (Tenn.) 339; Butler v. Legro, 62 N.
436; Butler v. Legro, 62 N. H. 350; H. 350, 13 Am. St. 573; Backus v.
McLimans v. City of Lancaster, 63 Byron, 4 Mich. 535. Also the fol-
Wis. 596, 23 N. W. 689. lowing English cases: Stanly v.
'M Bl. Com. 135. Jones, 5 M. & P. 193, 7 Bing. 369, 20
=°Co. Litt. 368b. . E. C. L. 165; Reynell v. Sprye, 21 L.
"The following are some of the J. Ch. 633; Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. &
cases holding that an agreement be- Bl. 58, 90 E. C. L. 80, 26 L. J. Q. B.
tween an attorney and his client 64.
that the attorney is to prosecute or •= Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 51, 27
defend the action for a part of the Am. Rep. 314, affirming 2 Mo. App.
recovery, without reference to the 1; Coleman v. Billings, 89 111. 183;
fact that the attorney is to pay the Bayard v. McLane, 3 Harr. (Del.)
expenses of the litigation, in whole 139; Allard v. Lamirande, 29 Wis.
or in part, is champertous and void: 502; Dockery v. McLellan, 93 Wis.
Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. 117; Thurs- 381. 67 N. W. 733; Orr v. Tanner. 12
ton v. Percival, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 415; R. I. 94; Benedict v. Stuart, 23 Barb.
Davis V. Sharron, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) (N. Y.) 421; Scott v. Harmon, 109
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holdings in these eases is not as great as might appear upon first
view. While the definition given by Blackstone is generally fol-
lowed by the courts of the present day, it is believed that an agree-
ment to pay the attorney a portion of the recovery is equivalent to
an agreement to pay the expenses, or a portion of the expenses,
to carry on the suit or defense. As Bouvier says: "When it is
considered that champerty is a species of maintenance, it is clear
that all these definitions import that the party bargaining for an
interest in the thing in dispute undertakes to aid in the prosecu-
tion of the suit for its recovery, and whether such aid is furnished
in money by a layman, who pays the expenses of the suit, or by an
attorney or solicitor, in services rendered in its prosecution, it is the
same, and each alike in effect, and in contemplation of law, is a
maintainer of the suit, and prosecutes it, in whole or in part, at his
own expense. The consideration paid in the latter case would be
equally as valuable as in the former, and the inducement to prose-
cute a doubtful or unconscionable claim would be the same, and the
evil, if any, the same. It is equally champerty, whether the con-
tract be for one-half, one-quarter or one-eighth of the thing in dis-
pute; and it would be strange, indeed, if the validity or invalidity
of the contract of this character were made to depend upon the
Mass. 237, 12 Am. Rep. 685; Park lard v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479; McPher-
Commissioners v. Coleman, 108 111. son v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404; Jeffries v.
591; Moody v. Harper, 38 Miss. 599; Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 305;
Wheeler v. Pounds, 24 Ala. 472; Peck v. Heurich, 167 U. S. 624; Beld-
Aultman v. Waddle, 40 Kan. 195; ing v. Smythe, 138 Mass. 530; Low v.
Moses v. Bagley, 55 Ga. 283; Jewel Hutchinson, 37 Me. 196; Hyatt v.
V. Neidy, 61 Iowa 299; Quigley v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 68 Iowa 662,
Thompson, 53 Ind. 317; Ware v. 32 N. W. 330; Thompson v. Rey-
Russell, 70 Ala. 174, 45 Am. Rep. nolds, 73 111. 11; Taylor v. Hinton,
82; Blaisdell v. Ahern, 144 Mass. 66 Ga. 743; Martin v. Clarke, 8 R.
393, 59 Am. Rep. 99; McPherson v. I. 389, 5 Am. Rep. 586; Wildey v.
Cox, 96 U. S. 404; Atchison, etc., R. Crane, 63 Mich. 720; Kelly v. Kelly,
Co. V. Johnson, 29 Kan. 218; Phil- 86 Wis. 170; Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio
lips V. South Park Com'rs. 119 111. 132; Coughlin v. New York, etc., R.
626; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75
Ackley, 171 111. 100, 49 N. E. 222; Lancy v. Havender, 146 Mass. 615
Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. I. 389. Where, Pince v. Beattie, 32 L. J. Ch. 734
however, the attorney does agree to Earle v. Hopwood. 9 C. B. (N. S.)
pay the costs or expenses of litiga- (99 E. C. L.) 566. 30 L. J. C. P.
tion, in whole or in part, the contract 217; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq.
will generally be held void: Coquil- 432, 36 L. J. Ch. 491.
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amount of the consideration to be paid; or, iu other words, upon the
payment of a part or the whole of the expenses of the suit."^^
§ 257. Division of spoils the offensive ingredient.—The offensive
ingredient in such a contract is the division of the spoils,—the agree-
ment that the agent or attorney shall receive a portion of the money
or thing that may be recovered. This is no less a contribution of
a portion of the expenses of the litigation by the agent or attorney
than it would be if he were to agree to pay a portion or all of the
costs in the case. But it is also held that an agent or attorney may
contract for a fee in a sum equal to one-half or one-fourth, or any
other portion of the recovery, and that this is not a champertous
agreement. Thus in Kentucky, where a client agreed to pay his
attorney, in case of the success of the litigation, an amount equal to
one-half of the value of the property recovered, the court ruled that
the agreement was not champertous, but valid and enforceable,
saying: "It is as competent for the litigant to regulate the amount
of his attorney's fee by the value or half the value of the property
in contest, as to regulate it by the value or half the value of any
other piece of property. Whether he regulates it by the one or the
other or agrees to pay a contingent fee in money, agreed upon by
the parties at the time, he is not subject to the denunciation of the
statute; provided that he is not to give a part of the profit or the
thing in contest."^* And in the same state a contract between an
attorney and client that the latter should pay the former a sum
equal to one-half (or other fractional part) of the amount recovered,
was held not to be void for champerty.^" The question of champerty
^ Bouvier Inst. Am. L., vol. 4, p. a part of them, as security for pay-
236. ment, the agreement is not cham-
"Wilhite v. Roberts, 4 Dana pertous:" Blaisdell v. Ahern, 144
(Ky.) 172. Mass. 393, 59 Am. Rep. 99. This
^ Evans v. Bell, 6 Dana (Ky.) would, of course, be analogous to an
479. See also, Ramsey v. Trent, assignment of part of the claim.
10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 336; Omaha, And so, an agreement between an
etc., R. Co. v. Brady, 39 Neb. attorney and client to prosecute a
27, 57 N. W. 767; Christie v. Sawyer, claim before a quasi-court, such as
44 N. H. 298. The rule was thus a commission appointed by the pres-
stated by the Massachusetts court: ident of the United States, in pur-
"Where the right to compensation suance of a treaty, is held by the
is not confined to an interest in the supreme court of the United States
thing recovered, but gives a right not to be champertous nor illegal
of action against the party, though because it stipulates for an amount
pledging the avails of the suit, or equal to one-tenth of the sum re-
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can only be raised by a party to the contract.^" In those states and
jurisdictions in which contingent fees are held to be illegal, there
can, of course, be no recovery on a contract in which the principal
or client agrees to pay his agent or attorney a fee only in case of
success, though there may still be a recovery in some cases on a
quantum meruit.^'' In some of the states statutes have been enacted
permitting attorneys and clients to make such contracts relative to
com|)ensation as may seem best to them.^®
§ 258. The common-law doctrine of champerty.—The common-
law doctrine of champerty is founded upon the principle enunciated
by Coke. "Nothing," says that author, "in action, entry or re-entry,
can be granted over; for so under color thereof, pretended titles
might be granted to great men, whereby right might be trodden
down, and the weak oppressed."^'' The rule applied to officers, at-
torneys and individuals alike: no one was permitted to take upon
him any business in suit in any court, or to have a part of the thing
in demand, and every agreement thereto was declared void.*" Cliam-
perty is a species of maintenance and punishable in the same man-
jjgp 41 "The distinction between maintenance and champerty seems
to be this: where there is no agreement to divide the thing in suit,
the party intermeddling is guilty of maintenance only; but where
he stipulates to receive part of the thing in suit, he is guilty of
champerty. "''-
§ 259. Harshness of doctrine criticized by the courts.—Under the
common-law rule, a chose in action could not be assigned, such an
assignment being void for maintenance.*^ The doctrine was other-
wise carried to great extremes. "The peculiar state of society out
covered by way of compensation, =«Hart v. State, 120 Ind. 83.
especially if the agreement to pay ^ Goodman v. Walker, 20 Ala. 482,
the compensation be made after the 68 Am. Dec. 134; Stearns v. Felker,
services have been rendered, in 28 Wis. 594; Merritt v. Lambert, 10
whole or in part: Wright v. Tib- Paige (N. Y.) 352.
bitts, 91 U. S. 252; Wylie v. Coxe, "" See, for example, Howell's
15 How. (U. S.) 415; Taylor v. Be- Comp. Stat, of Mich., § 9004.
miss, 110 U. S. 42. By these rulings ^ Co. Litt. 114a.
it seems that claims against the "4 Kent Com. (8th ed.) 449,
United States government may be note a.
prosecuted by an attorney for part " 4 Bl. Com. 135.
of the recovery as his compensation. *- 4 Cooley Bl. 134, note.
See also, Manning v. Sprague, 148 ^' Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320.
Mass. 18, 1 L. R. A. 516.
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of which the law grew," said the supreme court of Alabama, "carried
it to the most absurd degrees; men were held indictable for aiding a
litigant to find a lawyer, for giving friendly advice to a neighbor
as to his legal rights, for lending money to a friend to vindicate his
known legal rights, for offering voluntarily to testify in a pending
suit, and other like offices of charity and friendship."-** The doc-
trine, as was well said by the federal court, "has come to be regarded
as something belonging to the past, and not suited to the circum-
stances of this age."-*^ In an Indiana case,*^ Elliott, J., speaking for
the supreme court, says of the doctrine of champerty and maintenance
as prevailing in that state: "It is seti'led that the rule of the com-
mou' law upon the subject of champertous contracts prevails in this
state.*^ It is clear, however, that the rule does not, and can not,
prevail in this state in its full extent since the code of 1852, for it
makes radical changes in the common-law rule upon the subject of
the assignment of choses in action. The common-law rule is limited
in its operation by several provisions of the code, but we deem it
unnecessary to notice them. Many of the courts where the code
system prevails have denied its force altogether, and the tendency
of modern decisions in America is to restrict rather than to enlarge
the operation of the rule.*^ The rule has ofteii been criticised by
the English courts; even as early as Master v. Miller^^ unfavorable
criticism was made. But our decisions, as we have seen, declare the
rule to be in force in this state, although the extent to which it pre-
vails has not been defined. It may, however, be safely assumed that
the rule is narrowed rather than extended, since to hold otherwise
would be to oppose the letter and spirit of our code, as well as the
general principles of what Austin calls our 'judge-made law.' "^*^
§ 260. Tendency of modern decisions toward a more liberal rule.
—There can be no doubt that the tendency of modern decisions,
"Gilman v. Jones, 87 Ala. 691. Bentinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458;
«Hickox V. Elliott, 10 Sawy. (U. Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. (U. S.)
S.) 415, 429. 4b7; Stoever v. Whitman, 6 Bin.
*^ Board of Com'rs v. Jameson, 86 (Pa.) 416; Coughlin v. New York,
Ind. 154. etc., R. Co., 71 N. Y. 443, 27 Am.
"Citing Stotsenburg v. Marks, 79 Rep. 75; Orr v. Tanner, 12 R. I. 94,
Ind. 193; Greenman v. Cohee, 61 17 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 759.
Ind. 201; Quigley v. Thompson, 53 '" 4 T. R. 320, vide p. 340.
Ind. 317; Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. "^"Citing Patterson v. Nixon, 79
117. Ind. 251. See also, Hart v. State,
"Citing Mathewson v. Fitch. 22 120 Ind. 83: Brown v. Ginn (Ohio),
Cal. 86; Cain v. Monroe, 23 Ga. 82; 64 N. E. 123.
Allard v. Lamirande, 29 Wis. 502;
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both in England and America, is away from the old and stringent
doctrine toward a more liberal rule which is in harmony with
modern conditions of society. "It is curious, and not altogether
useless," says Buller, J., "to see how the doctrine of maintenance
has, from time to time, been received in Westminster Hall. At one
time, not only he who laid out money to assist another in his cause,
but he that by his friendship or interest saved him an expense
which he would otherwise be put to, was guilty of maintenance.
* * * Nay, if he officiously gave evidence, it was maintenance;
so that he must have had a subpena or suppressed the truth. That
such doctrine, repugnant to every honest feeling of the human
heart, should be soon laid aside, must be expected."^^ That cham-
perty or maintenance has long since ceased to be prosecuted as a
crime in England is sufficiently evidenced by the fact, as stated by
Stephen, that no person has been criminally punished for it in that
country within the memory of living man.^^ In California, Dela-
ware, Nebraska and New Jersey the law of champerty and main-
tenance has never been in force. ^^ In Utah the statute has so modified
the common law that the parties are permitted to make any con-
tract as to compensation for services which would formerly have
been champertous.^* In Michigan, though the common-law doc-
trine was declared to prevail in that state at one time,^^ it seems
to have been abolished by statutes subsequently to the rendi-
tion of that decision.^" And in New York, it is said that no
vestige of the law of maintenance, including that of champerty,
now remains, except what is contained in the revised statutes with
reference to some matters connected with the transfer of real
estate. ^^ The appellate court of Illinois says that the doctrine "has
been so pruned away and exceptions so grafted upon it that there
is nothing of the substance left of it in this state. ^* In Indiana, as
" Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 340. '' Backus v. Byron, 4 Mich. 535.
^- 3 Stephen Hist. Crim. L. of Eng. ""^ Wildey v. Crane, 63 Mich. 720.
234. "' Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y.
"Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86; 289; Coughlin v. New York, etc., R.
Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Cal. 564; Bal- Co., 71 N. Y. 443.
lard v. Carr, 48 Cal. 74; Bayard v. ^* Dunne v. Herrick, 37 111. App.
McLane, 3 Harr. (Del.) 139; Omaha, 180. But see Geer v. Frank. 179 111.
etc., R. Co. V. Brady, 39 Neb. 27; 570, 45 L. R. A. 110, where it is held
Schomp V. Schenck, 40 N. J. L. 196, that if both the elements of contin-
29 Am. Rep. 219. gency and agreement to pay part
"Croco V. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 18 of the costs of the suit are present
Utah 311, 54 Pac. 985. the contract will not be enforced.
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we have just seen, the doctrine has been greatly modified by the codes
and the decisions.®^ In most of the other states of the Union, it seems
that the law of champerty is recognized as being in force, either by
statute or the common law, but in greatly modified form. And
we think it may be stated as the prevailing rule, deducible from
the current of modern decisions, that contracts for contingent fees
between attorney and client for services, are valid and enforce-
able, if made in good faith ; that such contracts are not rendered
illegal by reason of their contingent character; that is, that they
are not void for champerty simply because the compensation is to
be measured by the quantum of recovery, and the avails of the
suit are pledged as security; provided, of course, the suit or defense
is not to be carried on, in whole or in part, at the attorney's
expense, and there is to be no division of such avails.''" But while
this is doubtless the prevailing rule, there are jurisdictions in which
contingent fees can not be collected at all, and others in which
contracts are held champertous upon the sole ground that the amount
of compensation is to depend upon the question and amount of
recovery, or is to be paid out of the avails of the suit. It may be
added that other states have departed so far from the doctrine
of champerty and maintenance that almost any kind of contingent
compensation agreed upon is collectible; provided, of course, there
be no overreaching or unfair advantage taken of the principal or
client, and the agreement be otherwise free from bad faith.*'^
^° See note 46, supra. Co., supra. In California it has been
"''Taylor v. Remiss, 110 U. S. 42; held that, the law of champerty and
Greenhalgh v. The Alice Strong, 57 maintenance not being in force, an
Fed. 249; In re Hynes, 105 N. Y. attorney is not prohibited from mak-
560; Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, ing a contract with his client by
16 L. R. A. 723; County of Chester which the attorney is to receive as
V. Barber, 97 Pa. St. 455; Perry v. his compensation a portion of the
Dicken, 105 Pa. St. 83, 51 Am. Rep. recovery in the suit, and is to pay
181; Rickel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., a part or all of the costs of such
112 Iowa 148, 83 N. W. 957; Wal- suit: Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Cal.
lace v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 112 564. See also. Potter v. Ajax Miu-
lowa 565, 84 N. W. 662; Croco v. ing Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 Pac. 999.
Oregon, etc., R. Co., 18 Utah 311, «' Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 609; Da-
54 Pac. 985; Courtright v. Burns, 13 vis v. Webber. 66 Ark. 190, 49 S. W.
Fed. 317; Zeigler v. Mize, 132 Ind. 822; Courtright v. Burners. 13 Fed.
403. And a plea of champerty or 317; Geer v. Frank, 179 111. 570, 45
maintenance must be specially L. R. A. 110.
pleaded: Croco v. Oregon, etc., R.
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§ 261. Recovery on quantum meruit.—When the contract for
compensation is void on the ground of chamjDerty or because it is
contingent, it does not necessarily follow that no compensation can
be collected by the agent or attorney. The general rule upon the
subject is unquestionably to the effect that the agent or attorney
may still recover for his services, upon a quantum meruit, the
same as if the champertous or contingent contract had never been
made, and the agreement to pay were an implied one.®^
§ 262. Contingent compensation—When enforceable—Condition
precedent.—If the compensation of the 'agent is a contingent one,
and collectible by the law of the jurisdiction, he will be entitled
to collect it, if the contingency has happened and he has fulfilled
his part of the engagement, whether the principal avails himself
of the benefits of the agent's services or not. And so, when a real
estate broker has, according to his agreement, produced a purchaser
who is able, ready and willing tc^ buy on the terms upon which
the broker was authorized to sell, he is entitled to receive his com-
mission, even though the owner refuses to execute the deed of con-
veyance or otherwise to carry out the contract of sale according to
its terms.^^ But if the contingency have not come to pass, the agent
will not be entitled to compensation, no matter how much work he
may have done or effort he may have made to bring it about. Thus,
in the case of the employment of a broker to find a customer, he
is not entitled to his commissions unless the customer is found,
ready, able and willing to purchase or sell, as the case may be.
He can not recover on a quantum meruit. If the principal fails
to fulfill his part of the engagement,—as, for example, where the
broker was employed to sell real estate on certain terms, and has found
a customer, Init the owner of the real estate is unwilling or unal)le
to carry out the contract,—the broker's commission is earned, and his
remedy is to sue for the commission, and not on the quantum
meruit.'^* The employment of a broker on commissions is not like
"^Merritt v. Lambert, 10 Paige ker, 30 Ala. 482, 500, 68 Am. Dec.
(N. Y.) 352; Stearns v. Pelker, 28 134.
Wis. 594; Rust v. Larue, 4 Litt. "'Moses v. Bierling, 31 N. Y. 462;
(Ky.) 412, 14 Am. Dec. 172; El- McFarland v. Lillard, 2 Ind. App.
liott v. McClelland, 17 Ala. 206; 160; Duffy v. Hobson. 40 Cal. 240;
Caldwell v. Shepherd, 6 T. B. Mon. Lockwood v. Rose, 125 Ind. 588.
(Ky.) 389; Holloway v. Lowe, 7 °' Fitzpatrick v. Gilson, 176 Mass.
Port. (Ala.) 488; Goodman v. Wal- 477.
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the ordinary case of employment of labor, but more in the nature
of an offer which can be accepted at any time before it is withdrawn.
Whenever the terms are complied with, it amounts to an acceptance;
and if withdrawn before acceptance, it is not a contract, and no
compensation can be recovered. "^^ The same is true where the agent
is employed to procure a^ loan of money for the principal. When
the agent has found a lender who is able, ready and willing to
furnish the money, the agent has earned his fee and is entitled to
it, whether the loan be accepted by the principal or not.*'° In all
such cases the basis of the right of recovery of the agent is the per-
formance of the condition upon which he agreed to perform the
service. Having done what he agreed to do, it is immaterial whether
the principal comes up to his part of the agreement or not; but
if the agent has not fully complied with his agreement, he is not
entitled to his compensation. These are cases where the right of
recovery of the agent depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
precedent. If this condition is not fulfilled, it is immaterial what
services the agent has performed: he will not be entitled to receive
compensation. Thus, where the condition was that the agent should
sell at a stipulated price, it was held that he was not entitled to
his commissions unless he sold for such price. ^" And the same rule
holds when the condition requires him to sell within a stipulated
time.^* On the other hand, the agent's claim can not be defeated or
forfeited by any default of the principal. The principal may indeed
revoke the agent's authority or take away from him the subject-matter
of the agency before the contract is carried into execution by the
agent ; but he can not thereby defeat the agent's right to recover for
his services if the conditions have been fulfilled.*''' . Xor is it' material
that the principal has realized no profits from the transaction or
.that he has incurred a loss thereby. The agent does not undertake
to insure profits to his principal or to keep him harmless from loss;
his undertaking only requires him to fulfill the terms of his contract
or to comply with the conditions therein stipulated. When he
has done that he is entitled to compensation. It must be kept
in mind, however, that the element of contingency, while not in
itself sufficient to render the contract for compensation void, in
most jurisdictions, is yet sufficient to lay such contract open to
"' Cadigan v. Crabtree (Mass.), 61 ""Jones v. Adler, 34 Md. 440.
N. E. 37. "« Irby v. Lawshe, 62 Ga. 216.
""Vinton v. Baldwin, 88 Ind. 104. ""Attrill v. Patterson, 58 Md. 226.
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close scrutiny; and if there be in it any element of illegality or
violation of public policy, the agent will not be entitled to collect
the contingent fee for which the parties have stipulated.'" Of this
character are contracts for lobbying and the performance of services
in procuring offices, gambling and other contracts that are void as
being against public policy.'^
§ 263. No compensation when purpose of agency is illegal.—
Of course, in cases in which the agency is an illegal one—that is,
where the agent is employed to perform some illegal transaction,
of which he has knowledge—he can not collect compensation for the
service except such as the principal is disposed to pay voluntarily.
Thus, a broker is not entitled to commissions for procuring a charter
party if the contemplated voyage is illegal. But if the illegality
is not apparent on the face of the contract, or if, though the general
subject-matter appears to Ije illegal, the contract is susceptible of
being legally performed, and is so performed, the agent is entitled
to his compensation.'^- And a note given to a broker for his com-
mission and to cover loss in stock-gambling operations is void.'^^
If, however, the broker simply brings the parties together for the
purpose of a purchase and sale of property, and, after his services
are performed, they enter into a contract which is immoral and
against public policy,—as, a wagering contract,—he may recover his
commissions, although the broker has knowledge of the character
of the contract, he not being a party to it.'* And practitioners in the
learned professions can not legally recover fees for their services
unless they have been licensed or otherwise qualified as required by
law." But it is otherwise if a physician is called to render services
in case of pressing emergency, where the physician is otherwise quali-
fied, but has not yet procured the proper license.""
§ 264. Nature of agent's compensation—No compensation for use-
less services.—When an agent has rendered the service undertaken
by him and has in all respects fulfilled the conditions of his contract
"Fowler v. Callan, 102 N. Y. 395; " Howarth v. Brearley, L. R. 19
Geer v. Frank, 179 111. 570, 45 L. R. Q. B. D. 303; Turner v. Reynall, 14
A. 110. C. B. (N. S.) 328; Orr v. Meek, 111
" See ante. § 65, et seq. Ind. 40.
'- Haines v. Busk, 5 Taunt. 521. ^^ Board of Com'rs v. Cole, 9 Ind.
"Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Pa. St. 89. App. 474.
'* Crane v. Whittemore, 4 Mo. App.
510.
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with the principal, he is entitled to his recompense. If the remuner-
ation was not to be contingent, the agent is entitled to receive pay-
ment according to the express contract, if the latter contains stipula-
tions controlling the compensation; if the contract contains no
stipulation as to compensation, the law implies a promise to pay what
the services are reasonably worth.'^' What is a reasonable compen-
sation depends largely upon the nature of the service to be performed,
the skill and reputation of the agent, the dangers and responsibilities
involved, the expense incurred, if any, and the time consumed in its
performance. Custom also may largely influence the question of
compensation; the evidence of what is usually charged for such
services under similar circumstances may be introduced, but evidence
of what was paid for similar services in another case is ordinarily
inadmissible."^ If, however, the agent's work is entirely useless,
owing to his want of skill or to his failure to exercise due care and
diligence, he can not recover anything for his services.'^® It is the
duty of the agent to exercise reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of the task he has undertaken ; and if he be incompetent
or negligent, he will be not only liable for any damages that his
principal may sustain, but may forfeit his entire compensation. If,
however, the services be not wholly worthless, he will be entitled to
claim on a quantum meruit ; unless the special contract between him
and his principal provide for such contingency, in which case the
contract will control.*** Thus, in a Xew Jersey case, it was held
that if an agent who has been employed to perform certain services
at a regular salary, neglects to keep proper accounts of the money
received by him in the course of the agency, as a result of which con-
siderable sums of money previously received by him are omitted to
be credited to the principal, the salary for the year in which the
omissions occurred is properly disallowed.*^ And where an attorney
employed to conduct a suit is guilty of negligence rendering all
previous steps useless in the result, he can not recover for any por-
"Cranmer v. Building and Loan Eyck. 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 62; Story
Ass'n, 6 S. D. 341. 61 N. W. 35; Ag., § 331.
Van Arman v. Byington, 38 111. 443. "'Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
"Mechem Ag., §§ 605, 606. 403-404; Farnsworth v. Garrard, 1
" Denew v. Deverell, 3 Camp. 451; Camp. 38; Rochester v. Levering,
Shaw v. Arden, 9 Bing. 287; Fisher 104 Ind. 562.
V. Dynes, 62 Ind. 348; Hart v. Ten- '' Ridgeway v. Ludlam, 7 N. J. Eq.
123.
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tion of his services in connection therewith.^^ Slight negligence,
however, will not work a forfeiture of all the agent's compensation,
but may go to reduce the amount of the demand.^^ A mere error
of judgment or omission, which does not amount to misconduct or
culpable negligence on the part of the agent, does not work a forfeiture
of his right to compensation.®* The agent's right to compensation
may likewise be forfeited by him by perpetrating a fraud upon his
principal in relation to the business of the agency. This may be done
by withholding valuable information from the principal, resulting
in loss to the latter.®^ And an agent can not sell the principal's
property to himself and recover compensation for his services.^*' And
so, where an agent sold his principal's land to a company in which
the agent was a shareholder and a director, without disclosing such fact
to the principal, he was adjudged to have forfeited his commissions.^^
And where he purchases property for his principal and receives from
the principal much more than he himself has paid for it, he forfeits
his right to compensation.®* ^Tiere the agent takes advantage of his
position to promote his own interest, which is inimical to that of the
principal, he can not recover for services in connection therewith.®*
The same result as to the forfeiture of compensation ensues where a
broker undertakes to represent two principals having conflicting
interests. **" But the acceptance of conflicting agencies will not work
a forfeiture of his commissions, if the agent has previously apprised
both principals of the fact, or if they are otherwise aware of the
same, and make no objections thereto.®^ And a mere middleman
employed simply to bring the parties together, without taking any
part in the contract between them, may recover a commission from
«=Bracey v. Carter, 12 A. & E. 373, son, 15 Ind. 70; Hunsaker v. Sturgis,
40 E. C. L. 74. 29 Cal. 142; Sumner v. Reicheniker.
*'' Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind. 9 Kan. 320; Jones v. Hoyt, 25 Conn.
562. 374; Hannan v. Prentiss, 124 Mich.
** Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind. 417, 83 N. W. 102; Marshall v. Eg-
562. gleston, 82 111. App. 52; Duesman
-«=Wadsworth v. Adams, 138 U. S. v. Hale, 55 Neb. 577, 76 N. W. 205;
380. Lewis v. Denison, 2 App. D. C. 387;
«« McGar v. Adams, 65 Ala. 106. Smith v. Tyler, 57 Mo. App. 668;
" Salomons v. Pender, 3 H. & C. Sessions v. Payne, 113 Ga. 955, 39
639. S. E. 325; In re Evans, 22 Utah 366,
«« Blair v. Shaeffer, 33 Fed. 218. 62 Pac. 913.
'» Salomons v. Pender, 3 H. & C. " Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344.
639. See Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1,
»» Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Patti- 40 L. R. A. 234.
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each, although they were both ignorant of the adverse employment
of the agent. ^- So, an agent who was authorized to sell land for two
distinct parties, and who brought about an interview between both
principals, which ended in the exchange of such lands by the prin-
cipals, was held entitled to recover his customary commission from
each; the court saying: "The plaintiff was not an agent to buy or
to sell, but only to act as a middleman to bring the parties together
in order to enable them to make their contract. He stood entirely
indifferent between them, and held no such relation in consequence
of his agency as to render his action adverse to the interests of either
party."^^
§ 265. Compensation by way of commissions.—Ordinary commer-
cial agents employed to buy and sell goods are usually paid a com-
mission on purchases or sales made by them, unless the contract of
agency stipulates for a salary or other kind of compensation. A
commission is an allowance of a percentage on the sums paid out or
those realized on the sale, or on the value of the goods purchased or
sold. Auctioneers, brokers, and factors usually receive such commis-
sions; and, where they are not fixed in the contract, they are ordi-
narily regulated by usage.^* Thus, where an owner of real estate
employs a broker to sell it for him, and nothing is said as to his
compensation, he will be entitled to recover such commission upon
the amount realized as may be established by evidence of what is
usually paid real estate brokers for such services. ^^
§ 266. Implied contract to pay for services.—Where commissions
are not the appropriate mode of compensation, and there is no fixed
recompense agreed upon, and the services are performed under cir-
cumstances implying a promise to pay for them, the agent will be
entitled to receive such compensation as he may be able to show the
services were reasonably worth. The law usually implies a promise
to pay for such services, when they are performed at the request of
the party receiving the benefit thereof; but if the services are per-
formed gratuitously, or without request, or the circumstances under
which they were performed do not indicate an intention to pay for
them, or do indicate a contrary intention, no such promise can be
»=Rupp V. Sampson, 16 Gray "'Story Ag., § 326.
(Mass.) 398. °*Ruckman v. Bergholz, 38 N. J. L.
'"'Rupp v. Sampson, supra. 531.
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inferred, and the agent will not be entitled to receive compensation.^*'
x\s has been well said, "all persons engaged in commerce called upon
to perform services in the due course of business are ex necessitate
entitled to compensation as growing out of and inseparably con-
nected with the contract of their employment."^' The intention to
compensate an agent may likewise be imjDlied from the beneficial
nature of the service. ^^ Thus, where a party knows that services are
being performed for him by another, and makes no objection thereto,
and receives the benefit thereof, he will be compelled to pay for such
services what they are reasonably worth.®^ The mere fact, however,
that the services are of benefit to the principal, is not necessarily
conclusive of the fact that they were to be paid for, if the circum-
stances indicate a different intention ;^°*' such fact will be treated as
a circumstance from which a request may be presumed, but it is not
conclusive evidence.^"^ But an agent can not rightly claim compen-
sation for mere gratuitous services, or for services performed volun-
tarily, either with or without the expectation of compensation. ^*^^
§ 267. Gratuitous services.—Whether the services are gratuitous
or not depends, of course, either upon the express contract between
the parties, or, in the absence of such contract, upon the particular
circumstances of the case. Thus, not only the character of the
services rendered, but the relation which the parties sustain to each
other, will often exert a controlling influence in determining the
question whether or not it was intended that the services should be
paid for. It is not probable, for instance, that members of the same
family, and those who are nearly related, will expect compensation
for the performance of services usually rendered by and between such
parties with the expectation of no reward save that of love and af-
fection. In such cases courts and juries will be guided largely by
probabilities: if from all the circumstances it does not appear prob-
able that an intention to pay was present, none will Idc implied. ^"^
»«Van Arman v. Byington, 38 111. ler, 67 Wis. 512, 58 Am. Rep. 877;
443; Waterman v. Gibson. 5 La. Scully v. Scully, 28 Iowa 548.
Ann. 672; Roberts v. Swift, 1 Yeates ">" Muscott v. Stubbs, 24 Kan. 520.
(Pa.) 209, 1 Am. Dec. 295; Mangum '"' Westgate v. Munroe, 100 Mass.
V. Ball, 43 Miss. 288, 5 Am. Rep. 227.
488. "= Scott v. Maier. 56 Mich. 554;
" Martin v. Roberts, 36 Fed. 217. Seals v. Edmondson, 73 Ala. 295, 49
«' Hatch V. Purcell, 21 N. H. 544. Am. Rep. 51.
'''Bartlett v. Sparkman, 95 Mo. '" Hinds v. Henry. 36 N. J. L. 328;
136, 6 Am. St. 35; Garrey v. Stad- Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465;
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Nor is it always necessary that a request to perform the services be
shown. Thus, if an attending physician call in a consulting phy-
sician, who renders services to the patient, the consulting physician
may recover from the patient the reasonable value of his services,
although the regular attending physician had agreed to pay for such
services himself, of which fact the consulting physician was, however,
ignorant.^"* And the same rule is applied in the case of attorneys.
If an attorney who is conducting a suit for his client call in assistant
counsel, who render services of which the client receives a benefit,
although it be done without the express consent of the client, but
without objection from him, such client may render himself liable
for the reasonable fee of such assisting counsel. ^*^^ But where one of
several clients employs an attorney for himself, and the benefit of
his services, from the nature of the case, inures to the others, who
merely stand by and accept such benefit without objection, such other
clients do not thereby become liable for any fees of such attorney.^"^
If, however, such parties are aware of the fact that the attorney em-
ployed to assist intends to look to them for pay, and they do not
interpose timely objection or declare their unwillingness to become
liable, they may render themselves responsible to him for pay.^'^"
Services are sometimes rendered by architects and mechanics which
are of a mere preliminary character, preparatory to the erection of
houses or other buildings, for which the person employed may not
be entitled to compensation. If an architect is called upon to fur-
nish the plans and specifications for a building, and nothing is said
as to paying for the same, he will generally be entitled to recover
the reasonable value of such services. But there may be circum-
stances under which he would not be entitled to recover anything.
If, for example, the evidence shows that such services were volun-
tarily performed, with the chances of future employment, or the
sketches and estimates were not accepted, there could be no recovery
whatever.^"®
Pew V. First Nat'l Bank, 130 Mass. ger v. Aiken, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 539.
391; St. Jude's Church v. Van Den- '"^ Jones v. Woods, 76 Pa. St. 408;
berg, 31 Mich. 287; Palmer v. Haver- Simms v. Floyd, 65 Ga. 719. But
hill, 98 Mass. 487; Taggart v. Tevan- see Hauss v. Niblack, 80 Ind. 407.
ny, 1 Ind. App. 339. "" Savings Bank of Cincinnati v.
^"^Garrey v. Stadler, 67 Wis. 512, Benton, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 240; Mc-
58 Am. Rep. 877. Crary v. Ruddick, 33 Iowa 521;
'"" McCrary v. Ruddick, 33 Iowa Weston v. Davis. 24 Me. 374.
521; Muscot v. Stubbs. 21 Kan. 521; '"'Scott v. Maier, 56 Mich. 554.
Ector v. Wiggins, 30 Tex. 55; Yer-
17
—
Principal and Agent.
§ 268 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 258
§ 268. Services by members of common family.—One of the most
frequent instances in which the question of compensation for services
arises, and whether such services are to be classed as gratuitous
or otherwise, is in cases where the services have been performed
by members of a common family residing together. The circum-
stances of near relatives by blood or marriage living together in the
same family, and one furnishing board, lodging, clothing, or other
necessaries or comforts of life, and the other rendering services in
return, are held to raise a presumption that such relatives are not
to be compensated in money; and no recovery can be had therefor,
in the absence of evidence showing an agreement to pay for the same.
The presumption arising from such circumstances may indeed be
rebutted; but the burden is upon the party alleging that compensa-
tion was to be made to prove a contract or agreement, express or
implied, that the services were to be paid for.^"'^ Thus, where a
child, after arriving at the age of majority, continued to reside in
the father's family and render services, receiving in return his board,
lodging and other maintenance, as before, without any understanding
that the services were to be paid for, it was held that the child could
not collect pay for such services.^^" If the relation is not that of
parent and child, but some other near relation, as that of uncle and
niece,^^^ or brother and sister,^^- the rule is the same. But the rela-
tion of cousins or that of granddaughter is not sufficient in itself
to raise the presumption that pay was not expected.^^^ But aside
from the matter of relationship, if it be shown that the party claim-
ing for the services was living with the defendant as a member of his
family, and receiving from him his maintenance and support, it is
generally sufficient to raise the presumption that other remuneration
was not intended. ^^* So, where a person from whom compensation
"'Hill V. Hill, 121 Ind. 255; Richards v. Humphreys, 15 Pick.
Smith v. Denman, 48 Ind. 65; Wal- (Mass.) 133; Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa.
lace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522; Curry St. 367, 371.
v. Curry, 114 Pa. St. 367; Walls' "^ Hays v. McConnell, 42 Ind. 385.
Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 460; Taggart v. "-Carpenter v. Weller, 15 Hun (N.
Tevanny, 1 Ind. App. 339; Hays v. Y.) 134.
McConnell, 42 Ind. 285; James v. "''Gallaher v. Vought, 8 Hun (N.
Gillen, 3 Ind. App. 472. Y.) 87; Hauser v. Sain, 74 N. C.
""Miller v. Miller, 16 111. 296. See 552.
also, Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. "*Gallaher v. Vought, supra:
465; Allen v. Allen, 60 Mich. 635; Neal v. Gilmore. 79 Pa. St. 421;
Kaye v. Crawford, 22 Wis. 320; Hays v. McConnell, 42 Ind. 285.
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was claimed had taken a child into his family to live with him until
he arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and the child continued to
reside in the family after the time had expired, the party benefited
by the services was held not to be liable for the same.^^^ But where
an aged and infirm woman requested her son-in-law to take her to his
home and care for her, and he did so, and it was shown that he gave
her such care and attention as she in her helpless condition stood
in need of, it was held that she was not residing wuth him as a
member of his family, and that he was entitled to collect from her
estate the value of the services so rendered.^^*^ If a child is not
living with its parent, having been emancipated by him, or having
arrived at the age of majority, there is no binding obligation on the
child to render services for the parent gratuitously; and the child
will have a valid claim against the parent for any services it may
render for him, the same as if the parties were strangers.^^^ And
where an aged pair took into their home a young girl to live with
them and serve them until the death of both, upon an agreement
that she was to be compensated out of the estate of the survivor, who
would make a will providing for her, it was held that an action
would lie against the estate of the survivor for a reasonable com-
pensation for such services.^^* But the mere promise or expectation
of a legacy is not always sufficient to show that it was intended to
pay the servant the value of the services, particularly where the
claim has no equity."^ The best evidence with which to overcome
the presumption that services were to be gratuitous is, of course,
that of an express contract.^^" But it is not essential that
there should be proof of an express stipulation for a salary or
wages: the claimant may prove the claim by circumstances proving
to the ]ur3^'s satisfaction that the services were rendered in expecta-
tion of pay by the claimant and that it was the intention of
the defendant to make compensation therefor.^- ^ In Fisher v.
"= Brush V. Blanchard, 18 111. 46; "= Grandin v. Reading, 10 N. J. Eq.
Andrus v. Foster, 17 Vt. 556; Meds- 370; Hartman's Appeal, 3 Grant's
ker v. Richardson, 72 Ind. 323. Gas. (Pa.) 271.
""Wence v. Wykoff, 52 Iowa 644. '-'' Medsker v. Richardson, 72 Ind.
"'Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293; Ul- 323; Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293; Wil-
rich v. Ulrich, 136 N. Y. 120; Parker son v. Wilson, 52 Iowa 44; Faloon
v. Parker, 33 Ala. 459. v. Mclntyre, 118 111. 292; Hertzog v.
"« Taggart v. Tevanny, 1 Ind. App. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465.
339; Davison v. Davison, 13 N. J. '-' Faloon v. Mclntyre, sitpra,- Mor-
Eq. 246; Martin v. Wright, 13 Wend, ton v. Rainey, 82 111. 215, 25 Am.
(N. Y.) 460, 28 Am. Dec. 468. Rep. 311; Green v. Roberts, 47 Barb.
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Fisher,^-- the court said that "the plaintiff might have shown to the
satisfaction of any jury that by the course of dealing between him and
the defendant,—as, for instance, that they kept books of account, or
had had settlements, or acts of this kind,—the relation of debtor
and creditor subsisted between them, and that it was not intended
or expected that these services should be rendered gratuitously."
Facts showing that parties only remotely related are living together
in one family do not of themselves necessarily raise the presumption
of gratuitous services; and where in such a case there is evidence
showing that the part)- claiming pay for services, though living in
the family for some years as a minor, and performing services for
his board, clothing and medical attendance, continued to reside there
after becoming of age, but furnished his own clothes and paid
his own medical bills, it was held sufficient to establish an implied
contract to pay what the services were reasonably worth.^^^ True,
no invariable rule can be laid down as to the exact nature and quantum
of evidence necessary to prove the existence of a contract to com-
pensate the servant or agent for the services rendered: every case
must be determined largely upon its own peculiar facts and circum-
stances. When the relationship is such as to raise the presumption
of gratuitous services, there can be no recovery in any case without
positive proof of a contract, either express or implied, that com-
pensation other than the benefits incidentally derived from the living
in the family was to be paid the claimant. The probative force
of the evidence introduced to overcome the presumption of gratuit}''
is always for the jury or the court trying the cause. Moreover, a
promise to pay for gratuitous services, made after they were ren-
dered, can not form the basis of an action to recover the same. If
such services were really gratuitous, the promise is a mere nudum
pactum, being without any consideration, and, therefore, void.^-*
§ 269, Compensation when agency is revoked.—The principal has
the power, though not always the right, as has been seen,^-^ to re-
voke the agent's authority at any time, unless it be coupled with
an interest. But if the principal exercises the power without the
right, the agent can not be deprived of his compensation. Where
the parties have provided by their agreement what the agent's com-
(N. Y.) 521; Fisher v. Fisher, 5 Y/is. ^"Morton v. Rainey, 82 111. 215, 25
472; Taggart v. Tevanny, 1 Ind. Am. Rep. 311.
App. 339. «* Allen v. Bryson. 67 Iowa 591.
"5 Wis. 472. "'Awte, §§ 159, 161, 164.
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pensation shall be in case the principal sees fit to revoke the authority
prematurely, such agreement will form the basis of the agent's re-
covery. But if there be no provision of that character in the con-
tract, the question arises, What will be the agent's remedy as to the
matter of compensation? In that case, if the employment was for
' a definite period and the agent was wrongfully discharged before
the expiration thereof, or was prevented by the wrongful act of the
' jDrincipal from performing his undertaking, the law gives him a
choice of remedies : he may elect to treat the contract as rescinded,
and sue upon a quantum meruit for the services performed by him,
less the amount already received; or he may sue immediately for a
breach of the contract and recover all probable damages resulting
from such breach; or he may wait until the expiration of the term
and recover the actual damages sustained by him.^*° He must, how-
ever, make his election between these remedies: he can not resort
to all : if he pursues the one, he thereby abandons the other. Neither
can he elect to treat the contract as being still in force and sue for
the various portions or installments of his salary as they become
due: he is not permitted thus to split his remedies. Formerl}'^, it
seems, the law was construed differently; it was then held that the
agent or servant might recover for "constructive wages" for those
portions of the term during which he was turned out of employ-
ment; but the so-called constructive wages are now included under
the head of damages resulting from the breach, and it is held that
there can be but a single demand for such breach. ^^'^ As said by
Mitchell, J., in a case decided by the Indiana supreme court: "A
party will not be permitted to present by piecemeal, in successive
suits, claims which grow out of an indivisible, entire contract, and
which might have been litigated and determined when the first suit
was brought. In such a case, the judgment in the first suit will be
a conclusive merger of all the plaintiff's rights under the contract."^^^
And in the same case the court quote approvingly the following
statement of the law from Freeman: "Where the action is upon a
contract, it merges all amounts due under or arising out of the con-
tract, prior to the suit. They constitute a single, indivisible demand.
)
"" Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. '-' Richardson v. Eagle Machine
(N. Y.) 381; Cutter v. Powell, 2 Works, 78 Ind. 422, 41 Am. Rep.
Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.) 1220, note; 584.
Gandell v. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375; '"Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Koons,
Planch^ v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14. 105 Ind. 507.
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The plaintiff can not be allowed to split up the various covenants
or promises contained in one contract and to recover upon each sep-
arately."^'"
§ 270. Doctrine of constructive services.—The doctrine of con-
structive services is still adhered to in some jurisdictions.^^" If, un-
der that doctrine, the agent or servant was unjustly discharged by the
master or principal before the end of his term, and his compensation
was payable in installments, he might, whenever an installment fell
due, bring his action therefor, in the meantime holding himself in
readiness to serve the master or principal according to the require-
ments of the contract. But he was also required, by another rule
of law, to accept employment elsewhere, if offered, thus doing every-
thing within his power to make the master's loss no greater than was
reasonably necessary. He was thus placed in the- dilemma of re-
maining idle, so as to be ready to serve the master, and, at the same
time, of accepting other employment whenever opportunity offered.
A doctrine so repugnant to correct principle could not well continue
to receive the approbation of the courts, and it is now generally re-
pudiated.^ ^^
§ 271. Modern rule.—Under the modern, and what is believed to
be the better rule, the agent, as we have seen, can have but one recovery
for any and all breaches of the contract by the principal. The
measure of damages, if he elect to treat the contract as still in force,
whether the suit be brought before or after the expiration of the
term of service, is, prima facie, the amount of compensation stipu-
lated in the contract of employment for the entire time, not exceed-
ing the amount that would have been due him had he completed
his undertaking.^^'
"'Freeman Judgm., § 240. See 544; Chamberlin v. McCalister, 6
also, Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Dana (Ky.) 352; James v. Allen
Hare Ch. 100, 115. County, 44 Ohio St. 226, 58 Am. Rep.
1^" Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299
Gardenhlre v. Smith, 39 Ark. 280
Jones v. Jones, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 605
821; Willoughby v. Thomas, 24
Gratt. (Va.) 521.
1^ Howard v. Daly. 61 N. Y. 362,
Armfield v. Nash, 31 Miss. 361. 19 Am. Rep. 285; Hunt v. Crane.
"1 Goodman v. PoCock, 15 A. & E. 33 Miss. 669, 69 Am. Dec. 381;
(N. S.) (69 E. C. L.) 576; Howard Richardson v. Eagle Machine
V. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. Works, 78 Ind. 422, 41 Am. Rep.
285; Richardson v. Eagle Machine 584; Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan,
Works, 78 Ind. 422, 41 Am. Rep. 6 Ind. App. 109; Hinchcliffe v.
584; Smith v. Hayward, 7 A. & E. Koontz, 121 Ind. 422.
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§ 272. Agent's duty to seek other employment.—But the agent,
upon his discharge, is bound to use reasonable diligence to secure
employment elsewhere ; and if he succeed in doing so, or if he could,
by the exercise of proper efforts, have secured other employment, the
compensation will be reduced in accordance with the amount received
or that would have been received for such other employment. ^^^ The
principal will, of course, be permitted to deduct, also, any amount
he may have paid the agent by way of compensation, from the whole
sum; and the remainder will be the damages the agent will be en-
titled to receive. The kind of employment the agent is required to
use diligence in attempting to procure is employment of the same
general nature as that from which he was wrongfully dismissed. ^^*
The agent or servant wrongfully discharged by the principal or
master can not be required to accept any and all kinds of employ-
ment that he may be offered or have the opportunity of receiving;
he is not supposed to be skilled in other matters than those in which
he was employed when discharged. Thus, if he be an actor, he can
not be required to accept employment as a singer ; and if he had been
engaged as a clerk or bookkeeper, he would not be compelled to ac-
cept employment as a farm laborer.^^^ Nor does the rule require the
agent or servant to go beyond the locality of his original employment
to seek or accept other work.^^® Whether the agent made reasonable
efforts to secure such other employment in the locality, and whether
he might have found such employment or not, are questions for the
jury to determine. The burden of proof in such cases is always
upon the principal : it devolves upon him to establish to the satis-
faction of the jury or court trying the cause that the agent has
accepted or could have found other employment of the same general
character in the locality, the same as in the case of any other defense
upon which he chooses to rely.^^' As has Ijeen seen, the agent should
"'Fain v. Goodwin, 35 Ark. 109; 758; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299,
Williams v. Chicago Coal Co., 60 111. 38 Am. Rep. 8.
149; Williams v. Anderson, 9 Minn. '^ Mechem Ag., § 623.
39; Kirk v. Hartman, 63 Pa. St. 97; '^Harrington v. Gies, 45 Mich.
Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64; 374; Costigan v. Monawk, etc., R.
Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Co., 2 Denio (N. Y.) 609, 43 Am. Dec.
Am. Rep. 285; Perry v. Simpson, 758; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299,
etc., Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 520. 38 Am. Rep. 8.
i^Wolf V. Studebaker, 65 Pa. St. '^Howard v. Daly. 61 N. Y. 362,
459; Costigan v. Mohawk, etc., R. 19 Am. Rep. 285; Ricks v. Yates, 5
Co., 2 Denio (N. Y.) 609, 43 Am. Dec. Ind. 115; Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan,
6 Ind. App. 109.
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be ready and willing to continue in the service of his principal at
the time of his dismissal ;^^'^ but there is no rule of law that requires
him to make a formal tender of his services to the principal, after
he has been discharged by him. Whether or not he held himself
in readiness to perform at the time of the dismissal is a question of
fact for the jury, and may be established by the circumstances of
die case, the same as any other fact that the party is required to
prove; and when the agent has once indicated his readiness to serve
the principal or master, there is no further obligation upon him to
hold himself in readiness to perform such services. ^^^
§ 273. No compensation after death or insanity of principal—
Exceptions.—Death or insanity of the principal, as has been hereto-
fore shown, operates as a revocation of the agency by force of law,
unless the agency was coupled with an interest. In such cases the
agent is not entitled to recover compensation beyond the period at
which the death or insanity occurred; nor would he be entitled to
damages for a wrongful discharge.^*^ But this rule will not apply in
case of the bankruptcy of the principal. Although such bankruptcy
operates as a revocation, it is not considered to be such an unavoid-
able occurrence as that of death or insanity. The bankruptcy of the
principal, therefore, does not furnish any defense to an action
brought by an agent for the refusal or neglect of his principal to
employ such agent after the bankruptcy .^*^ And an agent who con-
sents to the principal's discharge, or evinces an acquiescence therein
by his acts and conduct, can not recover damages for a breach of the
contract. ^*^ And where a corporation, on account of its insolvency,
has passed into the hands of a receiver, an agent previously em-
ployed by such company, at a stipulated salary, and whose term of
service has not expired when the receiver is appointed, is not en-
titled to recover damages out of the funds in the hands of the re-
ceiver, in the absence of any default of the company during its life."^
§ 274. Death, insanity, sickness, etc., of agent.—In case of the
death of the agent before the completion of the service for which
"« Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, '" Lewis v. Atlas, etc., Ins. Co., 61
19 Am. Rep. 285. Mo. 534.
""Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, "= Patnote v. Sanders, 41 Vt. 66;
19 Am. Rep. 285. Boyle v. Parker, 46 Vt. 343.
HO Yerrington v. Greene, 7 R. I. "= People v. Globe, etc., Ins. Co.,
589, 84 Am. Dec. 578. 91 N. Y. 174.
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he was employed, the agency is terminated, and his estate may re-
cover the value of his services to the time of his death. ^^^ The old
rule seems to have been that in case of an entire contract there could
be no division or apportionment of the compensation, notwithstand-
ing the failure to perform was through no fault of the agent."^
But the rule now generally enforced is to the effect that where the
agent is prevented by death, insanity, sickness or other disability
from performing the contract, though it be a special, entire contract,
and the agent professes to act under it, and has done for and deliv-
ered to the other party something of value to him, which he has
accepted,—although no action will lie on the special contract for
the work done or thing delivered, yet the party who has been thus
benefited by the labor and performance of the other will be liable
on an implied promise arising out of the circumstances, to the ex-
tent of the value received by him."" But it has been held that where
sickness was the cause of the revocation, and the sickness could have
been foreseen, but was not provided against, no recovery can be had,
even upon a quantum meruit}*''
§ 275. Renunciation of agency by agent—Rule as to compensa-
tion in case of.—When the agent himself dissolves the relation be-
tween him and his principal, by a renunciation of the same, it may
be under circumstances furnishing a justification for his doing so
or it may not. If the agent has in his contract reserved the right
of renunciation at his will, he will doubtless be entitled to recover
compensation to the time of the dissolution, according to the terms
of the contract, whether he have good reasons for breaking off the
relation or not.^*® And if the parties have provided in their con-
tract that in case of the renunciation or abandonment of the agency
by the agent he shall forfeit a certain amount or all of his
compensation, such provision will be enforced, unless it be an un-
i^Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79, 58 Am. Brown, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 440; Lake-
Dec. 618; Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. man v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463, 69 Am.
197, 75 Am. Dec. 388. Dec. 77; Riddle v. Gilbert, 21 Wis.
"= Cutter V. Powell, 6 T. R. 320, 2 395; Hillyard v. Crabtree, 11 Tex.
Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.) 1212. 264, 62 Am. Dec. 475.
'" Lomax v. Bailey, 7 Blackf. "' Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 554.
(Ind.) 599; Milnes v. Vanhorn, 8 See also, Leopold v. Salkey, 89 111.
Blackf. (Ind.) 198; Fenton v. Clark, 412; Hunter v. Waldron, 7 Ala. 763.
11 Vt. 557; Britton v. Turner, 6 N. ''* Provost v. Harwood, 29 Vt. 219;
H. 481; Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. Evans v. Bennett, 7 Wis. 351.
188, 65 Am. Dec. 560; Fuller v.
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reasonable or oppressive exaction on the part of the principal."®
Provisions of this character are now frequently inserted in contracts
with the employes of manufacturing companies, including also a
stipulation that the employe will give notice a certain time before
abandonment of his intention to do so; and where such stipulations
are not unreasonable and oppressive, the courts will enforce them.
Such stipulations may be made by express contract between the
employer and the individual employe or servant, or may constitute
a portion of the rules and regulations of the company or firm, agreed
to by the employes generally. If the employe sign such regulations
or enter into the employment with knowledge of them, he will be
bound by them.^^'' But the mere fact that the employe had been
informed of the regulations, and continued to work for the company
without objection, is not necessarily conclusive, as matter of law,
that he assented to them.^^^ And whether or not there has been an
abandonment by the employe of his work is a question for the jury,
under all the circumstances of the case;^^- a mere temporary ab-
sence, for example, would not justify the conclusion of an abandon-
ment and a consequent forfeiture of accrued wages. ^^^ In the absence
of any stipulation for a forfeiture of accrued wages unless notice
of abandonment be given, there can be no such forfeiture ; unless the
agent is otherwise at fault, as we shall presently see. And even
where there is such a stipulation, if the absence of the agent or
employe is not attributable to his own default, but rather to some
unavoidable cause, such as illness or other visitation of Providence,
there will be no forfeiture, although notice has not been given. ^^*
§ 276. When agent abandons undertaking without just cause
—
Entirety or divisibility of contract—Rule in equity.—A very im-
portant question, and one upon which there appears to be some
"" Richardson v. Woehler, 26 Mich. ^'^ Collins v. New England Iron
90; Walsh v. Walley, L. R. 9 Q. B. Co., 115 Mass. 23; Preston v. Ameri-
367; Pottsville Iron, etc., Co. v. can Linen Co., 119 Mass. 400.
Good, 116 Pa. St. 385, 2 Am. St. ^^= Partington v. Wamsutta Mills,
614. 110 Mass. 467.
i=" Harmon v. Salmon Palls Mfg. ^^^ Herber v. U. S. Flax Mfg. Co.,
Co., 35 Me. 447, 58 Am. Dec. 718; 13 R. I. 303.
Walsh V. Walley, L. R. 9 Q. B. 367; '"Fuller v. Brown. 11 Mete.
Pottsville Iron, etc., Co. v. Good. 116 (Mass.) 440; Hughes v. Wamsutta
Pa. St. 385, 2 Am. St. 614; Brad- Mills, 11 Allen (Mass.) 201.
ley v. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co., 30 N.
H. 487.
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conflict in the decisions, is whether the agent forfeits the compen-
sation already earned by him, if he leaves his principal's employment
before the expiration of the term of service, and without any just
cause. Much depends, in such cases, upon whether the contract of
employment is an entire one, in point of time, or whether it is di-
visible. If the contract be for an entire, indivisible undertakinsr,
the prevailing doctrine in England and America is to the effect that
the agent who, without any just cause, voluntarily abandons his un-
dertaking, forfeits his entire compensation, and is liable to the prin-
cipal in damages besides.^^" This was the common-law rule, and it
is still in force in many jurisdictions. It is applicable, however,
only in cases where the entirety of the contract is so plain and evi-
dent as to render full performance a condition precedent. In such
case it was said that no recovery could be had upon a quantum
meruit, for the plain reason that there was an express contract by
which the parties must be guided; and that there could be no re-
covery upon the special contract, because the agent had failed to com-
ply with his part of it. The parties having made the contract, the
courts could not relieve them."® Whether the contract is entire or
not depends upon the intention of the parties as expressed in the
contract, and such intention must be gathered from all its terms
when construed together.^^'^ A contract is entire when it is the in-
tention of the parties that the whole undertaking is to be completed
before any portion of the consideration can be demanded. Payment
in such cases is in one specified amount of money or in some specific
article. Thus, where the contract was for the complete repair of
certain chandeliers, and they were returned incompletely repaired,
the court held that there could be no recovery for what had been
done on them."'' The full performance in such cases is a condition
^""^ Waddington v. Oliver, 2 B. & P. v. Payne, 71 111. 408; Miller v. God-
N. R. 61; Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt, dard, 34 Me. 102, 56 Am. Dec. 638;
52; Spain v. Arnott, 2 Stark. 227, 3 Martin v. Schoenberger, 8 W. & S.
E. C. L. 400; Diefenback v. Stark, (Pa.) 367; Mack v. Bragg, 30 Vt.
56 Wis. 462, 43 Am. Rep. 719; Dover 571; Cutter v. Powell, 6 T. R. 320,
v. Plemmons, 10 Ired. (N. C.) 23; 2 Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.) 1212.
Clark v. Gilbert, 26 N. Y. 279, 84 '=" Stark v. Parker. 2 Pick. (Mass.)
Am. Dec. 189; Preston v. American 267, 13 Am. Dec. 425.
Linen Co.. 119 Mass. 400; Word v. ^^ Ritchie v. Atkinson, 10 East
Winder, 16 La. Ann. Ill; Jewell v. 295; More v. Bonnett, 40 Cal. 251..
Thompson, 2 Litt. (Ky.) 52; Cald- "'Sinclair v. Bowles, 4 M. & R.
well v. Dickson, 17 Mo. 575; Thrift 1, 9 B. & C. 92.
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precedent, unless performance was prevented by the fault of the prin-
cipal; and if the requirement entail a hardship upon one of the par-
ties, he can justly blame no one but himself for having entered into it.
The rule was formerly much more rigorously applied than now.
Thus, it was held in an English case, where a sailor had accepted a
promissory note from his employer for the services to be performed
by him, and it was provided by the agreement between the two that
he should "proceed, continue and do his duty on board for the voy-
age," and he died before the arrival of the ship, that there could
be no recovery on the note, nor on a quantum meruit}^^ This iron
rule of the common law has, however, been much relaxed in modern
times, by the application of the principles of equity. As we have
already seen, an employe will be relieved from the forfeiture of wages
already earned; and this is true even where full performance is a
condition precedent to the collection of compensation, if the aban-
donment of the service is not due to the fault or wrongful act of the
employe. Hence, it has been held that where an attorney failed to
complete his contract for the rendition of professional services, on
account of his election to the bench, he could recover on a quantum
meruit for that portion of the services already performed by him.^^"
And where a servant was called away as a witness, the same ruling
was made.^''^
§ 277. Application of equity rule in some of the states.—In many
of the states of the Union the courts have applied a more equitable
rule to the construction of indivisible, entire contracts, though the
failure to perform is due to the fault or wrongful act of the agent
or servant. In those states it is held that if the employer has re-
ceived and accepted a substantial benefit from the services of the
employe, the latter may recover on a quantum meruit; the amount
of compensation being limited, however, to the contract price, after
deducting all damages sustained by the employer by reason of the
servant's abandonment or wrongful act.^^- Under this rule the
"=' Cutter V. Powell, 6 T. R. 320, 2 48 Ind. 153; Everroad v. Schwartz-
Smith Ld, Cas. (9th ed.) 1212. kopf, 123 Ind. 35; Gastlin v. Weeks,
i"" Balrd V. Ratcliff , 10 Tex. 81. 2 Ind. App. 222; Lincoln v.
!«' Melville v. De Wolf, 4 E. & B. Schwartz, 70 111. 134; Dobbins v.
844. Higgins, 78 111. 440; Dover v. Plem-
^"^Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481; mons, 10 Ired. (N. C.) 23; Wilson v.
Coe V. Smith, 4 Ind. 79; Ricks v. Adams, 15 Tex. 323; Powers v. Wil-
Yates, 5 Ind. 115; Adams v. Cosby, son, 47 Iowa 666; Robinson v. San
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principal is entitled to recover from his agent all damages that the
former may have sustained by reason of the wrongful abandonment.
Such damages may be recovered in a separate action by the prin-
cipal, or he may recoup the agent's claim in an action by the latter
for the compensation, by way of defense. If recoupment is resorted
to, the claim for it must grow out of the same contract or transac-
tion sued upon by the agent, and the principal can not recover judg-
ment over, for damages in excess of what is found to be due the agent,
the principal being relegated to a separate action. Eecoupment is
a common-law proceeding or defense, and goes to reduce the plain-
tiff's damages.^"^ But if the suit be in equity, or in a state where
the code provides for a counterclaim, the defendant principal may
file such counterclaim and recover judgment over, if the defendant's
claim exceed that of plaintiff. ^''^
§ 278. Further as to severable and indivisible contracts.—Of
course, if the contract is severable, the agent is entitled to recover
for any compensation falling due at any period, and a subsequent
abandonment by him of the service does not operate as a forfeiture
of salary or wages already earned. ^^^ A contract is severable if by
its terms it is the duty of one of the parties to perform several and
distinct items, and of the other to pay the price apportioned to each
item, or the price to be paid is left to be implied by law. And the
same rule holds where the price to be paid is clearly and distinctly
apportioned to different parts of what is to be performed, although
the latter is in its nature single and entire.^®*' But if the consid-
eration to be paid is single and entire, the contract must be regarded
as entire; although the subject of the contract may consist of sev-
eral distinct and independent items. ^''" A divisible contract is one
that, in respect of the things contemplated and embraced by it, may
be divided into two or more parts not necessarily dependent on each
other nor intended by the parties that they should be.^"- Thus, a
contract to perform some specific service is entire, and the price
ders, 24 Miss. 391; Allen v. McKib- v. Garner. 27 Ind. 4; Standley v.
Mn, 5 Mich. 449; Wolf v. Gerr, 43 Northwestern, etc., Ins. Co., 95 Ind.
Iowa 339; Parcell v. McComber, 11 254.
Neb. 209, 38 Am. Rep. 366; Duncan ^"'^ Taylor v. Laird, 1 H. & N. 266.
v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99; Downey v. ^"^2 Parsons Conts. (5th ed.) 517.
Burke, 23 Mo. 228; Wood Master '""2 Parsons Conts. (5th ed.) 519.
and Serv. 240. '"' Wooten v. Walters, 110 N. C.
"''•'Mechem Ag., § 647. 251.
^'"Pomeroy Rem., § 736; Woodruff
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can not be demanded until it is fully performed.^®^ So, if a builder
engage to erect a house within a specified time, and at a specified
price, he to furnish all the materials and labor, the contract is entire
;
and if the part of the house which has been constructed be destroyed
by fire, the loss will be that of the builder, and not that of the other
party. If in such case the party contracting with the builder has
advanced money to the latter, he may recover the same in an action
for that purpose, and also the damages caused by the failure to com-
plete the building according to contract. ^^" And where one was
employed to serve for a year at so much per month, the contract
was adjudged to be entire.^"^ And so, a contract to teach school for
a school term, consisting of so many days, is entire ; and if the teacher
is prematurely discharged, he or she may recover for the entire term,
if otherwise entitled to recover; and this is true even though the
teacher fail to serve during the entire term, unless such failure be
due to the fault of such teacher. ^'^ But a contract to perform a
specified service for a given sum, of which service the other party
receives the benefit, and to pay for the same in installments as the
performance progresses, is divisible, and the installments may be
sued for as they mature.^^^ And a contract made by one person with
three others not in any way connected, that he will represent them
in the sale of their coal, taking the same from them in equal quanti-
ties from their respective mines, is a severable contract, especially
where all the parties have so treated it.^'* In Massachusetts, in
an action by the plaintiff growing out of an agreement to work for
the defendant seven months, at twelve dollars per month, the court
was of opinion that the contract was entire, and that the plaintiff,
who had left the defendant's service tefore the time had expired,
could not recover for partial services performed. The plaintiff
contended that it was a contract for seven months, at twelve dollars
per month, to be paid at the end of each month; but the court re-
fused to give it that construction, saying that it was not the contract
proved. As there was no time fixed in the contract for payment,
the law fixed the time at the period when the services were com-
^^' Rockwell V. Newton, 44 Conn. "- School Town of Carthage v.
333; Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 Gray, 10 Ind. App. 428; Charlestown
Fed. 864. School Tp. v. Hay, 74 Ind. 127.
"'Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. "^Cunningham v. Mon-ell, 10
272. Johns. (N. Y.) 203, 6 Am. Dec. 332.
'"Reaf V. Moor, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) •* Shipman v. Straitsville Central
337. Mining Co., 158 U. S. 356.
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pleted. The fixing of the rate of payment at so mitch per month
was regarded by the court as simply a convenient rating in case the
contract should be terminated by consent, or death, or other casualty,
before its expiration."^ In Mississippi the court declined to follow
the rule enunciated in Britton v. Turner, ^''^ which seems to be the
leading case in which the right of an agent who has abandoned the
service of his principal to recover on a quantum meruit for services
actually rendered is asserted. "The decided weight of authority,"
says Cooper, J., "is to the contrary.""^ "And it was decided at an
early day, in this state," continues the same learned judge, "that
an entire contract of this character could not be apportioned, and
that, under the circumstances named, no recovery could be had by the
party guilty of the breach of contract; that he could not recover on
the special contract because he himself had not performed, nor upon
quantum meruit, because of the existence of the special contract.""*
§ 279. Agent's right to reimbursements—Manner of proving dis-
bursements.—"Another right of agents is to be reimbursed all their
advances, expenses and disbursements made in the course of the
agency on account of, or for the benefit of their principal. This
is naturally, nay necessarily, implied from the very character of
every agency to which such advances, expenses and disbursements
are incident, whenever they fall within the appropriate duty of the
agent. Hence, all the incidental charges and expenses incurred for
warehouse room, duties, freight, lighterage, general average, salvage,
repairs, journeys and other acts done to preserve the property of the
principal, and to enable the agent to accomplish the objects of the
principal, are to be fully paid by the latter. So, if an agent has, at
the express or the implied request of his principal, necessarily in-
curred expenses in carrying on or defending suits for the benefit of
his principal, those expenses must be borne by the latter, and the
agent will be entitled to recover them from him.""^ The doctrine
here stated rests upon the implication that the expenditures for which
the agent asks to be reimbursed are paid at the principal's express
or implied request, or are such as the principal is liable for by im-
plication of law. Of course, where the authority is express, there
"= Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Mete. "' Timberlake v. Thayer, 71 Miss.
(Mass.) 286. 279.
™ 6 N. H. 481. "' Story Ag., § 335.
'"Citing Lawson Cents., § 470,
n. 4.
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can be no difficulty in determining the fact and extent of the prin-
cipal's liability, for in such a case the contract is the best and only
evidence. Being requested to make such payments, the agent is
clearly entitled to be reimbursed, the law always implying a duty
and promise to refund on the part of the principal.^^" On the con-
trary, where the contract provided that the agent should pay charges
and expenditures, it was held that there could be no reimbursement,
and evidence of a different custom in the community was held not
admissible.^®^ But even where the agent has not been requested to
make such advances, if properly incurred, and reasonably and in good
faith paid, without any default on the part of the agent, he will be
entitled to reimbursement by the principal.^®- On the other hand,
the agreement may clearly imply that there is to be no reimburse-
ment. After all, the right of the agent to be reimbursed depends
upon the agreement, express or implied.^*^ Thus, in cases of real
estate brokers, rental agents, etc., the agent may incur expenses for
advertising, etc., for which, in case of failure to sell or rent, he is
not entitled to be reimbursed, and is, therefore, subjected to a loss.
This is true even if he succeeds in selling or renting the property.
In such cases the commissions of the agent to which he is entitled in
case of success are deemed adequate to cover such expenditures as
are incident to the services.^®* The doctrine that renders principals
liable for the proper and necessary expenditures of their agents is
founded upon necessity and justice. Thus, if an agent be sued on a
contract made in pursuance of authority, though the suit be without
cause and he eventually succeeds, the law implies that the principal
will indemnify him and refund the expense. ^*^ Usage, too, is not
without a controlling influence. Wlien usage sanctions it, an agent
may, if he act in good faith concerning it, and there is an emer-
gency, insure a cargo, and collect the premium from the principal. ^^^
Wliere an attorney, under implied authorit}-, indemnifies an officer
for making a levy, and sustains a loss, he may recover the loss from
>^ Sutherland Dam. (2d ed.), 25 L. J. C. P. 603; Martin v. Silli-
§ 789. man, 53 N. Y. 615. See also, Gilles-
^"^ Champion Mach. Co. v. Ervay pie v. Wilder, 99 Mass. 170; Sibbald
(Tex. App.), 16 S. W. 172. v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378,
""^ Story Ag., § 336. 38 Am. Rep. 441.
^^^Sentance v. Hawley, 13 C. B. ^=*' Stocking v. Sage, 1 Conn. 518.
(N. S.) 458. 1*' Wolff v. Horncastle, 1 B. & P.
^^ Simpson v. Lamb, 17 C. B. 603, 316.
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the client.^^'^ And where a general business agent for an individual
person is also the agent of an insurance company, and in that
capacity writes insurance on the property of his principal, but under
circumstances that make the policy valid, or at most only voidal)le,
he is entitled to te reimbursed for the premiums paid by him.^^® As
to the manner of proving disbursements and advances, not much
need be said. Common-law evidence is always proper in such cases;
but the receipts and vouchers of the persons who received the money
are always competent, if such payments were legitimate. In such
case, if the undertaking be the supervising of the building of a house,
for example, it is not essential that the supervisor furnish, proof of.
the actual delivery of the material, or the number of days workmen
were employed, but the receipts and vouchers are sufficient prima facie
evidence of payment, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
will entitle the supervisor to recover expenses thus incurred.^*® It
should be remembered, however, that the agent can not recover dis-
bursements unnecessarily incurred, or such as might by the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence have been avoided. ^'^^ The agent in
this, as in all other branches of his undertaking, must exercise proper
care and diligence in the execution of his trust, and the principal
can not be made answerable to the agent for money paid out use-
lessly or carelessly; and the same is true of acts that are unauthor-
ized by the express or implied agreement between the parties/^^^
§ 280. Agent's right to be indemnified.—Besides the duty of re-
imbursing the agent for necessary outlays in the course of the agency,
the principal is likewise compelled, under the law, to indemnify the
agent against the consequences of all acts done by the latter in the
exercise of his authority, provided such acts are not illegal."- That
the rule which enables an agent to recover indemnity from the prin-
cipal is grounded in justice and fair dealing is well illustrated by the
^'^ Clark V. Randall, 9 Wis. 135. Co., 37 N. Y. 297; Otter Creek Lum-
"' Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind. ber Co. v. McElwee, 37 111. App.
562. 285; Flower v. Downs, 6 La. Ann.
""Blazo V. Gill, 143 N. Y. 232. 538; Beach v. Branch, 57 Ga. 362;
^"^ Brown v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564. Greene v. Goddard, 9 Mete. (Mass.)
"^Clamagaran v. Sacerdotte, 8 212; Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481;
Mart. N. S. (La.) 538. Betts v. Gibbins, 2 A. & E. (29
^"^Saveland v. Green, 36 Wis. 612; E. C. L.) 57; Stocking v. Sage. 1
Powell V. Newburgh, 19 Johns. (N. Conn. 518; Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick.
Y.) 284; Howe v. Buffalo, etc., R. (Mass.) 174.
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statement of Mr. Story, that as on the one hand the agent is not per-
mitted to reap any of the profits of his agency properly belonging
to his principal, so on the other hand the agent is entitled to he in-
demnified against all losses which have been innocently sustained
by him, on the same account, except those sustained by his own fault
or nogligence.^''^ The losses must, however, be the proximate re-
sults,—the natural consequences of the execution of the agency.
If they be merely the results of casualty or accident, or if the agency
be only the occasion, and not the cause of the losses or damages,
the agent can not recover them from the principal.^^* Hence, if the
agent unnecessarily expose himself to injury while engaged in the ex-
ecution of his authority, he can not recover damages of the principal.
If, however, the thing done was properly conducive to the discharge
of the duties of the agency, the principal is liable.^^^ The business
in which the agent is employed must he the cause and not merely
the occasion or condition of the same.^**^ Hence, if an agent, under
direction of his principal, has by mistake cut timber partly from the
land of another, which his principal has received and disposed of,
he is entitled to recover from the principal the damages he was
bound to pay on account of the trespass.^^^ And a like remedy is
open to the agent where he has been compelled to pay damages for
a false representation of the quality of his principal's goods, made
innocently in pursuance of directions from the principal, and in con-
sequence of a deception practiced by him; or for converting the
property of a third person by his principal's direction, claiming to
be the owner, the agent having no notice of any adverse title; or to
pay the price of property purchased for his principal and the ex-
penses of a suit consequent upon the purchase. ^^^ But the agent
must not have exceeded his authority in the incurring of the loss.
Hence, where the principal had employed the agent, who was skilled
in the management of horses, to take two horses to Eichmond, Ya.,
to exhibit them at the state fair, and sell them at the best price he
could obtain for them, and the agent sold one of the horses, but,
being unable to sell the other, after ineffectual efforts to do so, and
without consulting his principal, took the remaining horse to Charles-
"' Story Ag., § 346. "' Drummond v. Humphreys, 39
"* Story Ag., § 341; Duncan v. Me. 347.
Hill, L. R. 8 Ex. 242. '** Sutherland Dam. (2d ed.),
^"=> Saveland v. Green, 36 Wis. 612. § 793.
i°« Wharton Ag., § 346.
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ton, S. C, where he finally succeeded in selling it, his expense?
amounting to $445.23, it being impossible for the agent, after he
reached Wilmington, N". C, owing to the unsettled state of the
countr}^, to bring back the horse, it was held by the supreme court
of Vermont that the agent exceeded his instructions and was not
entitled to pay for liis expenses after he left the place to which his
instructions directed him to go.^®® Illustrations of losses not the
proximate results of an agency are given in an early Pennsylvania
ease
—
D'Arcy v. Lyle;^^° namely, where the agent, while on a journey
for his principal, and on his business, is robbed of his own money, or
receives a wound, or his horse is taken lame, the agent furnishing his
own horse. In the first illustration it was not necessarily a part of
the agent's business to carry the money. In the case where the agent
was wounded, the principal was not bound for the cure of the wound,
for it was one of the risks which the agent took upon himself. In the
last example, that of the horse becoming lame, the court said it de-
pended upon the contract : if the contract required the agent to carry
a letter for the principal and deliver it at a certain place, the agent
would be bound to furnish his own horse, and the principal would
not be liable for an injury that might befall the animal. This case
of D'Arcy v. Lyle is itself an apt illustration of a loss incurred in
the execution of the agency. There the agent had been employed
by the principal to recover goods of the latter from a firm at Cape
Francis, San Domingo. He succeeded in securing the goods by
judicial proceedings, and accounted for them to the principal. In the
meantime, the agent having executed a bond to one Kichardson, who
had attached the goods to satisfy an alleged claim, Eichardson
Ijrought suit against the agent D'Arcy to recover the value of the
goods. D'Arcy was again successful in court; but the matter was
now taken in hand by Christophe, who had succeeded by revolution
in becoming president of Hayti, and he issued an arbitrary order
that D'Arcy and Eichardson should engage in combat, and that the
victor should have judgment in the suit. The result of the fight
being uncertain, Christophe decreed that they should fight again,
whereupon D'Arcy attempted to flee the country. Having been in-
tercepted and brought before the president, D'Arcy consented to
confess judgment for the $3,000, and subsequently paid the same.
He then sued his principals and obtained a verdict. Upon a review
of the case, the court decided that the verdict ought to stand, it
i»» Fuller V. Ellis, 39 Vt. 345, ^""S Binney (Pa.) 441.
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•being regarded by the court as a determination of the question
whether the proceedings at the Cape were in consequence of D'Arcy
having received possession of his principal's goods there. The court
held that damages incurred by an agent under such circumstances
should be borne by the principal ; and the objection that, at the time
the judgment was rendered against the agent, "he was no longer an
agent, having long before made up his accounts, and transmitted the
balance to the defendant," was declared to have no weight, the judg-
ment being but the consummation of the proceedings which were
commenced during the agency. It was further objected that no man
would be safe if he were to be responsible, to an unknown amount, for
any sums which his agent might consent to pay, in consequence of
threats of unprincipled tyrants in foreign countries; but the court
refused to suppose extreme cases, which it would be time enough to
decide when they occurred. The amount paid by the agent under
the circumstances was not more than the estimated value of the
property. Had it been far in excess of that, the court intimated that
a different conclusion might have been reached, as to the excess. The
mere fact that the principal had no title to the property in dispute
in such a case would not be sufficient to defeat the agent's claim for
indemnity, for it was this want of title that occasioned the agent's
loss. If the agent has reasonable grounds to believe that the prin-
cipal is the owner of the property, and he is duly authorized to take
it, and does so without knowing at the time that such taking is a tres-
pass or a tort, a promise of indemnity will be implied, although it
subsequently turn out that the principal's title was not good and that
the act of taking was a trespass.-"^
§ 281. Agent can not recover for illegal outlays.—But if the act
performed by the agent, and on account of which he suffered the loss
or outlay, was illegal on its face, or he had knowledge of the illegal-
ity, the law does not give him the right of indemnity. 2''- In such
case the law will not lend its aid to change the result which the
agent produced by his wrongful act, any more than it will interfere
between wrongdoers in other cases ; and this is true without reference
to the question whether the principal expressly promised to indemnify
2"! Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633; 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105; Cumpston v.
Avery v. Halsey, 14 Pick. (Mass.) Lambert, 18 Ohio 81, 51 Am. Dec.
174. 442; Howe v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 37
^"2 Bibb V. Allen, 149 U. S. 481; N. Y. 297; Harvey v. Merrill, 150
Jacobs V. Pollard, 10 Cush. (Mass.) Mass. 1.
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the agent in his wrongdoing or not.'**^ If, however, the principal
appears to have a right to authorize the act to be done, but the agent,
fearing that the act may prove to be unlawful, requires indemnity,
which is given, the agent is entitled to recover it.-"* If the principal
and the agent are both wrongdoers there can be neither 'indemnity
nor contribution. This is the general rule. The exception is where
the act is not clearly illegal in itself.-"^ And a further qualification
of the rule is that the parties must know at the time that it is a
wrong.^**^ The agent's right to receive indemnity from his principal
applies not only to the recovery for losses already sustained by the
former, but includes the right to retain funds or securities in his
hands so as to protect himself against outstanding liabilities not yet
matured or that have not been enforced.^*''^
§ 282, Agent may pay loss without waiting to be sued.—When
the agent becomes satisfied that he has rendered himself liable in
damages to a third party on account of an act done for his principal,
in good faith, he is not required to wait until he is sued before he
will be permitted to pay such damages, in order that he may re-
cover them from his principal; as soon as he becomes assured of his
liability, he may pay such third person and then proceed against the
principal, if the latter refuses to reimburse him. But in such case,
he can recover only such amount as he was legally bound for, without
regard to the fact that he may have paid more.-°*
§ 283. Rights and remedies of subagents.—A subagent is entitled
to all the rights and remedies against his employer that an agent 'is
entitled to. The law of principal and agent applies to him as it
does to the principal and the chief agent. The only difficulty is in
determining when the relation subsists between him and the prin-
cipal, and when between him and the chief agent. We have already
seen that in some instances the selection of the subagent may be by
the express or implied appointment of the principal, and that, by the
usages of trade, he may sustain the same relation to the principal as
that occupied by the chief agent ; while in other instances, when not
so appointed, or when usage does not sanction it, he becomes the ap-
^' Story Ag., § 339. -"^ Story Ag., § 339.
'"'Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66. -'"Sutherland Dam. (2d ed.).
See also, Coventry v. Barton, 17 § 793.
John. (N. Y.) 142; Howe v. Buffalo, ="^ Saveland v. Green, 36 Wis.
etc., R. Co., 37 N. Y. 297. 612; Clark v. Jones, 16 Lea (Tenn.)
=»"> Belts V. Gibbins, 2 A. & E. 57. 351.
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pointee of the agent solely.-'"* Where his employment is effected
without the express or implied assent of the principal, or is not
sanctioned by usage, there is no privity between the two, and there
can be no reciprocal rights or obligations subsisting between them;
unless, indeed, his acts in the course of the undertaking are duly
ratified by the principal with a full knowledge of all the facts. But
wherever there is such privity between them, the subagent will have
a personal claim against the principal for his compensation, and for
disbursements and indemnity, the same as the real agent ; and, if the
principal knowingly adopts his acts, the subagent will be entitled to
pay, and to a lien upon property in his hands for commissions, dis-
bursements and indemnity, the same as the agent would have been.^^**
And while ordinarily he will have no general lien if he knows or has
reason to believe that the agent is acting for another and not for him-
self in the particular undertaking, yet he may avail himself of a gen-
eral or special lien against the principal to the extent that the agent
himself has such lien at the same time against the principal, unless the
acts of the superior agent or his own are tortious.^^^ But the mere fact
that the principal knows of the employment of the sul)agent, and
that he is acting as such, will not render the principal liable for the
services of the subagent, even though the principal has accepted
benefits resulting from such employment, in the absence of the
element of privity between the principal and the sul)agent.-^^ Nor
can a principal be held liable on a special contract for compensation
entered into between the agent and su1)agent, unless he has ratified
it.^^^ ^liere there is no evidence to show that the principal employed
the subagent or in any way agreed to the agent's employment of him,
the subagent can not recover from the principal upon the contract
for services. He can at best only recover for work and labor, on the
qnmiium meruit.''^* But if A employ B to effect a policy of insur-
ance for his benefit, and B, without A's knowledge, employ C to effect
the policy, representing himself to C as the principal, C will have
a lien on the policy against A for the general balance due to him
from B.^^^ And where a contract for services was made on behalf
of an insurance company by its agent with a subagent, providing that
^^Ante.% 1%^, et seq. ^''^ 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (2d
""Story Ag., §§ 388-390. ed.) 984, n. 1, citing Beyers v.
='1 Story Ag., § 389; McKenzie v. Hodge, 1 Misc. (N. Y.) 76.
Nevius, 22 Me. 138, 38 Am. Dec. 299. ^^ Johnson v. Pacific Mail S. S.
-'- Homan v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 5 Cal. 408.
Co., 7 Mo. App. 22. "^ Westwood v. Bell, 4 Camp. 349.
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as part compensation for such services the subagont should receive
a specified percentage of the amount paid by the principal for the
services of the agent so making the contract, it was held that the
contract was that of the principal and not that of the agent, the lat-
ter being estopped to claim of the company the share of his profits
contracted to be paid to another, and that in such case the subagent
could recover such percentage from the company upon performing
the services.-^®
§ 284. Rights and remedies of employes of agents in cases of
emergency—Application of doctrine of agency by implication of
law.—The j^ower of an agent or employe of a company or corporation
to procure the services of another emploj^e, such as a physician or
surgeon, to attend upon one injured in the service of the company,
etc., has already been discussed under the head of agency by neces-
sity.^^'^ It need only te said, in addition, that where the doctrine of
an agency by implication of law is recognized in such cases, the sub-
employe can recover from the principal the value of his services ren-
dered in emergencies pertaining to the hazardous business in which
such company is engaged, provided the agent had express or implied
authority to make such employment, or occupied such a position in
the company's service that the law will presume he had such author-
I^y_2i7a Thus, where that doctrine is recognized, the courts will pre-
sume that the "general manager" of a railroad company has the gen-
eral direction and control of the company's affairs, and that this in-
cludes the authority to bind it by contracts for the services of surgeons,
nurses, etc., to persons injured on the line of its railway."^- But it
must appear, either from the nature of the duties imposed upon the of-
ficer making such employment, or from such duties being known, or
from other evidence, that he had such authority ; and in the absence of
such proof, the presumption will not be indulged. ^^^ As a general
rule, "neither a roadmaster, section agent, yardmaster nor station
master will be presumed to have authority to employ a physician to
attend a servant of the company injured in the line of his duties.
™^tna Ins. Co. v. Church, 21 -" Pierce Railroads 277; Williams
Ohio St. 492. v. Cammack. 27 Miss. 209; Louis-
^" Ante, §§ 85, 86. ville, etc., R. Co. v. McVay, 98 Ind.
="a See 1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), 391. See also, McCarthy v. Missouri
§§ 544-548. R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 385; Walker v.
2" Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mc- Great Western R. Co., L. R. 2 Ex.
Vay, 98 Ind. 391. 228.
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So, also, it is held that there is nothing in the duties of the company's
solicitor, or surgeon, or engineer, or conductor, from which such
authority can be presumed. But an emergency calling for imme-
diate action in order to save life or prevent suffering may be suffi-
cient to confer authority upon the subordinate to employ necessary
surgical aid, if he is the highest representative of the company on the
ground. * * * rpj-^g authority of such a subordinate agent, how-
ever, arises only with the emergency which makes it necessary for him
to possess it, and ends with such emergency."--^ Hence, the com-
pany is not bound by the act of such subordinate officer in continuing
the employment of nurses and the purchase of medicines, after the
emergency has ceased to exist. And if the company employ a physi-
cian or surgeon regularly, and he be conveniently at hand, there can
be no presumption that a subordinate agent of the company has the
authority to employ another. Even the regularly employed surgeon
of the company has no such authority. And in the absence of an ex-
press contract entered into by some one authorized to represent the
company, a physician can have no claim against the company for
services rendered to an injured employe or passenger. The service
must be rendered upon the credit of the company.^-^ An agent, as
a general rule, has no authority to employ a subagent; and unless
express or implied authority is proved, or the act of appointment or
the acts of the subagent done in behalf of the principal are ratified
by the latter, the agent alone will be liable to the subagent for any
claim he may have for services, etc.---
§ 285. Rights of unauthorized agent whose acts are subsequently
ratified.—When the agent undertakes to act without authority con-
ferred expressly or by implication, or by operation of law, his acts
are absolutely void, and he is not entitled to recover compensation,
or to be reimbursed or indemnified by the principal. But if the prin-
cipal ratifies the acts of the agent, and accepts the benefits thereof,
he is liable to the agent the same as if the acts had been authorized
by him originally. And this, as we have seen, may be done expressly
or by implication. The principal is bound by the act, even though
it results to his detriment: he adopts the agent's acts as his own and
takes his agency cum onere.^-^ By such ratification the principal
2=' Elliott Railroads, § 222. 168; Taylor v. Xostrand. 134 N. Y.
"' Elliott Railroads, § 222. 108.
^= Wilkins v. Duncan, 2 Litt. (Ky.) -^ Hovil v. Pack, 7 East 164.
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impliedly agrees to pay the agent not only his commissions, but his
necessary outlays, and to indemnify him against losses incurred in
the assumed agency. Thus, where the master of a ship entered into
a charter party whereby he was himself to receive the freight, and as
a consideration therefor was to convey troops and to tit the vessel for
that purpose, and he advanced money out of his own pocket and drew
bills on the owner for the rest of the expenses to enable the ship to
earn the freight, and the owner ratified the contract, it was held by
the house of lords that the master, when sued by the owner for the
freight, as money had and received, had a right at law to deduct the
money so advanced without pleading a set-off, and that he had a
right in equity to be reimbursed out of the freight so earned ; such
a case not falling within the rule that the master has not, in ordinary
circumstances, a lien on the freight for wages and disbursements.-^*
And if the agent improperly appoint a subagent under him, and such
unauthorized act be subsequently ratified by the principal, the latter
will be bound by the ratified acts of the subagent in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as if he had originally given to the agent
a power of substitution.--" The assumed agent is entitled to recover
the expenses incurred in such case the same as if he had acted with
full authorit5\-^® If, however, there are intervening rights in favor
of third parties, which had accrued prior to the time of the vesting
of the agent's rights by reason of the ratification, or, in other words,
prior to the ratification itself, the latter will not have a retrospective
effect, so as to divest the rights of such third parties.--'^ Thus, where
goods are stopped in transitu by an unauthorized person, a purchaser
in good faith can not he divested of his rights in them by a subse-
quent ratification of the unauthorized stoppage.--® And so, where
a debtor's books and accounts are assigned to a surety for indemnity
by the act of an unauthorized agent, and the assignment is subse-
quently ratified by the owner, the ratification does not relate back to
the time of the assignment, as would be the case if no rights inter-
vened; and if, before such assignment is ratified, a party holding a
claim against the owner of the accounts garni,-h the claim in the
hands of the party owing it, the garnishor can not be deprived of the
^* Bristow v. Whitmore, 9 H. L. ione v. Tagliaferro, 10 Moore P. C.
Cas. 391, 31 L. J. Ch. 467. 175.
== Story Ag., § 249. v"^ Story Ag., §§ 245. 246; Wharton
^Hovil V. Pack, 7 East 164; Frix- Ag., §§ 77, 78.
"' Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. 786.
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lien thus acquired by the ratification of the assignment."^ And the
same rule holds where property conveyed to satisfy a debt was ac-
cepted by an agent without authority: where, prior to the ratifica-
tion of such acceptance, an attachment had been levied on such
property, the holder of the attachment lien could not be deprived of his
rights thereunder ; the ratification not being retroactive so as to carry
it back to the time of the commission of the unauthorized act.^^"
§ 286. Remedies of agent against principal.—We are next to in-
quire, in a general way, what are the remedies by which an agent or
representative may enforce against his principal the duties and ob-
ligations which the latter owes to him, in case the principal fails or
refuses to discharge these voluntarily. If the claim of the agent is
for compensation for services performed, whether the same be com-
missions, wages, salary, or fees, it is quite obvious that the ordinary
common-law remedies of assumpsit and debt are open to him. The
most usual remedies, unless suit te upon a special contract, are the
common counts for work and laljor done or services rendered.-^^ He
may also, in a proper case, maintain a suit in equity.-^- If the action
is for indemnity, whether in contract or tort, the law implies a
promise on the part of the principal, and the agent may sue in
assumpsit; or, if the act was a tort, he may bring an action on the
case.^^^ We have already pointed out the remedy for a wrongful
discharge of the agent by the principal.-^* Of course, if the forum
is in a code state, the agent will have his remedy in the ordinaiT civil
action for work and labor or services, or on the special contract; or,
if in tort, for damages. In addition to these remedies the agent may
withhold from moneys in his hands belonging to his principal such
amounts as may be justly owing to him ])y the latter for advances,
expenses, disbursements and loans arising in the course of the agency,
whenever the amounts are definite and certain and do not merely
sound in damages; and this may be done by recoupment, counter-
claim, or set-off, in any action instituted against him by the principal
for any balance in his hands.-^^ And in certain cases—as, where
a consignment has been made to the order of a factor—he has also
the right of stoppage in transitu, and a lien for his general balance.-^"^
""Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 800. 42 =='16 Encyc. of PI. & Pr. 916, and
Am. Dec. 612. notes.
=^"Kempner v. Rosenthal, 81 Tex. -'* A?! ^e. §§ 269-271.
12. "^ Story Ag., § 350; Pomeroy Rem.,
•'' 16 Encyc. of PI. & Pr. 917. § 777, et seq.
'- Story Ag., § 350. "" Story Ag.. § 350.
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§ 287. Agent's lien for compensation, expenses, etc.—In addition
to these personal remedies by which the agent may enforce the duties
and obligations due him from the principal, the law in many cases
gives the agent a special remedy, by way of a right to hold the prop-
erty, money or effects of the principal that may te in the agent's
hands, in order to secure himself in any just claim he may have
against the principal for compensation, expenses, disbursements, in-
demnity, etc. This right is called a "lien." The word "lien" is
French, and means a tie or bond or band, being derived from the
Latin "ligare" to bind. A lien, in its legal sense, is a tie that binds
property to a debt or claim for its satisfaction.-'" "In its most ex-
tensive signification, the term includes every case in which real or
personal property is charged with the payment of any debt or duty;
every such charge being denominated a lien on the property. In a
more limited sense, it is defined to be a right of detaining the prop-
erty of another until some claim is satisfied."-^^ Liens may be either
:
(1) of common-law origin, or (2) of statutory creation, or (3) they
may be the results of contracts. Many kinds of liens have been
given to agents and employes by statutory enactments ; it is also true
that many more may be and are created by contracts between the
parties. While a large portion of statutory and contract liens may
be made applicable between principals and agents, it is our purpose
to notice these only incidental^ ; what we have to say on the subject
of liens will have reference more especially to common-law liens.
The liens of agents are of common-law origin, though they have often
been enlarged upon by statutes, in cases of particular classes of agents.
The lien which an agent is entitled to, therefore, as a general rule, is
the right to retain that which is in his possession belonging to his
principal, until his demands have been satisfied. '^^
§ 288. General and particular liens—Illustrations of each.
—
Agent's liens are divisible into two classes; namely, (1) specific or
particular liens, and (2) general liens. A specific or particular lien
is a lien upon some particular article of another in the hands of one
who has bestowed labor upon it or performed services or incurred
expenses with reference to it. "A particular lien is usually defined
to be the right to retain a thing for some charge or claim growing
out of or connected with that identical thing; such as for labor or
"' Anderson Law Die, citing ''* Bouvler Law Die.
Stephani v. Bishop of Chicago, 2 =•'' Story Ag., § 352; 2 Kent's Com.,
111. App. 249. Lect. xli.
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services or expenses bestowed upon that identical thing."2*o A gen-
eral lien, on the other hand, "is a right to retain a tiling not only
for charges and claims specifically arising out of, or connected with,
the identical thing, but also for a general balance of accounts be-
tween the parties, in respect to other dealings of a like nature."^*^
A particular lien extends not only to goods and chattels, but to money
which constitutes the fruits of the agency and which remains in the
hands of the agent, or has not so far gone out of his possession as to
constitute delivery to another.-*^ Thus, where one employs another to
obtain for him a loan of money for a stipulated commission, the
agent procuring the loan has a lien upon and is entitled to retain
the money in his hands for the amount of his commission, until the
same is paid.^*^ A particular or specific lien can arise only in one
of four ways: (1) by an express contract; (2) by a usage or custom
of trade; (3) by implication of law; (4) by a statute.^** When the
lien arises by implication of law, it results from the relation of the
parties and their acts, independently of any contract. From this
source are believed to come the particular liens of innkeepers, com-
mon carriers, farriers, blacksmiths, tailors, shipwrights, and other
artisans.-*^ As was said in an English case: "The principle seems
to be well laid down * * * tj^at where a bailee has expended
his labor and skill in the improvement of a chattel delivered to him,
he has a lien for his charge in that respect. Thus, the artificer to
whom the goods are delivered for the purpose of being worked up into
form, or the farrier by whose skill the animal is cured of a disease,
or the horsebreaker by whose skill he is rendered manageable, have
liens on the chattels in respect of their charges. All such specific
liens lieing consistent with the principles of natural equity, are fa-
vored by the law, which is construed liberally in such cases."^*® Par-
ticular liens haye been declared to exist at common law in favor of
the following classes of agents:—those who keep and train horses
under contract "with their owners;'*'^ auctioneers for their commis-
sions and expenses,—and these may be retained out of any deposits
=^" Story Ag., § 354. ed.) 576, citing Fergusson v. Nor-
=" Story Ag., § 354. man, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 76.
=«-Muller V. Pondir, 55 N. Y. 325; ^"^ Story Ag., § 355.
Nagle V. McFeeters, 97 N. Y. 196. -" Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W.
^« Vinton v. Baldwin, 95 Ind. 433. 270.
=^13 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. (1st -^' Scott v. Mercer, 98 Iowa 258, 60
Am. St. 188.
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or proceeds of sale received b}- them on account of their principals f*^
common carriers for the price of carriage or freight upon particular
goods ;-*'' masters of ships on their vessels for wages and disburse-
ments,—and the lien is to be preferred to that of a mortgagee ;^^*'
brokers, when in a position to exercise the right,—as in case of in-
surance brokers, on policies and the proceeds for commissions due
them and premiums paid by them;^^^ artisans and mechanics on the
specific property bailed to them, on the theory that such property
has been enhanced in value by the services of such artisans and
mechanics bestowed upon the property.^^^ General liens are liens for
a general balance of account due from the owner of the property
to which it attaches to the one having it in possession. ^^^ General
liens are not favored in law or equity. Such a lien can, in the ab-
sence of express contract, be claimed only as arising from dealings in
a particular trade or line of business in which the existence of a gen-
eral lien has been judicially proved and acknowledged, or upon ex-
press evidence being given that according to the established custom
a general lien is claimed and allowed.-^"* General liens have been
declared to exist in favor of attorneys at law;-^^ of factors or com-
mission merchants on the goods consigned to them or the proceeds
thereof or securities for the same f^^ and of banks, upon all funds
and securities of depositors for the balance of their accounts. -"''
Banks also have liens on paper which they hold for collection from
other banks, whether it is the property of such other banks or not,
unless it is so earmarked as to show other ownership.-^®
§ 289. Possession essential to maintain lien.—Whether a common-
law lien be general or particular, it is an essential element of its ex-
istence that there should be possession and the right to possession of
the property upon which it is asserted.^^^ If the party claiming the
=« Hammond v. Barclay, 2 East -=' Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
227; Beller v. Block, 19 Ark. 566. 428.
^"Butler V. Woolcott, 2 N. R. 64. ^''^ Bowling Green Sav. Bank v.
^^^oThe Mary Ann, L. R. 1 A. & Todd, 52 N. Y. 489.
E. 8. "^ McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 138,
=^' McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 138, 38 Am. Dec. 299; Nagle v. McFeeters,
38 Am. Dec. 299. 97 N. Y. 196; Martin v. Pope, 6 Ala.
="Quimby v. Hazen, 54 Vt. 132; 532.
Oakes v. Moore, 24 Me. 214, 41 Am. "'^ 13 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. 97, and
Dec. 379. authorities cited.
='^^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's -•''' 13 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. 97.
ed.) 428. "'3 Parsons Conts. 234; Paley Ag.
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lien never had possession of the propert}-, or, having had such pos-
session, has relinquished it, the lien either never attached or has
been lost. Nor will any lien, whether general or particular, attach
to goods on account of a debt or debts accruing before the relation
of agent commenced.-®" But by possession is not necessarily meant
the actual custody of the property, for that may be in a servant or
employe whose duty it is to care for it; and the possession may be
constructive,—as, where the property is at sea and bills of lading
for it have been indorsed or delivered. Such possession is sufficient
to authorize a lien.^®^ So where a consignment of goods was made to
a creditor, and they were set apart in the factory and given into the
custody of a special bailee of the consignor, who had control over them,
and gave notice of the lien to attaching creditors, the lien of the cred-
itor for advances, etc., was not defeated for want of sufficient pos-
session.-®^
§ 290. "Who may exercise right of lien and against whom.—It is
furthermore essential to the validity of a lien that, on the one hand,
the right to it must be exercised by the bailee of the property, and,
on the other, against one who- has the general or special ownership of
it. The lien never inures—in the absence of a statute—to one who
is merely an agent or employe of the bailee. "It exists not in favor
of a journeyman or day laborer, whose possession is that of the em-
ployer, and who has no other security for his wages than the em-
ployer's personal responsibility on the contract of hiring; and he
who claims it, therefore, must be a bailee under the contract which
the civilians call locaiio operis faciendi."-^^ That it can not, as a
general rule, be asserted against one who has not the right to exercise
ownership over it is self-evident; for if the rule were otherwise, a
stranger who might wrongfully have acquired the custody of the
property would then be in position to incumber it to an extent that
w^ould render it valueless, in whole or in part, to the owner. There
is, however, a well recognized exception in favor of those whose duty
to the public requires them to receive the property and care for it.
Thus it was said in a Massachusetts case: "Again, a lien is a pro-
prietary interest, a qualified ownership, and, in general, can only be
(Lloyd's ed.) 137; 3 Chitty Com. ='" Sumner v. Hamlet. 12 Pick.
Law 547; Story Ag., § 361. (Mass.) ,76.
^-^2 Kent's Com. 638; Story Ag., ^'^^ Per Gibson, C. J., in Mclntyre
§ 361. V. Carver, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 392.
^^ Story Ag., § 361.
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created by the owner, or by some person by him authorized. In case
of innholders and a few others who are by law bound to give credit
for the keeping of horses, etc., it may well be held that the person
putting up the horse at the innkeeper's stable shall be deemed the
agent of the owner, whoever he is, so far as the providing for his sus-
tenance, and, therefore, that the innkeeper may have a lien, though
the horse be left by a person other than the owner."-*'* Originally,
indeed, the common law only gave a lien to those who were thus
required by the nature of their occupation to receive property de-
livered to them, and to be at trouble and expense in regard to it.
These vocations were regarded as a necessity or convenience to the
public; and it was deemed but just and salutary that those who were
thus in duty bound should have the privilege of retaining possession
of the property until their just charges were paid.-''^ This privilege
has been since extended to every bailee for hire who, by his skill or
labor, has imparted additional value to the particular property de-
livered into his custody, whether he is required by law to receive the
same or not; and he is entitled, the same as in the other cases, to
hold the property until his charges are paid.^**^
§ 291. Innkeeper's lien.—An innkeeper has a right to a lien upon
all the property of his guest placed under the protection of the inn
for the full amount of his bill.^'^^ But the lien does not extend to
the person of the guest, though this is said to have been formerly
his privilege ;^''^ nor does it extend to the wearing apparel on his
person.^^" The common-law right to such a lien does not exist un-
less the person against whom such right is asserted is a guest of the
innkeeper. The latter is an insurer of the property of his guests,
and for this extraordinary responsibility the law accords to him the
extraordinary privilege of holding such property for his charges;
so, before he can exercise that privilege, it is essential that it be
shown that the goods were brought under protection of the inn by
a person in the character of guest.-^*'
2<^ Hollingsworth v. Dow, 19 Pick. "'> Sunbolp v. Alford, 1 Horn & H.
(Mass.) 228. 13, 3 M. & W. 248; Grinnell v. Cook,
=«=Naylor v. Mangles, 1 Esp. 109. 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485.
^ 2 Kent's Com. 635. -"" Elliott v. Martin, 105 Mich. 506,
^'^'Mulliner v. Florence, L. R. 3 Q. 55 Am. St. 461; Grinnell v. Cook, 3
B. D. 484. Hill (N. Y.) 485; Smith v. Dearlove,
=" Newton v. Trigg, 1 Show. 268; 6 C. B. 132, 9 C. & P. 208, 38 E. C.
Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 485, L. 82.
38 Am. Dec. 663.
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§ 292. Boarding-house keepers have no common-law lien.—
A
boarding-house keeper or lodging-house, keeper is not an innkeeper,
and hence has no lien under the common law on the property of his
boarders or lodgers.^^^ In many states, however, statutes have teen
enacted extending to boarding-house and lodging-house keepers the
same responsibilities and privileges that apply to innkeepers; and
when there is such a statute the proprietor of such a place is entitled
to a lien the same as an innkeeper. It frequently happens, however,
that the proprietor is engaged in keeping both a hotel or inn and a
boarding and lodging-house. WTien this is the case, and there is no
statute giving the proprietor a lien, his only rights are to be found
at the common law. In such instances, if the liability of the debtor
was incurred as a mere boarder or lodger, or in some other way be-
sides that of guest, the proprietor has no lien.-^^
§ 293. Relation of host and guest,—As the relation of host and
guest determines both the liability and the right of the proprietor,
it is of great importance to be able to determine when that relation
subsists. The mere fact that a party takes meals and lodging at a
hotel or an inn does not necessarily constitute such relation. A
guest is generally a traveler, one away from home, who receives the
accommodations of the inn.^"^ Parsons says a guest is one who
comes "without any bargain for time, remains without one, and may
go when he pleases."-^* While a guest must be a traveler, it is not
material that he should travel any distance. "A townsman or neigh-
bor may be a traveler, and, therefore, a guest at an inn, as well as he
who comes from a distance or from a foreign country. If he resides
at the inn, his relation to the innkeeper is that of a boarder; but if
he resides away from it, whether far or near, and comes to it for en-
tertainment as a traveler, and receives it as such, paying the cus-
tomary rates, we know no reason why he should not be subjected to
all the duties of a guest, and entitled to all the rights and privileges
of one."^''^ Nor does the mere fact that one is staying at a hotel
or inn in pursuance of a previous special arrangement as to the
time he expects to remain, the price to be paid, etc., necessarily ren-
=" Southwood v. Myers, 3 Bush '"^ Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
(Ky.) 681; Queen v. Askin, 20 U. C. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 26 Am. St. 325.
Q. B. 626; Cochrane v. Schryver, 12 =" Parsons Conts. 151.
Daly (N. Y.) 174. =" Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lowe,
-'-Pollock V. Landis. 36 Iowa 651; supra.
Reed v. Teneyck, 19 Ky. L. 1690, 44
S. W. 356.
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der the party a boarder instead of a guest.-'*' And whether the
party is a guest or a boarder is always a question of fact to be de-
termined from all the evidence before the trial court or jury.-'" We
have said that a lodger is not a guest in the sense of the common
law relating to innkeeper's liabilities and rights: a lodger is one
who, for the time being, makes his home at his lodging place. ^''^
This home or lodging place may be at a hotel or an inn ; but the fact
that lodgings have been taken at such place does not render the
occupant a guest or entitle the proprietor to an innkeeper's lien.
g 294. Not essential that guest have title to property in order
that lien may attach.—As to the title to the property upon which
the lien attaches, it is not necessary, as we have seen, that it be in
the guest's name, but it is sufficient if the property was brought to the
inn by him, and received by the innkeeper on the faith of the innkeep-
ing relation.^^'* Under this rule, even stolen property becomes the sub-
ject of a lien, unless the innkeeper has ground for suspicion that would
justify a refusal on his part to receive it. The rigid requirement of
the law which compels the landlord not only to receive but to insure
the safety of all property of his guests would render a refusal on his
part to receive such property extremely hazardous; and it is only
just that the law should accord him this summary method of en-
forcing compensation for the extreme risks that he assumes. Hence,
whether the property be that of the guest or not, if it is brought
by him to the inn and receives its protection, the host may, under the
law, claim his lien upon it to the extent of the accommodation sup-
plied; and even if the property has been stolen, the owner is not
entitled to its possession until he has paid the charges.^^" And the
lien attaches even to property exempt from execution, when it has
been given by statute for a boarding-house keeper's lien.-®^ The
=•''' Bershire Woollen Co. v. Proc- ^'^ Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana
tor, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417; Fay v. (Ky.) 310.
Pacific Imp. Co., 93 Cal. 253, 27 Am. -'' Swan v. Bournes, 47 Iowa 501,
St. 198. 29 Am. Rep. 492. See also, Proc-
="Magee v. Pacific Imp. Co., 98 tor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. 67, 32
Cal. 678, 35 Am. St. 199. E. C. L. 503, where it was held
"' Pullman Palace Car Co. v. that the sheriff under a fi. fa.
Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 26 Am. St. 325. against the guest could only levy
^' Manning v. Hollenbeck, 27 Wis. upon the guest's property subject to
202; Hollingsworth v. Dow, 19 the lien of the innkeeper for ac-
Pick. (Mass.) 228. commodations, including wine sup-
19
—
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innkeeper, however, has no right to detain the property of one guest
for the debt of another, though they be in the same company.^*^
§ 295. For what supplies innkeeper may have lien.—The inn-
keeper's privilege of a lien is generally limited to the usual accom-
modations furnished a guest at an inn, such as food, drink, lodging,
horse-feed and stabling, etc. But it has teen held that an innkeeper
may acquire a lien upon the goods of his guest for money loaned
him, if there was an agreement between them that the goods should
stand good for the amount of the loan.^^^
§ 296. What guests innkeeper bound to receive.—An innkeeper is
legally bound to receive and entertain all guests apparently respon-
sible and of good conduct who may come to his house. The mere
fact that the guest is an infant does not justify a refusal to receive
him; and unless the innkeeper, from the conduct of such infant
guest, has some reason to believe that he is acting contrary to the
wishes of his guardian, he is justified in entertaining him, and is
entitled to a lien upon his goods for such entertainment, and even
for money furnished him if used in the purchase of necessaries.-**
An infant may, however, be of such tender years, or there may be
such other circumstances, as to indicate that he is not properly a
guest at an inn, in which case the innkeeper may be justified in not
receiving him ; and he would probably not have a lien on the infant's
effects if he did.
§ 297. Agisters and livery-stable keepers—Horse trainers.—Agis-
ters and livery-stable keepers have no common-law lien on stock re-
ceived by them for feed and care. Here again the statutes have in
many states extended the rights and privileges of agents' liens to
where they did not exist before. In all such cases the student or
practitioner should fully acquaint himself with the statutes of his
state, before determining in his mind whether the lien exists or not.
A horse trainer, however, has a common-law lien upon the horse
trained by him, upon the theory that the training has imparted ad-
ditional value to the animal, by reason of the services bestowed upon
plied to the guest's order, without =" Watson v. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.)
regard to the quantity thereof. 147.
=" Kennedy v. Muller, 1 W. N. C. =" Bevan v. Waters, 3 Car. & P.
(Pa.) 445. 520.
2*^ Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P.
67, 32 E. C. L. 503.
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§ 298. Nature of common-law lien—Remedies thereunder.—
A
common-law lien, as we have seen, is a mere right to hold the property
for the payment of the charges, and can not be enforced by any legal
proceedings. The privilege of a lien is lost when the property on
which it is claimed passes out of the possession of the lienor. The
lien is not property nor a right to property. It is neither jus ad rem
nor jus in re, but a mere personal right of retainer. It is not assign-
able, nor is it subject to attachment or other legal process of the
creditors of the lienor, as a chose in action would be."^^ The common
law gives the holder of such a lien no means of enforcing it, except
to sue the lienee on the debt and obtain execution against him, in
which case the property may, of course, be levied upon to satisfy such
debt, provided the debtor own it or have an interest in it. The only
other remedy is the retaining of the property, unless the statute of
the particular state has provided a method of enforcing the lien
either by sale or by legal proceedings. The case of a factor is an
exception ; for a factor has the power to sell and may reimburse him-
self out of the proceeds.-^^ In case of a pledge of the property, too,
the agent or pledgee may sell the property at public sale after demand
and reasonable notice have been given the owner. -®^ It has indeed
been held in a few states that the lien of an innkeeper or common
carrier might be enforced in equity, without a statute. Thus, in Ken-
tucky, it was decided by the court of appeals that an innkeeper may
go into a court of chancery and obtain a decree enforcing his lien upon
the horse of his guest. -*^ Mr. Jones, in his valuable work on Liens,
denies the general power of courts of equity to enforce such liens;
saying: "Generally, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enforce
a common-law lien by sale merely because there is no remedy at law,
or because the retaining of possession under a passive lien involves
expense or inconvenience. Generally, a lien at law or by statute
can be enforced only under express statutory provisions. An
equitable form of procedure may be expressly provided ; but in the
absence of such provision, a lien can not be enforced in equity unless
jurisdiction is acquired under well established rules."-^'' It seems
that, where an accounting is involved, a court of equity has jurisdic-
=^Lovett v. Brown, 40 N. H. 511. "^^ Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.)
=»'2 Kent's Com. 642; Shaw v. 310. See also, Cairo, etc., R. Co. v.
Ferguson, 78 Ind. 547; Parker v. Fackney, 78 111. 116.
Brancker, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 40. -•'"Citing Thames Iron Works Co.
=*' Parker v. Brancker, supra; Pot- v. Patent Derrick Co., 1 J. & H. 93,
ter v. Thompson, 10 R. I. 1. 97.
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tion.-'*^ By the great weight of authority also, the lienholder has
no power to sell the property to satisfy his lien.^^^ Possibly a sale
will be justified if the property be a horse that has eaten its full value,
or some perishable article. Such seems to be the custom of London
and Exeter, if not the general rule.^®^ The lien of an agent is gen-
erally a particular lien, and does not extend to claims beyond the
scope of the agency. There are some classes of agents, however, who,
as we have already seen, are entitled to general liens.
^1 Jones Liens, § 1038. -'''- Thames Iron Works Co. v. Pat-
2»a Briggs V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 6 ent Derrick Co., supra; Bacon
Allen (Mass.) 246; Bailey v. Shaw, Abridg. "Liens," D, cited in Jones
24 N. H. 297, 55 Am. Dec. 241. Liens, § 1038, n. 3.
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§ 299. Public and private agents—Distinction between.—In treat-
ing of the relation of agents to third parties it has been found eon-
.
venient to divide agents into two classes ; namely, public and private
I
agents. A public agent is one who represents the government,
whether national, state or municipal,—a public officer.^ By a private
' State V. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59, 8 Ohio St. 1. In Ogden v. Raymond,
Am. Rep. 488; State v. Judges, 21 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429. the
(293)
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agent is meant one who acts for an individual, or a firm, or a private
corporation. Concerning the duties, obligations and liabilities of
these respective classes of agents to third persons, and the rights of
third persons as against agents, a marked distinction must be ob-
served. The authority of a public agent is generally conferred by
statute ^or other public law, of which every one is bound to take no-
tice ; and the government or other public authority can not be bound
by the acts of its agents, unless they be performed according to the
power thus conferred, or unless the agent is held out as possessing such
power, or is employed thus to represent his government or that
division thereof for which he assumes to act. In cases of private
agencies, on the other hand, the authority is not generally conferred
by statutes or other public law, but by private contract, of which
third .parties can not be presumed to have actual knowledge; and
the principals of such private agents are therefore held responsible,
not only for the exercise of authority actually conferred, but for such
also as they hold out their agents to appear to possess. This is so,
as stated by Stor}% "in order to guard the public against losses and
injuries arising from the fraud or mistake, or rashness and indis-
cretion of their agents. And there is no hardship in requiring from
private persons, dealing with public officers, the duty of inquiry, as
court, by Elsworth, J., speaking to
the question of who are public
agents and whether or not a school
trustee is such agent, said: "We
do not readily apprehend why the
defendant [the school trustee], de-
riving his public and official char-
acter from the general law and the
election of the people of a given
district, under the law, may not
be held to be a public agent as much
as if he were the agent of the state
immediately, or of a county, town,
society or school district. Wherein
is the difference? All derive their
power from the same source, par-
celed out, only to be exercised in
different jurisdictions and for dif-
ferent purposes." But while every
public office may be said to embrace,
in a sense, the idea of an agency, a
civil officer is something more than
a mere agent, he being a part of the
governmental machinery: State v.
Valle, 41 Mo. 29. And an officer, in
the sense in which that word is
used in the constitution of the
United States, is a public function-
ary appointed either by the presi-
dent, by the heads of the depart-
ments, or by the courts of law; no
other appointee is an officer within
the meaning of that instrument.
Hence, it has been held that an ex-
amining surgeon appointed by the
commissioner of pensions is not an
officer liable to indictment under
section 12 of the act of 1825 (4
Stat. 118) for extortion, though he
may properly be called an agent or
employe: United States v. Ger-
maine, 99 U. S. 508.
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to their real or apparent power and authority to bind the govern-
ment."^
§ 300. Private agent owes duty to principal only.—And first as
to private agents. Strictly speaking, the duty such an agent owes
is to his principal, and to him only, and third persons acquire no
rights whatever against the agent which arise out of the agency, as
such. There is between him and the general public no contractual
relation whatever, and as long as he enters into no such relation on
behalf of himself he can incur no liability. If he fail to perform
the undertaking he has assumed for his principal, he will, of course,
be responsible to the latter for such failure; but with this the public
have no concern; as long as he remains inactive no one but his prin-
cipal can complain ; the agent is not liable to any one but him for his
non-feasance or mere omission or nonperformance of his duties.^
Hence, if the principal has engaged with some third party to perform
an act, and he employs an agent for the purpose of performing such
act and the agent fails to do so, the principal, and not the agent,
is liable to such party. The agent has entered into no agreement
except with his principal; he, therefore, owes no one any duty but
him, and the law imposes none upon him with reference to out-
siders.* It is otherwise, of course, if he undertakes to act for the
principal: the very moment he does so, he necessarily comes* in con-
tact with others; he then assumes an obligation to those also with
whom he acts as the representative of him whose authority he under-
takes to execute; if he directly inflicts an injury upon the stranger
with whom he deals for his principal, he may render himself liable
to such stranger.^ One of the most common instances of this kind
is where the agent acts without authority.^
/. 0?i Contract.
§ 301. Agent not liable if he discloses principal and acts in his
name.—A private agent may assume duties and obligations and incur
liabilities that will result in his being subjected either to an action
^ Story Ag., § 307a. ^ Delaney v. Rochereau, supra.
^ Dean v. Brock, 11 Ind. App. 507; " Terwilliger v. Murphy, 104 Ind.
Brown Paper Co. v. Dean, 123 Mass. 32; Cochran v. Baker, 34 Ore. 555,
267; Labadie v. Hawley, 61 Tex. 52 Pac. 520, 56 Pac. 641; De Remer
177, 48 Am. Rep. 278. v. Brown, 55 N. Y. Supp. 367.
* Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La.
Ann. 1123, 44 Am. St. 456.
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upon contract or an action in tort. We shall first inquire into his
liability upon contracts. As has been seen, an agent may, in con-
tracting with a third party for his principal, act entirely within the
scope of his authority, or partly or entirely outside of the same. If
he acts wholly within the limits of his authority, and the principal
is known or disclosed, and the agent acts for him only, the agent is
not personally liable to the third party for a breach of the contract.'
In such case the contract is wholly that of the principal and the third
party, and the agent is but the medium of bringing the parties to-
gether; and after the contract has been entered into, the agent
is entirely eliminated from it and can not be rendered liable
thereon. "If a different rule were to prevail," says Story, "it would
greatly embarrass all the transactions of parties, and especially those
of a commercial nature, through the instrumentality of agents, since
the latter could never escape a personal responsibility in the execu-
tion of mere authority, by any precautions whatever."^ And Chan-
cellor Kent, speaking upon the same subject, says: "Every contract
made with an agent in relation to the business of his principal is a
contract with the principal, entered into through the instrumentality
of the agent, provided the agent acts in the name of the principal.
* * * It is a general rule, standing on strong foundations, and
pervading every system of jurisprudence, that where an agent is duly
constituted, and names his principal, and contracts in his name, and
does not exceed his authority, the principal is responsible and not
the agent."^
§ 302. General presumption that agent intended to bind principal
—How agent may render himself personally liable.—And inasmuch
'Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. L.) 549; Newland Hotel Co. v. Lowe
392; Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. Furniture Co., 73 Mo. App. 135.
106; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. ^ Story Ag., § 261.
379, 58 Am. Dec. 429; Lewis V. Har- "2 Kent's Com. 629, 630. See
ris, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 353; Maury v. also, Green v. Kopke, 18 C. B. (8S
Ranger, 38 La. Ann. 485, 58 Am. E. C. L.) 549; American Nat'l Bank
Rep. 197; American Nat'l Bank v. v. Wheelock, 82 N. Y. 118; Merrill
Wheelock, 82 N. Y. 118; Humes v. v. Williams, 63 Cal. 70; Rosenthal
Decatur Land Imp., etc., Co., 98 Ala. v. Myers, 25 La. Ann. 463; Comer
461; Gulf City Const. Co. v. Louis- v. Bankhead, 70 Ala. 493; Tuttle v.
ville, etc., R. Co., 121 Ala. 621, 25 Ayres, 3 N. J. L. 257; Anderson v.
So. 579; Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Timberlake, 114 Ala. 377, 62 Am.
Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 79 N. W. 261; St. 105; Robeson v. Chapman, 6 Ind.
Merrill v. Williams, 63 Cal. 70; 352.
Green v. Kopke, 18 C. B. (86 E. C.
297 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. § 302
as the law always presumes that every person will do his duty, when
an agent has undertaken to contract for or on behalf of his principal,
speaking the language of the latter and not his own, and having
authority to do so, there is a presumption that he intended to bind
his principal and not himself.^" This presumption will prevail until
overcome by evidence to the contrary. The agent may, however,
render himself personally responsible, either in addition to making
the principal liable, or independently thereof. In the former case,
he may do so by pledging his own credit in addition to that of the
principal; as, by becoming for him a surety, guarantor or co-con-
tracting party of any kind.^^ He may purposely and intentionally
incur the liability ; as where, by express contract, he personally war-
rants an article. ^^ Or he may render himself liable without any
actual intent to do so, but by employing such terms in the contract
as will preclude him from denying such intent. Illustrations of the
latter character are found in cases in which the agent denominates
himself as agent, trustee, or by some other description, but still binds
himself as an individual. ^^ This rule has already been discussed in
a preceding portion of this work.^* It is immaterial, in such cases,
whether the term "agent" is used in the body of the instrument or in
the signature or in both. Thus, where the lessees in the caption of a
lease were described as "trustees of Q. Lodge, Xo. 139, I. 0. of G.
Templars, or their successors in office," and such lessees in the body
of the instrument covenanted to pay the rent, without using any
words indicating that they were acting for another, the words "trus-
tees," etc., were regarded as simply descriptio personarum.^^ And
the following agreement, "I, G. W. C, land agent of the 0. & M. E.
Co., hereby agree to pay," etc., signed "G. W. C, land agent," was
held to be the personal agreement of G. W. C.^* So, where two par-
ties entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of real estate,
and the purchaser was designated in the body of the contract as
"President," and signed as "President of B. C. Institute," the con-
" Hall v. Lauderdale, 46 N. Y. 70; '^Dayton v. Warne, 46 N. J. L.
Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627; 659.
Story Ag., § 264. ' See ante, § 207, et seq.
" Armstrong v. Stokes, L. R. 7 " Stobie v. Dills, 62 111. 432.
Q. B. 598; Hall v. Lauderdale, su- "' Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495.
Vra; Shordan v. Kyler, 87 Ind. 38. To the same effect are the cases of
'= Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487; Hobbs v. Cowden, 20 Ind. 310; In-
Hull V. Brown, 35 Wis. 652. habitants, etc., v. Weir. 9 Ind. 224;
Hayes v. Matthews, 63 Ind. 412.
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tract Ijeing made on condition that the "B. C. Institute will accept
and approve of this purchase and its terms and agreement" within
a stated time, and the purchaser agreed to pay and to secure the
purchase-money by his bond and mortgage on the premises, the con-
tract was decided to be that of the individual purchaser and not that
of the corporation, the words "President," etc., being held as de-
scriptio personae merely.^^ In all such cases, the agent, in order to
bind his principal and not himself, must execute the instrument in
the name and on behalf of the principal,—as, "John Doe, by Richard
Roe, his agent, promises," or "Richard Roe, for John Doe, agrees,"
or "Richard Roe, agent for John Doe, covenants," etc.; and must
sign the instrument in the name or on behalf of the principal,—as,
"John Doe, by Richard Roe, agent," or "Richard Roe, agent for
John Doe," or "Pro John Doe, Richard Roe, agent," or simply "John
Doe," without any words to show that the signature was made or the
instrument executed by an agent. ^^
§ 303. Where principal is undisclosed.—It must be quite clear,
then, that an agent may render himself personally liable on a con-
tract attempted to be executed by him for and on behalf of liis prin-
cipal, if he has employed language that the law regards as that of
the agent, personally, and not that of the principal. His liability
is, however, not confined to that class of contracts. "There are three
cases," said the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, "in which
the agent becomes personally liable : ( 1 ) where the principal is not
known; (2) where there is no responsible principal; (3) where the
agent becomes liable by any undertaking of his own."^^ The last
of these heads was briefly considered in the preceding section, and
was more fully elaborated in Chapter V, under the head of Execution
of Authority.^** It remains to consider the agent's liability in cases
where the principal is undisclosed, and in cases where there is no re-
sponsible principal. And first, as to contracts in which the agent fails
to disclose his true relation. In making a contract the agent may dis-
close the fact that he is acting for another without disclosing the name
of such other person ; or he may disclose neither the name of the
principal nor the fact that he, the agent, is acting for another in-
stead of for himself. If he disclose neither the fact of the agency
"Buffalo Catholic Institute v. (Mass.) 214. 13 Am. Dec. 420; citing
Bitter, 87 N. Y. 250. Paley Pr. & Ag. 25-5.
'" See ante, § 207, et seq. =« See atite, § 205, et seq.
" Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick.
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nor the name of the principal, he will be clearly liable as principal.-^
If he disclose the fact of the agency, but not the name of the principal,
and use terms in themselves sufficient to bind himself, he will be liable
at the election of the third party, the same as if he were the real
principal. The mere fact that he professes to act as agent for an-
other, or to execute the contract as such, is not sufficient in itself to
prevent responsibility from attaching to him.^^ If he would escape
personal liability he must name the principal in the contract, and
employ such language as on its face purports to be the obligation or
undertaking of the principal, and renders him liable ex vi terminiP
If the contract be in writing, much depends, of course, upon its
wording. "If the form of the contract is such that the agent per-
sonally covenants, and then adds his representative character, which
he does not in truth sustain, his covenant remains personal and in
force, and binds him as an individual; but, if the form of the con-
tract is otherwise, and the language, when fairly interpreted, does
not contain a personal undertaking or provision, he is not personally
liable; for it is not his contract and the law will not force it upon
him. He may be liable, it is true, for tortious conduct if he has
knowingly or carelessly assumed to bind another without authority;
or, when making the contract, has concealed the true state of his
authority, and falsely led others to repose in his authority; but as
we have said, he is not of course liable on the contract itself, nor in
any form of action whatever."^* WTiere the contract is not in writing,
and the agent does not disclose the fact that he is acting for an-
other, together with the name of the principal, the same rule ap-
plies, and he can not escape liability on the ground that he con-
tracted merely as agent. And the fact that the third party had
knowledge of the agency is not in itself sufficient to exempt the
agent from personal responsibility. The duty is upon the agent to
disclose the principal, and not upon those with whom he deals to
''Boyd V. L. H. Quinn Co., 40 N. IrTine v. Watson, L. R. 5 Q. B. D.
Y. Supp. 370; Pierce v. Johnson, 34 414; Welch v. Goodwin, 123 Mass.
Conn. 274; Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 71, 25 Am. Rep. 24; Merrill v. Wil-
530; Bartlett v. Raymond, 139 Mass. son, 6 Ind. 426; Bartlett v, Ray-
275; Argersinger v. Macnaughton, mond. 139 Mass. 275.
114 N. Y. 535, 11 Am. St. 687; John- =* Per Ellsworth, J., in Ogden v.
son v. Armstrong, 83 Tex. 325. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec.
^=Per Byles, J., in Kelner v. Bax- 429. See also, Paice v. Walker, L.
ter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174, 180. R. 5 Ex. 173; Higgins v. Senior, 8
=^Ex parte Hartlep, 12 Ves. 349; M. & W. 834; Story Ag., § 269.
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discover it, and if he fails to do so, and deals with persons unaware
of his agency, he must answer personally for the debts he contracts.^^
Dr. Wharton expresses the view that the doctrine that agents are
personally liable when they disclose the fact of the agency, but not
the name of the principal, applies primarily only to auctioneers and
factors, and that the cases in which other agents are held liable rest
partly on the usage of trade and partly on the fact that the parties
charged acted without authority ;^*^ and there is other respectable
authority for thus limiting the rule.^'^ Whatever classes of agents
the rule applies to, however, it is certain tliat such agent is liable
unless he discloses both the fact of the agency and the identit}^ of the
principal. And in all contracts other than specialties, when there
is an undisclosed principal, either the agent or the principal—when the
latter is discovered—may be held liable; the third party having the
right to elect which he will pursue.^^ In such cases, parol evidence is
not admissible to exonerate the agent ; for if, by the terms of the con-
tract, he has bound himself individually, the admission of parol
evidence to show that he contracted only as agent would be a viola-
tion of the rule that tlie terms of a Avritten instrument can not be
contradicted or varied by parol proof.^* We shall hereafter discuss,
as fully as may be, the liability of the undisclosed principal in such
cases. ^" For the present it will be sufficient to say that parol evi-
dence is admissible in this class of cases to charge the undisclosed
principal, now discovered, and that this is held not to be in violation
of the rule which forbids the introduction of parol evidence to con-
tradict a written instrument.^^ Such a contract binds not only the
-^Per Steele, J., in Baldwin v. 178; Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill
Leonard, 39 Vt. 260, 94 Am. Dec. (N. Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618; Merrill
324. See to the same effect, also, v. Kenyon, 48 Conn. 314, 40 Am.
Bickford v. First Natl Bank, 42 111. Rep. 174; Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. &
238, 89 Am. Dec. 436; Story Ag., W. 834.
§ 266; Argersinger v. Macnaugh- ^ Higgins v. Senior, supra ; Cream
ton, 114 N. Y. 535, 11 Am. St. 687; City Glass Co. v. Friedlander, 84
Kain v. Humes, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) Wis. 53; Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bed-
610. ford's ed.) 362.
=« Wharton Ag., § 502. '<> Post, §§ 328-334.
-'Hutchinson v. Tatham, L. R. 8 ^^ Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y.
C. P. 482; Fleet v. Murton, L. R. 357; Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W.
7 Q. B. 126; Dale v. Humfrey, El. 834; Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass.
B. & E. (96 E. C. L.) 1004, 27 L. J. 169; Waddill v. Sebree, 88 Va. 1012;
Q. B. 390. Chandler v. Coe, 54 N. H. 561.
^^ Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass.
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agent, but the principal also, unless it be under seal and required to
be so; because the act of the agent is the act of the principal, or, as
said in some cases, because the principal "is taken to have adopted
the name of the agent as his own, for the purpose of the contract."^^
Some of the New York cases seem to hold that when the agent de-
scribes himself as such in the contract, but does not sign the contract
with the name of the principal, the latter can not be held liable, and
the agent alone is bound.^^ But whether the principal is liable or
not, the agent certainly is. Unless the agent, on the face of the con-
tract, in some manner discloses the principal, and acts on his behalf
and in his name, or evinces an intention to do so, he will generally
be precluded from showing that the contract was that of another and
not of himself; unless the contract is ambiguous, so as to admit of
parol evidence. "A man has a right to the character, credit and
substance of the person with whom he contracts; if, therefore, he
enters into a contract with an agent, who does not give his principal's
name, the presumption is that he is invited to give credit to the agent
;
still more, if the agent does not disclose his principal's existence."^*
§ 304. Contract by agent in behalf of nonexisting principal.—
An agent is furthermore liable on the contract into which he has
entered for and on behalf of an assumed principal when the latter
has no existence in fact at the time of the making of such contract. ^^
But if the agent, in good faith, makes a contract in behalf of his
principal, who has died without his knowledge, the agent is not
liable personally.^'' No distinction is to be observed between a non-
^^Byington v. Simpson, supra; Lacouture, 4 La. 64; Carlisle v.
Higgins v. Senior, supra; Thorn- Steamer Eudora, 5 La. Ann. 15.
son v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78, 3 ^ Anson Conts. 345. See also, 2
Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.) 1648, and Kent's Com. 630; Rendell v. Harri-
notes; Cothay v. Fennell, 10 B. & man, 75 Me. 497; Casco Nat'l Bank
C. 671; Hunter v. Giddings. 97 v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307; Souhegan
Mass. 41, 93 Am. Dec. 54; Bickford Nat'l Bank v. Boardman, 46 Minn,
v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 111. 238, 89 293; Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W.
Am. Dec. 436. 834.
=' Barker v. Mechanic Ins. Co., 3 ^^Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P.
Wend. (N. Y.) 94; Spencer v. Field, 174; Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220;
10 Wend. (N. Y.) 87; Stone v. Wood, Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411;
7 Cow. (N. Y.) 453; Bank of Gen- Washburn v. Frank, 31 La. Ann.
esee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 315. 427.
See, per contra, besides the cases ^^ Smout v. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1.
cited in note 32, supra, Hopkins v.
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existing or purely fictitious principal and one that ma}^ have an
existence, in a sense, and yet not be recognized as possessing a dis-
tinct legal entity, sometimes called an irresponsible principal; such
as a married woman, who, under the common law, could not be sued;
or an unorganized society,—such as a social club, or a political
meeting. In either case, the one who assumes to represent such
supposed person is personally liable. A very common illustration
of a fictitious or nonexistent principal is that of the promoters of
an intended railway or other company before incorporation; here
there is no existing principal when the contract is made, for there
is no corporation; and if incorporation never takes place the pro-
moters are personally liable on contracts made or for debts incurred
by them.^^ The contract may, of course, be so worded as to exempt
the promoters from personal responsibility; or it may be so framed
that no suit could be maintained upon it, as such, and an action on
the original undertaking might become necessary in order to render
the promoters liable. But unless this be true, they will generallj'
be personally bound on the contract; and if subscriptions to stock
have been paid to them, the subscribers may recover the money so
paid from the person to whom such paj'ments were made, if the
company is not incorporated.^^ The contracts of the promoters in
behalf of the projected corporation will not bind the latter after
organization, unless the company subsequently adopt the acts as its
own.^** Whether the company, subsequently to its becoming a char-
tered organization, can ratify the acts of the promoters, in the tech-
nical sense of the term, seems to be very doubtful, as there must be
an existing principal at the time of the unauthorized contract en-
tered into by the agent before a valid ratification can take place.*"
There is no doubt, however, that the contracts or agreements of the
promoters may be adopted by the corporation when it comes into
existence, although this would amount to a new contract; and such
an adoption may be implied from the circumstances; as, for ex-
ample, from knowingly accepting the benefits of the engagements
made by the promoters.*^
^Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. ^Kelley v. Newburyport, etc.,
174; Hurt v. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 310; Horse R. Co., 141 Mass. 496; Oakes
Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355; v. Cattaraugus Water Co., 143 N. Y.
Sproat V. Porter, 9 Mass. 300; Nock- 430; 1 Elliott Railr., § 14.
els V. Crosby, 3 B. & C. 814. *° 1 Morawetz Corp., § 549.
'«1 Elliott Railr., § 13. "Ibid.
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§ 305. Unincorporated associations, clubs and meetings.—A com-
mon illustration of an irresponsible principal is the case of an un-
incorporated association; such as a social club, acting by a commit-
tee. In such case the debts contracted by such committee are the
personal obligations of the members of the committee, and they are
liable therefor. "One professing to act as agent," to quote the lan-
guage of the supreme court of Wisconsin, "if he does not bind his
principal, binds himself. And it can make no difference that the
reason why he does not bind his principal is because the principal
for whom he professes to act has no existence."*^ In the case re-
ferred to, the court went so far as to hold that where such a com-
mittee acts by an agent all the members of the committee are liable.
"Such a rule is salutary," say the court, "and tends to the promotion
of justice, by preventing the procurement of services from too in-
cautious and confiding laborers, by putting forward an irresponsible
committee to act for an irresponsible public gathering."*^ Of course,
in this class of cases, as in those of promoters of intended cor-
porations, it may be shown in defense that the credit was extended
only to the society and not to the agent, in which case there would
be no liability on the part of the agent. Thus, where an unincor-
porated post of the Grand Army of the Eepublic duly authorized
and subsequently ratified a contract made by a committee of such
post, with a third party, for the giving of a number of performances
of a spectacular entertainment, the profits to go to the post, and there
was nothing to show that such post could not render itself liable, as
such, for the expenses incurred by virtue of such contract, it was
held by the supreme court of Pennsylvania that the members of the
committee were not individually liable upon such contract.** But
in the same state it was decided that the members of a committee of
a political meeting, appointed to give a free public dinner for the
party, were personally liable for the bill, there being no responsible
principal, and the creditor being presumed to have relied upon the
responsibility of the persons who gave the order. ''^ Of course, an
unincorporated society, such as a club, can not, as such, generally
become a party to a contract ; but the members thereof who contract
in the name of the organization may render themselves personally
liable as principals, when they themselves create the debt or obliga-
" Per Paine, J., in Fredendall v. " Pain v. Sample, 158 Pa. St. 428.
Taylor, 23 Wis. 538. " Eichbaum v. Irons, 6 W. & S.
*^Ibid. (Pa.) 67, 40 Am. t>ec. 540.
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tion, or ratif}* it, or when they hold themselves out as agents for a
principal having no legal existence. In such a case no member can
bind another,—as a partner binds his copartners, for example; but
his own liability is predicated upon the theor}' that he himself en-
tered into or ratified the contract, or represented himself to be acting
for an alleged principal, and that the latter would do and perform
certain things.*" Even if the credit is extended to the supposed
principal, if the latter has no legal existence, and certainly if the
third party is without knowledge of that fact, the pretended agent is
liable.*^ If, however, the third party is fully aware of the fact that
there is no responsible principal, and yet is willing to deal with the
agent, not upon his personal credit, but in the full confidence that
he will be repaid by the j^erson whom the agent assumes to represent,
though no obligation may rest upon such person to do so, the agent
will not be personally liable.*^ And it is incumbent upon one who
alleges that credit was extended to such principal, and him only, to
establish that fact by the evidence.*^ But an unincorporated society
may, by statutory enactment, Ijecome a legal entity in such a way as to
bind itself 1)y its contract ; and, w^hen this is the case, it may, of course,
]ye bound by the contract of its authorized agent, or In' a ratification
of such contract, if unauthorized originally.^*' That the members of
a society or club having no corporate existence authorized the contract
or debt in such a way as to render themselves personally accountable
may be shown by the constitution or by laws or by the vote of a meet-
ing in which they acquiesced. Thus, where a college class, at a meet-
ing of the members, voted for the publication of a book, and selected
one of their number as "business manager of the publication," who
made a contract for such publication, the members of the class who
thus voted or assented to the result of the vote were held personally
lialjle in an action by the publisher for work done and materials
furnished."^
§ 306. Nature of action against agent in such case.—Whether a
person holding himself out as agent and contracting for an assumed
principal having no legal existence is liable upon the contract directly,
or whether the suit must be in the nature of an action in tort for dam-
ages, for contracting without authority, are important questions that
^Per Seevers, J., in Lewis v. Til- ** Comfort v. Graham, 87 Iowa
ton, 64 Iowa 220. 295.
" IMd. °'' See Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220.
'^ Story Ag., § 287. "' Wilcox v. Arnold, 162 Mass. 577.
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often arise in practice. The rule is that an agent so contracting is or-
dinarily liable directly upon the contract; for in such cases the law
presumes that he contracts upon his own responsibility, and intends to
bind himself, and it so holds him, for in no other way could the con-
tract have any validity.^- Accordingly, in a case where the mayor of
a city officially offered a reward for the arrest of a fugitive municipal
officer, such mayor having no authority to bind the municipality
or any of its departments by such an offer, the supreme court of New
Jersey held—applying the imle applicable to private agents—that the
mayor was personally liable for the reward; the law presuming thai
he contracted upon his own responsibility.^^ The presumption that
the agent intended to bind himself renders him liable on the contract
directly; unless, indeed, there is something in its terms which makes
it necessary that the plaintiff proceed specially against the agent for
contracting without authority.^* So, in a case decided in Missouri,
where the captain of a military company had signed an instrument
on behalf of the company, it was held by the supreme court of that
state that the captain was liable upon the instrument.^^ Where the
contract is in writing, therefore, and is executed on behalf of an as-
sumed principal having no legal existence or authority to execute it,
it is the general rule that the person assuming to act as agent will be
held liable on the instrument directly, as the real principal. Where
the contract is not in writing, it will be governed by similar rules;
the facts, of course, depending upon the evidence. It must be re-
membered, moreover, that in such cases the presumption that the
agent intended to bind himself is only a prima facie presumption, and
may be overcome by evidence showing that the credit was in reality
not extended to him ; and when this is shown, the agent is not liable,
either upon the contract or in tort. And this, in cases of unwritten
contracts, may be shown by the circumstances of the case. Thus, it
was held that the members of a building committee of an unincor-
porated church society were not personally liable, for services ren-
dered in building a meeting-house, to one jointly' concerned with them
as shareholders in the building, where it was shown they had no
funds in their hands to pay for such services, and where it did not
appear that any express promise was made by them, or that their
=^ Booth v. Wonderly, 36 N. J. L. L. 117. See also, Kelner v. Baxter,
250. L. R. 2 C. P. 174.
'•^ Timken v. Tallmadge, 54 N. J. " Booth v. Wonderly, supra.
'^'^ Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193.
20—Principal and Agent.
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j]ulividual credit was pledged to the payment of such services; it
also appearing that they were appointed by the body of the subscribers
to the shares of the building fund to execute a mere trust, and were
acting under the direction and control of such subscribers, and sub-
ject to their orders and to removal by them.^" And, generally, the
trustees of a voluntary association are not liable personally for its
debts, unless made so by statute, or unless they have rendered them-
selves so by contract. ^^ Whether the credit was extended to the
agent individually or not is, therefore, a question of fact to be de-
termined by the jury, or the court sitting as such. If, however, the
contract be a written one, its construction is solely for the court; and
evidence to show a contrary intention from that apparent on its face
is not generally admissible, unless such contract is ambiguous.^^
§ 307. Nature of liability of agent acting without authority.—
One who assumes to act as agent for another in a given transaction
may do so wholly without authority, or he may act in excess of
the authority actually possessed by him. If he enter into a written
contract on behalf of another without authority, the question may,
and frequently does arise, whether he is liable on such contract per-
sonally, or whether he must be sued in another kind of an action.
Some of the authorities hold that, in all written contracts except
specialties, if the pretended agent has so worded the instrument as
to make it appear that he is acting for or on behalf of another, and
not himself,—^having no authority to do so,—he binds himself per-
sonally, and will be liable in an action on the contract itself, for
the reason that he must have intended to bind some one; and if he
was unauthorized to bind the principal, he is estopped to deny that'
he intended to bind himself, as in that case no one whatever would
be bound.^'' But the objection to this doctrine is that it would re-
quire the court to make a new contract for the parties, or one into
^"Cheeny v. Clark, 3 Vt. 431, 23 Johns. (N. Y.) 307, 7 Am. Dec. 381;
Am. Dec. 219. Sinclair v. Jaclison, 8 Cow. (N. Y.)
" Wolf V. Schleiffer, 2 Brew. (Pa.) 543; Richie v. Bass, 15 La. Ann.
563; Hall v. Siegel, 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 668; Levy v. Lane, 38 La. Ann. 252;
206. Keener v. Harrod, 2 Md. 63; Dale
^*See ante, § 216. v. Donaldson, 48 Ark. 188; Terwilli-
^" Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio ger v. Murphy, 104 Ind. 32^ An-
(N. Y.) 471; Richardson v. Cran- drews v. Tedford. 37 Iowa 314; Ccff-
dall, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 335; Rossiter man v. Harrison, 24 Mo. 524; Weare
V. Rossiter, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 495, 24 v. Gove, 44 N. H. 196.
Am. Dec. 62; White v. Skinner, 13
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which they have not themselves entered ; and the courts now generally
repudiate it. While the decisions are not uniform, the great weight
of modern authority is that the agent is not personally bound on the
contract itself, and can not be held licible in an action thereon."^
The agent may indeed be liable ex contractu when he executes a
written contract for another without authority. If the contract is
in writing, and the agent himself did not receive the consideration
upon which it is based, he may yet be liable ex contractu. In that
case, his liability is on an implied warranty of his authority to act,
although he intended no wrong, but honestly believed himself to be
in possession of authority to enter into the contract.*^ ^ In such case,
he has inflicted an injury upon another; and as he has held himself
out as having competent authority to do the act, it is but just that
he should be personally responsible for the consequences of the
wrongful assertion; for, "where one of two innocent persons must
suffer a loss, he ought to bear it who has been the sole means of pro-
ducing it, by inducing the other to place a false confidence in his
acts, and to repose upon the truth of his statements."^-
§ 308. Agent not liable when third party knew facts—Death of
principal—Fraudulent misrepresentation of authority.—But if the
party with whom the agent has contracted knew that the agent had no
authority, or was cognizant of all the facts upon which the assump-
tion of authority was based,—as, for example^ where both parties
labored under a mistake of law with reference to the liability of the
principal,—the agent is not liable either in toft or upon the con-
tract.''^ And if the principal is dead at the time the contract is en-
'«' Lewis V. Nicholson, 18 Q. B. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 12 L. R. A.
503; Duncan v. Niles, 32 111. 532, 83 346; Delius v. Cawthorn, 2 Dev.
Am. Dec. 293; McCurdy v. Rogers, (N. C.) 90.
21 Wis. 199, 91 Am. Dec. 468; Ogden "'^ Cochran v. Baker (Ore.), 56 Pac.
V. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. 641; Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St.
Dec. 429; Harper v. Little, 2 Me. 14, 525, 12 L. R. A. 346; Campbell v.
11 Am. Dec. 25; Abbey v. Chase, 6 Muller, 43 N. Y. Supp. 233.
Cush. (Mass.) 54; Bartlett v. Tuck- '--Story Ag., § 264; Collen v.
er, 104 Mass. 341, 6 Am. Rep. 240; Wright, 8 E. & B. 647; Smout v.
; Hall V. Crandall, 29 Cal. 567, 89 Am. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1; Kroeger v.
Dec. 64; Cole v. O'Brien, 34 Neb. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311; Baltzen v.
68; Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494; Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467; Simmons v.
Simmons v. More, 100 N. Y. 140; More, 100 N. Y. 140; Boston, etc.,
Fleet V. Murton, L. R. 7 Q. B. 126; R. Co. v. Richardson, 135 Mass. 473.
Pitman v. Kintner, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) "^Newport v. Smith, 61 Minn. 277;
251, 33 Am. Dec. 469; Trust Co. v. Newman v, Sylvester, 42 Ind. 106;
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tered into, and there is consequently no principal who is bound, still
the agent will not be liable, if the fact of the principal's death was
unknown to both parties.*'* Death, it is true, revokes the agency in
that case, and it is to be assumed that an injury has resulted to the
third party ; but such injury can not be said to have been wrongfully
inflicted by any act of the agent, it being regarded as the act of God
;
neither can there he said to be any implied warranty, as the agent
was acting in perfect good faith and could not by the exercise of
ordinary prudence have anticipated such injury. If the pretended
agent fraudulently represented himself as such when he was really
not, he will, as we shall hereafter see, be liable in an action ex delicto
for a deceit, for the damages caused by his wrongful act.**^ But even
here the injured party might waive the tort and sue on the implied
contract, if the agent received the benefit of the consideration in-
volved in the contract entered into by him for the supposed prin-
cipal.^^
§ 309. Liability of agent for money had and received.—An agent
is also liable for money had and received, if money has been paid to
him by mistake and he has turned it over to his principal after notice
of such mistake; but if it was paid voluntarily, and the agent paid
it over to the principal before notice, the agent is not liable in any
form of action."^ And where the party who contracted with the
agent under a mistake of fact had no notice of the agency, the pay-
ment of the money by the agent to the principal, even before demand
Murray v. Carothers, 1 Mete. (Ky.) the agent's liability for torts, see
71; Snow v. Hix, 54 Vt. 478; Hall v. post. § 312, et seq.
Lauderdale, 46 N. Y. 70; Abeles v. ""Russell v. Koonce, 104 N. C. 237.
Cochran, 22 Kan. 406; Barry v. "'Cabot v. Shaw, 148 Mass. 459;
Pike, 21 La. Ann. 221; Humphrey v. Herrick v. Gallagher. 60 Barb. (N.
Jones, 71 Mo. 62; Western Cement Y.) 578; Ashley v. Jennings, 48 Mo.
Co. V. Jones, 8 Mo. App. 373. App. 142; Hobensack v. Hallman, 17
«* Story Ag., § 265a; Smout v. II- Pa. St. 154; Shepard v. Sherin, 43
bery, 10 M. & W. 1; Carriger v. Minn. 382; Upchurch v. Nors-
Whittington, 26 Mo. 311, 72 Am. worthy, 15 Ala. 705; Smith v.
Dec. 212. Binder, 75 111. 492; Wallis v. Shelly,
"^Noyes v. Loring, 55 Me. 408; 30 Fed. 747; Cox v. Prentice, 3 M. &
Taylor v. Shelton, 30 Conn. 122; S. 344; Jefts v. York. 10 Cush.
Sheffield v. Ladue, 16 Minn. 388, 10 (Mass.) 392; Jefts v. York, 12 Cush.
Am. Rep. 145; Hancock v. Yunker, (Mass.) 196; Elliott v. Swartwout,
83 111. 208; Bartlett v. Tucker. 104 10 Pet. (U. S.) 137.
Mass. 341, 6 Am. Rep. 240. As to
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upon the agent, will be no defense to an action against such agent by
the third party to recover the money.®*
§ 310. Unauthorized agent not liable if principal would not have
been liable.—If an agent, without authority, enter into a contract
for an assumed principal with a third party upon which the principal
would not be liable if he had authorized its execution, there can be
no liability of the agent. To illustrate: if one person should under-
take to make a contract for another which would be void by the
statute of frauds, the party on whose behalf the contract was en-
tered into would of course not be bound; but neither would the
other person, the one who assumed to act as agent; for the third
party could not be said to have been injured by the act of the pre-
tended agent in going through the idle ceremony of making a void
contract; and having sustained no injury, the third party could re-
cover nothing in any form of action.*^^
§ 311. Public agents not generally liable.—We now come to con-
sider the rule as to pviblic agents. Upon this subject. Story says:
"But a very different rule, in general, prevails in regard to public
agents; for, in the ordinary course of things, an agent, contracting
in behalf of the government, or of the public, is not personally bound
by such a contract, even though he would be by the terms of the
contract, if it were an agency of a private nature. The reason of
the distinction is that it is not to be presumed either that the public
agent means to bind himself personally, in acting as a functionary of
the government, or that the party dealing with him in his pul)lic
character means to rely upon his individual responsibility. On the
contrary, the natural presumption in such cases is, that the contract
was made upon the credit and responsibility of the government itself.
* * * This principle not only applies to simple contracts, both
oral and written, but also to instruments under seal, which, are ex-
ecuted by agents of the government in their own names, and purport-
ing to be made by them on behalf of the government; for the like
presumption prevails in such cases, that the parties contract, not
personally, but merely officially, within the sphere of their appro-
-priate duties. * * * So, an indenture, executed between A. B.,
describing himself as 'secretary of war,' of the one part, and C. D.
of the other part, for a demise of certain buildings for public pur-
"'Newall V. Tomlinson, L. R. 6 C. ""Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494;
P. 405. Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467.
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poses, and for a certain period, and containing a covenant, on the
part of A. B., to pay the stipulated rent during that period, has been
held not to bind A. B. personally, but to bind the government alone.
The same principle applies to cases, where public officers, contracting
for a public purpose, afterwards, upon a settlement of accounts with
the other contracting party, strike a balance, and in writing promise
to pay that balance on a specific day, signing their names, with their
official designations annexed,—as, for example, as commissioners; for
such a written document is quite consistent with an intention not to
incur any personal responsibility, but merely to apply the public
funds, which might be in their hands at the time prescribed, towards
the discharge of the public debt.""" The rule as to public agents
being deemed to act only for the public and not for themselves is,
however, one of presumption merely, which is always subject to
rebuttal by proper evidence showing that it was in fact the intention
to charge the agent personally. ^^ Notwithstanding the general rule
as stated, there are cases in which the distinction between the liabil-
ity of public and private agents to third persons seems not to have
been observed. Thus, where a paper was headed, "State of Iowa,
County of Jones, Township of Hale," and signed, "W. H. Glick,
Pres. School Board," and "I. B. Southrich, Sec'y School Board,"
ordering the delivery of certain school supplies, and containing a
promise to pay, it was held to be the personal obligation of the sign-
ers and not of the school corporation, there being no terms used in
the contract showing any design to bind such corporation, and the
additions to the names of the signers being held merely descriptive.^^
But in accordance with the rule mentioned it was held that notes head-
ed "Monticello, Ind.," and reading, "We promise to pay," and "the sub-
scribers promise to pay," and signed respectively by the subscribers
as "Trustees of Monticello School," and "School Trustees," were the
obligations of the school corporation, and not of the signers per-
sonally, and that the additions, "Trustees of Monticello School," and
"School Trustees," were not mere descriptio personarum, but showed
'^ Story Ag., § 302, et seq. See hart, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 375, 20 Am.
also, Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch Dec. 621.
(U. S.) 109; Fox v. Drake, 8 Cow. "Story Ag., § 306.
(N. Y.) 191; Tutt v. Hobbs, 17 Mo. '^Wing v. Glick, 56 Iowa 473. See
486; Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick, also. Fowler v. Atkinson. 6 Minn.
(Mass.) 120, 34 Am. Dec. 41; Walker 579; Village of Cahokia v. Rauten-
v. Swartwout, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 444, berg, 88 111. 219.
7 Am. Dec. 334; Belknap v. Rein-
311 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. § 312
an intention to charge the school town. Judge Woods;, who delivered
the opinion of the court, said: "Contracts made by public agents
stand upon a different footing [with regard to the rule of descriptio
personae] from those made by agents of persons or of private cor-
porations."^^ When the instrument is negotiable by the law mer-
chant, and there is enough indicated in the body and signatures to
show that it is the contract of a public agent, as such, it is believed
that it will not bind the agent personally, even when the instrument
is held by an innocent third person ; and certainly this is true when
the controversy is between the original parties.'^*
11. For Torts.
§ 312. Agent's liability for torts generally.—An agent, whether
public or private, is liable to third persons in many cases for his
torts; that is to say, for the wrongs done by him to such persons in
the course of his agency. An agent, like a servant, is only liable to
third persons for acts of misfeasance and malfeasance, but not for
acts of nonfeasance;'^ his obligations are to his principal, and not
to other parties. As to his principal, the agent must not fail to act,
for this is but a part of his agreement. As to third parties, he is
under no obligation to act, for he has not engaged to do so with
them; all he is required to do with reference to third parties is that
when he does act for his principal he shall act so as not to injure
them ; or that he shall not act at all, if to do so would injure them.
Nonfeasance is the failure to do a thing which it is the duty of a
person to do. Misfeasance is the doing of a thing one ought to do,
but doing it in a wrong way. Malfeasance is the doing of a thing
which the law directs one ought not to do at all.'*^ Now, an agent
owes his principal the duty of doing what he has undertaken to do
for him; but he owes no such duty to third persons. Hence, if an
agent engage to sell goods for his principal, he may render himself
liable to the latter for failing to mate sales when opportunity offers
;
"School Town of Monticello v. v. Haseltine, 3 Ind. App. 491; Baird
Kendall, 72 Ind. 91, 37 Am. Rep. v. Shipman, 132 111. 16, 22 Am. St.
139. And to the same effect, see 504, and elaborate note at p. 512;
Wallis V. Johnson School Township, Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39
75 Ind. 368; Pine Civil Township v. Am. Rep. 437.
Huber Mfg. Co., 83 Ind. 121. '" Coit v. Lynes, 33 Conn. 109;
•* Mechem Ag., § 440. Wright v. Spencer, 1 Stew. (Ala.)
" Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. 576; Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray
Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456; Block (Mass.) 309, 63 Am. Dec. 741.
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but he will not be liable to third persons for such failure, because
he owes them no such duty. If the agent should undertake to make
a sale, however, and in the course of the same should make a mis-
representation or false warranty or be guilty of other fraudulent
conduct to the injury of the other contracting party,—the purchaser,
—
the agent would be liable to him for the damages sustained. The
one is a case of nonfeasance, the other of misfeasance. Hence, if
the agent once undertakes to perform the work of his principal for
which he was employed, he owes to third persons as well as to his
principal the duty of exercising proper care and diligence so as not
to cause injury to them by his acts ; and having undertaken the work,
he is in duty bound to complete it, if the failure to do so would cause
injury to any person. His failure to complete the work undertaken
is not nonfeasance.'^'^ Thus, if an agent or servant whose duty it is
to handle gunpowder or other exj)losives, after doing so, leaves the
same exposed so as to cause an explosion from which an injury re-
sults, he is liable in damages to the person who sustains the injury.'^^
This is not because he is an agent, but because he is a wrongdoer;
it is an act of negligence, and not a mere negligent omission. Had
he not undertaken to handle the explosives at all, although in duty
bound to his principal to do so, he could not be held accountable to
third parties for injury resulting from the omission. And if a
blacksmith, whose duty it is to shoe the horse of liis customer, im-
poses that task upon his servant, who had agreed to perform it,
but fails entirely to do so, and in consequence thereof the horse
becomes lame and is injured, the servant is not liable to the owner
of the horse for injury. Or if the servant has undertaken to shoe
the horse, and by his mere negligence a consequential injury results
to the owner, there is no liability on the part of the servant. "But
if the servant, in shoeing the horse, has pricked him, or has ma-
liciously or wantonly lamed him, an action will -lie personally against
the agent himself. '"'^^ The former are instances of nonfeasance, the
latter of misfeasance and malfeasance, respectively. A good illus-
tration of the distinction is found in a ^Massachusetts case, where
the manager of a building had caused the water to be turned into the
water pipes of the building without first inspecting such pipes as to
"Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass "Story Ag., § 310; Story Bailm.,
102, 39 Am. Rep. 437. §§ 402, 409.
" Jenne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. L. 257,
39 Am. Rep. 578.
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their condition. It was held that he was liable to a tenant in a
lower story for an injury caused by the water coming into the pipes
when the latter were out of repair. The failure to examine the
pipes was a mere nonfeasance, but the turning in of the water when
the pipes had not been examined was an act so negligently done as
to amount to a misfeasance.^" The distinction was illustrated by
Lord Holt in the case of Lane v. Cotton}'^ "If a bailiff." said his
lordship, "who has a warrant from the sheriff to execute a writ,
suffer his prisoner by neglect to escape, the sheriff shall be charged
for it, and not the bailiff; but if the bailiff turn the prisoner loose,
the action must be brought against the bailiff himself; for then he
is a kind of wrongdoer, or rescuer; and it will lie against any other
that will rescue in like manner."
§ 313. No defense that principal is also liable.—It is not material
that the principal may also be liable for the same tort. If the prin-
cipal has directed the agent or servant to do the wrongful act, it is
no excuse for the agent : they are' simply tort-feasors, and either or
both are liable, as other tort-feasors are; the agent can not shield
himself behind his principal and say that he acted upon the latter's
authority to commit a wrong. Therefore, an auctioneer employed
by a sheriff to sell goods wrongfully taken upon execution is liable
to the injured party for the conversion, the same as the sheriff.**^
And the agent can not exonerate himself by showing that he com-
mitted the act innocently or in ignorance of the rights of the third
party, and in the full belief that his principal had ample authority;
-the agent must know the law, and the law does not permit that one
person confer authority upon another to perpetrate a wrong upon
the person or property of a third party; indeed, in matters of tort
there can be no such relation as that of principal and agent.^^ Thus,
a person who sells intoxicating liquors in violation of law—such as
selling without a license, or to infants, or on forbidden days—can
not shield himself behind the person for whom he is doing business
and say that he is only -acting as the agent of the owner of the
saloon; and the same is true with reference to other business pro-
hibited except by license.®* As to the commission of any illegal
^^Bell V. Josselyn, 3 Gray (Mass.) 549; Josselyn v. McAllister, 22 Mich.
309, 63 Am. Dec. 741. 300.
"12 Mod. 472, 488. ** Winter v. State, 30 Ala. 22;
"Story Ag., § 312. Hays v. State, 13 Mo. 246; Wason v.
^'Berghoff v. McDonald, 87 Ind. Underbill, 2 N. H. 505; Temple v.
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act, it may be stated that each person is responsible for his own and
not for his neighbor's affairs; hence, if an agent do an act in viola-
tion of law and injury result to another, he can not excuse himself
by showing that he was acting for another.®^
§ 314. Agent's liability for fraud in executing principal's con-
tract.—An agent may be guilty of fraud 'in the execution of his
principal's authority; and if injury result from it to the party with
whom he has dealt, he will be liable ex delicto in an action for the
damages resulting from the wrongful act, as will also the principal
;
or, if the transaction result in a benefit to the agent personally, he
may be sued ex contractu for money had and received.®® The rule
applies to directors and other officers of corporations as to fraud,
negligence, mismanagement, etc.®^
§ 315. Agent's liability for personal injuries.—An agent may be
liable for a' personal injury resulting to another through his negli-
gence. Keeping in mind the doctrine that mere nonfeasance will
not, as a general rule, subject an agent to liability, it is neverthe-
less true, as we have heretofore seen, that when the agent has once
entered upon the performance of his undertaking, he must do every-
thing reasonably necessary to its performance with due regard for
the safety of others. Thus, where one who is employed to superin-
tend the erection of a building fails to provide suitable scaffolding
to prevent bricks from falling to the ground, he is liable to one in-
jured by the falling of a brick from the building.^® Some of the
decisions are difficult to reconcile. Thus, it is held in some cases that
an agent who has the possession and control of the real estate of
another,—who is a nonresident,—and who is bound to keep the prem-
ises in repair, and fails to do so, or to take proper care of the same, will
be liable to a third party for any injury sustained by reason of such
Sumner, 51 Miss. 13, 24 Am. Rep. Mass. 25, 49 Am. Rep. 25; Kroeger
615. V. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311, 47 Am.
^ Swaggard v. Hancock, 25 Mo. Rep. 718.
App. 596; Duluth v. Mallett, 43 * Salmon v. Richardson, supra;
Minn. 204; Bennett v. Bayes, 5 H. & Hodges v. New England Screw Co.,
N. 391. 1 R. I. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 624.
"'Moore v. Shields, 121 Ind. 267; *' Mayer v. Thompson, etc., Bldg.
Campbell v. Hillman, 15 B. Mon. Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. 620; Baird v.
(Ky.) 508, 61 Am. Dec. 195; Salmon Shipman, 132 111. 16, 22 Am. St. 504;
V. Richardson, 30 Conn. 360. 79 Am. Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62
Dec. 255; Hedden v. Griffin, 136 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Ellis v.
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failure;*^ while in others this is said to be a nonfeasance, for which
such agent is not liable.**'^ The difficulty which seems to have led-
to the conflict between these and other decisions upon this subject
obviously lies in the failure of some of the courts to observe the dis-
tinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, and the further
failure to observe the principle that when a person commits an
act which amounts to a malfeasance he violates a duty which he
owes to third parties; not because he is an agent of some one, but
because he is a member of society and must so conduct himself aS'
not to inflict injury upon others, whether he do so in the perform-
ance of his engagements as an agent or in any other capacity.^"
§ 316. Agent's liability for conversion.—A conversion of the prop-
erty of another siibjects the wrongdoer to an action. If the case is
clearly one of a conversion, no difficulty can be encountered in com-
ing to a proper conclusion. The fact that he is an agent will fur-
nish no justification for the conversion; for, as the Indiana supreme
court said, "in tort^, the relation of principal and agent does not
exist; they are all wrongdoers."^^ But suppose the agent is himself
ignorant of the title of the real OTvner, acting merely on behalf of
another, and under his direction; he would still be liable, under the
decisions, for the conversion of the property. "A person is guilty
of a conversion who intermeddles with any property and disposes of
it," says Lord Ellenborough, "and it is no answer that he acted under
authority from another, who had himself no authority to dispose of
it. And the court is governed by the principle of law, and not by
the hardship of any particular case."^^ Cases of this character fre-
quently occur in the transactions of auctioneers, factors and brokers
McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237, 15 Am. Berghoff v. McDonald, 87 Ind. 549;
St. 308; Shearman & Redf. Neg., Bennett v. Ives, 30 Conn. 329; Blue
§ 244. V. Briggs, 12 Ind. App. 105.
^ Baird v. Shipman, 132 111. 16, 22 " Berghoff v. McDonald, supra.
Am. St. 504; Campbell v. Portland "= Stephens v. Elwall, 4 M. & S.
Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552. 16 Am. Rep. 259, cited in 14 M. & W. 270; Lee v.
503; Ellis v. McNaughton, 76 Mich. Mathews. 10 Ala. 682, 44 Am. Dec.
237, 15 Am. St. 308. 498; Marks v. Robinson. 82 Ala. 69;
^'aDean v. Brock, 11 Ind. App. Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass. 357, 35
507. Compare also, Delaney v. Am. St. 495; McPheters v. Page, 83
Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Me. 234, 23 Am. St. 772; Koch v.
Rep. 456; Feltus v. Swan, 62 Miss. Branch, 44 Mo. 542, 100 Am. Dec.
415. 324.
""Shearman & Redf. Neg., § 244;
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with persons with whom they have dealings for their principals.
So, an auctioneer who sells the property of another without his con-
sent is liable to the owner for conversion, though he acts on the
authority of another who has no title to it, and though he is innocent
of any intentional wrong, and ignorant of the title of the owner.^^
And a stockholder who received from the thief stolen certificates
of stock and sold them was held liable to the true owner for the
value of the stock, though he acted in good faith about the matter,
believing that his principal was the owner thereof.®* So, a cotton
factor who sold the crop of the tenant was held liable to the land-
lord for the conversion of the crop without having satisfied the
landlord's lien.''^ And a sewing machine agent who took from a
married woman a sum of money and a machine, belonging to her
husband, in exchange for another machine, without the husband's
consent, was held liable to the husband for the conversion.®^
§ 317. Agent's liability on implied warranty of authority.—An
agent is liable, as we have had occasion to observe, for a false war-
ranty or representation of his authority,®^ If the warranty was not
express, but arose simply by implication from the exercise of the
authority, and the agent honestly believed himself to be in possession
of such authority, although he was not, it is generally held that he
is not liable ex delicto, but may be sued on the implied contract of
warranty.®^ But if the misrepresentation be fraudulent, or if the
business transaction be under such circumstances as will show that
he had knowledge of his want of authority, but assumed to act as if
he possessed it, he will be liable in an action ex delicto for the dam-
ages sustained by the misrepresentation or false warranty. Thus,
where a person without any authority signs a promissory note or other
contract as agent of another person, falsely representing himself to
be authorized to do so, he is liable to the injured party in a special
action in tort.®®
'* Robinson v. Bird, supra. disposes or assists the principal in
^* Swim v. Wilson, 90 Cal. 126, 25 disposing of property belonging to
Am. St. 110. a third person, in ignorance of the
"^ Merchants', etc.. Bank v. Meyer, title of the true owner, is not there-
56 Ark. 499. by rendered liable for a conversion.
=«Rice V. Yocum, 155 Pa. St. 53S. ^' Ante, §§307, 308.
But see Lenthold v. Fairchild, 35 °^ See cases cited in note 61, supra.
Minn. 99, where it is held that an ^ Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461, 8
agent acting solely for his prin- Am. Dec. 146; Duncan v. Niles, 32
cipal and under his directions, who 111. 532, 83 Am. Dec. 293; Union
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§ 318. No defense that agent received no benefit or acted under
instructions.—The fact that the agent derived no personal benefit or
advantage from the wrong committed by him will be no justification
of its commission ;^"" as in the other instances named, he can not
invoke the protection of his agency, and show that some one else
received the benefit of his wrongful act. The principal could not
have delegated any lawful authority to the agent to commit a wrong,
and, whether he acted for himself or for some one else, he is
none the less a wrongdoer ; hence, that he acted within the scope of his
instructions, or that his principal was present and directed him to
do the act, will not exonerate him from personal responsibility j^**^
if the principal could not with impunity have performed the act
himself, he could not authorize the agent to do it, for he could not
authorize another to do what he could not have done himself. ^*'-
School Township v. First Nat'l
Bank, 102 Ind. 464; M'Henry v. Duf-
field, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 41; Potts v.
Henderson, 2 Ind. 327. There are
cases, however, which hold that the
agent in such a case may be made
liable in an action on the case for
deceit. Thus, it was said by the
supreme court of Ohio, Williams, J.,
speaking for the court, in Trust Co.
v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 12 L. R. A.
346: " "While, however, the author-
ities generally agree that a person
who, without having in fact author-
ity to make a contract as agent, yet
does so under the bona fide belief
that such authority is vested in
him, is nevertheless personally re-
sponsible to those who contract
with him in ignorance of his want
of authority, a diversity of opinion
is found in the cases in regard to
the exact nature of the liability, and
the character of the action by which
it may be enforced. In Jenkins v.
Hutchinson, 13 Q. B. (66 E. C. L.)
744, it is intimated by Erie, J., that
an action of deceit would lie in such
cases, notwithstanding the good
faith of the agent, and some au-
thorities may be found to that ef-
fect. Another class of cases hold
that the liability is upon the con-
tract; but it is believed that wheth-
er the agent is so liable depends
upon the intention of the parties as
discovered from the contract itself;
and on this question the form of
the agreement and the mode of sig-
nature may be quite conclusive.
The rule on this subject as stated in
Story on Agency is that an agent
can not be sued on the very instru-
ment itself, as a contracting party,
unless there be apt words to charge
him: Section 264a. Still another
class of cases establish the rule,
which we are inclined to adopt, that
in cases like the one we are con-
sidering the agent is liable upon his
implied promise that he possesses
the authority he assumes to have."
""Weber v. Weber, 47 Mich. 569.
"^ Weber v. Weber, supra; John-
son V. Barber, 5 Gilm. (111.) 425, 50
Am. Dec. 416.
'"- Mali V. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381, 100
Am. Dec. 448. See Bocchino v. Cook
(N. J. Sup.), 51 Atl. 487.
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§ 319. Agent of foreign principal—Former and modern rules.—
As to the agents of principals residing abroad,—as, where a mer-
chant in Germany or France had his factor or other commercial
agent to transact business for him in England or in this country,
—
the rule formerly was that the agent was liable on all contracts made
by him for his principal, without regard to whether he described
himself in the contract as agent or not; the presumption being that
exclusive credit was given the agent, who resided at home, rather
than to the principal, who resided abroad. ^°^ The reason for this
rule was said to be the general convenience and usage of trade, and
the fact that the principal was presumed to be unknown to the one
extending the credit. ^°* It would seem, therefore, that if the prin-
cipal was in fact known and credit expressly and intentionally given
him, instead of the agent, the reason for the rule would fail and the
rule itself cease to operate. And this is believed to be true. The
rule that the credit must be taken to have been extended to the agent
was indeed only presumptive; and evidence was admissible to show
that it was the intention to hold the principal liable nothwithstand-
ing his business was in a foreign country ;^°^ although the presump-
tion that exclusive credit was given to the agent was said to be so
strong "as almost to amount to a conclusive presumption of law."^"®
The rule, however, never applied to the states of the Union, as they
were never considered foreign to each other in this sense.^"^ Accord-
ing to the current of modern authority, the old doctrine is now prac-
tically exploded, and whether credit was given the principal or the
agent is a question of fact and not of law.^"®
^^^ Story Ag., §§268, 290, 400; ^"^ Story Ag., § 290.
Gonzales v. Sladen, Bull. N. P. 130; "' Vawter v. Baker, 23 Ind. 63;
Peterson v. Ayre, 13 C. B. (76 E. Talntor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill (N.
C. L.) 353; Vawter v. Baker, 23 Ind. Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618.
63; Merrick's Estate, 5 W. & S. ^"" Green v. Kopke, 36 Eng. L. &
(Pa.) 9; Hochster v. Baruch, 5 Daly Eq. 396; Kirkpatrick v. Stainer, 22
(N. Y.) 440; Pollock Conts. (6tli Wend. (N. Y.) 244; Taintor v. Pren-
ed.) 95; Kaulback v. Churchill, 59 dergast, supra; Maury v. Ranger, 38
N. H. 296. La. Ann. 485, 58 Am. Rep. 197; Oel-
^»* Wharton Ag., § 791; Story Ag., ricks v. Ford, 23 How. (U. S.) 49;
§ 268. Bray v. Kettell, 1 Allen (Mass.) 80;
^»= Vawter v. Baker, 23 Ind. 63; Murphy v. Helmrich, 66 Cal. 69.
Maury v. Ranger, 38 La. Ann. 485,
58 Am. Rep. 197.
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Section Section
349. Principal not liable when act by agent in course of agency
was result of collusion be- —Exceptions.
tween agent and third party. 356. When principal not bound by
350. When principal bound by ad- notice to agent.
missions of agent. 357. Principal bound by knowledge
351. When act is within res gestae. actually in agent's mind at
352. Agent's statements need not time of transaction.
have been made at precise 358. Rule applies to corporations.
moment of occurrence of act 359. Notice to subagent.
to be of res gestae. 360. Liability of mercantile agen-
353. Declarations of agent not ad- cies for injuries resulting
missible until proof of agen- . from false reports.
cy has been made. 361. Principal not criminally liable
354. Principal bound by notice to for crimes of agent.
agent. 362. May be liable civilly for
355. Notice must have been received agent's crimes.
§ 320. Purpose of this chapter.—In this chapter we shall consider
the nature and extent of the duties and obligations a principal owes
to those persons, generally designated as third persons or third parties,
with whom the agent deals or transacts business for his principal ; the
principal's liability for failing to discharge those duties or obligations
;
and the rights of such persons out of which the duties and obligations
of the principal arise.
§ 321. The doctrine of identity.—As an agency is created mainly
for the purpose of enabling the principal to enter into contract rela-
tions with persons with whom he can not conveniently deal in per-
son, it becomes the duty of the principal to recognize and fulfill all
the authorized lawful engagements into which his agent has entered
for him, as well as those not authorized originally, but subsequently
ratified by him. The agent, as Wharton expresses it, is absorbed in
the principal, and he alone is liable upon such contracts as are legally
executed for him by his agent. ^ Most, if not all, tlie liabilities of the
principal for the acts of his agent grow out of the fiction of unity or
identity : the contract, in contemplation of law, is entered into by the
principal himself, for he and his agent are identical ; whatever the
agent does in the course of the agency is the same as if the principal
had done it, and the principal receives all the benefits and must assume
all the burdens of and liabilities for such acts, the same as if they
were his own ; from such a contract the agent, after its execution and
delivery, becomes entirely eliminated, and thereafter the relation be-
1 Wharton Ag., § 454.
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tween the principal and other contracting party is the same as if it
had been entered into by the principal individually. And this is
true whether the authority was conferred upon the agent directly or
by implication; for, if the principal has by his conduct suffered third
parties to transact business with the agent on the assumption that
he had authority from him, it is as fully his duty to make good the
agreements thus made for him as if he had authorized them in the
most solemn manner.^ But the principal not only obligates himself
by the assumption of the relation to perform the contracts made for
him in pursuance of such authority as he has conferred or led others to
believe he has conferred, and to perform those ratified by him, if
originally unauthorized; but by force of the doctrine of identity he
also becomes liable for the agent's torts. He tacitly warrants that the
agent will so conduct himself, while in the perfornaance of the duties
of his employment, as not to cause any injury to those with whom
he comes in contact as agent for him. The public, generally, have a
right to assume that the principal will select no one to represent him
who is not in every way fitted to discharge the trust imposed upon
him, and if injury occurs by reason of the misconduct or negligence
of the person so chosen, it is more in the interest of justice that the
loss should be suffered by him who has set' the cause thereof in motion
than by another who had nothing whatever to do with inciting it.
The principal may incur liabilities, then, for the agent's acts: (1) on
contracts made by the agent, and (2) on torts committed by the agent.
§ 322, Agent may bind principal on contract.—We have already
seen that an agent who is duly authorized to do so may bind his
principal, ex contractu, if he execute the authority conferred upon him
in the latter's name and on his behalf.^ If the agent discloses both
the fact of the agency and the name of the principal, and, in the
execution of the contract, speaks for the principal only, it is the con-
tract of the principal, and of him only, and he will be bound by it
the same as if he had entered into it in person.* There can be no
difficulty in establishing the obligation and liability of the principal,
if the contract was duly authorized by and was entered into ostensibly
for the principal. On the other hand, it is equally clear that if the
contract was not authorized, and the principal had not by words or
=* Wharton Ag., § 454. * Ante, § 207.
^Ante, §§ 234, 301.
21
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conduct led the tliird party to believe it was authorized, the alleged
principal is under no obligation to carry out its terms; and in the
absence of any ratification or estoppel on his part, he can not be bound
by it. And so also, although the agent was fully authorized to enter
into such a contract for the principal, yet if he did so on his own
behalf, and for himself only, and not for and on behalf of the prin-
cipal, the latter is not bound by it to the party with whom such agent
contracted, if all the parties to the transaction were known. These
are plain propositions and do not here require the citation of any
authorities to confirm them.
\ I. Liability on Contracts,
§ 323. Principal bound on contract.—It is well established by the
authorities that the principal is bound by the contract of his agent,
entered into on his behalf, not only when the same is within the real,
but also when it is within the apparent scope of the agent's authority
;
provided, of course, that the terms employed are sufficiently apt, and
that the third party acted in good faith.^ If the authority exercised
by the agent was fully authorized, or, in other words, if the agent
acted within the actual scope of his authority, there is no doubt what-
ever of the principal's liability. But his liability is not confined to
this. There are so many ways of conferring authority, and, in many
cases, so much reason for believing it has been conferred, although it
has not, that the policy of the law often is to imply such authority
from the course of business or employment, or other circumstances
indicating clearly that the acts performed have received the sanction
of the principal. "The proof of such recognition [of authority], it
may be admitted," say the supreme court of Iowa, "must be such
as makes the belief of such authority strong and reasonable. The
general rule is that the principal is bound if he has actually authorized
the act or if he has authorized those with whom the agent dealt in
his behalf to believe, as fair and reasonable men, that the authority
had actually been given."^ Akin to the doctrine we are now dis-
cussing is the rule that third parties will not be bound by secret in-
= Marsh v. Gilbert, 2 Hun (N. Y.) 20 Iowa 554; Wheeler v. McGuire,
58; -Hunt v. Chapin, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 86 Ala. 398; Story Ag., § 133; Crane
139; Westfield Bank v. Cornen, 37 v. Gruenewald, 120 N. Y. 274.
N. Y. 319, 93 Am. Dec. 573; Minor "Whiting v. Western Stage Co.,
V. Mechanic's Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 20 Iowa 554.
46; Whiting v. Western Stage Co.,
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struetions to an agent, of which such third parties have no knowl-
edge. If a person delegates authority to an agent to perform certain
acts or transact certain business for him, but restricts him in the
exercise thereof by certain secret instructions or directions, the prin-
cipal is nevertheless bound by the agent's act as authorized without
such limitation, unless the third party had notice of such instructions
or directions.^ Any other rule would make innocent persons suffer
who had nothing whatever to do with the appointment or holding out
of the agent ; whereas the equitable doctrine is that "where one of two
or more innocent persons is to suffer, he ought to suffer who misled
the other into the contract by holding out the agent as competent to
act and as enjoying his confidence."^ In harmony with these prin-
ciples of the law, one who innocently pays money to an unauthorized
agent for his supposed principal, when the latter has made it possible
for the agent to mislead such innocent party, so as to repose confidence
in him, will be protected by such payment. Thus, where one who
had negotiated a loan of money through an agent, permitted the agent
to retain the note and mortgage, and the mortgagor made payments
to the agent while the papers were in his hands, it was held that such
innocent third person would be protected and the mortgagee would be
compelled to bear the loss.**
§ 324. As to duty of third party to ascertain agent's authority.—
However, it is generally the duty of the third party to ascertain, in the
first place, what the agent's authority is, and if it be in writing, to de-
mand an inspection thereof. The mere fact that an agent assumes to
act as such is not sufficient to render the principal liable to a third
party with whom the agent has dealt ;^° but if the third party exercises
due and proper care in ascertaining the agent's authority, he may
safely act upon appearances ; he can not be held bound by secret limi-
tations upon the authority ostensibly given ;^^ it is not his duty to in-
quire for private letters or secret instructions. ^-
^ Rourke v. Story, 4 E. D. Smith " Markey v. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co.,
(N. Y.) 54; Fatman v. Leet, 41 Ind. 103 Mass. 78; Cruzan v. Smith, 41
133; Simonds v. Clapp, 16 N. H. Ind. 288; Edwards v. Schaffer, 49
222; Walsh v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., Barb. (N. Y.) 291; Murphy v.
73 N. Y. 5. Southern L. Ins. Co., 3 Baxt.
« Story Ag., § 443; Crane v. (Tenn.) 440, 27 Am. Rep. 761; Car-
Gruenewald, 120 N. Y. 274. michael v. Buck, 10 Rich. Eq. (S.
^ Crane v. Gruenewald, 120 N. Y. C.) 332, 70 Am. Dec. 226; Lister v.
274. Allen, 31 Md. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 78.
'"Hurley v. Watson, 68 Mich. 531. '-Story Ag., § 73.
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§ 325. Distinction between general and special agent.—The dis-
tinction we have pointed out in the former chapters with respect to
general and special agents is supposed by many of the older authorities
to alter materially the conditions by which the principal's liability
is determined. ^^ Thus, if the agency be a general one, it is said to
render the principal liable if the agent was acting within the general
scope of his authority, notwithstanding the act was contrary to his
private instructions; while in case of a special agency, the public is
required to ascertain the precise extent of his authority, and the third
party is bound even by private restrictions, unless the principal has
held the agent out as possessing the authority exercised by him.^* It
is very doubtful, however, whether this distinction will hold in every
case.^^ It may be conceded that if the agency be special, and the
limitations be contained in the grant of authority itself, whether it
be written or oral, the third party can not hold the principal liable
beyond such authority: this, then, being tlie "scope" of the agent's
authority. ^*^ But is not this true also of a general agency? Generally
the scope of any agent's authority is determined by his commission or
what is equivalent to it. In any agency the principal is bound by
the acts of the agent, if they be within the apparent scope of author-
ity; that is, the authority which the agent is held out to possess.
"'No man is at liberty to send another into the market to buy or sell for
him as his agent, with secret instructions as to the manner in which
he shall execute his agency, which are not to be communicated to those
with whom he is to deal, and then when his agent has deviated from
those instructions, to say that he was a special agent, that the instruc-
tions were limitations upon his authority, and that those with whom
he dealt in the matter of his agency acted at their peril, because they
were bound to inquire where inquiry would have been fruitless, and
to ascertain that of which they were not to have knowledge. It would
render dealing with a special agent a matter of great hazard. If the
principal deemed the bargain a good one, the secret orders would
continue sealed, but if his opinion were otherwise, the injunction of
secrecy would be removed and the transaction avoided, leaving the
party to such remedy as he might enforce against the agent."" If
^^Ante, §§ 18, 192. "See Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T.
"Rossiter v. Rossiter, 8 Wend. R. 12, 16.
(N. Y.) 495; Blackwell v. Ketcham, ^^ Munn v. Commission Co., 15
53 Ind. 184; Cruzan v. Smith, 41 Johns. (N. Y.) 44, 8 Am. Dec. 219.
Ind. 288; Story Ag., § 126; Smith ^'Parker, C. J., in Hatch v. Tay-
Mercantile Law (2d ed.) 59. lor, 10 N. H. 538.
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the limitation upon the authority of the agent be part and parcel
of the authority conferred,—as where it is contained in the same
written instrument, or stipulated orally in the contract of delegation
of authority,—third parties must be bound by the limitation. Thus,
if the owner of a horse send him to a market by a stranger with ex-
press directions not to warrant him, and the agent, contrar}^ to such
orders, sell him with a warranty, the owner will not be liable on the
warranty. ^^ In such a case as this the agency is special, and the
third party must ascertain what the authority is at his peril, for it
can not be maintained that there is anything about such an agency
that carries with it an implication or appearance of authority to war-
rant. If the third party demands the agent's authority, and is shown
an instrument containing the same, the principal would not be at
liberty to show that the authority so delegated was in fact limited
by private instructions that were not to be disclosed. And if the
delegation of authority was oral, and the third party, upon demand,
was informed of the nature thereof, the information being true and
in harmony with the usages and customs of trade as to the extent to
which an agent of his class generally exercises sucli authority, the
principal can not show in defense that the agent had secret instruc-
tions contravening such ostensible authority. ^^ If the authority is
fairly inferable from the terms of the authority granted, the act of
the agent in pursuance thereof, whether a general or special agent,
is binding upon the principal as to all persons who act in good faith
upon that assumption. -°
'^ Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757. principal or master will not be
" Carmichael v. Buck, 10 Rich, bound by any act of the agent not
L. (S. C.) 332, 70 Am. Dec. 226. warranted expressly by, or by fair
^^ Lister v. Allen, 31 Md. 543, 100 and necessary implication from, the
Am. Dec. 78; Westfield Bank v. Cor- terms of the authority delegated to
nen, 37 N. Y. 320; Law v. Stokes, him,"—and then proceeds to say:
3 Vroom (N. J.) 249, 90 Am. Dec. "The general rule is correct; but
655; Reynolds v. Davison, 34 Md. in the application of it to cases
662. In Lister v. Allen, supra, the affecting the rights of third per-
court adopts the general rule as to sons who have dealt with the agent
special agents laid down by Chitty; in good faith, care must be taken
namely:—"If the agent is appointed not to bind them by limitations
only for a particular purpose, and placed on the authority of the
is invested with limited powers, or, agent by the private instructions of
in other words, is a special agent, the principal, which are not known
then it is the duty of persons deal- to such third persons, nor properly
ing with such agent to ascertain inferable from the nature of the
the extent of his authority, and the agent's employment." Hence, it may
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§ 326. Principal bound by authorized acts of agent, and the means
of carrying- such acts into execution.—]\Ioreover, the agent having in
all cases the implied authority to use all the means reasonably neces-
sary to execute the powers actually conferred, it follows that the prin-
cipal is bound by the acts of the agent performed in employing such
means.^^ In accordance with this rule, it has been held that if a trav-
eling salesman is sent out by his house to sell goods on samples he may
bind the house for a livery bill contracted by him for the purpose
of transporting himself and his samples; and this without regard to
the 'fact that the principals had furnished him with money sufficient
to pay all expenses, if the liveryman was ignorant of the fact of the
agent's want of authority to have such bills charged to the princi-
pals.^^ Much depends also upon custom or usage. Thus, where it is
be stated upon the authority of
the cases cited that even though the
authority of the agent be a special
one, yet if the principal placed in
his hands such muniments of title
as authorized the third party to deal
with the agent as the owner of the
article, or as having the power of
disposition over it, and the third
party dealt with the agent in good
faith, he will be protected against
the claim of the principal, although
the agent may have violated his in-
structions; and in this regard there
is no difference between a special
and general agent.
^Huntley v. Mathias, 90 N. C.
101; Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin,
51 N. H. 56.
" Bentley v. Doggett, 51 Wis. 224.
"The real question is," said the
court, "Can the agent, having the
money of his principals in his pos-
session for the purpose of paying
such hire, by neglecting to pay for
it, charge them with the payment to
the party furnishing the same, such
party being ignorant at the time of
furnishing the same that the agent
was furnished by his principals
with money and forbidden to
pledge their credit for the same?
There can be no question that, from
the nature of the business required
to be done by their agent, the de-
fendants held out to those who
might have occasion to deal with
him, that he had the right to con-
tract for the use of teams and car-
riages necessary and convenient
for doing such business, in the
name of his principals, if he saw
fit, in the way such service is usu-
ally contracted for; and we may,
perhaps, take judicial notice that
such service is usually contracted
for, payment to be made after the
service is performed. It would
seem to follow that as the agent
had the power to bind his princi-
pals by a contract for such service,
to be paid for in the usual way,
if he neglects or refuses to pay for
the same after the service is per-
formed, the principals must pay.
The fault of the agent in not pay-
ing out of the money of his princi-
pals in his hands can not deprive
the party furnishing the service of
the right to enforce the contract
against them, he being ignorant of
the restricted authority of the
agent. If the party furnishing the
service knew that the agent had
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customary to sell property with a warranty the authority to sell will
generally imply authority to warrant, even though the agent have
no actual authority to do so.-^ But the cases concerning which such
custom prevails are usually limited to those in which the article sold
and warranted was not present and subject to the purchaser's inspec-
tion.2* Indeed, the authorities generally go so far as to hold that an <
authority to sell usually includes an authority to warrant the quality
of the article sold, if such article is not present and subject to in-
spection of the purchaser.-^ An authority to sell does not usually
imply authority to sell on credit.-^ A party who relies upon the
authority of an agent to sell on credit, based upon commercial custom
in a particular business, has the burden of showing such custom and
proving that the credit given was not unreasonable.-" And whenever
a third party deals with an agent in a manner different from the gen-
eral custom, it is the duty of such party to ascertain the extent of the
agent's authority in such dealing.-^ Authority to collect is usually
implied from the agent's possession of the paper ; but evidence of this
is indispensable, in the absence of proof of express autho^it^^^^ In
been furnished by his principal
with the money to pay for the serv-
ice, and had been forbidden to
pledge the credit of his principals
for such service, he would be in a
different position. Under such cir-
cumstances, if he furnished the
service to the agent, he would be
held to have furnished it upon the
sole credit of the agent, and he
would be compelled to look to the
agent alone for his pay. We think
the rule above stated as governing
the case is fully sustained by the
fundamental principles of law
which govern and limit the powers
of agents to bind their principals
when dealing with third persons.
. . .
In this view of the case it was im-
material what the orders of the
principal were to the agent, or that
he furnished him money to pay
these charges, so long as the per-
son furnishing the service was in
ignorance of such facts. In order
to relieve himself from liability, the
principal was bound to show that
the plaintiff had knowledge of the
restrictions placed upon his agent,
or that the custom to limit the pow-
ers of agents of this kind was so
universal that the plaintiff must be
presumed to have knowledge of
such custom."
=^ Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cow.
(N. Y.) 354; Cooley v. Perrine, 41
N. J. L. 322; Edwards v. Dillon,
147 111. 14, 37 Am. St. 199. But a
special agent to sell a horse has no
such authority: Cooley v. Perrine,
supra.
'^Talmage v, Bierhause, 103 Ind.
270; Ahern v. Goodspeed, 72 N. Y.
108.
=^Talmage v. Bierhause, 103 Ind.
270.
^'Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148,
24 L. R. A. 339.
-'Payne v. Potter, 9 Iowa 549.
=«Tldrick v. Rice, 13 Iowa 214.
"•'Kohl V. Beach, 107 Wis. 409, 81
Am. St. 849.
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a recent Illinois case it was held that a contract of guaranty against
loss is not within the implied authority of a general salesman of
goods.^" And one who holds a claim for collection has no implied
authority to receive anything in payment except money. ^^
§ 327. Principal not bound if agent had adverse interest.—The
principal is not bound for the contracts or agreements of his agent
if the latter had an adverse interest in the subject-matter of the agency,
Avhicli was at the time of the transaction known to the third party,
Imt unknown to the principal.^^ A fortiori, if the agent himself is the
adverse party, his acts are not binding on his principal.^^
§ 328. Liability of undisclosed principal.—What has been said thus
far as to the liability of the principal on the contracts of his agent
has reference to a principal who was disclosed by the agent and named
by liim in the contract on which it is sought to make the principal
liable. The agent may, however, make a contract or perform an act
for his principal, which he was authorized to make or perform, with-
out naming or disclosing his principal, or even the fact of his agency,
at the time he enters into the contract or performs the act, and the
third party may deal with the agent in ignorance of the fact that there
is a principal and of his identity. In such case the third party may,
when he discovers the principal, elect to pursue him instead of the
agent, and the former will be liable on the contract.^* "It may cer-
tainly be now regarded as a point settled beyond all possible contro-
versy that if an agent, duly authorized, makes a contract in his own
name, without disclosing his principal, and even when such principal
is entirely unknown to the other contracting party, he is nevertheless
bound, and damages may be recovered of him in an action for its
breach. By contracting in his own name the agent only adds his per-
'"Braun v. Hess, 187 111. 283, 79 =^ Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill
Am. St. 221. See to the same effect, (N. Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618;
Kinser v. Calumet Fire Clay Co., Youghiogheny Iron, etc., Co. v.
165 111. 505. Smith, 66 Pa. St. 340; Hubbard v.
^' Cram v. Sickel, 51 Neb. 828, 66 Tenbrook, 124 Pa. St. 291, 10 Am.
Am. St. 478. St. 585; Henderson v. Mayhew, 2
=- See Wassell v. Reardon, 11 Ark. Gill (Md.) 393, 41 Am. Dec. 434;
705. 54 Am. Dec. 245; Harrison v. Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn. 314, 40
McHenry, 9 Ga. 164, 52 Am. Dec. Am. Rep. 174; Trueman v. Loder,
435; Herman v. Martineau, 1 Wis. 11 A. & E. 587, 39 E. C. L. 319;
136, 151, 60 Am. Dec. 368. Smith v. Plummer, 5 Whart. (Pa.)
^^ Harrison v. McHenry, supra. 89, 34 Am. Dec. 530.
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sonal obligation to that of the person who employs him."^^ Or the
third party may knowingly prefer to deal with the agent on the
latter's own responsibilit}' and extend credit to him, whether he is
aware of the agency or identity of the principal or not, in which case
the agent, and not the principal, will be liable.^** If the credit was
given to the agent exclusively, the third party being in possession
of all the facts with reference to the agency and the identity of the
principal, no recourse can be had upon the principal.^'^ The parties
'
have a right to elect with whom they wnll deal, and another party
can not be introduced into the contract, if they determine otherwise
;
and the election being once intelligently exercised, can not be aban-
doned thereafter by one of the contracting parties.^^ But if the facts
of the agency or the identity of the principal be undisclosed, and
there is no specific election to hold the agent instead of the principal,
the latter is liable on the contract when discovered. The principal
and agent are identical, so far as the effects of the contract are con-
cerned. When the agent performs an act, the act is performed by the
principal, and the results are the same unless there are intervening
rights. WTien the agent enters into a contract, it is the principal
entering into such contract; he receives the consideration for it and
should, therefore, be subject to the corresponding liabilities. The
doctrine of the identity of the principal and the agent, and that of
holding one whose estate has been enriched at the expense of another
liable to the extent of the benefits received, both unite in laying the
foundation for the liability of an undisclosed principal, and give rise
to the further (reciprocal) liability of third parties to the princi-
pal.^^ The rule that the undisclosed principal may be made liable
to the third party, when discovered, is applicable even if the fact of
the agency was known to such third party, provided the name or iden-
^Sharswood, J., in Youghiogheny ^ Story Ag., § 447; Winchester v.
Iron, etc., Co. v. Smith, 66 Pa. St. Howard, 97 Mass. 303; Kingsley v.
340. Davis, 104 Mass. 178.
"" Pope v. Meadow Spring Dis- ^° See Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa.
tilling Co., 20 Fed. 35; Schepflin v. St. 298; Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N.
Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569. Y. 625; Irvine v. Watson, L. R. 5
=• Henderson v. Mayhew, 2 Gill Q. B. D. 414; Thomson v. Daven-
(Md.) 393, 41 Am. Dec. 434; Silver port, 9 B. & C. 78, 3 Smith Ld. Cas.
V. Jordan, 136 Mass. 319; Hyde v. (9th ed.) 1648, 17 E. C. L. 45; Ford
Paige, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 150; Jones v. Williams, 21 How. (U. S.) 287;
V. ^tna Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 501. As Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn. 314,
to what constitutes an election to 40 Am. Rep. 174.
hold the agent, see Beymer v. Bon-
sall, 79 Pa. St. 298.
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tity of the principal was unknown when the contract was made.^^^
In such case the third party may elect whether to hold the agent or
the principal; but having once exercised the choice of election, he
can not afterwards hold the party against whom he has abandoned
liis remedy. The difficult question is to determine when an election
has been made.*" It may be correctly laid down, then, as a rule, that
where an authorized agent has entered into a simple contract with a
third party, which was in fact made for his principal, but in which
the name of the principal was not disclosed, and which contract was,
on its face, in the name of the agent only, the third party may, when
he discovers the principal, abandon his remedy against the agent
and hold the principal.*^
^a Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn.
314, 40 Am. Rep. 174.
*" Ferry v. Moore, 18 111. App. 135;
Guest V. Burlington Opera House
Co., 74 Iowa 457.
"See the citations in last note;
also: Henderson v. Mayhew, 2 Gill
(Md.) 393, 41 Am. Dec. 434; May-
hew V. Graham, 4 Gill (Md.) 339,
363; Borcherling v. Katz, 37 N. J.
Eq. 150; Lovell v. Williams, 125
Mass. 439; Taintor v. Prendergast,
3 Hill (N. Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618;
Episcopal Church of Macon v. Wi-
ley, 2 Hill Eq. (S. C.) 584, 1 Riley
Ch. (S. C.) 156, 30 Am. Dec. 386;
Smith V. Plummer, 5 Whart. (Pa.)
89, 34 Am. Dee. 530; Higgins v.
Senior, 8 M. & W. 834; Woodford v.
Hamilton, 139 Ind. 481. "It has
long been settled to be a general
rule of law," said the supreme
court of Texas, in Sanger v. War-
ren, 91 Tex. 472, 66 Am. St. 913,
"that if A contracts with B, suppos-
ing him to be acting in his own
behalf, but afterwards discovers
that he was acting for C, A can
thereupon elect to hold C upon the
contract. The rule is held appli-
cable to written contracts, and, by
a process of reasoning not entirely
satisfactory, even to those required
by statute to be in writing. In the
leading case of Higgins v. Senior,
8 M. & W. 834, Parke, B., said: 'The
question in this case, which was
argued before us in the course of
the last term, may be stated to be,
whether in an action on an agree-
ment in writing, purporting on the
face of it to be made by the defend-
ant, and subscribed by him, for the
sale and delivery by him of goods
above the value of ten pounds, it is
competent for the defendant to dis-
charge himself, on an issue on the
plea of 7ion assumpsit, by proving
that the agreement was really made
by him by the authority of and as
agent for a third person, and that
the plaintiff knew those facts at the
time when the agreement was made
and signed. Upon consideration, we
think it was not; and that the rule
for a new trial must be discharged.
There is no doubt that, where such
an agreement is made, it is com-
petent to show that one or both of
the contracting parties were agents
for other persons, and acted as such
agents in making the contract, so
as to give the benefit of the con-
tract on the one hand to. and charge
with liability on the other, the un-
named principals; and this, wheth-
er the agreement be or be not re-
quired to be in writing by the stat-
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§ 329. Parol evidence to establish liability of undisclosed prin-
cipal.—It is immaterial whether the contract is written or unwritten.
ute of frauds; and this evidence in
no way contradicts the written
agreement. It does not deny that
it is binding on those whom, on
the face of it, it purports to bind;
but shows that it also binds an-
other, by reason that the act of
the agent, in signing the agree-
ment, in pursuance of his author-
ity, is in law the act of the princi-
pal. But, on the other hand, to
allow evidence to be given that the
party who appears on the face of
tne instrument to be personally a
contracting party is not such
would be to allow parol evidence
to contradict the written agreement,
which can not be done:' Beckham
V. Drake, M. & W. 79; Texas, etc.,
Co. V. Carroll, 63 Tex. 48; Heffron
V. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 15 Am. St.
764. The exceptions to the rule,
however, are so numerous, broad,
and well defined, and rest upon
principles of such a fundamental
character, that the careful student
of the law is driven to the conclu-
sion that they are more important
than the rule itself, and that the
statement of the rule in such broad
language has produced much con-
fusion of thought and greatly em-
barrassed and probably has often
misled the courts in their efforts
to apply correct legal principles to
particular cases. It is well settled
that the rule never had any applica-
tion to negotiable instruments, no
one being chargeable thereon unless
his name appears as a party to the
paper in some relation: Authori-
ties above cited. Again it has been
said that this broad doctrine, that
when an agent makes a contract in
his own name only, the known or
unknown principal may sue or be
sued thereon, may be applied in
many cases with safety, and espe-
cially in cases of informal commer-
cial contracts. But it is certain that
it can not be applied where exclu-
sive credit is given to the agent, and
it is intended by both parties that no
resort shall be had by or against the
piHncipal: Story Ag., § 160a; nor
does it apply to those cases where
skill, solvency, or any personal qual-
ity of one of the parties to the con-
tract is a material ingredient in it:
Fry Spec. Perf., § 149; Kelly v.
Thuey. 102 Mo. 522. And the court
refused to allow the undisclosed
principal to enforce specific per-
formance of a contract to convey
land on the ground that, the owner
having contracted for the notes of
the agent for deferred purchase-
money, he could not be compelled
to accept those of the principal.
Again, it is well settled that the
rule never had any application to
sealed instruments, especially those
which at common law must have
been under seal, such as convey-
ances of land: Briggs v. Partridge,
64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617; Tut-
hill V. Wilson, 90 N. Y. 423; Wal-
ters V. Northern Coal Co., 5 De G.,
M. & G. 629; Borcherling v. Katz,
37 N. J. Eq. 150; Farrar v. Lee, 10
App. Div. (N. Y.) 130, 41 N. Y.
Supp. 672; Evans V. Wells, 22 Wend.
(N. Y.) 324; Jones v. Morris, 61 Ala.
518. According to the weight of au-
thority, if the deed from Bowser
and others to Rees had been sealed
and delivered by the grantors to
Rees at common law, his acceptance
thereof would have made it his deed
to the same extent that it would
have been if signed and sealed by
him also. and that as to him it would
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or required to be in writing by the statute of frauds or not : the rule
is applicable to all contracts not specialties or negotiable by the law
have been a sealed instrument.
Therefore, an action of covenant
could have been maintained against
him, but not against his principals,
Sanders and others, on the contract
of assumption therein contained:
Finley v. Simpson, 22 N. J. L. 311,
53 Am. Dec. 252, and authorities
cited in briefs therein; Golden v.
Knapp, 41 N. J. L. 215; Sparkman
V. Gove, 44 N. J. L. 253; Atlantic
Dock Co. V. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35,
13 Am. Rep. 556; Bowen v. Beck,
94 N. Y. 86, 46 Am. Rep. 124; May-
nard v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158; Smith
V. Pocklington, 1 Cromp. & J. 445;
Vanmeter v. Vanmeter, 3 Gratt.
(Va.) 148; and authorities supra.
There are cases holding that it
would not at common law have
been considered Rees' deed, and
that covenant could not have been
maintained thereon against him:
Maule V. Weaver, 7 Pa. St. 329;
Johnson v. Muzzy, 45 Vt. 419, 12
Am. Rep. 214; Trustees v. Spencer,
7 Ohio (pt. 2) 149 (493); Goodwin
V. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510; Martin v.
Drinan, 128 Mass. 515; Hinsdale v.
Humphrey, 15 Conn. 431. Therefore,
at common law the general rule
above stated would have had no ap-
plication to the conveyance to Rees,
and his undisclosed principals would
not have been liable. We are of opin-
ion that the result is not affected by
the following statute: 'No private
seal or scroll shall be necessary to
the validity of any contract, bond,
or conveyance, whether respecting
real or personal property, or any
other instrument of writing,
whether official, judicial or private,
except such as are made by corpo-
rations, nor shall the addition or
omission of a seal or scroll in any
way affect the force and effect of the
same:' Tex. Rev. Stats.., art. 4862. It
is true the statute renders it unnec-
essary to place a seal upon a deed,
but it does not undertake to give
one executed without a seal a dif-
ferent status from what it would
have had before if executed with a
seal. On the contrary, it provides
that the addition or omission of a
seal shall not 'in any way affect
the force and effect of the same.'
In order for the omission of the
seal not to in any way affect its
force or effect, the deed must be
allowed to retain the only status
it had before. When we adopted
the common law, its settled rules
relating to the construction and
effect of deeds became a part of
our system. To them we were
compelled to resort to determine
the nature and extent of the estate
conveyed by the deed as well as
of the covenants therein contained,
and who were bound or benefited
thereby. It was not the intention
of said statute to abolish them. As
said in Jones v. Morris, 61 Ala.
518, in discussing a more compre-
hensive statute than ours: 'Though
a seal may not now be necessary
to a conveyance of a legal estate
in lands, yet the instrument, the
deed of conveyance, which it must
still be termed, though shorn of its
dignity of a seal, retains all the
operation and effect of a deed
sealed at common law. Its cove-
nants may be as comprehensive,
and, whatever they may be, are as
obligatory, and its recitals are as
incapable of being gainsaid, as if
it were sealed with the greatest
formality. The estoppel which a
sealed instrument, or its covenants.
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merchant.*- It may seem difficult to understand, at first, how one,
not on the face of a written contract a part}' to it, can be brought into
it without violating the rule that a written iustrimient can not
be contradicted or varied by parol evidence. Parol testimony is ad-
missible, however, to show that some one not named in the contract
as the obligor was in fact the principal contracting party; and what-
ever may be the merits of the doctrine, it is now firmly settled that
the admission of parol evidence is not in violation of the rule men-
tioned. The evidence is not admitted to vary or contradict the writ-
ten contract; it is jJroposed in such case to prove by the testimony
offered, not that the instrument is not binding upon those whom it
purports to bind, but that it is binding also upon another, for the rea-
son that when the agreement was entered into by the agent it was
in law the act of the principal, the two being regarded as identical.''^
§ 330. Qualification of doctrine of liability of undisclosed prin-
cipal—English and American cases.—The doctrine of the liability of
an undisclosed principal is to be qualified, however, by certain excep-
tions now to be mentioned. The English courts now hold that where
the third party has by his words or conduct misled the principal so
as to cause him to believe that the agent and third party have come
to a settlement, and relying upon this the principal pays the agent
or settles with him, the third party can not afterwards sue the prin-
created at common law it is now cessity of affixing a seal to a deed;
claimed by the appellee shall be but in other respects,—as, for in-
attached to the conveyance by the stance, with reference to the doc-
agents of the appellant. And we trine of estoppel,—the deed retains
can not doubt that the estoppel the incidents it possessed as a
which at common law grew out of sealed instrument at common law.'
the covenants or the recitals of a The effect of the statute is differ-
sealed instrument attaches now to ent as to other contracts, for the
an unsealed conveyance of the legal placing of the seal thereon at com-
estate in lands. The statute is not mon law raised them from parol to
so broad in its sweep as to blot out specialty contracts, which can not
the common-law principles which be done under the statute."
give security to conveyances of ^- See the cases in last note.
real estate. It would be fearful, in- "^ Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W.
deed, if this was the operation of 834; Watteau v. Fenwick, L. R.
the statute, and the freehold in (1893) 1 Q. B. 346; Ford v. Wil-
lands was not invested with greater liams, 21 How. (U. S.) 287; Bying-
dignity than the fleeting ownership ton v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 45
of chattels.' Devlin Deeds, § 249, Am. Rep. 314; Gates v. Brower, 9
says: 'The effect of these statutes N. Y. 205, 59 Am. Dec. 530; Chand-
is simply to dispense with the ne- ler v. Coe, 54 N. H. 561.
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cipal, his conduct in such case constituting an estoppel in pais.**
According to these cases, an undiscovered principal would not be jus-
" Irvine v. Watson, L. R. 5 Q. B.
D. 414; Davison v. Donaldson, L.
R. 9 Q. B. D. 623; Heald v. Ken-
worthy, 10 Ex. 739, 24 L. J. (Ex.)
76. The modern English rule is so
lucidly enunciated by Bramwell, L.
J., in the case of Irvine v. Watson,
just cited, that we deem it profita-
ble to copy a portion of his opinion
here. He says: "I am of opinion
that the judgment must be aflirmed.
The facts of the case are shortly
these: The plaintiffs sold certain
casks of oilj and on the face of the
contract of sale Conning appeared
as the purchaser. But the plaintiffs
knew that he was only an agent
buying for principals, for he told
them so at the time of the sale,
therefore they knew that they had
a right against somebody besides
Conning. On the other hand, the
defendants knew that somebody or
other had a remedy against them,
for they had authorized Conning,
who was an ordinary broker, to
pledge their credit, and the invoice
specified the goods to have been
bought 'per John Conning.' Then,
that being so, the defendants paid
the broker, and the question is
whether such payment discharged
them from their liability to the
plaintiffs. I think it is impossible
to say that it discharged them, un-
less they were misled by some con-
duct of the plaintiffs into the be-
lief that the broker had already
settled with the plaintiffs, and made
such payment in consequence of
such belief. But it is contended
that the plaintiffs here did mislead
the defendants into such belief, by
parting with the possession of the
oil to Conning without getting the
money. The terms of the contract
were 'cash on or before delivery,'
and it is said that the defendants
had a right to suppose that the sel-
lers would not deliver unless they
received payment of the price at
the time of delivery. I do not
think, however, that that is a cor-
rect view of the case. The plain-
tiffs had a perfect right to part
with the oil to the broker without
insisting strictly upon their right
to prepayment, and there is, in my
opinion, nothing in the facts of the
case to justify the defendants in
believing that they would so insist.
No doubt if there was an invaria-
ble custom in the trade to insist
on prepayment where the terms of
the contract entitled the seller to
it, that might alter the matter; and
in such case non-insistence on pre-
payment might discharge the buyer
if he paid the broker on the faith
of the seller already having been
paid. But that is not the case
here; the evidence before Bowen,
J., shows that there is no invariable
custom to that effect. Apart from
all authorities, then, I am of opinion
that the defendants' contention is
wrong, and upon looking at the au-
thorities I do not think that any of
them are in direct conflict with that
opinion. It is true that in Thomson
V. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78, both Lord
Tenterden and Bayley, J., suggest
in the widest terms that a seller is
not entitled to sue the undisclosed
principal on discovering him, if in
the meantime the state of the ac-
count between the principal and the
agent has been altered to the prej-
udice of the principal. But it is im-
possible to construe the dicta of
those learned judges in that case lit-
erally; it would operate most un-
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tified in settling with his agent, and would be in danger of incurring
liability to the third party also, unless such third party had, by liis
representations or conduct, or both, induced or misled the principal
to settle with the agent. The majority of American decisions are
to the effect that an undisclosed principal is not liable to the third
party on a contract made by his agent, if the state of the accounts
between the principal and his agent has been so altered that it would
result in injury to the principal were he obliged to pay or settle
again with the third party.* ^ It can not be said, however, that the
American decisions are uniform upon the subject. The courts of
Louisiana and Maryland, and perhaps others, are disposed to follow
the modern English rule.*" It is thus seen that there is a manifest
difference between what is generally spoken of as the American rule
and that which is at present applied in England. According to the
American rule, the principal may safely settle with the agent at any
time before he is discovered, and he will not be liable. By the
English rule, the duty of settling with the third party devolves upon
the principal from the time the contract is entered into until it has
been fully discharged, and he will only be justified in settling with the
agent if he has been misled into doing so by the words or conduct of
the third party. The American authorities are based upon the ruling
of Lord Tenterden and Bayley, J., in the case of Thomson v. Daven-
port." This ruling, or dictum, as it is now generally regarded, has
been expressly repudiated by the English courts in the cases above
cited, while the courts in this country have generally adhered to it,
justly to the vendor if we did. made by the seller either by words
I think the judges who uttered or conduct, the seller can not after-
them did not intend a strictly wards throw off the mask and sue
literal interpretation to be put on the principal.' That is in my judg-
their words. But whether they did ment a much more accurate state-
or not, the opinion of Parke, B., in ment of the law."
Heald v. Kenworthy, 10 Ex. 739, 24 ^^ Story Ag., § 449; Parsons Conts.
L. J. (Ex.) 76, seems to me prefer- 63; Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 Ind.
able; it is this, that, 'If the coiv 248; McCullough v. Thompson, 45
duct of the seller would make it N. Y. Super. Ct. 449; Laing v. But-
unjust for him to call upon the ler, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 144; Knapp
buyer for the money, as, for exam- v. Simon, 96 N. Y. 284; Pradley v.
pie, where the principal is induced Hyland, 37 Fed. 49. See Emerson
by the conduct of the seller to pay v. Patch, 123 Mass.' 541.
his agent the money on the faith *" Hyde v. Wolf, 4 La. 234, 23 Am.
that the agent and seller have come Dec. 484 and note on p. 486, citing
to a settlement on the matter, or if other cases,
any representation to that effect is *^ 9 B. & C. 78. See note 44, supra.
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and it has been approved by Story and Parsons. Mr. Mechem regards
the present English doctrine as "eminently reasonable and just."**
Whether our courts will eventually accept the views of Mr. Mechem
and the later English cases, or those of Story and Parsons and the
American decisions that have followed Lord Tenterden and Mr. Jus-
tice Bayley, remains to be seen. It may be said, therefore, that the
right of the third j^arty to proceed against the principal, when dis-
covered, is subject to the exception that if the principal has in good
faith paid or settled with the agent, in whole or in part, then to the
extent of such payment or settlement he would be discharged from
liability to the third party also. What constitutes good faith on the
part of the principal is to be determined by the rule obtaining in the
particular jurisdiction in which the question arises. If in such juris-
diction the old English rule is followed, then it is immaterial, it seems,
whether the principal was misled into making such payment or settle-
ment by the conduct of the third party or not, provided the payment or
settlement was made before he was discovered as being the principal.
If what we designate as the modern English rule governs, then the
settlement will be no defense, unless the principal was misled into it
by the conduct or representations of the third party. The former is
believed to be the prevailing rule in this country.
§ 331. Further exception—Election by third party.—The liability
of an undisclosed principal on the authorized contract of his agent is
subject to the further exception that if, after such principal has been
discovered, the third party knowingly elects to hold the agent liable,
he is precluded from afterwards pursuing the principal ; the liability
to the third party is not a joint liability of the agent and principal.
The third party may treat the contract as that of the principal, which
it really was. It is only the agent's own conduct or concealment of
the true principal, or the holding himself out as such principal, that
renders such agent liable at the option of the third party. If, after
discovering the real contracting party, he chooses to hold him to the
contract that he has authorized his a'gent to make for him, his remedy
is exhausted; provided, of course, the choice is made knowingly; but
he can not hold them both liable.*'' The rule of election applies not
*' Mechem Ag., § 697. Barb. (N. Y.) 150; Ranken v. De-
^^ Silver v. Jordan, 136 Mass. 319; forest, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 143; Meek-
Hyde V. Wolf, 4 La. 234, 23 Am. er v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349; Hen-
Dec. 484; Schepflln v. Dessar, 20 derson v. Mayhew, 2 Gill (Md.) 393,
Mo. App. 569; Hyde v. Paige, 9 41 Am. Dec. 434; Addison v. Gan-
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only to the case of an undisclosed, but to that of a known principal
also.
§ 332. How question of election determined.—Whether or not there
nas been an election made b}^ the third person is a question that is not
always free from doubt; for it must appear clearly that the choice
was made with full knowledge of all the facts, and that full freedom
of choice was exercised. Generally speaking, the question is one of
fact for the jury, under the direction of the court. ^° There is in such
case at least a prima facie presumption that the credit was given to
the principal, and not to the agent; and if the plaintiff relies on the
fact that credit was given to the agent, the plaintiff has the burden
of establishing the fact by clear proof. ^^ The mere fact that the third
party has commenced an action against the agent, even after the dis-
covery of the principal, is not conclusive evidence of an election,
such as will discharge the principal ;^^ nor is the fact, that, after dis-
covery of the principal, demand was made upon the agent for the sum
due.^^ Whether the taking of a judgment against the agent after the
principal has been discovered is conclusive, is not certain; indeed, it
has been held that nothing less than satisfaction of such a judgment
would bar an action against the other party.^* But the contrary has
been held in England.^^ And so it has been ruled in Massachusetts
that the prosecution of the claim to final judgment is a bar.^® It
is difficult to lay down a rule that will apply to all cases. Wliether
or not there has been an election must, of course, depend upon the
peculiar circumstances of each case. There can not be said to be
freedom of choice when the facts are not all known to the third party,
dassequi, 4 Taunt. 573, 3 Smith Ld. Mills, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 319; Fery v.
Cas. (9th ed.) 1641; Pope v. Mead- Moore, 18 111. App. 135; Beymer v,
ow Spring Distilling Co., 20 Fed. 35; Bonsall, 79 Pa. St. 298.
Ahrens v. Cobb, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) =^ Calder v. Dobell, L. R. 6 C. P.
643. 486.
^Maryland Coal Co. v. Edwards, "Beymer v. Bonsall, supra; Ma-
4 Hun (N. Y.) 432; Cobb v. Knapp, pie v. Railroad Co., 40 Ohio St. 313,
71 N. Y. 348, 27 Am. Rep. 51; Cur- 48 Am. Rep. 685.
tis v. Williamson, L. R. 10 Q. B. =^ Paterson v. Gandassequi, 15
57; Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn. 314, East 62, 3 Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.)
40 Am. Rep. 174. 1634.
"Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. '^^ Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass.
349. 178.
'^Raymond v. Crown and Eagle
22
—
Principal and Agent.
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or when the means of making such choice are not all in his possession
;
and in acting without such knowledge the act does not constitute an
election. Nor is it sufficient, it seems, that the party acting has the
means of ascertaining the facts, but does not make further inquiry,
unless he knows who the real principal is. Though he be informed
that there is a principal, and though he fail to pursue the inquiry,
he will not be bound by the choice.^^
g 333. Additional exception—Undisclosed principal can not be
made liable on sealed instruments.—Where the contract executed by
the agent is a specialty,—that is, an instrument required by the com-
mon law to be under seal,—the general rule is that the principal can
not be held bound by it unless it is executed in his name. This is an
additional exception to the rule that the third party may hold the real
principal when he discovers him. This exception is founded upon the
inflexible common-law rule that forbids the introduction into such a
contract of parties whose names do not appear upon the face of the
same. On such a contract, therefore, no one is liable but the agent.^*
As to instruments in which a seal, though used, is not actually re-
quired, they may render the principal liable in assumpsit on the prom-
ise contained in the instrument, provided the principal's interest in
the contract appear on the face thereof and he have received the bene-
fits of its provisions.^®
§ 334. Another exception—Negotiable instruments.—Still another
exception to the liability of an undisclosed principal, when discovered,
is in cases of negotiable instruments. Generally, by the strict rule
of the law merchant, one who is not a party to a negotiable instrument
is not bound by it; hence an undisclosed principal can not be made
liable on such an instrument when the agent has contracted personally
" Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. & er v. Warren, 91 Tex. 472, 66 Am.
C. 78, 3 Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.) St. 913. See note 33, supra, on this
1648; Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn, point.
314, 40 Am. Rep. 174. '"'' Dubois v. Delaware, etc.. Canal
=^'Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. Co., 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 285; Lawrence
357, 21 Am. Rep. 617; Clarke v. v. Taylor, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 107; Moore
Courtney, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 350; Bor- v. Granby Mining, etc., Co., 80 Mo.
cherling v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. 150;^ 86; Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229,
Kiersted v. Orange, etc., R. Co., 69* 55 Am. Dec. 330; Briggs v. Part-
N. Y. 343; Huntington v. Knox, 7 ridge. 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617;
t:!ush. (Mass.) 371; Elwell v. Shaw, Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns.
16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126; Sang- (N. Y.) 60.
339 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSONS. § 335
and in his own name.^" By the rules of the law merchant each holder
of the paper takes it upon what it purports to be on the face thereof^
and parties not named in such contract can not be brought into it by
parol. Such an instrument passes from hand to hand as money, and
must be accepted in the character in which it appears and circulates.
II. Liability of Principal for Agent's Torts.
§ 335. Doctrine of identity the basis of principal's liability.—Hav-
ing now discussed the duties and liabilities of the principal upon the
contracts of his agent, we pass to the consideration of his liability
for the torts of the agent. It is a general principle of law, as well
as of the social compact, that every one must so conduct himself in
the enjoyment of the privileges of life and property as not to injure
the person or property of others. But if a man can not with impunity
perform an injurious act in person, neither can he do so by or through
the instrumentality of another. In law the principal and his agent,
or the master and his servant, are regarded as identical, at least in
the performance of every authorized act. "Qui per alium facit, per
seipsum facere mdetur" is the maxim that applies here—"whatever a
person does through another is the same as if he had done it himself .''
This identity of the principal and agent is sometimes spoken of as a
fiction, but it conserves a rational public policy when properly applied.
If a legal wrong is committed by an accountable being, the party in-
jured may obtain redress therefor in damages. If the wrong was
' committed by his authorized agent, or servant, the result is the same.
By "authorized agent" it is not meant to imply that the wrongful act
itself must be authorized by the principal or master, or that any pre-
sumption of that nature must be indulged before the principal can be
held responsible : it is sufficient if the agent was authorized to perform
the act in the performance of which the wrong was committed; for
the principal is responsible, not only for the act itself, but for the ways
and means employed in the performance thereof. The principal may
be perfectly innocent of any actual wrong or of any complicity therein,
but this will not excuse him, for the party who was injured by the
;
wrongful act is also innocent ; and the doctrine is that where one of
two or more innocent parties must suffer loss by the wrongful act of
""Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush.
517; Sturdivant v. Hull, 59 Me. 172; (Mass.) 371; Slawson v. Loring, 5
Powers v. Briggs, 79 111. 493; Brown Allen (Mass.) 340; Sparks v. Dis-
y. Parker, 7 Allen (Mass.) 337; patch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531.
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another, it is more reasonable and just that he should suffer it who
has placed the real wrongdoer in a position which enabled him to com-
mit the wrongful act, rather than the one who had nothing whatever
to do with setting in motion the cause of such act.^^ "In such cases,"
says Stor}'', "the rule applies {respondeat superior), and it is founded
upon public policy and convenience, for in no other way could there
be any safety to third persons in their dealings, either directly with
the principal, or indirectly with him, through the instrumentality
of agents. In every such case the principal holds out his agent as
competent and fit to be trusted, and thereby, in effect, he warrants his
fidelity and good conduct in all matters within the scope of the
agency."®^
§ 336. Principal liable for wrongful acts of agent done in course
of employment.—Of course, if the master or principal authorized or
ratified the tort, or participated in it himself, he will be liable for
the damages occasioned by it.®* But if he did not authorize or ratify
it he will still be liable if it was done in the course of the agent's
or servant's employment;^* and this is so even if the master or prin-
cipal had actually forbidden the act to be done.®^ The test is, whether
the tort was committed in the course of the employment of the servant
or agent : if the wrongful act complained of was outside of the course
of such employment, the master or principal is not liable, unless it
was subsequently ratified. Consequently, where an armed watchman
was employed to guard a brewery and prevent breaches of the peace,
and a person came about the premises intoxicated and disorderly, and
was pursued, and while retreating, shot by the watchman, the shooting
was held not to be in the line of the watchman's employment, and the
owners of the brewery were held not liable.*'*' But a railroad company
is liable for the acts of its conductor or other servants having authority
'^Lee V. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 Power, 87 N. Y. 535; Howe v. New-
N, Y. 442. march, 12 Allen (Mass.) 49; Mer-
"- Story Ag., § 452. chants' Nat'l Bank v. Guilmartin,
"^Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 88 Ga. 797; Moir v. Hopkins, 16 111.
330. 313, 63 Am. Dec. 312.
"* Turner v. North Beach, etc., R. "° Turner v. North Beach, etc., R.
Co., 34 Cal. 594; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., supra: Oakland City, etc., So-
Co. v. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399, 52 Am. ciety v. Bingham, supra: Moir v.
Rep. 675; Rounds v. Delaware, etc., Hopkins, supra.
R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129, 21 Am. Rep. ""Golden v. Newbrand, 52 Iowa
597; Oakland City, etc.. Society v. 59, 35 Am. Rep. 257.
Bingham, 4 Ind. App. 545; Quinn v.
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to eject trespassers, if siic-li conductor or other servant in ejecting
such trespasser uses more force than is reasonably necessary to accom-
plish such ejection.*'" The test whether the act was committed in the
line of eiiployment or not is not applicable, generally, when such act
consisted of an assault or other trespass upon or injury to a passenger
while being carried on a train, boat or other vehicle operated by a
carrier of passengers. In such case the carrier owes the passenger
the duty of safe conduct and protection from all injury by any one,
whether a servant of such carrier or not; it therefore makes no dif-
ference in the passenger's liability whether the injury is inflicted by
a servant in the course of his employment or not.®^
§ 337. Liability for agent's negligence.—One of the classes of torts
for which the principal is responsible in damages, if committed by
the agent in course of the employment, is that of negligence. This
class of torts arises most frequently in the relation of master and
servant, though torts of this character also occur in the relation of
principal and agent. If a locomotive-engineer, who is the servant of
a railroad company, a common carrier of passengers and freight, so
negligently run his train as to cause a derailment, and an injury
result, the company will be liable in damages for the negligence of
the engineer. This is a case of master and servant. The same rule
applies in a case of principal and agent. Thus, if the owner of a
certain estate place the same in charge of an agent or manager, and
the latter negligently permit the houses thereon to go to decay ; or if,
in erecting a building on the premises, the work be done so negligently
and unskillfully by the direction of the agent as to cause the building
to fall over, in either of these cases there will be such negligence by
the agent that a person injured in consequence thereof will have his
remedy in an action of damages against the principal. In either case,
however, the act negligently done or omitted must be within the scope
or course of the employment of the agent or servant, or there will be
" Hoffman v. New York, etc., R. "* See the exhaustive note in 41
Co., 87 N. Y. 25, 41 Am. Rep. 337; Am. Rep., at p. 340. See also.
Rounds v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 64 Dwindle v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
N. Y. 129, 21 Am. Rep. 597; Chicago, 120 N. Y. 117; Bryant v. Rich, 106
etc., R. Co. v. Flexman, 103 111. 546; Mass. 180; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v.
Craker v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 36 Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512; Dillingham v.
"Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504; McKin- Russell, 73 Tex. 47; 3 Thompson
ley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 44 Iowa Neg. (2d ed.), § 3162, et seq.
314, 24 Am. Rep. 748. See 3 Thomp-
son Neg. (2d ed.), § 3302, et seq.
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no liability ou the part of the principal. Hence it ma}- be correctly
stated that if an agent or servant, while in the course of the employ-
ment of the principal or master, perform an act in a negligent or
reckless manner, and an injury result to a third party, the principal
will be liable in damages for such injury.^^
§ 338. Not necessary that act should have been authorized by
principal if done in course of employment.—The basis of liability in
such cases is not the presumption that the tort has been committed
with the assent or by the authority of the principal or master, for it
is immaterial whether the principal assented or authorized the wrong
or not, if it occurred in the course of the employment of the agent
or servant.^" It is rather on the ground of public policy that the
principal is held responsible: he has introduced the agent to the
business world, as it were, and he thereby vouches for the agent's
skill and competency, and that he will exercise such skill as well as
the requisite care in the transaction of his business. It is essential,
however, that the injury occurred while the agent or servant was
within the scope of his employment. ^ATien this is established or
admitted, the principal's liability is clear, and it is immaterial whether
the person who inflicted the injury was an agent or a servant. '^^
§ 339. Meaning of scope or course of employment—Illustrative
cases.—Just what is meant by the scope or course of the employment
is not always easy to determine ; for a person may be within the scope
of the employment for some purposes and not for others. In cases of
negligence by a servant or agent, he is in the course of the employ-
ment when he is doing his master's work or performing the task of his
principal. It is not necessary that he should be obeying the master's
command at the moment when the injurious deed is committed, or the
omission occurs, for then the agent could only bind the principal
by authorized acts. He must, however, Idc engaged in the service
of his employer or principal and must be in the prosecution of it when
the wrong is committed, and there must be no willful departure from
"'Garretzen v. Diienckel, 50 Mo. N. Y. 255, 10 Am. Rep. 361; Cleve-
104, 11 Am. Rep. 405; McKenzie v. land v. Newsom, 45 Mich. 62.
M'Leod, 10 Bing. 385; Higgins v. '" Higgins v. Watervliet Turnpike
Watervliet Turnpike Co., 46 N. Y. Co., supra.
23, 7 Am. Rep. 293; Pittsburg, etc., ''See Wilson v. Owens, 16 L. R.
R. Co. V. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399, 52 Ir. 225; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Ralin,
Am. Rep. 675; Armstrong v. Cooley, 132 U. S. 518; Pollock Torts (4th
10 111. 509; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 ed.) 260; Maier v. Randolph. 33 Kan.
340.
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such employment or service.'- Xo inflexible rule can be laid down
for determining whether or not the agent is within the scope of his
employment when the injury was committed, and every case must be
determined by its own peculiar facts. A few of the most frequently
occurring instances may be cited in which the agent or ser\^ant would
be within the course of his employment at the time of the injury.
Thus, if a servant be set to cutting timber on his master's land, and
he ignorantly cut trees on the land of another ;^^ or if a father
send his son in search of his (the father's) cattle, and the son igno-
rantly take with them other cattle belonging to a neighbor;''* or
where a man's servant, in the ordinary course of business, obstructs
the public highway, by which a third person is injured ;^^ or where
a locomotive-engineer on a moving train fails to sound the whistle
of his engine, as required by law, or according to custom, and a
person is injured thereby;"'' or where a telegraph operator mistakenly
or purposely sends a different message from the one delivered to
him,^''—in all these cases the master or servant is liable, the act being
deemed in the course of the employment. Among the instances in
which the agent or servant has been held not to be acting within the
course of his emplojanent, but independently thereof, may be men-
tioned the following:—AMiere a servant borrowed liis master's team
for his own private use, and while driving it injured another;''® and
where section men, emplo3'ed to repair a railroad track, kindled a fire
on the right of way for the purpose of cooking a meal, and left the fire
unextinguished, and it spread and caused injury to adjoining prop-
erty.''^ And it has been held that if a servant driving a carriage of
his master, in order to effect some purpose of his own, wantonly strikes
the horse of another person, producing an accident, the master is not
liable; but if, in order to perform his master's orders, he strikes, but
injudiciously, and in order to extricate himself from a difficulty,—that
will be negligent and careless conduct, for which the master will be
liable, being an act done in pursuance of the servant's authority.*"
'" Moir V. Hopkins, 16 111. 313, 63 " Harlow v. Humiston, 6 Cow. (N.
Am. Dec. 312; Johnson v. Barber, Y.) 189.
10 111. 425, 50 Am. Dec. 416; Arm- '^ Goodfellow v. Boston, etc., R.
strong V. Cooley, 10 111. 519; Tuller Co., 106 Mass. 461.
V. Voght, 13 111. 277; May v. Bliss, '^ New York, etc., Tel. Co. v. Dry-
22 Vt. 477; Luttrell v. Hazen, 3 burg, 35 Pa. St. 298.
Sneed (Tenn.) 20. "Bard v. Yohn, 26 Pa. St. 482.
" Luttrell v. Hazen, supra. ''^ Morier v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co.,
^Andrus v. Howard, 36 Vt. 248, 31 Minn. 351.
84 Am. Dec. 680. ^ Croft v. Alison, 4 B. & Aid. 590.
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§ 340. Relation of principal and agent or master and servant
must exist at time tort is committed.—The question in such cases
alwaj's is, whether at the time the injury was committed the agent
or servant was serving the principal or master. The principal is
not liable if the agent was at the time acting for himself, although
this was but temporarily so: the relation of principal and agent or
master and servant must subsist at the time.*^ Hence, if a person
borrow a horse from the owner, and the borrower, by negligently
driving, cause an injury to a third person, the owner of the horse
will not be liable, for there is no relation of master and servant or
principal and agent between the borrower and the owner. *^ And
where the servant of a livery-stable keeper drove a horse immoder-
ately and thereby killed the animal, such driving being entirely un-
authorized by the keeper of the stable, and solely for purposes of the
driver's own, the master was held not liable.^^
§ 341. Liability for willful wrong of agent or servant.—We pass
now to consider whether a principal or master is liable for a tort
committed willfully by his agent or servant. There is no doubt as
to his liability, of course, if the wrongful act was done at his command
or by his direction, connivance or acquiescence; in such a case,
the fact that he stands to the perpetrator in the relation of principal
or master does not render his accountability different from that of any
other tort-feasor, if he is shown to have been a participant in the in-
jurious deed. On the other hand, if t^e injury was done by the
agent or servant while outside the scope of his employment, it is
equally clear that there is no liability on the part of principal or
master, unless the act was authorized by him.^* The question that
most concerns us, however, is whether, as in cases of negligence,
he is also liable when the injury was perpetrated in the course of
the employment of the agent or servant, but without knowledge or
consent on his part, or in violation of his express direction. It was
formerly thought that when the wrongful and unauthorized act of
the servant or agent was done willfully or maliciously, that was
See also, McKenzie v. M'Leod, 10 "Adams v. Cost, 62 Md. 264, 50
Bing. 3^5. Am. Rep. 211. See also, Stevens v.
« Joel v. Morison, 6 C. & P. 501; Woodward, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 318.
Bard v. Yohn, 26 Pa. St. 482; Mitch- ^ M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East 106;
ell V. Crassweller, 13 C. B. 237. Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479,
s^Herlihy v. Smith, 116 Mass. 9 Am. Dec. 168.
265.
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of itself sufficient evidence of its not being done in the course of
the employment; for in such circumstances the relation of master
and servant or principal and agent could not be said to subsist, the
act itself being a departure from the business of the master or prin-
cipal; and there are many cases to support this doctrine.*^ The
modern decisions, however, at least in this country, tend to support
the rule that if the willful or intentional mischief was done by the
agent or servant within the scope of the employment, the principal
or master is liable.^*' "The test of the liability of the master is," say
the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, "that the act of the serv-
ant is done in the course of doing the master's work, and for the
purpose of accomplishing it. If so done, it is the act of the master,
and he is responsible whether the wrong done be occasioned by negli-
'^ Wright V. Wilcox, 19 Wend. (N.
Y.) 343, 32 Am. Dec. 507; Richmond
Turnpike Co. v. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill
(N. Y.) 480; Whitaker v. Eighth
Ave. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 295; Rounds v.
Delaware, etc., R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129,
21 Am. Rep. 597; M'Manus v. Crick-
ett, 1 East 106; Lyons v. Martin, 8
A. & E. 512; Peachey v. Rowland, 13
C. B. 182; Adams v. Cost, 62 Md.
264, 50 Am. Rep. 211; Croft v. Ali-
son, 4 B. & Aid. 590.
^Williams v. Pullman, etc., Co.,
40 La. Ann. 87, 8 Am. St. 512; Levi
V. Brooks, 121 Mass. 501; Goddard
V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202,
2 Am. Rep. 39; Jeffersonville R. Co.
V. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116, 10 Am. Rep.
103; McKinley v. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 44 Iowa 314, 24 Am. Rep. 748;
Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Rice, 38
Kan. 398, 5 Am. St. 766; Sherley v.
Billings, 8 Bush (Ky.) 147, 8 Am.
Rep. 451; Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc.,
R. Co., 90 N. Y. 588, 43 Am. Rep.
185; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Vandi-
ver, 42 Pa. St. 365, 372; Dillingham
V. Russell, 73 Tex. 47; Gilliam v.
South, etc., R. Co., 70 Ala. 268; Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co. v. Flexman, 103
111. 546; Chicago City R. Co. v. Mc-
Mahon, 103 111. 485; Craker v. Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co., 36 Wis. 657; Nash-
ville, etc., R. Co. V. Starnes, 9 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 52, 24 Am. Rep. 296; Mott
V. Consumers' Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543;
Meyer v. Second Ave. R. Co., 8
Bosw. (N. Y.) 305; Quigley v. Cen-
tral Pac. R. Co., 11 Nev. 350; Stew-
art V. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co., 90 N.
Y. 588, 43 Am. Rep. 185. "The lia-
bility of the principal is not af-
fected by the fact that the tort
was willfully committed, for it is
now firmly settled that whether the
wrong results from negligence or is
the product of willfulness, the prin-
cipal is responsible if it was com-
mitted within the line of the agent's
duty:" Elliott, J., in Evansville,
etc., R. Co. V. McKee, 99 Ind. 519,
520. And on page 521 of the same
case, the learned judge further says:
"The rules we have stated lead to
the conclusion that the principal is
liable for the tort of the agent,
where the particular act, although
willful and not directly authorized,
was within the line of the agent's
duty; but if the act was an inde-
pendent one, and not within the
scope of the agency, the person in-
jured can not compel the principal
to respond in damages."
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gence, or by a wanton and reckless purpose to accomplish the master's
business in an unlawful manner."®^ And in a New York case it was
said by Andrews, J., speaking for the court: "The master who
puts the servant in a place of trust or responsibility, or commits to
him the management of his business or the care of his property, is
justly held responsible when the servant, through lack of judgment
or discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence
of passion aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond
the strict line of his duty or authority and inflicts an unjustifiable
injury upon another."^
^
§ 342. Kule is applicable to corporations.—The rule applies to
corporations that are principals as well as to individuals occupying
a similar relation.^'' It has been held, however, that a corporation will
not be liable for the malicious prosecution of a third person by one
of its agents, unless the act has been expressly authorized or
subsequently ratified.^** In a Massachusetts case, decided in 1893,
the action was for damages against an educational corporation for
*'Levi v. Brooks, 121 Mass. 501.
*' Rounds v. Delaware, etc., R. Co.,
64 N. Y. 129, 21 Am. Rep. 597. "To
constitute a willful injury the act
which produced it must have been
intentional, or must have been done
under such circumstances as evinced
a reckless disregard for the safety
of others and a willingness to inflict
the injury complained of. It in-
volves conduct which is quasi-crim-
inal:" Per Mitchell, J., in Louis-
ville, etc., R. Co. V. Bryan, 107 Ind.
51. "Our decisions recognize the
doctrine that where the act of the
wrongdoer is so recklessly done, in
disregard of the probable conse-
quences, a willingness or intention
to inflict the injury which results
therefrom may be implied, and a
distinction between an actual inten-
tion to do the injury and a construc-
tive one is shown:" Per Jordan, J.,
in Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Miller,
149 Ind. 490, 500. "Willfulness does
not consist in negligence. On the
contrary, . . . the two terms
are incompatible. Negligence arises
from inattention, thoughtlessness,
or heedlessness, while willfulness
can not exist without purpose or de-
sign. No purpose or design can be
said to exist where the injurious act
results from negligence, and negli-
gence can not be of such a degree as
to become willfulness:" Parker v.
Pennsylvania Co., 134 Ind. 673, quot-
ed \Nath approval in Cleveland, etc.,
R. Co. V. Miller, supra.
*' Hanson v. European, etc., R. Co.,
62 Me. 84, 16 Am. Rep. 404; Erie
City Iron WorTts v. Barber, 106 Pa.
St. 125, 51 Am. Rep. 508; Nims v.
Mount Hermon Boys' School, 160
Mass. 177; Goodspeed v. East Had-
dam Bank, 22 Conn. 530, 58 Am. Dec.
439; Williams v. Planters' Ins. Co.,
57 Miss. 759, 34 Am. Rep. 494.
""Dally V. Young, 3 111. App. 39;
Carter v. Howe Machine Co., 51 Md.
290, 34 Am. Rep. 311.
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personal injury occasioned to a passenger for hire, upon a boat
used as a public ferry operated by the corporation, through the negli-
gence of the ferr3aiian in managing the boat. The defendant pleaded
that the act was ultra vires, but the court held that this was not a good
defense. The court said: "It is a general rule that corporations
are liable for their torts as natural persons are. It is no defense to
an action for a tort that the corporation is not authorized by its
charter to do wrong. Eecovery may be had against corporations for
assault and battery, for libel and for malicious prosecution, as well
as for torts resulting from negligent management of the corporate
business. * * * If a corporation by its officers or agents unlaw-
fully injures a person, whether intentionally or negligently, it would
be most unjust to allow it to escape responsibility on the ground
that its act is ultra vires. The only plausible ground on which the
defendant in the present case can contend that it should be exempt
from liability for the negligence of its servant in managing the ferry-
boat is that the contract to carry the plaintiff was ultra vires, and
therefore invalid, and that the duty for neglect of which the plaintiff
sues arose out of the contract, and disappears with it when the con-
tract appears to be void." The court overruled the contention of
counsel, however, and held the defendant liable upon the ground that
the acts of such corporation were not different in kind from the
ordinary acts of corporations in excess of the powers given them by
their charter. "We are of opinion, therefore," the court continued,
"that if the defendant, while running the ferryboat, accepted the
plaintiff as a passenger to be transported for hire, and undertook
to carry him across the river, he was in the boat as a licensee, and
it owed him the duty to use proper care to carry him safely, and,
whether an action could be maintained for a breach of contract or
not, it is liable to the plaintiff in an action of tort for neglect of that
duty.®^
§ 343. Liability of principal for fraud of agent.—A principal is
liable also for the fraud of his agent in the transaction of the business
intrusted to the agent by the principal, whether the fraud was author-
"Nims V. Mount Hermon Boys' Miss. 759, 34 Am. Rep. 494; Phila-
School, 160 Mass. 177. See also, delphia, etc., R. Co. v. Quigley, 21
Vance v. Erie R. Co., 32 N. J. L. How. (U. S.) 202; Gruber v. Wash-
334; Goodspeed v. East Haddam ington, etc., R. Co., 92 N. C. 1; Mer-
Bank, 22 Conn. 530, 58 Am. Dec. 439; cliants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall.
Williams v. Planters' Ins. Co., 57 (U. S.) 604.
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ized by him or not.^- Tims, if an agent, appointed to sell property,
in the course of the sale make false and fraudulent representations
concerning its value and quality, and what the principal paid for it,
the principal will be bound by such representations, if he accept the
fruit of such sale."^ And if an agent authorized to procure insur-
ance fraudulently conceal from the underwriters a material fact
within his knowledge, it will invalidate the insurance just as if it
had been concealed by the principal himself. And here again the
familiar rule is applicable, that "where one of two or more innocent
persons must suffer, he ought to suffer who has misled the other
into false confidence in his agent, by clothing him with apparent au-
thority to act and speak in the premises; and who otherwise might
receive an injur}^, for which he might have no adequate redress."®*
So, where an agent authorized to sell his principal's flock of sheep
knew that some of them were diseased, but concealed such fact from
the person to whom he sold the sheep for the principal, the latter
was held liable for the damages sustained by the purchaser.®^ And
where an agent fraudulently misappropriated collaterals deposited
with him on a loan of his principal's money, the principal was held
liable to the third party to the extent of the value of such collaterals.®®
Generally speaking, it is the duty of one who deals with an agent
to ascertain what his authority is ; and if the authority has been cor-
rectly ascertained, the principal will be bound by all the acts of his
agent within the real or apparent scope of such authority. And if
the act was originally unauthorized, but is subsequently ratified by
the supposed principal, it becomes the act of the principal also, and
he will be bound by it as if he had done it himself; and in ratifying
such act, the principal should use proper diligence as to the scope
of the matter about to be ratified ; for when once he adopts the trans-
action as his own, it includes all the acts within the scope of the as-
sumed authority.®^
^=Bank of Batavia v. New York, ^^Fairchild v. McMahon, supra;
etc., R. Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 60 Am. Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117.
Rep. 440; Friedlander v. Texas, etc., "* Story Ag., § 139.
R. Co., 130 U. S. 416; Fifth Ave. ^= Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. (N.
Bank v. Forty-second St., etc., R. Y.) 518.
Co., 137 N. Y. 231; Fairchild v. Mc- '^Reynolds v. Witte, 13 S. C. 5, 36
Mahon. 139 N. Y. 290, 36 Am. St. Am. Rep. 678.
701; McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. "' Busch v. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 315,
82, 17 Am. St. 178. 326.
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^ 344. Whether it is necessary that fraud should be for principal's
benefit.—Whether the princiiDal is responsible for the fraudulent acts
of his agent which were for the agent's benefit only, is a question
as to which there has not been complete uniformity in the adjudica-
tions. The English courts generally hold that the principal is liable
only to the extent of the benefits or advantages received by him
from the fraudulent contract or transaction.^* "An attentive con-
sideration of the cases has convinced me," says Benjamin, "that
the true principle is that these corporate bodies, through whose agents
so large a portion of the business of the country is now carried on,
may be made responsible for the fraud of those agents to the extent
to which the companies have profited from these frauds; but that
they can not be sued as wrongdoers, by imputing to them the miscon-
duct of those whom they have employed."^" But while the more
recent English cases are as stated by Mr. Benjamin, the king's bench
decided in 1789 that the principal is liable in an action on the case
for deceit for a false "affirmation" made by the agent with intent to
defraud the third person, and that it is not necessary that the prin-
cipal should be benefited by the deceit. ^'^'^ Many of the American
cases, applying the rule that the principal is liable for all the acts
and representations of his agent made in the course of the perform-
ance of the business confided to him, hold that if within these limits
the agent has committed a fraud or other injury upon a third party,
whether authorized by the principal or not, or whether it was for the
benefit of the agent or of the principal, the principal is liable to such
third party, if the latter dealt with the agent in good faith.^*'^ The
theory upon which these cases proceed is that of estoppel: where
the third party is ignorant of the facts misrepresented by the agent,
and deals with such agent in good faith, and pursuant to the appar-
ent power conferred upon him, the principal is estopped to deny
the truth of the facts as represented by his agent, whom he has held
out to the world as worthy of credence ; the very fact of his authority
being a sufficient warranty of the truth of all representations made
by the agent in the course of the business for which he was em-
ployed. ^''-
" Benjamin Sales, §§ 462-467, etc., R. Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 60 Am.
where the cases are cited. Rep. 440.
'«' Benjamin Sales, § 466. "-Bank of Batavia v. New York,
'"* Pasley v. Freeman. .3 T. R. 51, etc., R. Co.. supra; Germania Nat'l
2 Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.) 1300. Bank v. Taaks. 101 N. Y. 442; Par-
'"' Bank of Batavia v. New York, ker v. Board of Supervisors, 106 N.
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§ 345. Elements requisite to bind principal.—Two elements seem
to be necessary, according to the cases cited and others that might
be mentioned, in order to bind the principal in such cases: 1. The
agent must have been acting within the real or apparent scope of his
authority; 2. The third party must have been acting in the utmost
good faith in the matter. If either of these elements be wanting,
there can be no liability on the part of the principal. Of course, the
agent would not be acting within the apparent scope of his authority
if he were a mere usurper, or one who had no authority whatever
to perform the act in the course of which the fraud was committed:
in that case, no one could be deceived by the agent's act ; hence, where
the agent is acting for himself, and that fact is known to third parties,
both of these elements would be absent; for there could not be good
faith on the part of the third person, nor could the agent be said to
be acting within the apparent scope of his authority.^"^
§ 346. Basis of the doctrine of the American cases.—The doctrine
of these American cases is more particularly applicable where the
apparent authority of the agent is such as is calculated to deceive
people of ordinary prudence and intelligence, and where the nature
of the business for which the agent is employed is such that it bears
the indicia of such apparent authority upon its face, so that it will
naturally be relied upon by third persons. In such cases the power
confided to the agent is such that it can not be executed by him with-
out making some sort of representation to such party, although it
may not have been contemplated by the principal that he should
make a false or fraudulent one. But if he was authorized to make
some representation, he is apparently authorized to make one that does
not prove to be true. The principal has therefore enabled the agent
to impose upon the third party, and must suffer the consequences.^'**
The character of the fraud or deceit is immaterial, if it has produced
an injury. The adjudications of this country have generally occurred
in connection with the sale by agents of shares in some stock company,
Y. 392; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Larned, 103 111. 293; Wichita Sav.
Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; Griswold v. Bank v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 20
Haven, 25 N. Y. 595; Fifth Ave. Kan. 519.
Bank v. Forty-second St., etc., R. ^"^ Moores v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank,
Co., 137 N. Y. 231; Allen v. South 111 U. S. 156; Farrington v. South
Boston R. Co., 150 Mass. 200; Ap- Boston R. Co., 150 Mass. 406.
peal of Kisterbock, 127 Pa. St. 601; ^«New York, etc., R. Co. v. Schuy-
Armour v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 65 ler, 34 N. Y. 30.
N. Y. Ill; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v.
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or the issuing of false bills of lading by the agents of common car-
riers."® But the doctrine has been extended to many other classes
of cases. Thus, a telegraph company has been held liable for the act
of its agent in sending a false telegram and receiving money there-
on;"® and a bank for the act of its cashier in drawing checks falsely
and using the money himself."' In a leading case in New York the
agent of the defendants had sold to the plaintiff sheep infected with
scab,—a fact at the time known to the agent but not to the defend-
ants. The plaintiff sued the defendants in an action on the case for
fraud, and the defendants were held liable not only for the loss of the
sheep that were sold to him by defendants' agent, but also for others
that had become infected by them.^"® The court in this case did not
confine the damages to such as the principal derived profit from, but
extended them so as to cover the entire injury sustained by the third
parties.^"'®
§ 347. English doctrine adopted by federal courts.—The federal
courts have adopted the doctrine now prevailing in England. Thus, it
is held by the supreme court of the United States that the agent
of a railroad or steamship company can not bind the company by
issuing a bill of lading for goods not actually placed in his posses-
sion or on board the conveyance ; as, where a person in collusion with
such agent fraudulently disposes of the goods represented therein
instead of shipping the same to their destination.^^''
§ 348. Public agents.—The rules of liability of principals for the
acts of their agents do not apply to public agencies: a public agent
or officer can perform no act by which he can render his principal
liable beyond the scope of his actual authority. Authority in such
eases is generally conferred by law,—that is, by statute or other public
acts, of which every one is presumed to have knowledge,—and hence
no one can be heard to say that he dealt with the agent ignorantly.
As a general rule, the government, whether state or federal, can not
^^ Armour v. Michigan, etc., R. ""See also, Bennett v. Judson, 21
Co., 65 N. Y. Ill; New York, etc., R. N. Y. 238.
Co. v. Scliuyler, supra. "" St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Kniglit,
"^McCord V. Western U. Tel. Co., 122 U. S. 79; Polland v. Vinton, 105
39 Minn. 181. U. S. 7; Friedlander v. Texas, etc.,
"" Phillips v. Mercantile Nat'l R. Co., 130 U. S. 416. See also, Ad-
Bank, 140 N. Y. 556. dison Torts, § 1209 and notes, and
'«« Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. (N, § 1213, et seq.
Y.) 518.
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be sued without its consent; but assuming that this objection is
waived or otherwise overcome, there is yet no liability. "In respect
to the acts and declarations and representations of public agents,"
says Story, "it would seem that the same rule does not prevail, which
ordinarily governs in relation to mere private agents. As to the latter
(as we have seen), the principals are in many cases bound where they
have not authorized the declarations and representations to be made.
But in cases of public agents, the government or other public author-
ity is not bound, unless it manifestly appears that the agent is acting
within the scope of his authority, or he is held out as having authority
to do the act, or is employed, in his capacity as a public agent, to
make the declaration or representation for the government. Indeed,
this rule seems indispensable, in order to guard the public against
losses and injuries arising from the fraud or mistake, or rashness
and indiscretion of their agents. And there is no hardship in requir-
ing from private persons, dealing with public officers, the duty of
inquiry as to their real or apparent power and authority to bind the
government."^ ^^ Hence, when third parties deal with public agents,
in such matters as contracting with municipal authorities or city
commissioners for public work, etc., they must know the powers of such
agents or officials as they are contained in the city ordinances or other
public law which contains the grant, and the legal effect thereof;
and if they fail to do so, and trust to the representations of such agent
or official, they do so at their peril, for the municipality will in no
case be liable beyond the express authority of such agents and that
necessarily incident thereto.^^- But the authority properly delegated
to a public agent carries with it all the necessary incidental powers
to execute such authority, and to this extent third parties are justifia-
ble in trusting to appearances. Hence, where a county judge was em-
powered by statute to provide a public courthouse for the counts', it was
held that the performance of this duty involved the power to enter
into all necessary contracts and to bind the county for the same,
but that he would have no authority to issue negotiable bonds, bear-
ing a high rate of interest, in discharge of such contract.^" But
a commissioner having authority to let a public contract has not the
implied or incidental power to agree to changes or alterations, so
^" Story Ag., § 307a. v. Bank of Missouri. 45 Mo. 528;
1" Mayor, etc., v. Eschbach, 18 Md. Mayor, etc., v. Poultney. 25 Md. 18.
276; Peirce v. United States, 1 N. & ^^= Hull v. County of Marshall, su-
H. (Ct. of CI.) 270; Hull v. County pra.
of Marshall. 12 Iowa 142; Missouri
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as to render the municipality liable for additional work not embraced
in the authorized contract, nor to agree to submit the matter to
arbitration.^^* Public officers are not generally liable for the acts
of their deputies or subalterns, though there are exceptions in some
cases, such as those of sheriffs and constables, in which it is the
policy of the law to make the superior officer responsible within cer-
tain limits for the official actions of the subordinate.^^
^
§ 349. Principal not liable when act was result of collusion
between agent and third party.—Nor will the principal in such a
case be held liable if the contract has been entered into through col-
lusion or fraud between the agent and the third party; and this is
true whether the agency be a public or a private one. Hence, where
there is an agreement or understanding between the agent and a third
person that the agent is to receive a commission or reward, if he will
induce the principal to consent to a contract with such person, or
enter into a contract with him for his principal, this being a fraud
upon the latter, a contract so entered into can not be enforced against
the principal, unless, with knowledge of the fraud, the principal
elect to take the benefit of such contract. ""^ The same doctrine
applies where the agent is in reality the principal on the adverse side,
or is secretly acting in the interest of the third party with the latter's
knowledge or connivance: the principal may then avoid the con-
tract."^
§ 350. When principal bound by admissions of agent.—The prin-
cipal is bound also by the admissions and declarations, as well as
the acts of his agent, when made while in the performance of the
business of the employment ;^^^ but before the principal can be af-
fected by such declarations it must be shown that the party making
them was in fact the agent of the person sought to be so affected, or
that he had authority to perform the act in relation to which the
declarations were made."** It is also an essential requisite, to make
"' Mayor, etc., v. Reynolds, 20 Md. of Alabama, S Ala. 590, 42 Am. Dec.
1, 83 Am. Dec. 535. 649; Dick v. Cooper, 24 Pa. St. 217,
"= Wharton Ag., § 550. 64 Am. Dec. 652; White v. Miller, 71
""City of Findlay v. Pertz, 66 Fed. N. Y. 118; Rowell v. Klein, 44 Ind.
427. 290.
'" Wassell v. Reardon, 11 Ark. 705, '"Rowell v. Klein, supra; Coon v.
54 Am. Dec. 245. Gurley, 49 Ind. 199; Wakefield v.
"'Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. South Boston R. Co., 117 Mass. 544.
O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99; Ball v. Bank
23
—
Principal and Agent.
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such declarations binding upon the principal, that they should have
been made so as to be a part of the res gestae; that is to say, so as to
be a part of the transaction, or made in the course of the transaction,
and not before or afterward. ^-'^
§ 351. When act is within res gestae.—As to when an act or
declaration is of the res gestae is not always clear. If the contro-
versy be one growing out of a contract, it is not so difficult to deter-
mine; for the res gestae then covers the period of the negotiations
only, and embraces but the time between the opening of the same
and that of closing the contract.^^^ If, however, the injury com-
plained of be a tort, and the declarations of the agent or employe
are claimed to be competent as being a part of the res gestae^ the ques-
tion is not so easy of solution. It must be borne in mind, in such
cases, that the testimony can be admitted only if the declaration or
statement is so connected and interwoven with the main transaction
as to be spontaneous and not the result of design and afterthought,
and pertains to and characterizes the main trar^saction : the state-
ment must be one naturally accompanying the act or calculated to
unfold its character or qualit3^^-^ A statement made by an injured
brakeman concerning the manner in which he received the injury,
made ten minutes after the happening of the accident, and after
he had been removed two hundred feet from the scene, was held by
the appellate court of Indiana not a part of the res gestae, and, there-
fore, not admissible as evidence against the principal or master.^ -^
And on the same theory, it was held by the same court that the
statements of a child injured by a street car, made ten minutes after
the injury happened, and while the child was being taken to the hos-
pital in an ambulance, were not parts of the res gestae.'^-* But
whenever what the agent did is admissible in evidence, what
he said about the act while doing it will be admissible also; for what
he said was but a verbal act, and is not regarded as hearsay. But
whenever the right or power to act has ceased, the principal can no
longer be affected by the declaration, and it becomes mere hearsay,
and, consequently, incompetent as evidence against the principal.^-^
^=0 Roberts v. Burks, Litt. Sel. Cas. "^Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Sloan,
(Ky.) 411, 12 Am. Dec. 325. 11 Ind. App. 401.
'-^ Bolds V. Woods, 9 Ind. App. 657. '" Citizens', etc., R. Co. v. Stod-
'-- Butler V. Manhattan R. Co., 143 dard, 10 Ind. App. 278.
N. Y. 417; Baker v. Gausin, 76 Ind. '-= Greenleaf Ev. (16th ed.), § 184c;
317; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Stein, 133 Story Ag., §§134-137.
Ind. 243.
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§ 352. Agent's statements need not have been made at precise
moment of occurence of act to be of res gestae.—There is considerable
confusion in the decided cases as to the point of time, relative to the
main transaction, at which the declaration must have been made,
in order to be a part of the res gestae. The current of modern au-
thority, however, seems to support the view that the statement need
not have been made at the precise moment of the main act or occur-
' renee
: it is sufficient if it springs out of the principal transaction,
tends to explain it, and is made "at a time so near it as to preclude
the idea of deliberate design."^^^ "Whether the declarations of an
agent made in regard to transactions already past, but while the
agency for similar objects still continues, will bind the principal,
does not appear to have been expressly decided; but the weight of
authority is in the negative."^-" The declaration, to bind the prin-
cipal, must also have been made in relation to the subject-matter of
the agency. "The mere idle, desultory, or careless talk of the agent,
having no legitimate reference to or bearing upon the business of his
principal, can not be binding upon the latter."^-^
§ 353. Declarations of agent not admissible until proof of agency
has been made.—It is to be remembered, however, that the admission
in evidence of the declarations of the agent is predicated on the as-
sumption that proof of the agency, independently of the admissions,
has been made sufficient to satisfy the jury, or court sitting as such,
that the relation subsists; in the absence of such independent proof
of the agency, the admissions are not competent. They are admissible
only upon the theory of the legal identity of the principal and the
agent, for otherwise they would be hearsay ; and the fact of the agency
must, therefore, be established before effect can be given to that
theory. The agency itself—that is to say, the delegation of authority
-
—can not, in such a case, be shown by the declarations or admissions
^'People V. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49, 95 72 Ga. 217, 53 Am. Rep. 838; Mc-
Am. Dec. 49; Com. v. McPike, 3 Leod v. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399; Elkins
Gush. (Mass.) 181, 50 Am. Dec. 727; v. McKean, 79 Pa. St. 493; O'Con-
lUinois, etc., R. Co. v. Tronstine, 64 nor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 27 Minn.
Miss. 834; Keyser v. Chicago, etc., 166; Williamson v. Cambridge R.
R. Co., 66 Mich. 390; Cleveland v. Co., 144 Mass. 148; Elledge v. Na-
Newsom, 45 Mich. 62; Toledo, etc., tional, etc., R. Co., 100 Cal. 282.
R. Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185; '=" Greenleaf Ev. (16th ed.),
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Buck, 116 § 184c, note 5, by Wigmore.
Ind. 566; Augusta Factory v. Barnes, "* Mechem Ag., § 714.
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of the agent.^'^ The authority of the agent, or ratification of the act,
must be shown, at least prima facie, before the principal can be bound
by the agent's acts or statements. The agent himself is, however, a
competent witness.^^"
§ 354. Principal bound by notice to agent.—It is, moreover, an
old and well established rule that the principal is bound by any notice
acquired by Ms agent during the course of the agency ; "notice to the
agent," it is said, "is notice to the principal."^^^ If A, by his agent, B,
purchase property of C, to which E claims an equitable title superior
to the legal title of C, A would not be bound by the equity of E, un-
less he had knowledge or notice thereof; but if at the time of the
purchase, B, the agent of A, had information as to E's equity, A is
bound by it the same as if the information or knowledge had been
possessed by A himself. This is upon the theory that A and B are
identical, and that whatever notice or knowledge B, as such agent,
has received concerning the matter, A is conclusively presumed
to have received also, whether in point of fact this is true or not.^^-
In the case supposed, had A and his agent, B, both been ignorant
of E's equity, A would doubtless have obtained a clear title; and the
same would be true had A contracted with C personally, and without
the intervention of an agent ; but having purchased through an agent
who had knowledge, A will be affected with constructive notice.^ ^^
The rule of constructive notice is based not only upon the doctrine
of the identity of the principal and agent, but also upon the theory
that whereas it is the duty of the agent to disclose to his principal
all information which he may have respecting the subject-matter of
the agency, it will be presumed that he has discharged that duty
by giving the principal the information in question."*
"'Greenleaf Ev. (16th ed.), § 184d. 125 N. Y. 57; Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bed-
1*^ Smith V. Kron, 96 N. C. 392; ford's ed.) 194, et seg.; Corneille v.
Hatch V. Squires, 11 Mich. 185; Pfeiffer, 26 Ind. App. 62.
Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66; '^= Mountford v. Scott, 3 Madd. 34,
Howe Machine Co. v. Clark, 15 Kan. 40; Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass'n,
492. 81 Pa. St. 256.
"1 Farmers', etc., Bank v. Butch- '^' Per Pollock, C. B., in Dresser
ers', etc.. Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, 69 Am. v. Norwood, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466.
Dec'. 678; Hill v. Nation Trust Co., ^^ Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563;
108 Pa. St. 1, 56 Am. Rep. 189; Car- Story Eq. Juris., § 408, note 2; Story
penter v. German, etc., Ins. Co.. 135 Ag., § 140.
N. Y. 298; Arff v. Star F. Ins. Co.,
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§ 355. Notice must have been received by agent in course of
agency—Exceptions.—There can be no question of the correctness
of the rule just stated, respecting constructive notice, provided the
notice was received by the agent in the course of the agency. If,
however, the notice came to liim before the relation commenced, it
is not so clear that it is the duty of the agent to disclose the informa-
tion to the principal, or that a presumption can be predicated that
such information has Ijeen communicated.^^^ And as to the doctrine
of identity, it can not apply but during the time of the agency.
If, however, the knowledge was actually present in the mind of the
agent at the time of the transaction in question, or if it had been
acquired by him so recently as to raise a reasonable presumption
that he must have had it in mind, it is now generally held that the
principal is affected by it, although it was not acquired in the course
of the agency, or was received prior to the commencement of the
relation. ^^® According to some authorities, however, it is the better
doctrine that in order to bind the principal, the knowledge, if ac-
quired outside of the course of the agency, must be actually present
in the mind of the agent, and that the evidence must establish this
in order to bind the principal. ^^^
§ 356. When principal not bound by notice to agent.—If, how-
ever, the knowledge was such as the agent was in duty bound not to
disclose, or such as it was reasonable to presume he would not disclose,
or if there was between the agent and third party a collusion or con-
spiracy to defraud the principal, the latter will not be affected by
the agent's knowledge, though it was received by the agent in the
course of the agency. ^^^ And although the agent's knowledge was
obtained in the course of the agency, if the agent is known to be ad-
versely interested in the transaction, the principal is not affected by
'"Willis v. Vallette, 4 Mete. (Ky.) -"'Constant v. University of Roch-
186; Martin v. Jackson, 27 Pa. St. ester. 111 N. Y. 604; Yerger v.
504; Yerger v. Barz, 56 Iowa 77; Barz, 56 Iowa 77; Willis v. Vallette,
Shaffer v. Milwaukee, etc., Ins. Co., 4 Mete. (Ky.) 186; Fairfield Sav.
17 Ind. App. 204. Bank v. Chase, supra.
'^Brothers v. Bank, 84 Wis. 381; '=' The Distilled Spirits, supra;
Lebanon Sav. Bank v. Hollenbeck, Fairfield Sav. Bank v. Chase, supra;
29 Minn. 322; The Distilled Spirits, National Life Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53
11 Wall. (U. S.) 356; Fairfield Sav. N. Y. 144; Innerarity v. Merchants'
Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Nat'l Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 52 Am.
Rep. 319; Dresser v. Norwood. 17 C. Rep. 710; Dillaway v. Butler, 135
B. (N. S.) 466; Schwind v. Boyce Mass. 479.
(Md.), 51 Atl. 45.
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such knowledge. ^''^ The reason for this exception to the general
rule is that one who has an interest to act a certain way can not be pre-
sumed to act another waj'.^***
§ 357. Principal bound by knowledge actually in agent's mind
at time of transaction.—Whether knowledge was actually communi-
cated to the principal or not seems to be immaterial ; for the presump-
tion, in the absence of the exceptions named, is conclusive, and can
not be overcome by proof that the agent in fact did not transmit
such notice to the principal.^*^ And whether the time in which the
information was received by the agent is so far past as to overcome
the presumption that it was present in his mind is a question, it
seems, to be decided by the circumstances of each case.^*^ The bur-
den of proof is upon the party alleging the existence of the knowl-
edge or notice relied upon.^*^^ Some of the cases hold, as has been
said above, that the principal is never affected by the notice unless it
was actually conveyed to the agent during the course of the agency;
and, according to this view, if the notice was received before the agency
began, it will, of course, have no binding effect upon the principal.^ *^
However, the weight of authority is believed to be that it is sufficient
if the knowledge was actually in the mind of the agent at the time
of the transaction, or was acquired so recently as to raise a presump-
tion to that effect; unless, indeed, the agent is in duty bound not to
reveal it, or the circumstances are such as to show collusion, personal
interest or other matters which will exonerate the principal from
being chargeable with such notice.^** The knowledge must be of
a matter so material to the 'transaction as to make it the agent's duty
to communicate the fact to his principal ;^^° if it concerns something
else than the transaction in question, or is so vaguely connected with
it that it would not bind the principal, if he were himself in posses-
sion thereof, it will not affect him. But if the knowledge is sufficient
to put a prudent man upon inquiry, and which, if diligently pursued,
^® Loring v. Brodie. 134 Mass. 453; 81 Pa. 256; Satterfield v. Malone, 35
Innerarity v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, Fed. 445.
supra; Frenkel v. Hudson, 82 Ala. '"The Distilled Spirits, supra;
158; Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Harris, Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363, 73
118 Mass. 147. Am. Dec. 543; Wilson v. Minnesota,
"" Frenkel v. Hudson, supra. etc., Ins. Co., 36 Minn. 112, 1 Am.
'^'The Distilled Spirits, supra. St. 659; Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C.
'*^The Distilled Spirits, supra. B. (N. S.) 466; Chouteau v. Allen,
"=a Mechem Ag., § 721. 70 Mo. 290.
"' Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass'n, '" Fairfield Sav. Bank v. Chase, 72
Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep. 319.
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would place the principal in possession of actual knowledge, it will
charge the latter with it, the same as if he had actually received it."*'
§ 358. Rule applies to corporations.—Corporations are affected by
such notice to their agents, the same as individual principals. The
only way in which corporations act, or are acted upon, is through
their agents. But the agent or officer who is thus capable of charging
the corporation with knowledge through him must, as in cases of
individuals, be one who is clothed with ample authority; hence, no-
tice to a stockholder or a single director is generally not sufficient
to charge the corporation.^*^ If, however, the officer acts for the
corporation in a capacity which authorizes him to bind the company
in such matters, the latter is charged with the notice. Thus, where a
note procured by fraud is discounted for a bank by one of its directors,
concerned in or having knowledge of the fraud, his act is the act of
the bank, and the bank is chargeable with his knowledge of such
fraud. ^*«
§ 359. Notice to subagent.—In cases where it is sought to charge
the principal with notice to a subagent, no great difficulty can arise.
If the subagent was appointed under circumstances which render
him privy to the principal, or in other words, if the subagent was
appointed by the authority, or with the assent, express or implied, of
the principal, the latter will be bound by his acts, and consequently
also by notice to such subagent. But if the subagent was appointed
by the main agent, without authority, express or implied, of the prin-
cipal, the latter is not responsible for his acts, and, consequently, is
not bound by any notice to liim.^*^
§ 360. Liability of mercantile agencies for injuries resulting from
false reports.—Important questions frequenth^ arise with regard to
the liability of mercantile agencies for the reports they furnish their
customers or subscribers of the commercial standing or ratings of
merchants and others with whom such customers or subscribers desire
to transact business. This subject might have been treated under
the head of the liability of the agent to third persons for the acts
""Baker v. Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70; Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am.
Chapman v. Glassell, 13 Ala. 50, 48 Rep. 319.
Am. Dec. 41; Hood v. Fahnestock, 1 "'National Security Bank v. Cush-
Pa. St. 470, 44 Am. Dec. 147. man, 121 Mass. 490.
"' Housatonic Bank v. Martin, 1 "" See Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S.
Mete. (Mass.) 294; Fairfield Sav. 308.
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of the subagent ; but as mercantile agencies are in one sense principals
to those from whom they obtain their information, it is not inappro-
priate to regard them here in that light, and as ordinary contracting
parties with their subscribers or customers. Should such an agency
render a false report as to the standing of some one inquired about,
and the subscriber or customer should sustain an injury by
reason of such false information, would the agency be liable in
damages ? It is almost the universal custom of such agencies to con-
tract with their subscribers that they will in no event be liable for the
negligence of the agent or person who procures and reports the infor-
mation, and that they do not guarantee the accuracy of the reports.
When this is the contract between such an agency and its subscriber,
the agency is, of course, not liable; its undertaking is simply that
of transmitting the information it receives from the local agent to
the subscriber ; and if the report proves inaccurate, or false, or fraud-
ulent, the agency can not be held accountable to him. Besides, even
if we regard the subscriber as the principal, the rule applies that where
the services demanded by the principal (the customer) can not be
performed by the agent in person, the latter will not be liable for the
negligence or misconduct of the subagent unless the chief agent him-
self be guilty of negligence. ^^'^ WTiether there is a liability on the
part of the agency to the subscriber or not, therefore, depends on the
nature of the contract between the two. If the agency has not ex-
pressly exonerated itself from liability, it is doubtless the implied
undertaking that the information is accurate ; and if it be not so, the
agency is liable.
§ 361. Principal not criminally liable for crimes of agent.—The
principal can not generally be held responsible, criminally, for the
crimes or offenses of his agent, unless they were done by his command
or with liis assent, in which case he would himself be a party to
the crime.^^^ As was pointed out in a former portion of this work,
the relation of principal and agent can not subsist in the commission
of crimes or criminal offenses.^^- It is true, one person may aid
and abet another in the commission of a crime, and the person who
does this may, as to other matters, stand in the relation of agent to
'="Dun v. City Nat'l Bank, 58 Fed. Ind. App. 526, 533; Com. v. Putman,
174, 23 L. R. A. 687. 4 Gray (Mass.) 16; United States
^=^Hipp V. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) v. Birch, 1 Cranch C. C. 571; Rex
149, 33 Am. Dec. 463; City of Ham- v. Muggins, 2 Stra. 883.
mond v. New York, etc., R. Co., 5 ^"Anie, § 68.
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him at whose instance he so aids and abets; or one person ma}' be
an accessory and the other a principal in the commission of a criminal
act; but the mere fact that one does an act of this nature at the re-
quest or command of another does not make the one a principal and
the other an agent ; and as no act can be criminal without a criminal
intent, it would seem that there could be no criminal responsibility
unless the party charged had in some way participated in the commis-
sion of such act/^^ and this is doubtless the general rule.^^^^ But
there is a class of offenses in which it it held that there may be a
conviction even without any intent : these are usually such as arise
under the revenue laws or pertain to police regulations. They may
he and usually are acts intrinsically innocent, but prohibited by stat-
ute; or they may even be offenses under the common law. So, under
the first class of cases, a person may be punished for the act of his
agent in opening the doors of his saloon on Sunday and engaging
in the unlawful sale of liquors ;^^* and under the common law, book
dealers and publishers have been held criminally liable for the publi-
cation and sale from their establishments of certain prohibited books,
by their agents, of which the principals had no knowledge whatever. ^^^
As to prohibited sales of liquors, it was held in Illinois that a principal
is criminally liable for the sale of intoxicants by his agent, though
such sale was in violation of instructions by the principal.^^® The
indictment in that case was predicated upon a statute providing that
:
"Whoever, by himself, clerk or servant, shall sell," etc., shall be liable.
The evidence showed that the defendant kept intoxicating liquors
for sale, and it was held by the supreme court that the defendant was
responsible for the acts of his clerks, no matter what instructions he
gave them. In Massachusetts it has been held that a sale of liquor
by an agent is prima facie evidence of his authority to make such
sale.^^^ And in Michigan, a conviction of a saloon keeper for the vio-
lation of a statute requiring all saloons to be closed on Sunday, was
affirmed, when the evidence sTiowed that the saloon-keeper's clerkj
without the knowledge or consent of his employer, but while the latter
was on the premises, had opened the saloon on Sunday morning to
"^Hipp V. State, supra. "^^ Rex v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21; Rex
153a People v. Parks, 49 Mich. 333; v. Gutch, M. & M. 433, 22 E. C. L.
Com. V. Putman, 4 Gray (Mass.) 16; 559.
Nail v. State, 34 Ala. 262; Rex v. '^ Noecker v. People, 91 111. 494.
Muggins, 2 Stra. 883; United States '"Com. v. Nichols, 10 Mete.
V. Shuck, 1 Cranch C. C. 56. (Mass.) 259.
'" People V. Roby, 52 Mich. 577.
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have it cleaned out, and meanwhile sold a drink to a casual customer,
who insisted on having it.^^^ The case seems to have turned upon
the point that the statute makes the offense in such a case to consist,
"not in the affirmative act of any person," as Judge Cooley expresses
it, "hut in the negative conduct of failing to keep the saloon, etc.,
closed." This provision would make it the duty of the owner or pro-
prietor not only to close the doors himself, but to keep a watch over
them and see that no one else opens them or gives access to those desir-
ing to purchase liquor. Tliis is quite different from holding one ac-
countable, however, for the affirmative act of another which he might
not by the reasonable exercise of diligence have prevented. The
learned court, however, did not base its conclusion solely upon the
wording of the statute, but took the broad ground that in such cases no
intent is necessary ; although, in the case under consideration, the evi-
dence was sufficient, the court said, to submit the question of intent to
the jury, if intent were necessary to be found. Under a statute of Mas-
sachusetts prohibiting licensed liquor-sellers from maintaining a
screen or curtain to cut off the public view of the premises, the court
in that state ruled that it was no defense to a prosecution that the
defendant had instructed his clerk not to draw the curtains, and that
the clerk had done so in violation of such instructions.^^® And in
the same state it was held that the proprietor of a saloon is criminally
liable for a sale made by his clerk during prohibited hours.^®" But
in Indiana the rule is to the contrary.^^^ In Missouri it is held
that jDroof of a sale of intoxicating liquors by an agent makes a
prima facie case against the principal, which may, however, be re-
butted by the latter by showing that the sale was forbidden by him.^*^-
In Connecticut, however, the court decided that a conviction for giving
credit to college students, in violation of a statute, can not be upheld
when the evidence shows that the sale was made by the barkeeper
of the defendant without the knowledge and against the express
directions of the latter, who was the proprietor of the saloon in wliich
the sale was made, and that a subsequent ratification of the act would
not render the defendant criminally responsible.^®^
§ 362. May be liable civilly for agent's crimes.—But while, as a
general rule, the principal can not be held criminally responsible for
"' People V. Roby, 52 Mich. 577. "' Rosenbaum v. State, 24 Ind.
"' Com. v. Kelley, 140 Mass. 441. App. 510.
""Com. V. Wachendorf. 141 Mass. '"= State v. McCance, 110 Mo. 398.
270. '"^ Morse v. State, 6 Conn. 9.
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the crimes of his agent, committed without his participation therein
or knowledge of or consent to the same, he will be held liable in
damages for any injury inflicted by his agent by means of such crime,
either to the person or the property of another. Such crimes are
also torts, and if committed by the agent in the course of his em-
ployment, the principal is civilly liable within the principles discussed
in a previous section.^*'* Many states have enacted statutes expressly
providing that damages may be recovered by the injured party on
account of the iinlawful sales of intoxicating liquors to certain per-
sons, either by the proprietor himself or by his agent ;^®^ and even
without such statute the principal would doubtless be liable. If, how-
ever, the circumstances are such as to prove that the act was not done
in the course of the business intrusted to the agent, or that he com-
mitted it by going outside of the lines of his employment, the
principal is not liable ;^^*' but if the principal ratifies the act, or know-
ingly reaps a benefit from the same, he is liable.^*'^
^^Ante, § 342. ^''" Payne v. Newcomb, 100 111. 611;
^"^ George v. Gobey, 128 Mass. 289; Erickson v. Bell, 53 Iowa 627, 36
Krelter v. Nichols, 28 Mich. 496. Am. Rep. 246.
^^ Golden v. Newbrand, 52 Iowa
59, 35 Am. Rep. 257.
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A. Of Third Persons to Agent.
/. On Contracts.
§ 363. Third party liable to agent in exceptional cases only.—
As a general rule, an agent, as such, has no claim upon a third party,
nor right to hold him liable on a contract entered into by such agent
on behalf of his principal.^ As we have heretofore had occasion to
state, an authorized agent who contracts in the name of his principal,
in manner and form such as will bind the latter, can not be held
liable to the other contracting party on such contract.^ But if the
agent can not be made personally liable to the third party, neither can
the third party in such case become liable to the agent. The agent
is but a middleman between the two, and as soon as the task of exe-
cuting the contract for his principal is performed, the agent having
acted in good faith, he is entirely eliminated from the transaction,
and any consequences that follow are the same as if the principal and
third party had entered into the contract in person ; after that the
principal can look only to the third party, and the third party to the
principal. Thus, a clerk or shopman who sells his principal's goods
can not maintain a suit against the purchaser for the price any more
than a clerk or shopman who has purchased goods for the principal
can be sued successfully by the vendor for the price of such goods.^
This proposition is too plain to be misunderstood. Other cases to
which the same rule applies do not appear so obvious, at least at
first glance. Thus, in the case of the assignment or indorsement of
a bill of lading to a person who is in reality but a mere agent of the
shipper, the bill of lading not being a negotiable instrument in the
sense that it vests title in an assignee or indorsee who has no gen-
eral or special property in the goods, it is held that such agent can
not maintain an action on such instrument for nondelivery of the
goods by the carrier.* And so, an agent who, in pursuance of his
principal's instructions, delivers money to a carrier, to be in turn
delivered by the latter to a consignee, can not maintain an action
against the carrier for failure to deliver the money, although the
'i Commercial Bank v. French, 21 Bayley v. Onondaga County Mut.
Pick. (Mass.) 486, 32 Am. Dec. 280. Ins. Co., 6 Hill (N. Y.) 476, 41 Am.
And generally, an agent can not Dec. 759; Lineker v. Ayeshford, 1
maintain an action on a contract Cal. 76.
entered into by him on behalf of his - Ante, § 301.
principal: Taintor v. Prendergast, ' Story Ag., § 391.
3 Hill (N. Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618; ^Lineker v. Ayeshford, 1 Cal. 76.
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agent's money may have been substituted for that of the principal
before delivery to the carrier.^ The liability in these last-mentioned
cases is based upon the same theory as in the cases of the clerk or
shopman: the agent in neither case has any personal interest. It is
only in exceptional cases, some of which we shall presently notice,
that an agent who acts for his principal has a right to maintain in
his own name an action on such a contract.
§ 364. When agent contracts in his own name.—But there are ex-
ceptional instances in which an agent may bring and maintain an ac-
tion in his own name on a contract made with a third party by author-
ity of his principal, and these we are now to consider. Though in
fact acting for his principal, the agent may intentionally or uninten-
tionally contract personally, or in his own name, as if he were the
principal. If he do so intentionally, he will, of course, not disclose
the principal's name nor make any reference to it in the contract.
The general rule of the common law is that when an agent makes
a contract in his own name, although in fact for his principal, the
other contracting party binds himself personally to the agent, and
may be sued by the latter in his (the agent's) own name.® In such
case both the contracting parties assume obligations, the one to the
other: the agent is personally bound to the third party, and the same
is true of the third party to the agent.'' Even if the third party knew
^ Thompson v. Fargo, 63 N. Y. 479. the place. The plaintiff—who had
In this case the plaintiff had col- forwarded the money—sued Fargo
lected a certain amount of money for the money, but it was held by
trom the government of the United the New York court of appeals
States for certain parties which was that the money became the property
due them for back pay as soldiers of the consignee the moment it was
in the army of the United States, delivered to the express company,
The plaintiff had received the and that the consignor ceased to
amount in a check, which he con- nave any property in it whatever,
verted into United States treasury See case between same parties in 49
notes, and these, after deducting his N. Y. 188.
fees for collecting the same, he in- "Winters v. Rush, 34 Cal. 136;
closed in an envelope directed to Murdock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 33 W.
J. & W. W., in care of M., at T., and Va. 407; Colburn v. Phillips, 13 Gray
delivered to the United States Ex- (Mass.) 64; Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind.
press Company, at Springfield, 111., 206.
for conveyance and delivery. The 'Story Ag.. § 396; Beebe v. Rob-
United States Express Company de- ert, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 413; Ludwig
livered the package to Fargo, an- v. Gillespie. 105 N. Y. 653: Neal v.
other carrier, at Decatur, 111., who Andrews (Tex. Civ. App.), 60 S. W.
conveyed it to its destination, but 459;Rhoades v. Blackiston, 106 Mass.
was unable to find the consignees at 334, 8 Am. Rep. 332; Evrit v. Ban-
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that the agent was acting for another, and knew who that person
was, the agent can not, in such case, be debarred from carrying on
the suit in his own name whenever a right of action arises from such
contract.^ If, on the other hand, the agent unintentionally contracts
in his own name, instead of the ijrincipal's, it may be the result of
inadvertence or ignorance on his part in drawing the contract. In
the latter case, if the promise runs to the agent co nomine, although
he may have described himself as "agent," or "agent of" some other
person named, these words will not necessarily operate to place the
right of action of the contract exclusively in his principal, and the
word "agent," etc., may be regarded as descriptive merely,^ leaving
the legal title of the instrument in the name of such agent person-
ally. The propositions here stated are, of course, subject to the rules
concerning the rights and liabilities of undisclosed principals else-
where considered.
§ 365. Tinder code provisions real party in interest must sue—
Exceptions.—In states where the reformed or code procedure prevails,
it is generally provided that actions must be brought in the name of
the real party in interest. Where such is the rule the principal alone
can sue, though the legal title of the chose in action or other matter
in controversy be in the agent. ^*' If, however, the agent be the trustee
of an express trust, or a person with whom or in whose name a contract
is made for the benefit of another, the codes usually make an exception
by providing that such parties may sue in their own names, without
Joining their beneficiaries.^^ The provision by virtue of which the
croft, 22 Ohio St. 172; Rosser v. Dec. 99; Hately v. Pike, 162 111. 241,
Darden, 82 Ga. 219, 14 Am. St. 152; 44 N. E. 441; Goodman v. Walker,
DuBois v. Perkins, 21 Or. 189; John- 30 Ala. 482, 68 Am. Dec. 134; Story
son v. Catlin, 27 Vt. 87, 62 Am. Dec. Ag., § 394; ante, § 208.
622; Hately v. Pike, 162 111. 241, 44 >'' Phillips Code Pldg., § 450; Con-
N. E. 441; Stoll v. Sheldon (la.), siderant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 389.
13 N. W. 201. " Coffin v. Grand Rapids Hy-
^ Lowndes v. Anderson, 13 East draulic Co., 136 N. Y. 655; Davis v.
130; McHenry v. Ridgely, 3 111. 309, Harness, 38 Ohio St. 397; Close v.
35 Am. Dec. 110; Shepherd v. Evans, Hodges, 44 Minn. 204; Holmes v.
9 Ind. 260; Winters v. Rush, 34 Cal. Boyd, 90 Ind. 332; Landwerlen v.
136; McConnel v. Thomas, 3 111. 313; Wheeler, 106 Ind. 523; Weaver v.
Clap V. Day, 2 Me. 305, 11 Am. Dec. Trustees of Wabash & Erie Canal,
99; Bragg v. Greenleaf, 14 Me. 395; 28 Ind. 112. See Bliss Code Pldg.,
Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. § 57; Pomeroy Rem., §§ 171-182. In
389; Murdock v. Franklin Ins. Co., Rogers v. Gibson, 15 Ind. 218, the
33 W. Va. 407. suit was upon a note payable to A.,
' Clap V. Day, 2 Me. 305, 11 Am. as school commissioner, and to his
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trustee of an express trust is permitted to sue in his own name has
been so liberally construed by the courts that the right of an agent to
sue in liis own name is quite as full and ample as it was under the
common law, and the agent may therefore generally maintain the
action notwithstanding the provision of the code giving the right of
action to the real party in interest. ^^ In the case of Heavenridge v.
Mondy, just cited, the supreme court of Indiana said : "The ipeaning
of the words the %ustee of an express trust,' as used in section four
above quoted, was not left to the interpretation and construction of
the courts, but their signification and construction were so plainly and
clearly defined by the legislature as to leave no room for doubt or
construction. Any person is a 'trustee of an express trust' with whom,
or in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit of another. The
word 'contract' is not used in a limited or restricted sense, but is used
and intended to be applied to all and any kinds of contracts. As the
note sued upon was made for the use of William Mondy, this action
might have been prosecuted in his name under the third section of
article two of our code ; but as it is payable to Alfred Mondy, for the
use and benefit of William Mondy, it thereby makes Alfred Mondy
the 'trustee of an express trust,' and the suit is properly prosecuted
in his name under the fourth section above quoted." In the case of
Considerant v. Brisbane, just cited, the court of appeals of Xew York,
speaking of the section of the code in question, said : "It is intended,
manifestly, to embrace, not only formal trusts, declared by deed
{7iter partes, but all cases in which a person acting in behalf of a third
party enters into a written express contract with another, either in
successors in office. The note was
given for a loan of money belonging
to the schood fund, and a statute of
the state made it the duty of county
auditors to institute suits for the
collection of such loans, in the name
of the state. It was held that the
action should have been prosecuted
in the name of the state on the re-
lation of the county auditor, al-
though the code provided that every
action must be brought in the name
of the real party in interest, except
that an executor, administrator, a
trustee of an express trust, or a per-
son expressly authorized by statute
might sue without joining the bene-
ficiary. In Vermont it is held that
where an instrument is made paya-
ble to one as agent for a considera-
tion advanced by the principal, the
principal has a right of action on
such instrument, and not the agent:
Arlington v. Hinds, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.)
431, 12 Am. Dec. 704 and note, p.
709.
^- Wolfe V. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W. 49: Societa
Italiana v. Sulzer, 138 N. Y. 168;
West V. Crawford, 80 Cal. 19;
Heavenridge v. Mondy, 34 Ind. 28;
Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y.
389.
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his individual name, without description, or in his own name, expressly
in trust for, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of another, by whatever
form of expression such trust may be disclosed. It includes not only
a person with whom, but one in whose name a contract is made for the
benefit of another." This is the general holding of the courts; and,
as thus construed, the statute enlarges rather than limits the scope
of cases in which an agent may sue in his own name on a contract
made for his principal, for it includes cases in which the contract
is made ostensibly in behalf of the principal, provided an express trust
may be discovered in the relation between the principal and the
agent.
§ 366. Agent's right subordinated to that of principal, except when
beneficially interested—Authority coupled with interest.—In the
cases covered by the last preceding section, the principal may sue in
his own name also, unless the agent has an interest coupled with his
authority, in which case he can sue to the extent of such interest. If
the agent has no such interest, the principal, being the ultimate party
in interest, should have the right to control the action, and he may,
therefore, suspend or extinguish it by taking the agent's place in the
suit, after it has been instituted, or by commencing the action in his
own name before.^^ In such cases the agent and principal may both
be made parties, especially in equity suits, so that full relief may be
granted in a single suit.^* If the agency has been terminated, the
agent can no longer sue in his own name.^^ If, however, the agent
has a beneficial interest in the subject-matter of the agency, the prin-
cipal can not control the suit, at least to the extent of such agent's
interest, and the agent may maintain the action thereupon in his own
name to the exclusion of the principal. Thus, an auctioneer, who sells
the goods of another in his (the auctioneer's) name, has such an in-
terest in the contract that he may sue in his own name for the price
of the goods sold.^*' The classes of agents generally regarded as
having such an interest are factors, auctioneers, warehousemen, car-
riers, policy brokers, masters of ships and others who have a lien on
the property for commissions, freights, etc., or a special property of
any character in the subject-matter of the agreement. ^^ In the case
"Rhoades V. Blackiston, 106 Mass. '" Bogart v. O'Regan, 1 E. D.
334. Smith (N. Y.) 590.
" 16 Encyc. PI. & Pr. 895. " See Grove v. Dubois, 1 T. R. 112
"Miller v. State Bank, 57 Minn. Johnson v. Hudson, 11 East 180
319, 59 N. W. 309. Brown v. Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 189
24
—
Principal and Agent.
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of an auctioneer it is not necessary to prove that he has a special
property or interest, for that follows as a matter of course from his
position as an auctioneer ; and "it is only where a party acts as a mere
agent or servant that a special beneficial interest must be proved to
maintain an action, or may te disproved, to defeat it."^* With regard
to auctioneers, "the doctrine stands upon the right of the auctioneer
to receive, and his responsibility to his principal for the price of the
property sold, and his lien thereon for his commissions, which give
liim a special property in the goods intrusted to him for sale and an
interest in the proceeds. In case of real estate, he can have no special
property, and would not ordinarily be held entitled to receive the
price. But when the terms of his employment and of the authorized
sale contemplate the payment of a deposit into his hands at the time
of the auction and before the completion of the sale by the delivery
of the deed, he stands, in relation to such deposit, in the same position
as he does to the piece of personal property sold and delivered by
him. He may receive and receipt for the deposit; his lien for com-
missions will attach to it ; and we see no reason why he may not sue
for it in his own name whenever an action for the deposit, separate
from the other action for the purchase-money, may become neces-
sary."^^ But an agent authorized to sell land for a commission, who
makes such sale, does not thereby acquire the right to bring an action
for a breach of the contract of sale."*' The rule applies only to con-
tracts made in the agent's name, or whether or not so made, when he
has a special property or beneficial interest in the subject-matter;-^
and it is settled that a mere interest in the proceeds by way of a com-
mission to be earned would not be sufficient.-- A factor or commis-
sion merchant, having a special property in the goods consigned to him,
is treated as a special owner of such property, and may sue in his own
name for the price of goods sold by him for the principal.^^ A broker
has, ordinarily, no authority to receive payment for property sold by
him, and can not generally maintain an action for the breach of a
contract made by him for his principal, he having no such interest in
the subject-matter as brings him within the rule. There are cxcep-
Steamboat Co. v. Atkins, 22 Pa. St. " United States Tel. Co. v. Gilder-
522; Neal v. Andrews (Tex. Civ. sieve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. Dec. 519.
App.), 60 S. W. 459. "Fairlie v. Fenton, L. R. 5 Ex.
^"Minturn v. Main, 7 N. Y. 220. 169.
^'Thompson v. Kelly, 101 Mass. "Graham v. Duckwall, 8 Bush
291, 3 Am. Rep. 353, per Wells, J. (Ky.) 12.
2° Tinsley v. Dowell, 87 Tex. 23.
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tions, however, by the usages of trade ; as in case of a policy broker,
who usually has the policy written in his own name, and may then sue
thereon.-*
§ 367. Instruments payable to cashier of bank, etc.—It is now gen-
erally regarded as a settled rule that if a note or other instrument
for the payment of money is made payable to the cashier of a bank,
—
, and sometimes also when payable to the treasurer or other officer of
a corporation,—the bank or corporation is deemed to be the real
payee, and the action on the instrument may be maintained in its
name as plaintiff.-^
§ 368. Undisclosed principal—Indorsements in blank.—Where an
agent contracts in his own name without any attempt to bind his
principal, we have seen that he may be held liable on the contract
thus entered into ; although if it develops afterward that the contract
was made for a principal who was at the time undisclosed or unknown
in the transaction, the latter may also become liable at the option of
the third party; and, conversely, the undisclosed principal may hold
=* Story Ag., § 109.
-^ Commercial Bank v. French, 21
Pick. (Mass.) 486, 32 Am. Dec. 280;
Crawford v. Dean, 6 Blackf. (Ind.)
181; Nave v. First Nat'l Bank, 87
Ind. 204; Erwin, etc., Co. v. Far-
mers' Nan Bank, 130 Ind. 367;
Nave V. Hadley, 74 Ind. 155; Stam-
ford Bank v. Ferris, 17 Conn. 258;
Garton v. Union City Nat'l Bank,
34 Mich. 279; Bank of Genesee v.
Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 312; First
Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 44 N. Y. 395;
Houghton V. First Nat'l Bank, 26
Wis. 663; Story Prom. Notes 127;
Morse Banks and Banking, §§ 158h,
170; Horn v. Newton City Bank, 32
Kan. 518; 1 Daniels Neg. Instr.,
§ 417. See ante, § 222. If the prin-
cipal is named in such an instru-
ment, the action may, of course, be
maintained by him. If the princi-
pal, however, is not named in the
instrument, extrinsic evidence is ad-
missible to show who is the real
principal. Hence, if a note or bill
is made payable or is indorsed to
"A. B. C, cashier, or order," the
bank may sue upon it, although not
named, and parol evidence would be
admitted to show of what bank he
was cashier. The suit, however,
could also be maintained by the
agent in his name. Even if the
name of the cashier or agent is not
given, the rule still holds good that
the suit may be brought by the cor-
poration, evidence aliunde being ad-
missible to explain the ambiguity.
While this is undoubtedly the ten-
dency of modern decisions, there are
authorities holding that only the
agent can sue on such contracts.
See Daniels Neg. Instr., §§ 1188,
1189. See also, in support of the
doctrine of the text, Dutch v. Boyd,
81 Ind. 146; Folger v. Chase. 18
Pick. (Mass.) 63; Bank of New York
V. Bank of Ohio, 29 N. Y. 619; Ar-
lington V. Hinds, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.)
431, 12 Am. Dec. 704, and the ex-
haustive note on p. 709.
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the third party liable, under certain conditions, on such contract.^®
The doctrine that the undisclosed principal is entitled to the benefits
of the contract made by his agent on his behalf, though not in his
name, is founded upon the fiction of the identity of the principal
and agent ; and the correlative doctrine that the third party may hold
the principal liable when the latter is discovered is based upon the
theory of reciprocity. As to the first part of this proposition, it may
be stated that the principal's rights in the contract can not be due
to the fact that they appear on the face of the contract, for they do
not ; these rights accrue to him only because the contract entered into
l)y his agent is a result of the delegation of authority to the agent. ^^
As between the principal and the agent, there can be no question
that whatever benefits arise by reason of the agency inure to the prin-
cipal's benefit. If they do not also inure to him when a third party
is concerned, it must be because such third party has contracted with-
out reference to the principal, and upon the sole credit of the agent.
This can make no difference, however, if the third party has not been
subjected to any loss by reason of the intervention of the principal;
in other words, if the principal intervenes or asserts his rights before
the third party has incurred a loss by settling with the agent, the third
party is in just as good a position as if the principal had not inter-
vened ; all that the agent can be required to do in any event is to carry
out the undertaking of the contract into which he has entered. The
third party having lost nothing by the intervention of the principal,
and the benefits of the contract in justice and equity belonging to the
principal, the court will award such benefits to the principal upon
the theory that the principal and the agent are one, and that what
the agent has contracted for really belongs to the principal."^ On
the latter branch of the proposition stated, it is sufficient to say that
if the principal is entitled to the benefits of the contract, he ought
likewise to bear the burden thereof ; and where it is shown that a party
to a contract has received the benefits thereof, he will not be heard to
say that he will not bear its corresponding burdens.^^ This is the
doctrine of reciprocity or mutuality. Upon such a contract the agent
=" See ante. §§ 328-334. =" See Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
= Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. Flanagan, 113 Ind. 488, 3 Am. St.
(Mass.) 371. 674; Vogel v. Pekoe. 157 111. 339;
=»Ford V. Williams, 21 How. (U. Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11,
S.) 287. See Sims v. Bond, 5 B. & 19 Am. St. 205.
Ad. (27 E. C. L.) 389, per Lord
Denman.
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has the right to sue as long as the j^i'incipal does not choose to do so
himself.^** "The law is that, where an agent acts for an undisclosed
principal, he becomes personally bound on the contract. * * *
And where the contract is made in his name, and he is individually
liable thereon, the liability is reciprocal, and the party with whom
the contract is made is bound to him for its performance, unless the
principal is disclosed and asserts his rights."^^ The agent also has a
=° Stewart v. Gregory, 9 N. D. 618,
84 N. W. 553.
^' Per Templeton, J., in Neal v.
Andrews (Tex. Civ. App.), 60 S. W.
459. Nor is it material that the
agreement was required to be in
writing by the statute of frauds;
the recent case of Kingsley v. Sie-
brecht, 92 Me. 23, 69 Am. St. 486,
contains a comprehensive statement
of the law upon this subject; we
quote a portion of the opinion of
tne court by Salvage, J.: "Two
questions arise: 1. May the undis-
closed principal sue upon a contract
made in the name of her agent? and
2. Is it competent for the undis-
closed principal to show by parol
that the party appearing in the
memorandum to be the contracting
party was her agent only, and con-
tracted in her behalf, and thus be
enabled to maintain an action on
the contract? We think both ques-
tions must be answered in the af-
firmative. The authorities are nu-
merous and decisive that the con-
tract of the agent is in law the
contract of the principal, and the
latter can come forward and sue
thereon, although at the time the
contract was made the agent acted
and appeared to be the principal.
In Wilson v. Hart, 7 Taunt. .295,
Parke, B., said: 'It is the constant
course to show by parol evidence
whether a contracting party is
agent or principal.' In Eastern R.
Co. V. Benedict, 5 Gray (Mass.) 561,
66 Am. Dec. 384, the court said that
'the rule that the principal may sue
in his own name upon a contract
made with his agent applies to cases
of sales by written bills or other
memoranda made by the agent,
using his own name, and disclosing
no principal,' the same as in cases
of oral contracts: Tainter v. Lom-
bard, 53 Me. 369; Barry v. Page, 10
Gray (Mass.) 398; Winchester v.
Howard, 97 Mass. 303, 93 Am. Dec.
93; Sims v. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. 389;
Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. (Mass.)
371; Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107
Mass. 37, 9 Am. Rep. 1; Byington v.
Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 45 Am. Rep.
314. And the weight of authority,
we think, sustains the proposition
that in case of a memorandum with-
in the statute of frauds, where the
name of the agent only appears, it
may be shown by parol who the
principal is, in support of an action
by the latter. In Higgins v. Senior,
8 M. & W. 834, it is declared that
'there is no doubt that where such
an agreement is made, it is compe-
tent to show that one or both of the
contracting parties were agents for
other persons, and acted as such
agents in making the contract, so
as to give the benefit of the contract
on the one hand to, and charge with
liability on the other, the unnamed
principals; and this, whether the
agreement be or be not required to
be in writing by the statute of
frauds; and this evidence in no way
contradicts the written agreement.
It does not deny that it is binding
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right of action where a negotiable instrument is indorsed in blank and
delivered to him for collection;^- but if the agent holds the note
merely as a depositary the right of action is in the principal.^^
§ 369. Defenses by third party.-
upon a contract made by him for
agent has the right to maintain, the
on those whom, on the face of it,
it purports to bind, but shows that
it also binds another by reason that
the act of the agent, in signing the
agreement, in pursuance of his au-
thority, is in law the act of the prin-
cipal. 'Parol evidence is always nec-
essary to show that the party sued is
the person making the contract and
bound by it. Whether he does so in
his own name, or in that of another,
or in a feigned name, or whether
the contract be signed by his own
hand, of by that of an agent, are
inquiries not different in their na-
ture from the question who is the
person who has just ordered goods
in a shop. If he is sued for the
price, and his identity is made out,
the contract is not varied by ap-
pearing to have been made by him
in a name not his own:' True-
man V. Loder, 11 Ad. & E. 589.
The statute of frauds does not
change the law as to the rights and
liabilities of principals and agents,
either as between themselves, or as
to third persons. The provisions of
the statute are complied witn if the
names of the competent contracting
parties appear in the writing, and,
if a party be an agent, it is not nec-
essary that the name of the princi-
pal shall be disclosed in the writing.
Indeed, if a contract, within the
provisions of the statute, be made
by an agent, whether the agency be
disclosed or not, the principal may
sue or be sued as in other cases:
Thayer v. Luce, 22 Ohio St. 62;
-When suit is brought by the agent
his principal, and which suit the
party sued may set up any defense
Pugh V. Chesseldine, 11 Ohio 109,
37 Am. Dec. 414; Dykers v. Town-
send, 24 N. Y. 57; Lerned v. Johns,
9 Allen (Mass.) 419; Hunter v. Gid-
dings, 97 Mass. 41, 93 Am. Dec. 54;
Williams v. Bacon, 2 Gray (Mass.)
387; Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. God-
dard, 14 How. (U. S.) 446; Browne
Statute of Frauds, § 373; 3 Parsons
Conts. (5th ed.) 10. Judge Story,
after stating the doctrine, said: 'The
doctrine thus asserted has this title
to commendation and support, that
it not only furnishes a sound rule
for the exposition of contracts, but
that it proceeds upon a principle of
reciprocity, and gives to the other
contracting party the same rights
and remedies against agent and
principal which they possess against
him:' Story Ag., § 160a. See also,
cases cited in note to Wain v. Warlt-
ers, 2 Smith's Lead. Gas. 252. . . .
There is no question but that the
memorandum must name or de-
scribe two contracting parties, as in
this case, a seller and a buj'er, but
the doctrine of the cases we have
cited is to the effect that if one of
the parties named is merely an
agent, the undisclosed principal
may be shown by parol. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the plaintiff may
show by parol that she was the real
principal, although Moran appeared
to be such in the memorandum."
^ Guernsey v. Burns, 2.5 Wend.
(N. Y.) 411.
='^ Hodge V. Comly, 2 Miles (Pa.)
286.
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which would be good against the principal had he sued in his own
name; unless the credit was extended to the agent exclusively, in
which case the principal can not be brought into the transaction.^*
On the other hand, if the principal exercises his right to sue
upon the contract, where he has the right, the third party may set
up any defense he would have had against the agent, had the latter
instituted the action in his name.^' The third party is even entitled
to a set-off against the agent for a debt which the agent previously
owed him, unless such third person had reasonable grounds to believe
that the agent was not dealing on his own account f^ but if the third
party dealt with the agent, knowing him to be such, he can not set up
a defense that would be good against the agent alone, if the latter
were the principal.^"
§ 370. Suit by principal who has represented himself as agent for
another.—An important question would be presented if a person who
had represented himself as an agent were in reality the prin-
cipal in the transaction. If, in such case, the performance of the
contract involved some consideration of a personal nature, conditioned
upon the identity of the parties as represented, such person could not
maintain an action thereon, at least without notifying the other party
^ Hayden v. Alton Nat'l Bank, 29 undisclosed principal, and the prin-
111. App. 458. cipal sues the buyer for the price,
=^ Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton, 17 the buyer can not set off a debt due
Pick. (Mass.) 159, 28 Am. Dec. 286; from the agent, unless, in making
Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill (N. the purchase, he was induced by the
Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618; Judson v. conduct of the principal to believe,
Stilwell, 26 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 513. and did in fact believe, that the
^ Baxter v. Sherman, 73 Minn, agent was selling on his own ac-
434, 72 Am. St. 631. In this case count. The rule of George v. Clag-
the court, speaking of the right of ett, 7 T. R. 355, does not obtain
the third party to set off an indi- where the purchaser knows that the
vidual debt of the agent in a suit agent is not the owner of the goods,
by the principal, says: "But this or when circumstances are brought
rule should not be extended beyond to his knowledge which ought to
the reason or principle upon which have put him upon inquiry, and by
It Is founded. It was never intend- investigating which he would have
ed to be so used as a shield as to ascertained that the agent was not
make every right of the real owner the owner." See also, Belfield v.
subordinate to the right of a third National Supply Co., 189 Pa. St. 189,
party, dealing with the agent, to 69 Am. St. 799; Powell v. Wade, 109
gain every possible advantage of Ala. 95, 55 Am. St. 915.
the transaction. Hence, where an "' Basaett v. Lederer, 3 T. & C.
agent sells in his own name for an (N. Y.) 671, 1 Hun (N. Y.) 274, 280.
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of the true condition of things in sufficient time before suit to enable
him to recede or to take steps to avoid the suit.^* Every person has a
just right to determine for himself with whom he will contract, and
no one can be forced into a contract with another against his will.^®
If, however, the pretended agent—being the real principal—did not
disclose or name any person for whom he professed to act, but merely
assumed to contract for some unnamed person, or to be acting in the
capacity of agent without stating for whom, it is held in England that
the suit may be maintained by such assumed agent as the real prin-
cipal.*'' In such a case, it is reasoned, it could not be well claimed
that the other contracting party relied upon the credit or ability of the
principal, for none such was named or disclosed; and he could have
intended to rely upon no one but the party with whom he contracted,
—
namely, the one who assumed to act as agent; and his designation as
agent will be disregarded as mere discriptio personae.
§ 371. Sealed instruments.—Contracts under seal, or specialties, as
we have seen, can not be varied or contradicted by parol, and hence,
no party not mentioned therein can be introduced into such a con-
tract. If, therefore, a deed of conveyance of the principal's real estate
is made by an authorized agent in his (the agent's) own name, it con-
veys nothing, and no action will lie against the principal on such in-
strument, for the deed can not be varied or explained by parol. On
the other hand, if such a conveyance be made by a party to an agent
in his (the agent's) name, as grantee, the principal can not maintain
an action thereon for a breach of the covenants therein contained.
And the same is true of an executory contract for the purchase of
land.*^ And as parol evidence can not be received to explain the in-
tention of the parties, even an attempt to execute such an instrument
by an agent in the name of the principal could not be shown to be the
act of another than the agent, and the fact that the party executing
such instrument described himself as "agent," or "agent of" another
party, will not change the character of the instrument or admit ex-
trinsic evidence to show that it was in fact executed by such party as
agent for some other person.*- It is to this class of instruments that
the common-law rule which forbids the contradiction of the contents
of a writing by parol evidence is most rigidly applied. Instruments
under seal, or specialties, were always regarded as possessing more
3« Story Ag., § 78. « Schmaltz v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 655.
^° Rayner v. Grote, 15 M. & W. " Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357.
359. "Ante, § 333.
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sacredness and solemnity than any other chiss of writings; and while
a seal has lost much of its former importance, the distinction between
simple contracts and specialties is still recognized, even in states
where the requirement for the use of a seal has been entirely abrogated.
A contract of this high character can not be turned into a simple
contract, and a party can not be introduced into such contract who does
not on its face appear to be interested in it.''^ If, therefore, an
instrument under seal be executed by a third party to an agent by
name, instead of his principal, the latter can not enforce the covenant
therein contained, or sue the party who executed it for a breach
thereof: such an action can be maintained only by the party to
whom, on its face, the instrument purports to have been executed.**
But if the instrument, though under seal, was not required to be so
under the common law, the seal may be disregarded and the instru-
ment treated as a simple contract.*^ In such a case the principal may
be made liable in assumpsit upon the promise contained in the instru-
ment, which may be resorted to in order to ascertain the terms of the
agreement.*® The same is doubtless true in case of a breach by the
third party, in which case the action may be maintained by the prin-
cipal, if he can show that such is his interest in the contract ; for the
same rules would then be applicable as in cases of other simple con-
tracts in writing.
§ 372. Money paid by mistake.—In Stevenson v. Mortimer,*''' Lord
Mansfield laid down the rule that "where a man pays money by his
agent, which ought not to have been paid, either the agent or prin-
cipal may bring an action to recover it back. The agent may, from
the authority of the principal, and the principal may, as proving it
to have been paid by the agent."*^ And the same doctrine has been ap-
plied where money has been paid by an agent for his principal on a
contract which proved to. be illegal, the agent being at the time igno-
rant of the facts which rendered it illegal. Thus, where an agent ef-
fected an insurance on a cargo of goods for his principal, who resided
in another country, and hostilities had actually broken out between
" Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. *" Lancaster v. Knickerbocker Ice
357. See also, Story Ag., § 422. Co., 153 Pa. St. 427.
" Shack v. Anthony, 1 Man. & S. "2 Cowp. 805.
573; Violett v. Powell, 10 B. Mon. ^^ Kent v. Bornstein, 12 Allen
(Ky.) 347. (Mass.) 342.
*" Lancaster v. Knickerbocker Ice
Co., 153 Pa. St. 427.
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the country in which the insurance was effected and that of the owner
of the goods, but news thereof had not reached the country where the
insurance Avas taken out, the vessel with the goods being captured and
confiscated, the court held the insurance void, but that the agent,
being ignorant of the fact of hostilities when the premium was paid
b}' him, was entitled to have the same returned as money had and
received to the agent's use and without consideration.*^ It has been
held, however, that if an agent, by mistake, sell the principal's goods
for less than the scheduled price, an action by him against an inno-
cent purchaser of the goods to recover the difference will not lie.^**
Where an agent lends his principal's money, taking a note therefor,
payable to himself, the note belongs to the principal, who may main-
tain an action thereon; and if, after notice to him of the principal's
superior right, the borrower pays the agent, he does so at his peril.®
^
This is because of the privity^ between the parties, the principal simply
asserting and obtaining the fruits of the contract entered into by his
agent for him as an unknown principal. But where an agent collects
money belonging to his principal and loans it to a third person, to
whom the agent is indebted, without notice to the borrower that the
money was that of another, the principal can not recover it, even after
notice that it did not belong to the agent. ®^ In the latter case, it could
not be said that there was in the hands of the borrower money of the
principal which in equity and good conscience should not be retained
by the third party, for the latter, having obtained it from the agent
without notice of the claim of the principal, and in view of the indebt-
edness of the agent to the borrower, had a legal right of set-off against
the agent in order to secure his own debt, and could not be deprived
of the same by the intervention of the principal's claim. This is so,
as the court said in tlie case last cited, "not only because money has
no ear-mark and can not easily be identified, but because a different
doctrine would be productive of great mischief." Property other than
money, however, stands upon different ground, and where an agent,
without authority, disposes of the same to a third party, the latter re-
ceives no title.
II. In Tort.
§ 373. For injury to property of principal.—An agent may main-
tain an action ex delicto against a third person for injury to goods
*" Oom V. Bruce, 12 East 225. " Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton,
^" Hungerford v. Scott, 37 Wis. 341. 17 Pick. (Mass.) 159. 28 Am. Dec.
" Farmers', etc., Bank v. King. 57 286.
Pa. St. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215.
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in which the agent had a special property or temporary ownership,
with immediate possession. Thus, a bailor may maintain trover
against all persons but the rightful owner if property in his possession
be taken away from him;''^ and in such case the agent can recover
damages for the full value of the property converted.^* He holds the
money over and above his own interest in trust for his principal.^®
He may maintain trover even against the absolute owner for a wrong-
ful conversion by the latter, although he can then only recover damages
to the extent of his interest.^® So, the consignee of undelivered goods
may maintain trover against one who has converted them.^' And,
generally, one who is entitled to the immediate possession of goods
of which he is wrongfully deprived by another may maintain trover
against the wrongdoer.^^ An agent may also maintain an action
against a third person for a libel relative to business in which he is
engaged for his principal, by reason of wliich he was injured in the
loss of commissions on goods, etc. ;^^ although this might not be true
of an agent who works on a salary.
B. Of Third Persons to Principal.
§ 374. In general.—While, as we have seen, those persons who en-
gage in business transactions with an agent who is acting for his prin-
cipal acquire certain well defined rights against him which he is in
duty bound to recognize and live up to, it is true, on the other hand,
that the principal also acquires certain reciprocal rights against such
persons, and that they assume toward him certain obligations which he
may enforce. Such obligations may arise out of contracts express or
implied, into which the agent has entered for the principal, or out
of torts committed by such third parties, to the injury of the principal,
or out of certain conditions from which trusts are created, in equity,
in favor of the principal.
7. On Contracts.
§ 375. Principal's right of action on authorized contracts or on
unauthorized contracts subsequently ratified.—The normal way in
which an agent generally contracts is in the name of his principal.
=' Faulkner v. Brown, 13 Wend. Pomeroy v. Smith, 17 Pick. (Mass.)
{N. Y.) 63. 85; Schley v. Lyon, 6 Ga. 530.
" Finn v. Western R. Corp., 112 ^' Fowler v. Down. 1 B. & P. 44.
Mass. 524, 17 Am. Rep. 128. " Cooley Torts 445-447.
" White V. Webb, 15 Conn. 302. '''' Weiss v. Whittemore, 28 Mich.
''Roberts v. Wyatt, 2 Taunt. 268; 366.
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When there is an express contract by an agent in the name of a
disclosed principal, the latter may, of course, enforce the contract
against the third party by suit in his own name the same as if he had
entered into it in person.^" But if the agent, at the time of enter-
ing into the contract, acts outside the real or apparent scope of his
authority, and the contract is subsequently ratified by the principal,
the latter may or may not be entitled to sue on the contract. This
will depend upon the solution of the question whether or not the
third party may recede from the contract before the principal has rati-
fied it, and after the discovery that the agent's act was without original
authority. This question was discussed in a former portion of this
work.''^ If the contract is ratified by the principal, not having been
previously receded from by the third party, the ratification relates
back to the time the contract was entered into, and the rights of the
parties are the same as if the contract had been authorized in the first
instance. In such case the principal may, of course, maintain an
action against the third party for a breach of such contract to the same
extent as if the contract had been originally made by his authority;
and the third party can not dispute the agent's authority.®^ But if
the third party seasonably repudiates the transaction, the principal
can not enforce the contract against him.®^ And, as we have herein-
Ijefore pointed out, if any rights intervene in favor of strangers, sub-
sequent to the original transaction, but prior to the ratification, the
parties to the contract take subject to the rights of such strangers.*'*
§ 376. Principal's rights subject to rights of third party.—But
while it is true that, by reason of such contract either originally
authorized or subsequently ratified, the principal acquires the right
to insist upon a performance and to sue for its breach, yet this right
is subject to certain well-recognized qualifications. In the first
place, the principal is bound by all the declarations, misrepresenta-
tions, concealments and fraud of the agent acting within the scope
of his authorit}', and the principal can not claim any benefit from the
contract made by the agent without at the same time making himself
""Barry v. Page, 10 Gray (Mass.) "-Gold Mining Co. v. National
398; Nicoll v. Burke, 78 N. Y. 581; Bank, 96 U. S. 640; Mayer v. Mc-
Sharp V. Jones, IS Ind. 314, 81 Am. Lure, 36 Miss. 389, 72 Am. Dec. 190.
Dec. 359; Destrehan v. Cypress "•'Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686;
Lumber Co., 45 La. Ann. 920; Don- Wilkinson v. Heavenrich, 58 Mich,
anoe v. McDonald, 92 Ky. 123. 5*4, 55 Am. Rep. 708.
^'Ante, §§ 153, 154. ^ Ante, §§ 144, 285.
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responsible for such agent's misconduct.*'^ As was well said by the
court of appeals of New York: "If an agent defrauds the person
with whom he is dealing, the principal, not having authorized or
participated in the wrong, may, no doubt, rescind, when he discovers
the fraud, on the terms of making complete restitution. But so
long as he retains the benefits of the dealing he can not claim immu-
nity on the ground that the fraud was committed by his agent, and not
by himself.'"'*' It is really immaterial whether the agent was acting
within the exact scope of his authority or not : if the matter was en-
tirely unauthorized by the principal, but he subsequently ratified it
by appropriating the benefits thereof, he will be bound by the miscon-
duct of the agent. ^^
§ 377. Undisclosed principal.—If the contract made by the agent
for his principal was a simple contract, and either the fact of the
agency or the name of the principal was undisclosed, the principal
may, nevertheless, as we have seen, avail himself of the benefit of such
contract and maintain a suit thereon for its breach;*'^ and parol evi-
dence may be introduced to prove such facts.®® In such case, either
the principal or the agent may be bound, at the option of the third
party; the agent because he has expressly bound himself by his con-
tract, and the principal because he has authorized the contract to be
made for him;^*' it is analogous to the ordinary case of a dormant
partner.'^ ^ But this rule also must be taken with some qualification.
Thus, if the principal exercises the privilege of appropriating the
benefits of the contract to himself, and sues the third party, the latter
has the right, as against the principal, to interpose every defense which
would have existed in his favor had the agent been the principal and
sued upon the contract ; the principal's right, in other words, is subject
to the equities of the third party. "^^ However, if the third party has
°' Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's ed.) "" Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15
469; Keough v. Leslie, 92 Pa. St. East 62, 3 Smith Ld. Cas. (9th ed.)
424. 1634; Taintor v. Prendergast, 3
""Ewell v. Chamberlin, 31 N. Y. Hill (N. Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618.
611, 619. " Huntington v. Knox, 7 Gush.
«'Du Souchet v. Butcher, 113 Ind. (Mass.) 371.
249; Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend. "Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill
(N. Y.) 260. (N. Y.) 72, 38 Am. Dec. 618; Traub
"^Ante, § 366; Glark v. Smith, 88 v. Milliken, 57 Me. 63; Ruiz v. Nor-
111. 298; Butler v. Dorman, 68 Mo. ton. 4 Gal. 355, 60 Am. Dec. 618;
298, 302, 30 Am. Rep. 795. Nave v. Hadlpy, 74 Ind. 155.
»"• Salmon Falls Mfg. Go. v. God-
dard, 14 How. (U. S.) 446.
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paid the agent before discovering the real princ-ipal, or has acquired a
set-off against him, the principal will generally be bound by such
payment or set-off.^^ But this right of defense can not avail a third
party, in case the agent is clothed with only a bare power to sell,
without possession of the goods or other indicia of ownership; as,
for example, in the case of a broker, who does not ordinarily have the
possession of the property which he is authorized to sell: a party
dealing with such an agent can not, without gross carelessness, be
misled into the belief that the agent is really the principal, and can
not therefore avail himself of the benefit of a set-off of a debt which
the agent owes such third party.'* But where a sale is made by a
factor, instead of a broker, the purchaser can set off a debt owing him
from the factor. '^^
§ 378. Third party's right of set-off.—In a case decided by the
English chancery division it was held that before a set-off will be
available to the defendant, in case of a sale, the following conditions
must be complied with: "1. That the sale should be made by a
person intrusted with the possession of the goods ; 2. That the agent
should sell the goods as his own, and in his own name as principal, by
the authority of the principal; and 3. That the purchaser dealt with
the agent as, and believed him to be, the principal in the transaction
up to the time when the set-off occurred."'** And it is the duty of the
third party to make reasonable effor.ts to ascertain whether the agent
is dealing for himself or for an undisclosed principal ; for "if, by due
diligence, the buyer could have known in what character the seller
acted, there would be no justice in allowing the former to set off a
bad debt at the expense of the principal.*'" Wliere the third party
has knowledge of the agency, but not of the principal's name, he is
put upon his inquiry as to who the principal is.'^* But it has been
held that the mere knowledge by the third party that the person with
whom he is dealing is a factor, though he also carries on business on
his own account, will not be sufficient notice unless such third party
"Peel V. Shepherd, 58 Ga. 365; '"^Ex parte Dixon, L. R. 4 Ch. Div.
Bernshouse v. Abbott, 16 Vroom 133.
(N. J.) 531, 46 Am. Rep. 789; Cros- "Miller v. Lea, 35 Md. 396, 6
by v. Hill, 39 Ohio St. 100. Am. Rep. 417; Frame v. William
"* Bernshouse v. Abbott, supra; Penn Coal Co., 97 Pa. St. 309.
Baring V. Corrie, 2 B. & Aid. 137. '^Whelan v. McCreary, 64 Ala.
'= Bliss v. Bliss, 7 Bosw. (N. Y.) 319.
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knew or had good reason to believe that the person was acting as
agent for some one in that particular transaction.''^
§ 379. Where contract is made on exclusive credit of agent.—
The rule that an unknown principal may take the benefit of his agent's
contract, when in fact it was made in behalf of such principal, has
some well known exceptions. In the first place, where the contract
between the agent and third person was made by the latter upon the
basis of a personal trust or confidence in the agent, who was believed
by him to be the principal, the undisclosed principal can not subse-
quently, without such third person's consent, take the benefit of such
contract or maintain an action thereon.**** No one can be forced to con-
tract with any person contrary to his will ; a party has a right to select
the person with whom he will deal or enter into contracts. There may
be special reasons why he should choose some particular person rather
than another : the person to be employed may be an artist or an author,
and the employer may prefer a painting from his hand, or a book of
his composition, to that of another ; or the third party may wish to en-
gage the services of the person on account of his character or some par-
ticular traits or qualities: in all these cases the third party has the
right to insist that the contract shall be performed by the party whom
he had engaged to perform it. Moreover, there may be special reasons
why the third party would not desire to deal with, a particular person,
and he might refuse to enter into a contract if the objectionable per-
son were to be the other party to it ; and if the undisclosed principal
proves to be such a person he ought not to be permitted thus to thrust
himself upon the other contracting party. In such case the undis-
closed principal could not be heard to say that he was equally as
skillful or competent as the one with whom the other party believed
he was dealing or with whom he intended to deal; whether the per-
son to be employed possesses the peculiar skill or ability desired by
the other party is a question solely for the determination of the latter,
and the freedom of contract can not be infringed by forcing upon one
the services of another, contrary to the dictates of his own judgment
;
whether his reasons are good or bad is a question with which the
courts have no concern whatever.®^ 'If, however, the contract or act
"Hogan V. Shorb, 24 Wend. (N. Dec. 93; King v. Batterson, 13 R. I.
Y.) 458, 461. 117, 43 Am. Rep. 13.
^Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 '^ Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, supra;
Mass. 28, 25 Am. Rep. 9; Winchester Winchester v. Howard, supra.
V. Howard, 97 Mass. 303, 93 Am.
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to be performed is of such a nature as not to depend upon any particu-
lar skill, ability, or other personal qualifications or traits, and the third /
party has received the benefit thereof, the law will require him to
perform his part of the engagement also. And so, if the party for
whose personal services the other stipulated actually performed the
same, there is no good reason why the third party should not be
required to render performance of his part of the contract to the
unknown principal, if there be one. But where the third party deals
with the agent upon the express understanding that the latter is the
principal, the agent thus pledging his own credit for the performance
of the contract, the unknown principal, if there be one, can not enforce
performance of the contract from the other party.**- In that case, the
third party could not enforce jjerformance against the principal, if the
latter should fail to perform, and there being no mutuality in such con-
tract, it can not be enforced on either side.
§ 380. Sealed instruments.—Still another exception to the general
rule that an undisclosed principal may avail himself of the benefits
of a contract made for him by his agent by bringing suit in his
own name, is in cases of sealed instruments. \Mien an instrument
is one that was required, at common law, to be under seal, we have
seen that the courts will recognize only the parties whose names appear
in the instrument itself, and will not admit parol evidence to prove
that some other party was in fact the principal, obligor or obligee,
grantor or grantee. ^^ If the instrument was executed by an agent to
a third party, and the agent failed to contract in the name of the
principal, the agent alone can maintain an action for its breach ; and
this is true although the agent described himself as such, unless he
acted ostensibly for and in the name of the principal.** The third
party could not, in such case, maintain an action against the principal,
because he does not on the face of the instrument stipulate for the
performance of the contract ; and it would be in violation of the rule
that forbids such an instrument to be contradicted or varied by parol
evidence, if the other contracting party were permitted to introduce
extrinsic evidence to show that some one other than the ostensible
obligor or grantor was the party intended to be bound. *^ This being
true, and the contract being one of reciprocal obligations, the principal
can not maintain an action on such a contract against the third
"-Winchester v. Howard, supra. ^ Ante, § 371.
^'Ante, § 333. "^ Ibid.
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party.^® In such case, however, the principal can generally avail him-
self of the benefits of the contract by suing in the name of the agent.^^
§ 381. Implied or quasi-contract—Money paid by mistake.—The
third party may also be liable to the principal in some cases on an
implied contract, or (/?<a6i-contractual obligation. It is a general prin-
ciple of equity that where a party in good faith has paid money to
another under a mistake of fact, under circumstances that would ren-
der it unconscionable for the party to whom the money was paid to
retain it, the person who has thus mistakenly paid such money may
recover it from the party to whom it has been so paid.^^ While there
is, in such case, no express promise to pay the money back, the courts
have established the fiction of a promise by holding that the recipient
can not be heard to say that although he has received the money,
he has in fact never made any promise to repay it. And it can make
no difference whether the money was thus paid by the principal him-
self or by his agent for him : under such circumstances, as we have
seen, either the principal or the agent may sue to recover the money. ^^
§ 382. Money paid in violation of agent's duty—Bona fide re-
cipient of money not affected.—The principle upon which money or
property may be recovered, however, is not confined to cases in which
money has been paid or property delivered by the agent under an
honest mistake or in the belief that he had a right or that it was his
duty to pay it : it extends to cases in which the agent pays such money
or turns over such other property in violation of his duty ; except, in
some cases, where the party receiving it is a ho7ia fide holder for value
and without notice of the misapplication.'*'* And it is not necessary
that the third party should have known whose money or property it
was that the agent was thus misapplying: it is sufficient if he knew
that the party from whom he received it was holding it as an agent;
and if he receives it with such knowledge he does so at his peril, and to
««Sims v. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. (27 *' Bispham Princ. of Eq. (6th ed.),
E. C. L.) 389; Clarke v. Courtney, § 190, et seq.
5 Pet. (U. S.) 319; Briggs v. Part- "^ Ante, § ^72; Stevenson v. Mor-
ridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. timer, 2 Cowp. 806; Ancher v. Bank
617; Cocke v. Dickens, 4 Yerg. of England, 2 Doug. 637; Holman
(Tenn.) 29, 26 Am. Dec. 214; Clap v. Frost, 26 S. C. 290.
v. Day, 2 Greenl. (Me.) 305, 11 Am. ="' Rusk v. Newell, 25 111. 211;
Dec. 99. Farmers', etc.. Bank v. King, 57 Pa.
"" Viol^tt v. Powell, 10 B. Mon. St. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215; Mason v.
(Ky.) 347. Waite, 17 Mass. 560.
25
—
Principal and Agent.
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defeat a recover}' by the principal he must show authority in the agent
so to dispose of it.''^ If, however, the principal has invested the agent
with the indicia df title to the property or with a semblance of author-
ity to dispose of it, the third party, acting in good faith and paying
value therefor, is protected, and the principal can not recover from
him.®^
§ 383. Distinction drawn between money and other property.
—
Money or bank notes stand upon a different footing from other per-
sonal property, for as money has no ear-marks and can not well be
identified, the third party usually acquires a good title to it if he ob-
tains it for value and without notice. But one who buys or otherwise
obtains from another personal property other than money generally
obtains no better title than the person had from whom he obtained it,
and hence the owner may recover either the specific property or its
value from the party who has thus received it.®^
§ 384. Money obtained from agent by fraud or duress.—Where an
agent is compelled to pay the money of his principal by duress, or it
is obtained from him by fraud, either the principal or the agent may
maintain an action against the wrongdoer for the money thus ob-
tained.^*
§ 385. Money obtained from agent by gambling, etc.—A principal's
money oljtained from an agent on a wager or by gambling may be
recovered from the winner by the principal in an action of dssumpsit
for money had and received, where the gambling or winning was
unlawful. ^^ In such cases the method of obtaining the money is
illegal, and the third party can not shield himself behind the defense
of innocence ; he pays no value for the money, and he obtains it without
the semblance of authority from the owner. The principal in such
cases not being in pari delicto, the doctrine that the courts will not
relieve the guilty parties from the consequences of their illegal trans-
actions does not apply.®** If by statute the losing party is enabled
" Gerard v. McCorraick, 130 N. Y. "^ Stevenson v. Mortimer, 2 Cowp.
261. 805; Stevens v. Fitch, 11 Mete.
"= Brewster v. Sime, 42 Cal. 139; (Mass.) 248; Holman v. Frost, 26
Levi V. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. S. C. 290.
Rep. 332; McMahon v. Sloan, 12 Pa. "'Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass. 560.
St. 229, 51 Am. Dec. 601, 607; Saltus •"'In Mason v. Waite. supra, the
V. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267, 32 court, speaking through Parker. C.
Am. Dec. 541. J., said: "The identical bills, paid
^^Levi V. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 by Sargent to the defendant, were
Am. Rep. 332. proved to be the property of the
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to recover the money so lost, it furnishes an additional reason for
allowing the principal to recover it, although, in such case, the agent
may maintain the action, if the principal does not choose to exercise
the right.'*'
§ 386. Property wrongfully obtained from agent by barter, pledge
or mortgage.—An agent who is authorized by the principal to sell
the latter's property has no authority to barter, pledge, mortgage, or
give away such property, 'and a transfer by any other method than
that of a sale conveys no title to the purchaser where the agent has
only the indicia of authority to sell such property. The principal
has a right, therefore, to recover such property or its value from the
person who has thus obtained it from the agent.^^ Nor has an agent
any right or authority to pledge his principal's money or goods for
the payment of his own debts; and if he does this, an action will lie
by the principal against the party to whom the money was so paid or
the property delivered, to recover the money or property or the value
of the latter. «^
plaintiff. They were committed to
Sargent, as a carrier, to pay to the
order of the plaintiff. They came
into the hands of the defendant un-
lawfully; for gaming is unlawful
by our statute. The defendant
could have gained no property in
them, even as against Sargent, who
might have recovered them back
within three months. Any other
person might have recovered double
the amount, without limitation of
time; and the defendant was fur-
ther liable to indictment. How
then can he have a right to retain
against the true owner, any more
than he would a horse, or any other
chattel, acquired in the same way?
It is true, in such a case, trover
would have been the proper action;
and, perhaps, would have been the
better action in this case, but for the
difficulty of identifying bank notes.
We do not see, however, why the
action for money had and received
will not lie. The notes were paid
and received as money; and as to
any want of privity, or any implied
promise, the law seems to be, that
where one has received the money
of another, and has not a right con-
scientiously to retain it, the law
implies a promise that he will pay it
over. Had Sargent paid the money to
an innocent person, for a valuable
consideration, or to satisfy a debt
of his own, the case might have
been different; as it would be mis-
chievous to require of persons, who
receive money in the way of busi-
ness, or in payment of debts, to
look into the authority of him from
whom they receive it."
" See Allen v. Watson, 2 Hill ( S.
C.) 319.
"^ Lowry v. Beckner, 5 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 41; Bertholf v. Quinlan, 68
111. 297; Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass.
453; Bott v. McCoy, 20 Ala. 578, 56
Am. Dec. 223; Hayes v. Colby, 65 N.
H. 192.
"=' Whitney v. State Bank. 7 Wis.
520; School Trustees v. McCormick,
41 111. 323.
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§ 387. Demand not necessary before suit.—Xo demand is generally
necessary as a condition precedent to maintaining the action against
the third party by the principal, where the third party has taken pos-
session of the property and exercises acts of OTVTiership over it. Thus,
where a horse was let by the owner to another person, and the latter,
without authorit}', bartered him to a third party, who took him and
exercised acts of ownership over him, it was held that an action of
trover and conversion would lie by the principal against such third
party; and proof of a previous demand and refusal was held unneces-
sary, the exercise of dominion over the animal being sufficient evi-
dence of a conversion.^*'*'
II. Pursuing Trust Funds.
§ 388. Constructive or resulting trusts.—The relation of trustor
and trustee may arise between parties without an express contract
between them to that effect. Thus, where property belonging to a
principal comes into the hands of his agent to be applied by him to
certain objects, the property becomes stamped with the character of
a trust, and can not subsequently be diverted from that purpose by
the agent. These trusts are generally spoken of as constructive or
resulting trusts.^"^ They are so called because they arise not by
virtue of any express contract, but result in or are construed as
such by operation of law.^"^^ Such trusts are created upon equitable
principles, to prevent, as far as possible, the transmutation of propert}'
by fraudulent means. When such property has been wrongfully
disposed of by the agent, the principal may follow it or the proceeds
thereof so long as they are distinguishable.^"- It makes no difference
whether the property is in its original or in an altered state as be-
tween the cestui que trust and the trustee and all parties claiming
under him, nor even as to third parties, unless the latter be purchasers
for a valuable consideration without notice. ^"^ Any subsequent
holder will be affected by the trust, who has acquired the same as a
gift, or without parting with value, or with actual or constructive
notice of the trust. ^"^ There need be no active participation in any
^<^ Gilmore v. Newton, 9 Allen '"- Frith v. Cartland. 34 L. J. Ch.
(Mass.) 171, 85 Am. Dec. 749. 301.
^"Underbill Trusts & Trustees '"^ Evans Pr. Ag. (Bedford's ed.)
12. 141.
"'a /bid. "* Farmers', etc.. Bank v. Sprague,
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fraiulnlent transaction of the agent by the third party, or in any
effort to defeat the trust : it is suthcient to affect him, if he be not an
innocent holder for valiie.^'*'^ So, where an agent loans his principal's
money and takes a note therefor, payable to himself, such note be-
longs to the principal ; and if the maker pays it to the agent after no-
tice of the trust, he does so at his peril.^*"^ The general doctrine here
involved is stated by Jordan, J., speaking for the supreme court of
the state, in a recent Indiana case, thus: "The authorities
generally affirm and support the right of a cestui que trust
to pursue and recover trust funds wrongfully diverted, where
their identity has not been lost, and where they have not passed
into the hands of parties for value without notice of the trust.
Whenever any property, or fund, in its original state, has once been
impressed with the character or nature of a trust, no subsequent
change of its original form, or the condition, can divest it of its trust
character, so long as it is capable of being identified; and the benefi-
ciary thereof may pursue and reclaim it, regardless of the form
into which it may have been changed, provided it has not gone into
the possession of a ho7ia fide purchaser without notice. All that the
law contemplates by requiring the property or fund to be identified
is a substantial identification ; and, in case the fund consists of money,
the cestui que trust may reclaim it, although not able to trace the
identical coins or bills, so long as its identity as a fund can be ascer-
tained. It is a well settled principle that the abuse of a trust fund
by a trustee, or fiduciary, confers no right upon him, nor upon those
who claim in privity with him. Where the fund has been misapplied,
or converted into other property, or mixed with the funds of the
trustee, or those claiming through him, and can be traced and
identified, courts will attribute the ownership to the cestui que trust,
and will not permit the wrongful act of the trustee, or fiduciary, in
mixing the trust fund with his own funds or those of a third party,
to defeat a recovery, but, in general, in such cases, will separate
the trust fund from the others with which it has been commingled,
and restore it to the beneficiary entitled to receive it."^°^ And if the
trust property be other than money, the disposal thereof without
52 N. Y. 605; Drovers' Nat'l Bank Hyde Park, 101 111. 595, 40 Am.
V. O'Hare, 18 111. App. 182; Gerard Rep. 218.
V. McCormick, 130 N. Y. 261; Over- '^"^ Farmers', etc., Bank v. King, 57
seers of Poor v. Bank of Virginia, 2 Pa. St. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215.
Gratt. (Va.) 544, 44 Am. Dec. 399. ^»' Pearce v. Dill, 149 Ind. 136, 142.
^"'^ Fifth Nat'l Bank v. Village of
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authority may be disavowed and set aside by the owner, even if it has
found its way into the hands of an innocent purchaser/'*^ And so,
if the agent purchase property with the funds of his principal, it may
be followed into the hands of a third person, though innocent, having
no notice of the right of the principal, who purchases for value, for
such third person can get no better title than has he from whom the
third person derives it.^**'* But if the money thus obtained be invested
in the purchase of goods which are mixed with others so as to be inca-
pable of identification, a court of equity will not enforce a trust. ^^"^
And the property of the fund or article must be in the principal before
the diversion takes place; for if an agent should fraudulently collect
commissions from a third party and invest them in other property, the
principal can not pursue the fund into the investments, since such
fund was not the property of the principal, but only represented a
debt due him from the agent for which an action for money had and
received would lie.^^^
"* Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton,
17 Pick. (Mass.) 159, 28 Am. Dec.
286.
^"» Stevenson v. Kyle, 42 W. Va.
229, 57 Am. St. 854.
""Union Nat'l Bank v. Goetz, 138
111. 127, 32 Am. St. 119. See the
elaborate note to this case at p. 125,
et seg., for a thorough review of
the authorities upon the subject.
"1 Lister v. Stubbs, L. R. 45 Ch.
Div. 1. In the case of Baker v.
New York Nat'l Ex. Bank, 100 N. Y.
31, 53 Am. Rep. 150, some commis-
sion merchants had sold the goods
of their principal and deposited the
proceeds with the defendant bank
in their own names, as agents. The
agents were individually indebted
to the bank, and the bank after-
wards, upon the agents becoming in-
solvent, charged its own claim
against the funds on deposit with it
by said agents. The court, speaking
through Andrews, J., said: "The
relation between a commission
agent for the sale of goods and his
principal is fiduciary. The title to
the goods until sold remains in the
principal, and when sold, the pro-
ceeds, whether in the form of
money, or notes, or other securi-
ties, belong to him, subject to the
lien of the commission agent for
advances and other charges. The
agent holds the goods and the pro-
ceeds upon an implied trust to dis-
pose of the goods according to the
directions of the principal, and to
account for, and pay over to him
the proceeds from sales. The rela-
tion between the parties in respect
to the proceeds of sales is not that
of debtor and creditor simply. The
money and securities are specific-
ally the property of the principal,
and he may follow and reclaim
them, so long as their identity is
not lost, subject to the rights of a
bona fide purchaser for value. In
case of the bankruptcy of the agent,
neither the goods nor their proceeds
would pass to his assignees in bank-
ruptcy for general administration,
but would be subject to the para-
mount claim of the principal: Ches-
terfield Mfg. Co. V. Dehon, 5 Pick.
(Mass.) 7, 16 Am. Dec. 367; Merrill
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///. In Tort.
§ 389. Injuries to property of principal.—Injuries to the property
of the principal, while in the hands of an agent, or, as we have seen,
even with their consent, to the prej-
udice of the cestuis que trustent.
The supposed difficulty in main-
taining the action arising out of
the fact that the money deposited
was not the specific proceeds of the
plaintiffs' goods, is answered by the
case of Van Alen v. American Nat'l
Bank, 52 N. Y. 1. Conceding that
Wilson & Bro. used the specific
proceeds for their own purposes,
and their identity was lost, yet
when they made up the amounts so
used, and deposited them in the
trust account, the amounts so de-
posited were impressed with the
trust in favor of the principals, and
became substituted for the original
proceeds and subject to the same
equities. The objection that the de-
posit account represented not only
the proceeds of the plaintiff's goods
but also the proceeds of goods
of other persons, and that the other
parties interested are not before the
court, and must be brought in in or-
der to have a complete determina-
tion of the controversy, is not well
taken. The objection for defect of
parties was not taken in the an-
swer, and moreover, it does not ap-
pear that there are any unsettled
accounts of AVilson & Bro. with any
other person or persons for whom
they were agents. The check oper-
ated as a setting apart of so much
of the deposit account to satisfy the
plaintiffs' claim. It does not appear
tnat the plaintiffs are not equitably
entitled to this amount out of the
fund, or that there is any conflict of
interest between them and any other
person or persons for whom Wilson
& Bro. acted as consignees. The
V. Bank of Norfolk, 19 Pick. (Mass.)
32; Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason
(U. S.) 232; Knatchbull v. Hallett,
L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; Duguid v.
Edwards, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 288;
Story Ag., § 229. The relation be-
tween a principal and a consignee
for sale is, however, subject to mod-
ification by express agreement, or by
agreement implied from the course
of business or dealing between
them. The parties may so deal that
the consignee becomes a mere debt-
or to the consignor for the proceeds
of sales, having the right to appro-
priate the specific proceeds to his
own use. In the present case the
bank account against which the
check was drawn represented trust
moneys belonging to the principals
for whom Wilson & Bro. were
agents. The deposits to the credit
of this account were made in the
name of the firm, with the word
"agents" added. They were the
proceeds of commission sales. Wil-
son & Bro. became insolvent in Octo-
ber, 1878, and they opened the ac-
count in this form for the purpose
of protecting their principals, which
purpose was known to the bank at
the time. The check in question
was drawn on this account in settle-
ment for a balance due to plaintiffs,
upon cash sales made by the draw-
ers as their agents. It is clear upon
the facts that the fund represented
by the deposit account was a trust
fund, and that the bank had no
right to charge against it the indi-
vidual debt of Wilson & Bro. The
bank, having notice of the charac-
ter of the fund, could not appropri-
ate it to the debt of Wilson & Bro.,
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a conversion of the same, renders the wrongdoer liable either to the
owner or agent in damages to the extent of the injury or the value
of the property converted,—the possession of the agent being regarded,
in such cases, as the possession of the principal; and a judgment
against one is a good bar to the action of the other."- And where the
property of the owner has been taken by a writ of replevin from the
possession of the agent, the principal may, even during the pendency
of such action, retake it by replevin from the plaintiff in the first
action.^ ^^ But if the goods are in possession of an agent or bailee
for a given time, by contract with the principal, the latter can not,
during the life of such contract, maintain an action of trespass against
one who has wrongfully taken the goods from the possession of the
one lawfully entitled thereto.^^* If, however, the agent has wrong-
fully disposed of such property to a third party, the principal may
recover the same or the value thereof from such party; as, in such
case, the agent can not confer upon the purchaser a better title than
he himself has.^^^
§ 390. Conversion of principal's property by third party.—The
principal has his remedy against both the agent and the third
party, when the agent, with the knowledge and consent of such third
party, wrongfully converts the principal's property by selling or pledg-
ing it to the third party. ^^® This is a case in which both the agent
and third person participate in the wrong. It may be true, however,
that the third person alone is blameworthy,—as, where he wrongfully
converts or injures the principal's property, while in the agent's
hands, without the knowledge or consent of the agent ; or where he
perpetrates a fraud upon the agent to the injury of the principal,
—
as, for example, in the purchase from or sale of goods to such agent
for the principal.^^^ In case there has been a conversion, the princi-
pal may sue in trover for the tort, or he may waive the tort and
sue in assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered.^ ^^ If the property
presumption, in the absence of any "^ White v. Dolliver, 113 Mass.
contrary indication, is that the 400, 18 Am. Rep. 502.
fund was adequate to protect all in- "* Soper v. Sumner, 5 Vt. 274.
terests, and that Wilson & Bro. ap- "^ Thompson v. Barnum, 49 Iowa
propriated to the plaintiffs only 392; Clarke v. Shee, 1 Cowp. 197.
their just share." "" Story Ag.. § 437.
"- Faulkner v. Brown, 13 Wend. "' Story Ag.. § 438.
(N. Y.) 64; Thorp v. Burling, 11 ""Story Ag.. § 439; Keener Quasi
Johns. (N. Y.) 285. Conts. 170, et seg.
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be other than money, and can be found in the possession of any
third party, whether he had notice of the rights of the principal
or not, it may be replevied from him by the principal ; for the agent
could give no better title than he had himself. If it has been
changed into other property, the third party will be liable in trover
for its value, for the conversion; equity, in such cases, impressing
upon the property the character of a trust, and holding the party liable
to account to the owner."" If the property converted be money or
bank bills, the principal can waive the tort and maintain an action
for money had and received; unless the third party was ignorant of
the principal's rights, in which case no action whatever will lie against
him, if he gave value for it.^-**
§ 391. Fraud of third party in contracting with agent.—A third
party may also be liable to the principal, in a proper case, for a fraud
perpetrated upon his agent in connection with a contract entered
into between such agent and third person. The party dealing with
the agent may, by misrepresentation, false warranty, or other wrong-
ful methods, have overreached the agent and thereby obtained an
unfair advantage to the injury of the principal The consequences
of such wrongful conduct are, of course, the same as if they had been
practiced by the third party in dealing with the principal directly:
the latter may rescind or avoid the contract, or sue for damages in
an action on the case, or, if the third person has thereby enriched
his estate, may waive the tort and sue in general assumpsit}^'^
§ 392. Fraud of third party in collusion with agent.—The case
supposed in the preceding section involves a wrong on the part of
the third person only, without the participation therein of the agent.
But the third party may enter into collusion with the agent and per-
petrate a fraud upon the principal. In such case, the principal would
have his remedy against the agent. But he is not confined to this.
Public policy forbids the enforcement of a contract against the prin-
cipal when such contract has been entered into as the result of a con-
spiracy between the principal's representative and the other party,
by which it is intended that the agent and other contracting party
"" 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur., § 1047. ans, 61 Iowa 35; Gushing v. Rice,
^"^ Ante, § 382. 46 Me. 303, 71 Am. Dec. 579; Beebe
>" See Tuckwell v. Lambert, 5 v. Robert, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 413,
Gush. (Mass.) 23; Perkins v. Ev- 417, 27 Am. Dec. 132.
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shall gain an undue advantage over the principal ; and it is immaterial
whether any actual injury will result to the principal or not.^"
Hence, the principal may rescind the contract, or may avoid it by
pleading the wrongful acts in defense of a suit upon such contract.^^^
And so, where an agent receives from the third party a secret bonus
with the view of being influenced by it to enter into a contract with
the third party, and it is shown that he actually was improperly in-
fluenced thereby, the principal may rescind or avoid such contract.^-*
Thus, in an Illinois case, the evidence disclosed that the owner of a
city lot, who was a foreigner by birth and to a great extent ignorant
of the English language and of business matters, was induced by
frequent solicitations to sign a paper authorizing one who claimed
to be acting as his agent to sell the lot for a price far below its real
value, of which such owner was also ignorant ; the person thus acting
as agent being shown to be also the agent of and receiving pay from
the purchaser and working for his interest and concealing important
facts from such owner, the court refused to enforce specific perform-
ance, on the ground that the contract was not entered into with fair-
ness and without misapprehension, but was inequitable and unjust.
And as a further ground for refusing the relief, the court said that
a contract made by one who acts as the agent of both parties may l)e
avoided by either principal. ^-^ This was an executory contract.
Were such a contract to be fully executed and a conveyance made,
the latter would doubtless be set aside on the application of the
injured party, or, if the rights of other parties had intervened, an
action for damages for deceit would lie.^^* Or the principal may, in
such case, if he act before other rights have intervened, and restore
to the vendor what he has received from him, sue to rescind the con-
tract and recover whatever property or rights he may have parted
with in the transaction. ^^^
§ 393. Enticing away or injuring servant.—A third person may
also become liable to the principal, in an action of tort, for wrong-
fully inducing the agent or servant to abandon his emplo)Tnent, with-
out the consent and against the will of the principal or master,
"= A7ite, § 72. '=*' See Panama, etc., Tel. Co. v.
'==* Panama, etc., Tel. Co. v. India India Rubber, etc., Co., L. R. 10 Ch.
Rubber, etc., Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 515. 515; Glaspie v. Keator, 5 C. C. A.
^'' Smith V. Sorby, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 474, 56 Fed. 203.
552, 28 Moak's Rep. 455. "' Mechem Ag., § 798.
^» Fish v. Leser, 69 111. 394.
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thereby causing loss of services and profits and advantages to the
hitter which he would have derived therefrom, if these can be deter-
mined from tlie' facts in the case/-^ And in such a case, where the
element of malice is an ingredient, even exemplary damages may be
recovered. ^^^ "It is not necessary," said the supreme court of South
Carolina, "to refer to authority to show that an action was maintain-
able at common law for enticing a servant from the service of his
master. To sustain it there must be an actual binding contract of
service, and where this exists, such an interference by a third person
as results in its violation will render him liable to the master, not
only for his actual loss, but for such further compensation in the
way of damages as may be demanded by the character of the cir-
cumstances attending the injury through which the loss was in-
flicted."^^** An action in tort will also lie for an injury to the servant
inflicted by the negligence of a third party; as, for example, where
a carrier negligently injures an apprentice, w^iile carrying him,
from which injury a loss of services occur to the master.^^^ The
same liability will arise, of course, if the personal injury to the
servant is from other causes than that of negligence ; as, for example,
the seduction of a man's daughter.^^^ And upon the same ground,
it has been held that a railroad company can maintain an action
for damages against one who maliciously causes the arrest of its en-
gineer while running a train, with intent to delay the train and injure
the company. ^^^
'-'"Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. "It is further insisted that the ac-
555. tion can not be maintained because
'-" Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456, the damages are consequential and
22 Am. Rep. 475, and note at p. 485. too remote. We think the injury
"" Daniel v. Swearengen, 6 S. C. and damages were direct. They
297, 24 Am. Rep. 471. were not only such as could reason-
"' Ames V. Union R. Co., 117 Mass. ably have been contemplated at the
541, 19 Am. Rep. 426. See also, time, which is one of the tests laid
Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 down in Sedgwick on Damages, vol.
Am. Rep. 780. 1, marg. p. 66-67, but they were the
^"- Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. damages actually contemplated. In
147, 14 Am. Rep. 584. Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131. the
'^ St. Johnsbury, etc., R. Co. v. court say: 'A wrongdoer is liable
Hunt, 55 Vt. 570, 45 Am. Rep. 639. not only for those injuries which
In this case the supreme court of are caused directly and immediate-
Vermont, in passing upon the ques- ly by his act, but also for such con-
tion of what may be taken into sequential injuries as. according to
consideration by the jury in assess- the common experience of men, are
ing damages in such cases, said: likely to result from his act.' Sedg-
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wick, p. 88, says the disposition of
courts is to include in the injurious
consequences, flowing from the ille-
gal act, those that are 'very remote.'
No extreme view is required here.
It can not be said that the stop-
page and delay of the plaintiffs'
train was a remote result of the de-
fendant's act. It was the probable,
if not necessary, result. And it
was in fact the direct, proximate,
immediate and contemplated result.
Familiar cases, often cited as show-
ing what damages are not too re-
mote to be included in the recovery,
are: McAfee v. Crofford, 14 How.
(U. S.) 447; Gunter v. Astor, 4
Moore 12, 16 E. C. L. 357; Gribb v.
Swan, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 381; Van-
denburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio (N. Y.)
464, 47 Am. Dec. 268; Burrows v.
March Gas, etc., Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 67;
Scott v. Kenton, 81 111. 96; Tarleton
V. M'Gawley, Peake 205. In the lat-
ter case it was held by Lord Ken-
yon, at nisi prius, that an action
lay for firing on negroes on the
coast of Africa, and thereby deter-
ring them from trading with the
plaintiffs, so that the plaintiffs lost
their trade. There the trespass was
directly against the negroes, but the
wrong intended and the injury ac-
tually done was to the plaintiffs.
The defendant cites the case of
Ashley v. Harrison, Peake 194,
where the proprietors of a theater
brought an action against the de-
fendant for having written a libel
upon one of the plaintiff's singers,
by which she was deterred from
appearing, whereby his profits were
lost. Lord Kenyon held that the
damages were too remote, but this
was on the ground that the damages
arose from the vain fears or caprice
of the actress. She could have sung
but would not. Her fears or caprice
Intervened between the wrongful
act and the alleged result. To make
the case parallel to this she should
have been driven from the stage
while performing her part, by un-
lawful interference of the defend-
ant, for the purpose of injury to
the plaintiff. See Hughes v. Mc-
Donough, 14 Vroom (N. J.) 459, 39
Am. Rep. 603."
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I. Qvalification and Admission to Practice.
§ 394. Purpose of this chapter.—Wo have heretofore given the
definitions of the various terms by which practicing lawyers are
(397)
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known, such as attorneys at law, barristers, solicitors, proctors, ser-
geants, counselors, advocates, etc.^ We now propose to consider this
subject more in detail. We shall examine into the necessary quali-
fications of lawyers entitling them to practice their profession; the
procedure incident to such admission; the relation which the prac-
ticing attorney sustains to the court and to the client; and the duties,
obligations, rights and privileges owing by and to him by virtue of
his office,
§ 395, Admission to practice, generally—Test oaths.—The admis-
sion to the practice of law, under the common law, is more in the na-
ture of a privilege than a general right, ^ This is shown by the fact
that it is required that, before any person shall be entitled to practice
law, he must be admitted to the bar and thus permitted to practice
law.^ Moreover, in the absence of constitutional or statutory pro-
visions, the power to admit to the practice of law rests entirely with
the courts.* The admission of lawyers to the bar is generally regarded
as a judicial function which can be exercised only by the courts; and
grave doubts have been expressed whether the legislature has power
even to prescribe the conditions upon which such admission may be
made.^ Ju the absence of constitutions or statutes to the contrary, and
even supplementary to statutory rules of procedure, the admission of
attorneys is generally regulated by rules of court.® But in the absence
of constitutional regulations, it is generally conceded that the sub-
ject is within the legislative control, the same as in the case of other
professions f it is accordingly held that the legislature may prescribe
such qualifications for admission as it may deem proper.® During
^Ante. 23. A. 701; In re Day, 181 111. 73, 50
2 Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; L. R. A. 519.
In re Day, 181 111. 73, 50 L. R. A. Mn re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 20
519. Am. Rep. 42; Splane's Petition, 123
'Wharton Ag., § 557; Cobb v. Pa. St. 527, 16 Atl. 481; In re Day.
Judge Sup. Ct, 43 Mich. 289; Bui- 181 111. 73, 50 L. R. A. 519.
lard V. VanTassell, 3 How. Pr. (N. « Weeks Attys. at Law, § 42; In
Y.) 401; In re Spicer, 1 Tuck. (N. re Day, supra.
Y.) 80; Newburger v. Campbell, 58 'Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293;
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 313, 9 Daly (N, Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 85 Am.
Y.) 102; Rader v. Snyder, 3 W. Va. Dec. 62; In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67.
413. « Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293;
^Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. (U. Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 85 Am.
S.) 9; In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67; Dec. 62; In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665.
In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 21 L. R. 21 L. R. A. 701,
399 ATTORNEYS AT LAW. § 396
and immediately after the civil war, congress and several of the
^tate legislatures prescribed as a test for the admission of attorneys
to the practice in the courts of the United States and such states,
respectively, an oath that the applicant had not aided or abetted the
rebellion, etc. These acts were generally held void as being ex post
facto, and in violation of the general pardon granted by the presi-
dent;® but in some of the states the power of the legislature to exact
such an oath was upheld;^** and but for the objections named, the re-
quirement for such an oath would doubtless be valid, except, perhaps,
in jurisdictions where the power of the legislature to interfere is de-
nied altogether. In some states an oath is required of an applicant
for admission to the bar that he has not been concerned in any duel
since a certain period, or at any time, and that he will not engage in
QQg loa
§ 396. Qualifications—Graduation from law school.—If it were
not for constitutional provisions to the contrary, the legislature, ac-
cording to many authorities, would have the power, within reasona-
ble limits, to prescribe the qualifications necessary for admission to the
bar.^^ Where the constitution required that every male person twen-
ty-one years old and of good moral character, possessing the necessary
qualifications to practice law, should be admitted to practice, it was
held by the supreme court of New York that the legislature could
not pass a valid law by which graduates of a certain law school should
be deemed to possess sufficient learning, and be admitted to the bar
without an examination ;^- but this decision was reversed by the court
of appeals. ^^ The validity of this act of the legislature was assailed
partly upon the ground that it ignored the constitutional requirement
that the applicant must be a male citizen of the age of twenty-one
= Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U. W. Va. 269; Ingersoll v. Howard, 1
S.) 333; Cummlngs v. Missouri, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 247. Such acts are
Wall. (U. S.) 277; Ex parte Quar- not unconstitutional: In re Blake,
rier, 2 W. Va. 569, 4 W. Va. 210; Ex supra. Contra, In re Dorsey, 7
parte Law, 35 Ga. 285; Champion Port. (Ala.) 293.
v. State, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 111. "In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 21
'"State v. Garesche, 36 Mo. 256; L. R. A. 701; In re Cooper, 22 N. Y.
Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; Ex 67.
parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 85 Am. Dec. ^- In re Graduates, 19 How. Pr.
62. (N. Y.) 97, 133, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
^"a See In re Blake, 1 Blackf. 348, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 353.
(Ind.) 483; Leigh's Case, 1 Munf. "In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67.
(Va.) 468; Ex parte Faulkner, 1
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years, and of good moral character. The court of appeals overruled
this contention, however, by resorting to a liberal construction of the
act in question, interpreting it to mean that the applicant must not
only be a graduate of the law school named, but must possess all the
other qualifications required by the constitution, as to age, sex, et<3.
;
and with this construction the constitutionality of the law was upheld.
In Indiana the constitution provides that every person of good moral
character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law
in all courts of justice.^* This provision has been by general consent
interpreted to mean that no other qualifications than a good moral
character and the right to vote shall be necessary in order to be ad-
mitted to the practice of law. An attempt was made, at the general
election of 1900, so to amend the constitution of Indiana as to confer
upon the general assembly the power to prescribe, by law, what qual-
ifications should be necessary for admission to practice law in all
courts of justice. ^^ By a decision of the supreme court it was de-
clared that the amendment had not received the required number of
votes, and that it was, therefore, not adopted.^^ This case is the first
authoritative construction of the constitutional provision as to the
qualifications required of applicants for admission to practice ; and it
seems to hold that an applicant can not be denied admission on ac-
count of his unwillingness to submit to an examination as to his learn-
ing in the law. The legislature has sought to obviate the objection-
able features of the constitutional provision which enables one not pos-
sessing any legal education whatever to practice law in all the courts
of the state, by the enactment of a statute making it the duty of
every court to keep a roll of attorneys, upon which shall be placed
the names of all such attorneys, and only such, as have been
admitted to practice after an examination by a committee of the bar
appointed by the judge, touching the applicant's learning in the law.
This statute has been practically a dead letter, however; and since the
decision of In- re Denny has been promulgated, it is questionable
whether any one can l>e kept from being admitted to practice, and con-
sequently from being treated in every way as a meml^er in good stand-
ing at the bar, if he be a legal voter and have a good moral character.
The legislature of Wisconsin enacted a law in 18-49 containing sul)-
stantially the same provisions as to the right to practice law as those
"Ind. Const., art. 7, § 21; Burns '"In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59
R. S. 1901, § 21. N. E. 359.
"Acts 1900, p. 560.
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contained in the constitution of Indiana, but the act was not gener-
ally enforced. Concerning that act the supreme court of that state,
through Ryan, C. J., expressed its views in the following strong lan-
guage:—"We do not understand that the circuit courts generally
yielded to the unwise and unseemly act of 1849, which assumed to
force upon the courts, as attorneys, any persons of good moral charac-
ter, however unlearned or even illiterate; however disqualified by na-
ture, education or habit, for the important trust of the profession.
We learn from the clerk of this court that no application under that
statute was ever made here. The good sense of the legislature has
long since led to its repeal. And we have too much reliance on the
judgment of the legislature to apprehend another such attempt to de-
grade the courts. The state suffers essentially by every such assault
of one branch of the government upon another; and it is the duty of
all the coordinate branches scrupulously to avoid even all seeming of
such. If, unfortunately, such an attack on the dignity of the courts
should again be made, it will be time for them to inquire whether the
rule of admission be within the legislative or the judicial power. But
we will not anticipate such an unwise and unbecoming interference
in what so peculiarly concerns the courts, whether the power to make
it exists or not."" Doubtless the general assembly of Indiana would
long since have repealed the provision in question had it been in its
power to do so; for it has repeatedly given expression of such inten-
tion by the proposal of constitutional amendments for its abrogation
;
but the process of changing the fundamental law is more tardy than
that of ordinary legislation, and it is not easy to predict how long
this obstruction to the judicial progress of a great state will continue
to stand.
§ 397. Educational qualification—Examination—Diploma.—In all
the states and territories,—except the state of Indiana,—as well
as in the District of Columbia, applicants for admission to the l)ar are
required to undergo some kind of an examination as to their learning
in the law, etc., either before the court in session, a committee of at-
torneys appointed by the court, or a state board of examiners.^*
"In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 20 12, §§ 579-587; Pamph. Acts 1897,
Am. Rep. 42. p. 1482. A/as/ra.--—Examination by
^^ Alabama:—Written examination judges of district court, or tlieir ap-
by the court, passed on by supreme pointees: 31 U. S. Stat, at Large,
court judges: Civ. Code 1896, ch. p. 448, §§ 731-736. Arizona:—Ex-
26
—
Principal and Agent.
5< 397 PRINCIPAL AXD AGENT, 402
Many jurisdictions have adopted, in addition, a preliminary test of
the general educational qualification of the applicant, in some in-
amination in open court before
board of examiners of district court
admits to district and inferior
courts; admission to supreme
court admits to all other courts in
territory: Rev. St. 1901, §§ 391-
399. Arkansas:—Public examina-
tion in state courts: Sand. & H.
'Stat. 1894, §§ 422-424; Sup. Ct.
Rules, 52 S. W. v. California:—
Examination in open court by
justices of supreme court or by
three or more supreme court com-
missioners appointed by supreme
court: Desty Code Civ. Proc. 1899,
§§ 275-279; Rules Supr. Ct., 64 Pac.
vii. Colorado:—Examination by
committee of law examiners ap-
pointed by supreme court: Mills
Ann. Stat, p. 465, §§ 196-198;
Rules Supr. Ct. 39-47, 49 Pac. v-vii.
Connecticut
:
—Examination by com-
mission of fifteen: Gen. Stat. 1888,
§§ 784, 785, 3264; Rules Supr. Ct,
26 Atl. xviii, xix. Delaware:—Ex-
amination by judges: Rev. Stat.
1893, eh. 92, p. 698, §6, ch. 24, p.
234, § 4; 13 Del. Laws, ch. 117, § 3.
District of Columbia:—Examination
by board of examiners: Rules Supr.
Ct & Ct. of App. Florida:—Exami-
nation in open court before judge
and two members of bar: Laws 1899,
ch. 4745; Rules Supr. Ct, 18 So. vi.
Georgia:—Written examination by
board of examiners appointed by
supreme court: Act Dec. 19, 1898,
p. 83; Rules Supr. Ct., 33 S. E. v-
vii. Idaho:—Examination in open
court by judges of supreme court
aamits to all courts; by district
courts admits to them only: Rev.
Stat 1887, §§3990-3994; Supr. Ct
Rules, 32 Pac. v, vi. Illinois:—
Written and oral test by state board
of examiners, uniform throughout
state: Kurd's Rev. Stat 1899, ch.
13, §§ 1-4; Supr. Ct Rules, § 39,
41 N. E. ix, X, 47 N. E. ix-
xi. Indian Territory:—Examina-
tion in open court: Stat. 1899,
§ 419. loioa:—Examination by
supreme court or by board of exam-
iners appointed by court: Ann.
Code 1897, §§ 309-315; Act Apr. 16,
1900, p. 6. Kansas:—Examination
by district court: Gen. Stat. 1901,
§§ 388-392, 406; Supr. Ct Rules, 58
Pac. vii. Kentucky
:
—Examination
before two judges of court of ap-
peals or commission of attorneys ap-
pointed by circuit court: Barb. &
Carr. St 1894, §§ 97-99. Louisi-
ana:—Examination by committee of
examiners appointed by supreme
court: Rev. Laws 1897, §§ 111-
115, 756; Supr. Ct Rules, 20
So. V, 21 So. xi, xii, 26 So.
vii. Maine:—Written and oral ex-
amination before state board ap-
pointed by governor on recom-
mendation of chief justice: Act
Mar. 17, 1899, p. 148. Maryland:—
Written examination before state
board of examiners appointed by
court of appeals: Laws 1898, ch. 139;
Rules of Ct of App., 44 Atl. v, vi;
50 Atl. vii. Massachusetts:—Exam-
ination before state board of exami-
ners for admission to supreme court:
Acts 1897, ch. 508; Acts 1898, ch.
384; Rules Supr. Ct, 50 N.
E. v. Michigan:— Written and
oral examination for admission to
supreme court before state board of
examiners appointed by governor
on recommendation of supreme
court: Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 1119-
1121, 1123. 1124. Minnesota:—Writ-
ten and oral examination before
state board of examiners: Stat.
1898, §§ 6172, 6174, 6175; Laws
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stances requiring the latter to pass an examination in certain branches,
and in others to produce evidence of having taken the course in a high
1899, ch. 60; Rules Supr. Ct, 44 N. Is^orth Dakota:—Examination be-
W. iv, 66 N. W. iv. Mississippi:— fore supreme court or committee:
Written examination before chan- Laws 1901, ch. 23; Supr. Ct. Rules,
eery court of county of residence: 74 N. W. xii. Ohio:—Oral and writ-
Code 1892, §§ 202-209, 211. Alis- ten examination by "standing com-
souri:—Oral examination in open mittee on examinations:" Bates
court by judge or judges of court Ann. Stat. (2d ed.), §§ 559-562;
and by committee of three attor- Supr. Ct. Rules, 35 N. E. vi, vii.
neys:. Rev. Stat. 1899, §§ 4919- Oklahoma:—Examination by court;
4921, 4937. Montana:—Examina- by district court admits to practice
tion— principally written — before in supreme court: Stat. 1893, §§ 316,
supreme court: Code Civ. Proc. 317; Supr. Ct. Rules, 43 Pac.
1895, §§ 390-394,- 396; Sup. Ct. Rule ix. Oreflron.-—Examination by su-
No. 17, in 13 Mont. 578; Supr. Ct. preme court, in open court, for
Rules, 57 Pac. ix, x. Nebraska:— admission to same, which admits to
Examination before supreme court all other courts: Hill's Ann.
or commission appointed by su- Laws 1892, §§ 1034-1036; id., p.
preme court: Comp. Stat. 1901, ch. 1052a; Supr. Ct. Rules, 37 Pac. ix, x.
7, §§ 2-9; Rules Supr. Ct., 83 N. W. Pennsylvania: — Examination by
vii, viii, 84 N. W. 611. Nevada:— board of examiners: Pepper & L.
Written examination in open court, Dig., p. 224, §§ 1, 3; Rule 8, Bd. of
at discretion of supreme court, by Exrs. Rhode Island:—Examination
district judge and two attorneys, by board of examiners: Pub. Stat,
constituting board of examiners: 1882, ch. 192, § 7; Supr. Ct. Rules,
Gen. Stat. 1885, §§ 2529-2535; Rules 39 Atl. vi. South Carolina:—Writ-
Supr. Ct, 62 Pac. vi. New Hamp- ten examination by supreme court:
shire:—Examination by supreme Rev. Stat. 1893, §§ 2288-2290; Supr.
court: Pub. Stat. 1901, ch. 213, Ct. Rules. South Dakota:—Exami-
§§ 1-5. Neiv Jersey:—Examination nation by supreme court or com-
before board of examiners: Gen. mission of examiners: Laws 1901,
Stat., p. 1043, § 140, p. 2330, § 6, p. ch. 60; In re Applications for Ad-
2603, § 396; Rules Supr. Ct. 1885. mission to Practice, 14 S. Dak. 429,
Neiv Mexico:—Examination by 85 N. W. 992. Tennessee:—Exam-
board of examiners for admis- ination by two judges or chancel-
sion to supreme court: Gen. lors or the faculty of any law school
Laws 1897, § 1040a; Supr. Ct. of the state: Shannon's Code 1896,
Rules 1897. New York:—Oral or §§ 5772, 5775-5779; Supr. Ct. Rules,
written examination before state Tempos .-—Examination before district
board of examiners in any depart- court by committee appointed by
ment of supreme court: Birdseye court admitting to inferior courts;
Stat. (2d ed.), pp. 167, 168, §§ 2-6; before supreme court admitting to
Supr. Ct. Rules, 48 N. E. vi-viii. all courts: Rev. Stat. 1895, §§ 255-
North Carolina:—Written test be- 260; Supr. Ct. Rules. Utah:—Exam-
fore two or more justices of su- ination by supreme court or by
preme court: Code, vol. 1, §§ 17- board of examiners: Rev. Stat. 1898,
20; Supr. Ct. Rules, 39 S. E. v. §§ 105-110; Supr. Ct. Rules, 49 Pac.
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school in good standing. ^^ In some states it is provided by law that
a diploma from some particular law school or a law school in good
standing shall admit the applicant without examination.-" Such a
xiii. Vermont:— Examination by
commission of attorneys, who report
to supreme court: Stat. 1894, § 1003;
Supr. Ct. Rules. Virginia:—Writ-
ten and oral examination by three
or more justices of supreme court of
appeals: Code 1887, § 3193; Supp.
Code 1898, §§ 3191, 3193; Supr. Ct.
Rules, 27 S. E. xvii. Washington:
—Written examination by commit-
tee; oral examination in addition
before supreme court by court
or committee: Ballinger's Code,
§§ 4759-4764; Rules Supr. Ct, 40
Pac. xii, xiii. West Virginia:—Ex-
amination by committee appointed
by supreme court: Acts 1901, ch.
62, amending sections 1 and 2 of
ch. 119 of Code; Rules of Supr. Ct.
& Bd. of Ex'rs. Wisconsin:—Exam-
ination by state board of examin-
ers: Sanb. & B. Stat. 1898, § 2586.
Wyoming :— Written examination
by state board of examiners or dis-
trict judge: Rev. Stat. 1899, §§ 3305,
3310; Supr. Ct. Rules, 58 Pac.
viii, ix.
'" This course was recommended
by the committee on legal educa-
tion of the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1897. It has been adopted in
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois. Iowa,
New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island and
Vermont. See the citations of Stat-
utes and Rules of Court under
note 18, supra. Delaivare:—Re-
quires examination in Latin, higher
mathematics, and in English and
American history. Minnesota:—
Applicant may be required to prove
that he has passed examinations in
one year's Latin, English and Amer-
ican history, English composition
and rhetoric, and common school
branches. New York:—Applicants
not graduates of colleges of good
standing must undergo examination
under authority of the State Uni-
versity in English composition, ad-
vanced English, one year Latin,
arithmetic, algebra, geometry.
United States and English history,
civics and economics or their
equivalents. Pennsylvania:— Ex-
amination upon the branches of a
good English education. See cita-
tions under note 18. supra.
'° Alabama:—Diploma from Uni-
versity of Ala.—LL. B. degree.
Georgia:—Graduates of law depart-
ment of State University; of law
school, Mercer University; of law
department. Emory College, and of
Atlanta Law School, without exam-
ination. Kansas:—Graduates of law
school of Kansas University.
Louisiana:—Diploma from law de-
partment of Louisiana University.
Michigan:—Graduates of law de-
partment of University of Michigan.
Minnesota:—Graduates of law de-
partment of University of Minne-
sota and St. Paul College of Law.
Mississippi:—Graduates of law de-
partment of University of Missis-
sippi. Missouri:—Graduates of law
department of State University;
Kansas City School of Law or Ben-
ton College of Law. Nebraska:—
Graduate of College of Law of Uni-
versity of Nebraska. North Dakota:
—Graduates from law department
of State University. Pennsylvania:
—Graduates from law department
of University of Pennsylvania.
South Carolina:—Graduates of law
school of State University. Ten-
nessee:—Faculty of any law school
may grant license to practice.
Texas:—Graduate of law school of
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provision has been held constitutional.-^ But in a recent Illinois case
the supreme court of that state asserts in strong language the inherent
right of the courfs to pass upon the question of admissibility of per-
sons as members of the bar, as a judicial question, and denies the right
of the legislature to override the rules of the court respecting admis-
sion to the bar, as an unconstitutional assumption by the legislature of
judicial power.- ^^ In this case the legislature had passed an act by
virtue of which those who began the study of law prior to a certain
period would be eligible to admission to the bar at the expiration of
two years, while those who began afterward would be compelled to
comply with the rules of the supreme court, which required three
years. The supreme court declared the act unconstitutional as being
special legislation ; saying :—"The right to practice law is a privilege,
and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court,
and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants to argue causes,
and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as
from jury service and arrest on civil process while attending court.
The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation.
* * * Another fatal objection to the permission in question is that
the legislature, in its enactment, overlooked the restraint imposed by
State University. West Virginia: longer than the constitutional limit:
—Diploma from law school of West State v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477. In a
Virginia University. Wisconsin:— recent case decided by the supreme
Graduates of law department of court of Illinois a statute was de-
State University. See the citations clared unconstitutional which un-
in note 18, supra, for statutes, etc. dertook to override the rules of the
-^ In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67, re- supreme court of that state respect-
versing s. c. sub nom. In re Gradu- ing admission of attorneys to the
ates, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 97, 10 bai', by requiring that any person
Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 348, 31 Barb. (N. who began to study law before a
Y.) 353. In Florida an act passed specified date, provided he had ob-
in 1897, entitled "An act to regu- tained a diploma from a law school
late admissions to the bar of this of the state after a specified period
state, to create a board of legal ex- of attendance, or passed a satis-
aminers, and to provide for a uni- factory examination before an ex-
form system of legal examinations," amining board, should be admitted
was held unconstitutional because it to practice. The court held the
created state officers on the board statute to be an unconstitutional as-
of legal examiners and failed to sumption by the legislature of
provide for their election by the power properly belonging to the
people or appointment by the gov- courts: In re Day, 181 111. 73, 50
ernor, as required by the constitu- L. R. A. 519.
tion, but made such officers appoint- -'a In re Day, 181 111. 73, 50 L. R.
ive by the supreme court and fixed A. 519.
their terms of office for a term
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the constitution, and assumed the exercise of a power properly belong-
ing to the courts. A provision which has been incorporated in each
successive constitution of this state is found in the present constitu-
tion as article 3, in the following language : ''The powers of the gov-
ernment of this state are divided into three distinct departments,
—
legislative, executive and judicial ; and no person or collection of \jeT-
sons, being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly di-
rected or permitted.' " From this provision in the organic law of the
state the court proceeds to discuss the relative powers of legislatures
and courts upon the subject under consideration, reviewing the history
of parliamentary legislation with reference to it, and holding that even
if parliament could have exercised such powers, the state legislature
can not do so, owing to its prescribed constitutional limitations. The
court, after noticing the decisions of the courts in this country respect-
ing this subject, and deploring the legislative enactments and consti-
tutional provisions which declare that any male citizen of good moral
character who is twenty-one years old may practice law, proceeds to
say:—"This court has never acknowledged the power of the legisla-
ture to prescribe reasonable conditions which will exclude from the
practice in our courts. * * * The effect of enforcing such a stat-
ute would be to degrade the profession and fill the ranks with those
not qualified by our rules. * * * j^ any consideration of the
question it must not be forgotten that restrictions upon the privilege
of practicing law are created only in the interest of the public wel-
fare, and neither for nor against the student. Xo one who has com-
menced preparation has any inchoate right on account of that fact,
but is bound to furnish the test of fitness required when he asks to
enter upon the practice. * * * The legislature may enact police
legislation for the protection of the pul)lic against things hurtful or
threatening to their safety and welfare. So long as they do not in-
fringe upon the powers properly belonging to the courts, they may
prescribe reasonable conditions which will exclude from the practice
those persons through whom injurious consequences are likely to
result to the inhabitants of the state. * * * it would be strange,
indeed, if the court can control its own court-room and even its own
janitor, but that it is not within its power to inquire into the ability
of the persons who assist in the administration of justice as its of-
ficers. The function of determining whether one who seeks to become
an officer of the courts, and to conduct causes therein, is sufficiently
acquainted with the rules established by the legislature and the courts
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governing the rights of parties and under ^yhich justice is adminis-
tered, pertains to the courts themselves. They must decide whether
he has sufficient legal learning to enable him to apply those rules to
varying conditions of fact, and to bring the facts and law before the
court, so that a correct conclusion may be reached. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that he possesses the requisite
qualifications, under such restrictions and limitations as may be
properly imposed by the legislature for the protection and welfare
of the public. The fact that the legislature may prescribe the quali-
fications of doctors, plumbers, horseshoers, and persons following
other professions or callings, not connected with the judicial system,
and may say what shall be evidence of such qualifications, can have
no influence on this question. * * * Xhe attorney is a necessary
part of the judicial system, and his vocation is not merely to find per-
sons who are willing to have lawsuits. He is the first one to sit in
judgment on every case, and whether the court shall be called upon
to act depends on his decision. * * * Whatever may have been
the propriety of the rule admitting the holder of a diploma issued
by a law school to practice, in view of the law schools existing at its
adoption the rule had become an alarming menace to the administra-
tion of justice. The legislature of New York, by the statute above
referred to, only sought to admit the graduates of a great university,
who had been examined by eminent lawyers ; but, under our rule, per-
sons were admitted who had been only nominally in attendance for
the stipulated period of time, upon schools of a very different grade.
There was no state supervision of law schools, and any person who
saw fit could organize a law school, and b}^ advertising that the diplo-
mas admitted to the bar, could obtain students. The language of the
proviso, ^Any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state,' is mere sound, and means nothing. Anything in the form of
a law school is regular, so far as the laws of this state are concerned.
In view of the disastrous consequences to the profession and the
public, the rule by which it was only a step from the diploma mill
to the bar was changed, and, in an effort to discharge a duty to the
public, the general standard of admission was raised. * * * It
was a valid rule of the court, acting within its unquestionable juris-
diction, and the question is whether the legislature could rightfully
encroach upon a power belonging to the judicial department, and set
aside the rule. The constitution answers the question in the negative."
g 398. Moral character.^Tn all jurisdictions applicants for admis-
sion to the bar are required to produce evidence of good moral charac-
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ter. This requirement has relation only to the character of the appli-
cant for honesty and integrity such as fit him for the faithful and
honest transaction of the business intrusted to him as a practicing
attorney.-" The courts are not limited in their inquiry as to the
moral character of the applicant to the certificate produced by him, but
may look behind it, and are bound to do so in cases attended with sus-
picious circumstances.^^ A finding that the applicant for readmission
has been honest and upright in his business relations outside of his
profession, is not equivalent to a finding that he is a person of good
moral character.^* In Indiana the statute provides that upon the
question of the moral character of an applicant for admission, any
citizen of the county may demand a jury;^^ but the supreme court
of the state has decided that an application for readmission to prac-
tice is triable only by the court. ^* The words "good moral charac-
ter," while general in their application, include all the elements
essential to make up a good character, such as common honesty and
veracity in professional intercourse;^^ and the collection of money
and failure to pay it over to the proper person after repeated demands
is such misconduct as will prevent an admission to the bar.-*
§ 399. Qualification as to age.—In all the states except those men-
tioned below, statutes exist requiring that the person desiring to be
admitted to the practice must be at least twenty-one j'ears of age, or
"of full age," as some of the statutes express it. The following states
are exceptions to this general rule :—In Delaware the applicant need
be but eighteen years old f^ in Georgia the age is not mentioned and
is, therefore, immaterial f^ in Kansas he need only be a citizen of the
United States ;^^ in Maryland nothing is mentioned as to age.^- A
statute of Arkansas,^" providing that the circuit court may remove
disabilities of infants so as to enable them to do business as adults,
is held 1)y the supreme court of that state not to abrogate the pro-
vision of the prior statute requiring applicants for admission to the
bar to be of the age of twenty-one years.^* But under a similar
statute in Florida, the court holds that a minor has a right to be
"State v. Byrkett, 4 Ohio Dec. 89. ch. 24, § 4; Del. Laws, ch. 117, § 3.
=*In re Attorney's License, 21 N. '" Ga. Civ. Code 1895. §§ 4397-
j. L. 345. 4412; Act Dec. 18, 1897, amended
-* Ex parte Walls, 73 Ind. 95. act Dec. 19, 1892.
==^ Burns Rev. Stat. 1901. § 974. ^^ Gen. Stat. 1899. §§ 3SS-392.
=«Ex parte Walls, 73 Ind. 95. ^ Pub. Gen. Laws 1888. art. 10.
27 jn re O . 73 Wis. 602. partly repealed; Laws 1898. ch. 139.
"'^lUd. ^'Mansf. Dig., § 1362.
^ Del. R. S. 1874, ch. 92, § 6, * Ex parte Coleman, 54 Ark. 235.
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examined and admitted, if qualified, and that he may enforce such
right by mandamus.^^
§ 400. Qualification as to sex—Cases holding women ineligible.—
Under the common law, according to the majority of the decisions,
a woman has no right, even if otherwise properly qualified, to demand
admission to the bar; and hence, in the absence of statutory or con-
stitutional provisions, she is ineligible.^^ In BradwelVs Case, cited
^ State V. Barnes, 25 Fla. 305.
^In re Bradwell, 55 111. 535, af-
firmed in 16 Wall. (U. S.) 130; In
re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116; Robin-
son's Case, 131 Mass. 376, 41 Am.
Rep. 239; In re Leonard, 12 Or. 93,
53 Am. Rep. 323; In re Goodell, 39
Wis. 232, 48 Wis. 693, 20 Am. Rep.
42; Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H.
460. In Robinson's Case, above
cited, Chief Justice Gray, speaking
for the supreme judicial court of
Massachusetts, said: "By the law
of England, which was our law
from the first settlement of the
country until the American Revo-
lution, the crown, with all its in-
herent rights and prerogatives,
might indeed descend to a woman
or to an infant; but under the de-
gree of a queen, no woman, mar-
ried or unmarried, could take part
in the government of tlie state.
Women could not sit in the house
of commons or the house of lords,
nor vote for members of parlia-
ment: 4 Inst. 5; Countess of Rut-
land's Case, 6 Coke 52b; Chorlton
V. Lings, L. R. 4 C. P. 374, 391, 392.
They could not take part in the ad-
ministration of justice, either as
judges or as jurors, with the single
exception of inquiries by a jury of
matrons upon a suggestion of preg-
nancy: 2 Inst. 119, 121; 3 Bl. Com.
262; 4 id. 395; Willes, J., in Chorlton
V. Lings, L. R. 4 C. P. 390, 391. And
no case is known in which a woman
was admitted to practice as an at-
torney, solicitor or barrister. The
only English instance of a woman
lawyer, cited by the petitioner, is
that stated in a note of Mr. Butler
in Coke upon Littleton, as follows:
'The celebrated Anne, Countess of
Pembroke, Dorset and Montgomery,
had the office of hereditary sheriff
of Westmoreland, and exercised it
in person. At the assizes at Ap-
pleby, she sat with the judges on
the bench:' Co. Litt. 326a, note
280. No authority is .given for the
statement. The office of sheriff of
Westmoreland was granted by King
John in the thirteenth century to
Robert de Veteripont, or Vipont,
and his heirs general, and after the
death of his last heir male in 1265
descended to Isabella, wife of
Roger de Clifford, and continued
to be an hereditary office until 1850,
when it was put by act of parlia-
ment on the footing of other like
offices: 3 Selden's Works 1839; Co.
Litt. 222; Collins Baronies 251, 317,
319, 321; Stat. 13 and 14 Vict, ch.
30. The Countess Anne was boi'n
in 1590, took the office by descent
from her father, George, Lord Clif-
ford and Earl of Cumberland, in
1605, and died in 1676, leaving a
very full autobiography, a tran-
script of which is preserved among
the Harleian manuscripts in the
British Museum, in which she says
of her ancestress, Isabella de Clif-
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in the last note, the supreme court of Illinois reached the conclusion
that under the statutes of that state no authority then existed to
ford, that 'in her widowhood she
sat in person as sheriffess in the
county of Westmoreland upon the
bench with the judges, as appears
by the pleas and records of her
time;' and mentions the appoint-
ment of a deputy sheriff by herself
in 1651. It is quite possible that
as a matter of ceremony, or by way
of asserting her title to the office,
she (as well as her ancestress three
centuries before) may sometimes
herself have attended the judges, or
that, in accordance with English
usage, a person of her rank and
distinction, when present in court,
may have been invited by them to
sit upon the bench. But that she
habitually discharged the general
duties of the office in person has
been shown by an accomplished
scholar, after careful research, to
be highly improbable in fact: 4
Craik Romance of Peerage 162.
And she could not have done so
without violating the well-settled
law. The office of sheriff was part-
ly judicial and partly ministerial;
the judicial functions could not be
delegated; but the ministerial du-
ties, including that of attendance
upon the judges, might be per-
formed by deputy : Dalton Sher-
iff, chs. 1, 4; Bandal's Case, Noy 21;
Bacon Use of the Law, 4 Bacon's
Works (ed. 1803) 97; Willes, J., in
Chorlton v. Lings, L. R. 4 C. P. 390.
When such an hereditary office de-
scended to a woman, she might ex-
ercise the office by deputy (at least
with the approval of the crown),
but not in person; nor could it be
originally granted to any woman,
because of her incapacity of ex-
ecuting public offices: Duke of
Buckingham's Case, Jenk. Cent. 6,
pi. 14, Dyer, 285b, pi. 39, Keilw. 17;
4 Inst. 128; Co. Litt. 107b, 165a;
Case of the Great Chamberlain of
England, 2 Bro. P. C. (2d ed.) 146,
36 Lords' Journals 302. Women
were permitted to hold the office of
keeper of a castle or jail, governor
of a workhouse, forester or con-
stable, for the reason that each of
those offices might be executed by
a deputy: Lady Russell's Case,
Cro. Jac. 17; 2 Inst. 382; Anony-
mous, 2 Ld. Raym. 1014; 3 Salk. 2;
4 Inst. 311; 2 Hawk., ch. 10, § 37;
Willes, J., in Chorlton v. Lings,
L. R. 4 C. P. 389. They were de-
cided to be capable of voting for
and of being elected to the office of
sexton of a parish, upon the ground
that this was not an office that con-
cerned the public: Olive v. In-
gram, 2 Stra. 1114, Vin. Abr., tit.
Femme, A, pi. 7, 8; 7 Mod. 263, 273,
274. And we are not aware of any
public office, the duties of which
must be discharged by the incum-
bent in person, that a woman was
adjudged to be competent to hold,
without express authority of stat-
ute, except that of overseer of the
poor, a local office of an adminis-
trative character, in no way con-
nected with judicial proceedings:
King V. Stubbs, 2 T. R. 395. An
attorney at law is not indeed in the
strictest sense a public officer. But
he comes very near it. As was said
by Lord Holt, "the office of an at-
torney concerns the public, for it is
for the administration of justice:'
White's Case. 6 Mod. 18; Ex parte
Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 378, 379. By
our statutes he is required, upon
his admission, to take and sub-
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admit women as attorneys. The court said: "Although an attorney
is an agent * * * when he has been retained to act for another,
the peace, legally perform all acts
pertaining to such office? Second.
Under the laws of this common-
wealth, would oaths and acknowl-
edgments of deeds, taken before a
married or unmarried woman, duly-
appointed and qualified as a justice
of the peace, be legal and valid?'
Although the provisions of the con-
stitution and statutes of the com-
monwealth regarding the office of
justice of the peace, while they do
not mention women, are not in
terms limited to men, yet the jus-
tices answered both the questions
proposed in the negative, for the
following reasons: 'By the consti-
tution of the commonwealth, the of-
fice of justice of the peace is a ju-
dicial office, and must be exercised
by the officer in person, and a wom-
an, whether married or unmarried,
can not be appointed to such an
office. The law of Massachusetts
at the time of the adoption of the
constitution, the whole frame and
purport of the instrument itself,
and the universal understanding
and unbroken practical construction
for the greater part of a century
afterwards, all support this conclu-
sion, and are inconsistent with any
other. It follows that if a woman
should be formally appointed and
commissioned as a justice of the
peace, she would have no constitu-
tional or legal authority to exercise
any of the functions appertaining
to that office:' Opinion of Jus-
tices, 107 Mass. 604. Whenever the
legislature has intended to make a
change in the legal rights or ca-
pacities of women, it has used
words clearly manifesting its in-
tent and the extent of the change
scribe in open court the oaths to
support the constitutions of the
United States and of this common-
wealth, as well as the oath of office;
this oath, the form of which has
remained without substantial
change since the time of Lord Holt,
nearly a hundred and eighty years,
pledges him to conduct himself 'in
the office of an attorney within the
courts' according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, and with
all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his clients; and he be-
comes by his admission an officer
of the court, and holds his office
during good behavior, subject to re-
moval by the court for malpractice:
Gen. Stats., ch. 121, §§ 30, 31, 34;
Rev. Stats., ch. 88, §§ 21, 22, 25,
and commissioners' notes; Stats.
1785, ch. 23; Prov. St. 1701-2 (1
Anne), ch. 71; Prov. Laws (State
ed.) 467; Randall's Case, 11 Allen
(Mass.) 473; Randall v. Brigham, 7
Wall. (U. S.) 523; Ex parte Rob-
inson, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 505, 512.
There is nothing in the action of the
legislature or of the judiciary of
the commonwealth which has any
tendency to prove such a change in
the law and usage prevailing at the
time of our separation from the
mother country as to admit women
to the exercise of any office that
concerns the administration of jus-
tice. In 1871 the governor and
council required the opinion of the
justices of this court, under chap-
ter 3, article 2, of the constitution
of the commonwealth, upon the fol-
lowing questions: 'First. Under
the constitution of this common-
wealth, can a woman, if duly ap-
pointed and qualified as a justice of
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yet he is also much more than an agent. He is an officer of the
court, holding his commission, in this state, from two members of
intended. The statutes permitting
a married woman to hold and con-
vey property, to malie contracts, to
sue and be sued, and to be an execu-
trix, administratrix, guardian or
trustee, have in no way enlarged
the capacity of any woman, mar-
ried or unmarried, to hold office,
and have no application to single
women or to legal disabilities to
which married and unmarried wom-
en alike are subject: Gen. Stats.,
ch. 108; Stats. 1869, chs. 304, 409;
1871, ch. 312; 1874, ch. 184. The
statute of 1869, ch. 346, providing
that 'any parish or religious so-
ciety may admit to membership
women, who shall have all the
rights and privileges of men,' would
seem to imply a doubt, at least,
whether they could previously have
been admitted to such membership
with equal privileges. The house
of representatives in 1874 having
taken the opinion of the justices
of this court that there was noth-
ing in the constitution itself to pre-
vent women from being members
of school committees, the legisla-
ture thereupon enacted that no per-
son should be deemed to be in-
eligible to serve upon a school com-
mittee by reason of sex; and it has
since expressly authorized women
to vote at election of school com-
mittees: Opinion of Justices, 115
Mass. 602; Stats. 1874, ch. 389;
1879, ch. 223; 1881, ch. 191. We
have not been referred to, and do
not recall, any other statute re-
specting the legal capacity of wom-
en except those which require for
their serving on certain public
boards connected with the super-
vision of charitable or reformatory
institutions or of prisons: Stats.
1877, ch. 195; 1879, chs. 291, 294.
In making innovations upon the
long-established system of law on
this subject, the legislature appears
to have proceeded with great cau-
tion, one step at a time; and the
whole course of legislation pre-
cludes the inference that any
change in the legal rights or capac-
ities of women is to be implied,
which has not been clearly ex-
pressed. The only statute making
any provisions concerning attor-
neys, that mentions women, is the
poor debtor act, which, after
enumerating among the cases in
which an arrest of the person may
be made on execution in an action
of contract, that in which 'the
debtor is an attorney at law,' who
has unreasonably neglected to pay
to his client money collected,- en-
acts, in the next section but one,
that 'no woman shall be arrested
on any civil process except for
tort:' Gen. Stats., ch. 124, §§ 5, 7.
If these provisions do not imply
that the legislature assumed that
women should not be attorneys,
they certainly have no tendency to
show that it intended that they
should. The word 'citizen,' in the
statute under which this applica-
tion is made, is but a repetition of
the word originally adopted with a
view of excluding aliens, before the
statutes of 1852, chapter 154. al-
lowed those aliens to be admitted to
tne bar who had made the pre-
liminary declaration of intention to
become citizens: Rev. Stats., ch. 88,
§ 19; Gen. Stats., ch. 121, § 28. The
re-enactment of the act relating to
the admission of attorneys in the
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this court, and subject to be disbarred by this court for what our
statute calls 'malconduct in his office.' He is appointed to assist in
same words without more, so far as
relates to the personal qualifications
of the applicant, since other stat-
utes have expressly modified the le-
gal rights and capacities of women
in other important respects, tends
rather to refute than to advance
the theory that the legislature in-
tended that these words should com-
prehend women. No inference of
an Intention of the legislature to
include women in the statutes con-
cerning the admission of attorneys
can be drawn from the mere omis-
sion of the word 'male.' The only
statute to which we have been re-
ferred, in which that word is in-
serted, is the statute concerning the
qualifications of voters in town af-
fairs, which, following the lan-
guage of the article of the constitu-
tion that defines the qualifications
of voters for governor, lieutenant-
governor, senators and representa-
tives, speaks of 'every male citizen
of twenty-one years of age,' etc.:
Gen. Stats., eh. 18, § 19; Const.
Mass. Amendments, art. 3. Words
which taken by themselves would
be equally applicable to women and
to men are constantly used in the
constitution and statutes, in speak-
ing of offices which It could not be
contended, in the present state of
the law, that women were capable
of holding. The courts of the com-
monwealth have not assumed by
their rules to admit to the bar any
class of persons not within the ap-
parent intent of the legislature as
manifested in the statutes. The
word 'person' in the latest rule of
court upon the subject, was the
word used in the rule of 1810 and in
the statutes of 1785 and 1836, at
times when no one contemplated
the possibility of a woman's being
admitted to practice as an attorney:
Rules Sup. Jud. Ct., 121 Mass.
600; 6 Mass. 382; Stats. 1785,
ch. 23; Rev. Stats., ch. 88,
§ 20; Gen. Stats., ch. 121, § 29. The
United States court of claims, at
December term, 1873, on full con-
sideration, denied an application of
a woman to be admitted to practice
as an attorney, upon the ground
'that under the constitution and
laws of the United States a court is
without power to grant such an ap-
plication, and that a woman is
without legal capacity to take the
office of an attorney:' Lockwood's
Case, 9 Ct. of CI. (U. S.) 346, 356.
At October term, 1876, of the su-
preme court of the United States,
the same petitioner applied to be
admitted to practice as an attorney
and counselor of that court, and
her application was denied. The
decision has not been officially re-
ported, but upon the record of the
court, of which we have an authen-
tic copy, it is thus stated: 'Upon
the presentation of this application,
the chief justice said, that notice of
this application having been pre-
viously brought to his attention, he
had been instructed by the court to
announce the following decision
upon it: By the uniform practice
of the court from its organization
to the present time, and by the fair
construction of its rules, none but
men are admitted to practice before
it as attorneys and counselors.
This is in accordance with immemo-
rial usage in England, and the law
and practice in all the states until
within a recent period; and the
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the administration of justice, is required to take an oath of office,
and is privileged from arrest while attending courts. * * * j^-
is to be remembered that at the time this statute was enacted, we had,
by express provision, adopted the common law of England, and, with
three exceptions, the statutes of that country passed prior to the
fourth year of James the First, so far as they were applicable to
our condition. It is also to be remembered that female attorneys
at law were unknown in England, and a proposition that a woman
should enter the courts of Westminster Hall in that capacity, or as a
barrister, would have created hardly less astonishment than one that
she should attend the bench of bishops, or be elected to a seat in
the house of commons. It is to be further remembered that when
our act was passed, that school of reform which claims for women
participation in the making and administering of the laws had not
then arisen, or, if here and there a writer had advanced such theories,
they were regarded rather as abstract speculations than as an actual
basis for action. That God designed the sexes to occupy different
spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply and
execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth. It may
have been a radical error, but that this was the universal belief cer-
tainly admits of no denial. A direct participation in the affairs of
the government, in even the most elementary form,—namely, the
right of suffrage,—was not then claimed, and has not yet been con-
ceded, unless recently in one of the newly settled territories of the
court does not feel called upon to 111. 535; In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232,
make a change until such a change 20 Am. Rep. 42. The suggestion in
is required by statute or a more ex- the brief of the petitioner, that
tended practice in the highest courts women have been admitted in other
of the states.' The subsequent act states, can have no weight here, in
of congress of February 15, 1879, the absence of all evidence that
enables only those women to be ad- (except under clear affirmative
mitted to practice before the su- words in a statute) they have ever
preme court of the United States been so admitted upon deliberate
who have been for three years mem- consideration of the question in-
bers of the bar of the highest court volved, or by a court whose de-
of a state or territory, or of the su- cisions are authoritative. It is
preme court of the District of Co- hardly necessary to add that our
lumbia. The conclusion that wom- duty is limited to declaring the law
en can not be admitted to the bar as it is, and that whether any
under the existing statutes of the change in that law would be wise
commonwealth is in accordance or expedient is a question for the
with judgments of the highest legislative and not for the judicial
courts of the states of Illinois and department of the government."
Wisconsin: Bradwell's Case, 55
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west. In view of these facts, we are certainly warranted in saying
that when the legislature gave to this court the power of granting
licenses to practice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that
this privilege should 1)6 extended equally to men and women. Neither
has there heen any legislation since that period which would justify
us in presuming a change in the legislative intent. Our laws to-day,
in regard to women, are substantially what they have always been,
except in the change wrought by the acts of 1861 and 1869, giving
to married women the right to control their own property and earn-
ings. * * * Thig step^ if taken by us, would mean that, in the
opinion of this tribunal, every civil office of this state may be filled
by women ; that it is in harmony with our constitution and laws that
women should he made governors, judges and sheriffs. This we are
not prepared to hold. * * * Por us to attempt, in a matter of
this importance, to inaugurate a practice at variance with all the
precedents of the law we are sworn to administer, would be an act
of judicial usurpation, deserving of the gravest censure. If we could
disregard, in this matter, the authority of those unwritten usages
which make the great body of our law, we might do so in any other,
and the dearest rights of person and property, would become a matter
of mere Judicial discretion. * * * jf ^j^g legislature shall choose
to remove the existing barriers, and authorize us to issue licenses
equally to men and women, we shall cheerfully obey, trusting to the
good sense and sound judgment of women themselves, to seek those
departments of the practice in which they can labor without reason-
able objection." In the state of Wisconsin the courts have always
doubted the power of the legislature to determine the question as to
who shall be allowed to practice law in the state courts. In GoodelVs
Case^' the supreme court denied the right of women to practice, and
refused to exercise the discretion to admit them, on the ground of
public policy. And in LocTiivood's Case,^^ the United States court of
claims reached the same conclusion; giving, among other reasons
why women should not bo permitted to practice, the following: "In
cases of misconduct by an attorney, he may be attached by the court,
and imprisoned ; but if the attorney were a married woman, then she
might come in and say that the misconduct occurred in her husband's
presence, and that, at common law, it was by his compulsion. She
might misapply the funds of a client, or be guilty of gross neglect or
^'39 Wis. 232, 20 Am. Rep. 42. '« 9 Ct. of CI. (U. S.) 346, af-
firmed in 154 U. S. 116.
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fraud, and the husband lie sued at common law, for the wrong." And
so the general term of the supreme court of Xew York ruled that
under the laws of that state a woman was not entitled to admission to
the bar.^^ It has also Ijeen repeatedly held that the denial to a woman
of the privilege of admission to the bar is not a violation of the pro-
visions of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.**^
§ 401. Enabling statutes—Cases holding women eligible under
common law.—In many of the states of the Union statutes have been
enacted enabling women to practice law; while in a few the courts
hold that no enabling statute or constitutional prpvision is necessary
to enable them to exercise that privilege,*^ if the courts see proper to
admit them. Since the decision of the Robinson Case*^ the legisla-
ture of Massachusetts has provided that women shall have the same
right to be admitted to the practice as men;*^ and since the Stoneman
Case^^^ was decided in Xew York, the legislature has amended the
code of that state so that race or sex shall be no ground for excluding
from admission to the bar ;** and since the decision of the Bradwell
Case,*^ the statutes of Illinois have been so amended that no person
can be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession or em-
ployment except military, on account of sex.*^ In Indiana the con-
stitution permits any person to practice law who has a good moral
character and is a legal voter.*' There is no statute of the state by
which women are given the right of admission to practice. The su-
preme court, in a somewhat recent case, has decided that neither the
common law nor the constitution prohibits women from being ad-
mitted to the bar, and that the courts possess the inherent power to
prescribe rules for the admission of women.*^ "Wliatever the objec-
tions of the common law of England," said the court, "there is a law
higher in this country, and tetter suited to the rights and liberties of
^ In re Stoneman, reported in
note to 53 Am. Rep. 323.
*» Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall.
(U. S.) 130; Lockwood's Case, 9
Ct. of CI. (U. S.) 346. affirmed in
154 U. S. 116; In re Taylor, 48
Md. 28, 30 Am. Rep. 451.
" See, as to the latter proposition,
In re Thomas, 16 Colo. 441, 13 L. R.
A. 538, 33 Cent. L. J. 416, 44 Alb.
L. J. 358; In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665,
21 L. R. A. 701.
«131 Mass. 376, 41 Am. Rep. 239.
«Act of April 10, 1882, p. 100.
"a Reported in note to 53 Am.
Rep. 323.
"N. Y. Laws 1886. ch. 425,
amending Code Civ. Proc, § 56.
"55 111. 535.
« Starr & C. Ann. Stat, ch. 48,
§ 4.
^" Ind. Const, art 7, §§ 7. 21.
*nn re Leach. 134 Ind. 665, 21
L. R. A. 701.
ll
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American citizens,—that law which accords to every citizen the nat-
ural right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in
the arts, the sciences, the professions or other vocations. This right
may not, of course, be pursued in violation of law, but must be held to
exist as long as not forbidden by law. We are not unmindful that
other states, notably Illinois, Wisconsin, Oregon, Maryland and Mas-
sachusetts, have held that in the absence of an express grant of the
privilege, it may not be conferred upon women. In some instances
the holding has been upon constitutional provisions unlike that of this
state, and in others upon what we are constrained to believe an errone-
ous recognition of a supposed common-law inhibition. However, each
of the states named made haste to create by legislation the right which
it was supposed was forbidden by the common law, and thereby recog-
nized the progress of American women beyond the narrow limits
prescribed in Westminster Hall." The supreme court of Colorado
takes the same advanced ground as that of Indiana.*® In the. case
cited in the note, it is held that attorneys are not civil officers within
the provision of the Colorado constitution that no person except a
qualified elector shall be eligible to any civil of military office, and that
there is nothing in the common law or in the statutes of that state
prohibiting women from admission to the bar.^° In New Hampshire
" In re Thomas, 16 Colo. 441, 13 example in the latter regard. We
L. R. A. 538. shall not indulge in speculation
^ In the course of the opinion, concerning the natural aptitude and
Helm, C. J., takes occasion to say: physical ability of women to per-
"The written opinions [speaking of form the duties of the profession,
the decisions of courts taking the nor shall we dwell upon considera-
opposite view from the one here ex- tions of propriety or expediency in
pressed] marshal all objections to the premises. These are matters as
conferring this privilege upon worn- to which wide differences of opinion
en, dwelling with special force and exist; and we conceive that they
clearness upon those existing out- have little, if any, bearing upon
side of constitutional and statutory similar applications now presented
provisions. They ably discuss ques- in this state, however pertinent
tions of impropriety and inexpe- they may have been in the common-
diency based upon the laws of na- wealths referred to when the above
ture, the bearing of historical cus- rulings were made. We shall like-
toms and usages, and the impedi- wise decline to give controlling
ments growing out of a woman's weight to historic custom or usage
legal status at the common law. in England, in the American col-
With all deference to those learned onies, and in the republic during its
courts, we decline to imitate their infancy. Reasoning, predicated
27
—
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it is held by the supreme court that the office of practicing attorney
is not a public office within the common-law rule by which women are
excluded from participating in the government of the state, as electors
and office holders; and women are therefore not prevented by such
rule from being licensed to practice law.^^ In -Pennsylvania it is de-
cided that the act of April 14, 1834, providing that judges of courts
of record may admit a competent number of persons to practice, and
that before any attorney shall enter upon the practice "he" shall take
an oath, etc., does not prohibit a woman from being admitted to the
bar as an attorney.^^ It may be safely stated, we think, that nearly
all the states of the Union, and the several federal courts, now admit
upon the latter ground, possesses
the inherent weakness of ignoring,
to a greater or less extent, the mar-
velous changes throughout the
country during the last fifty years
in the legal status of woman. It is
a significant circumstance, indicat-
ing the trend of popular sentiment
on the subject, that each of the
cases above referred to was speedily
followed by a statute providing for
the admission of women to the pro-
fession. The supreme court of the
United States, and the courts of the
district of Columbia, Massachusetts,
Illinois and Wisconsin, no longer
adhere to the rule of discrimination
on the ground of sex. Women are
now licensed without question to
practice in these courts as well as
in those of several other states upon
the same conditions as men, save
only that the act of congress re-
quires three years' membership of
the bar of the highest court in some
state or territory as a condition
precedent to their appearance be-
fore the supreme court of the
United States. In this common-
wealth, women of sufficient age,
married or single, may make con-
tracts, form partnerships, inherit,
acquire and dispose of property, in
all respects substantially the same
as men. The policy of our legisla-
tive and judicial action has tended
constantly towards conferring upon
them the same property rights and
business status as are enjoyed by
men. They may undoubtedly pur-
sue all vocations and enterprises of
a business character. They may
also become ministers, physicians,
or educators, and if any limitation
in regard to the learned profes-
sions exists, such limitation applies
solely to the bar. The privilege of
practicing this profession and shar-
ing in its emoluments is alone ques-
tioned. Hence we contend with
none of the difficulties encountered
by the courts above mentioned aris-
ing from the disabilities of women,
especially married women, at com-
mon law. Applications like the one
before us may therefore be regarded
with judicial favor, usually extend-
ed when equality of rights is in-
volved, unless some restrictive pro-
vision be found in our statutes or
constitution."
=^'In re Ricker, 66 N. H. 207, 24
L. R. A. 740.
"Richardson's Case (Com. PL),
3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 299. See also, In
re Kilgore, 17 Wkly. Notes Cas.
(Pa.) 562, 563.
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women to practice, if they possess the necessary qualifications re-
quired by law or the rules of court. ^^^
§ 402. Race, residence and citizenship.—It has been a custom of
long standing in this country to permit a lawyer in good repute in
another state to practice in particular cases without examination or
without being sworn as a practicing attorney of the state into whose
court he seeks admission ; but an attorney has no right to compel such
admission if refused, it being a mere matter of custom and comity,
and being confined to the practice in "certain causes in which the at-
torney is retained for the time being." It does not include the right
to a general license to practice. ^^ In all save a few of the states, prac-
ticing attorneys in good standing in other states are admitted. In
those states in which a contrary rule prevails it is generally provided
by statute that such nonresident attorneys may be admitted if they
have been practicing before the highest court of their own state for
a number of years. Persons of good character may be admitted to
the supreme court of the United States if they have practiced for
three years in the supreme court of their own state.^* Under the
laws of California, a Chinaman will not be admitted to practice in
the supreme court of that state, although he presents a license to prac-
tice in the supreme court of New York, and exhibits naturalization
papers issued by a competent court, such papers being void under act
of congi-ess of May, 18,82.^^ And in Maryland, under the act
of 1876^'' of that state, a colored citizen of the state was held
not eligible. ^^ In North Carolina, aliens not naturalized can not
be licensed to practice law.^^ But in Ohio, a foreigner who resides
in the state and has declared his intention to become a citizen, and
who possesses the other qualifications, may be admitted.^** There is
"alt was recently decided in Am. Rep. 55; In re Leonard, 12 Or.
Maryland that under the statute of 93, 53 Am. Rep. 323; Matter of
that state providing that "any male Henry, 40 N. Y. 560.
citizen" having certain qualifications "Rule Supr. Ct., 3 Supr. Ct. Repr.
shall be admitted to the practice of v.
law, women are not entitled to ad- °= In re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal.
mission, although the code provides 163, 24 Pac. 156.
mat the masculine shall include all '"' Ch. 264, § 3.
grades except where such construe- " In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28, 30 Am.
tion would be absurd or unreason- Rep. 451.
able: In re Maddox, 93 Md. 727, 55 ''"In re Thompson, 10 N. C. 355.
L. R. A. 298. =" Ex parte Porter, 3 Ohio Dec. 333.
'' In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 20
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no natural right in favor of one not a citizen of the state, or of the
United States, to be admitted to practice; and a statute or constitu-
tional provision is generality regarded as necessary to warrant the ad-
mission of such person.*'" In some states resident aliens are expressly
given the privilege of such admission by act of the legislature.^^
§ 403. Requirement to serve clerkship.—It is provided by statute
in some jurisdictions that every applicant for admission to the bar
must have served as a clerk in some laTTs^er's office for a prescriljed
period next before his examination for admission. Where this is the
rule the candidate must have actually served such clerJcship during
the required period, and must have been activeh' engaged in assisting
the attorney whom he serves as such clerk, with the business under
his control. ^^ It is not enough that he should simply have read law
under the direction or tutelage of such lawyer: the requirement for
service as clerk must be substantially complied with, "A clerksliip
to an attorney," said the supreme court of Xew Jersey, "imports the
office of assistant to an attorney,—an actual occupation in and about
the attorney's business and under his control. The service is to be
rendered, not solely or mainly by the study of law books, but chiefly
l)y attending to the work of the attorney under his direction. The
purpose of the rule is that the clerk shall be actually engaged in the
practice of law under the guidanc^ of his master for the stated period,
so that by direct contact with an attorney's duties he may acquire
the skill and facility in the profession which are necessary for ena-
bling him to protect and promote independently the interests that
clients may afterward commit to him. This is the sole object of re-
quiring the clerkship to be served with a practicing attorney. For
the mere study of legal principles, a retired counselor or a professor
would be an apter guide.""^ But it is doubtful whether this can be
thought to be altogether the object of the provision, when it is held
as it was in Pennsylvania, that a clerkship with a judge of the su-
preme court or the president of the common pleas, is a sufficient
compliance with the requirement. As judges are not engaged in the
practice of law, it can not in this case be deemed to be the purpose
of the rule to enable the young attorney to acquire experience in the
8" Matter of O'Neill, 90 N. Y. 584. Judges. 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 187; Mat-
" Or. Laws 1891, p. 42. ter of Moore, 108 N. Y. 280: Ex
'2 In matter of Dunn. 43 N. J. L. parte Sayre. 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 368: In
359, 39 Am. Rep. 600: In re Taylor, re A. B.. 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 191.
6 D. & R. 428: Ex parte Hill. 7 T. ^' In matter of Dunn, supra
R. 452. See also, Commonwealth v.
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practice by association with his preceptor.*'* The pursuit of classical
studies was formerly deemed of sufficient importance in some juris-
dictions to warrant the enactment of laws providing for a diminution
of the term of the clerkship upon proof of the applicant's having to
a certain extent pursued the study of the classics. ^^
§ 404. Nonresident attorneys.—Persons who are not residents of
the state have, as stated above,® ^^ no absolute right to practice therein,
though possessed of all other qualifications.''® Such attorneys are,
indeed, admitted in most jurisdictions, ex gratia; but in the absence
of a statutory or constitutional requirement, the courts are not bound
by law to admit them. Even if the applicant can show that he has
practiced his profession for the requisite number of years, if he is a
resident of another state this will not give him the right of admission
if he is not a citizen of the United States : he must be a citizen of this
country when he makes application to be admitted.®'^ Hence, a
Chinaman can not be admitted, as of right, from the fact that he has
been admitted in another state and has also been naturalized, the nat-
uralization papers being void.''^ But statutes are frequently passed
allowing nonresident attorneys to practice when otherwise properly
qualified;®'' and as a general rule, attorneys from other states are ad-
mitted for the purpose of practicing in some particular case or cases,
but not as permanent members of the bar.^*' They are sometimes
admitted by statute upon the same terms on which nonresident attor-
neys are admitted in the state from which they have come.
"^ Commonwealth v. Judges, 1 S. permit gentlemen of the bar in
& R. (Pa.) 187. other states to appear as counsel
"'See Anonymous, 3 Wend. (N. on the trial or argument of causes.
Y.) 456, Such has been the uniform practice
'^^a.Ante, § 402. of this court. And, under all or-
"' In re Henry, 40 N. Y. 560. dinary circumstances, it will always
" Matter of O'Neill, 90 N. Y. 584. be a pleasure to us to permit mem-
"" In re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. bers of the bar of other states to
163, 24 Pac. 156. argue causes here, whenever they
"" Or. Laws 1891, p. 42. See may appear here to do so. No li-
Splane's Petition, 123 Pa. St. 527; cense to practice here is necessary
Ex parte Schaefer, 32 La. Ann. or proper for that purpose; the
1102; In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, usual and proper practice being to
20 Am. Rep. 55. grant leave, ex gratia, for the occa-
'"As said by Ryan, C. J., speaking sion. But general license to prac-
for the supreme court of Wisconsin tice here as attorney and counselor
in the case last cited: "It is, we be- rests upon quite different considera-
lieve, the general practice of courts tions. The bar is no unimportant
of record in the several states to part of the court; and its menjbers
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§ 405. Mandamus to compel admission, etc.—The question whether
admission or readmissiou to tlie bar may be enforced by mandamus
proceedings is one as to wliich there can not te much controversy : the
great weight of authority being that mandamus will not lie to compel
such admission. It is generally held that the act of admitting an at-
torney to the bar is a judicial one: and although the legislature may
say what qualiiications the applicant must possess, whether in fact
he does possess these and other qualifications necessary, in the court's
opinion, to admission, is a question for the court to which he applies,
and can not be made the subject for a writ of mandamus.''^ But man-
damus seems to be the proper remedy to compel the restoration of an
attorney who has been disbarred or suspended; either where the act
was without jurisdiction, or was an abuse of the court's discretion,
or was unjust or unlawful."- Mandamus has been declared to te the
proper remedy, also, to allow an applicant for admission to the bar to
take the examination therefor, when refused though entitled to do so.'^
Where the facts are undisputed, the appellate tribunal may, perhaps,
enforce admission by mandamus.
§ 406. Oath of office.—Upon admission to the bar an attorney is
required to take the oath of office, by which he promises to support
the constitution of the United States and of his own state, and faith-
fully and honestly to discharge his duties as an attorney at law.^*
are officers of the court. * * *
and, if officers of the court, cer-
tainly, in some sense, officers of
the state for which the court acts.
* * * The state may have extra-
territorial officers, as commission-
ers to take acknowledgments, etc.
But these are exceptions; and the
general business of the state must
be performed by citizens or deni-
zens of the state: and the officers
charged with it must be resident
in the state. * * * it would be
an anomaly, dangerous to the safe
administration of justice, that the
office should be filled by persons re-
siding beyond the jurisdiction of
the court, and practically not sub-
ject to its authority. We take it
that members of the bar of this
state lose their, right to practice
here by removing from the state.
After they become nonresidents,
they can appear in courts of this
state ex gratia only. Our courts
can not have a nonresident bar."
"' Commonwealth v. Judges, 1 S.
& R. (Pa.) 187; Ex parte Garland.
4 Wall. (U. S.) 333; Ex parte Se-
combe, 19 How. (U. S.) 9.
"Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. (U.
S.) 505; Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind.
493.
" State V. :gaker, 25 Fla. 598. See
Commonwealth v. Judges. 1 S. & R.
(Pa.) 187.
'* This is the form of oath re-
quired in Indiana, under Burns
Rev. Stat. 1901, § 977. There is no
substantial difference in the forms
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§ 407. License to practice.—In many of the states an attorney at
law is required to have a license or certificate before he is permitted
to enter upon the practice of his profession. Such a license must be
obtained in the manner prescribed by law or it will be revoked.'^
But it will be presumed, the contrary not appearing, that one actually
practicing in court as an attorney has teen duly licensed to practice.''^
The mere fact that the statute substitutes a diploma from a law school
for an examination will not excuse the holder of such diploma from
taking out a license; and one who undertakes to practice without
such license is liable to be prosecuted, if to practice without a license
constitutes an offense in the jurisdiction in which he so engages in
the practice. But where the license is issued by the supreme court, an
admission to the bar of that court, spread of record, is equivalent to
the required license."' One can not represent another in a court of
justice merely as an "agent." He must be a licensed attorney, and his
license must be entered on the roll of the court in the clerk's office of
the proper court.'^ A license from the supreme court of Xew York,
stating that the holder has been admitted to the bar of the court of
appeals of that state, is not a compliance with the rule of court in
Pennsylvania which allows an attorney practicing in the highest
court of a state to practice before the supreme court of Pennsylvania
;
as the supreme court of Xew York has no authority to certify to the
of the oaths in the different states. United States:" Rule 2, Supr. Ct.
In Pennsylvania the applicant In the other federal courts a simi-
swears (or affirms) that he will sup- lar oath is required. In some of
port the constitution of the United the states the oath of an attorney is
States and the constitution of the that he will not violate the duties
commonwealth, "and that you will enjoined on him by law: Weeks
behave yourself in this court as to Attys. at Law. § 67. In other juris-
the client, and that you will use no dictions the oath is that the appli-
falsehood, nor delay any person's cant "will discharge the duties of
cause for lucre or malice:" 1 attorney and counselor to the best
Brightly's Purdon's Dig., ch. 189. of his knowledge and ability:"
The oath or affirmation required to Weeks Attys. at Law, § 70.
be taken by the attorney or coun- "^ People v. Betts, 7 Colo. 453 ; In
selor on his admission to the su- re Burchard. 27 Hun (N. Y.) 429.
preme court of the United States is •''' Ex parte Trippe. 66 Ind. 531.
as follows: "I, , do solemnly •• In re Villere. 33 La. Ann. 998.
swear (or affirm) that I will de- " Robb v. Smith, 4 111. 46; Cobb
mean myself, as an attorney and v. Judge of Super. Ct.. 43 Mich. 289;
counselor of this court, uprightly Weir v. Slocum, 3 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
and according to law; and that I 397.
will support the constitution of the
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admission of attorneys to practice before the court of appeals/® And
in Wisconsin it has been decided that a license to practice in the cir-
cuit courts will not entitle the holder thereof to practice in the su-
preme court of that state. ^*' An attorney who has been licensed to
practice in a state, before the formation of a new state out of a portion
of the territory of the old state, will not be required to take out a new
license in the new state.^^ In New Jersey, it is held to be within
the discretion of a justice of the peace to admit an unlicensed at-
torney to appear and practice. ^^ The requirement for a license to
practice law usually applies only to the practice in courts of record.^^
//. The Relation of the Attorney to the Court. ^
§ 408. Duty of attorney to court.—An attorney at the bar is under
obligations to deport himself with becoming respect to the court
and its officers; and this duty requires him to refrain from abusive
language toward both the court, counsel and parties.** But there
must be a formal disbarment in order to justify a court in preventing
a member of its bar from practicing before such court; and it is er-
roneous to exclude such a member from the practice, though he has
been guilty of conduct that would be sufficient cause for disbarment,
in the absence of a judgment of removal or suspension. ^^
§ 409. Summary jurisdiction—Disbarment.—Attorneys may be-
come liable to the summary jurisdiction of the court for various
causes. This jurisdiction, as stated in a work of merit, extends "to
cases when they [the attorneys] act without authority ; to striking
them from the rolls and suspending them from practice; to the of-
fense of permitting others to use their names ; to compelling in proper
cases the disclosure of the client's abode or occupation, and to compel-
ling them to produce the client, and to disclose a certain class of
communications * * * ; to the paying of money and costs; to
the answering of matters of affidavits ; to contempts of court ; and to
"Splane's Petition, 123 Pa. St. *' See Hall v. Sawyer, 47 Barb. (N.
527, 16 Atl. 481. Y.) 116; Porter v. Bronson, 29 How.
^"In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 20 Pr. (N. Y.) 292, 19 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
Am. Rep. 42. 236.
*'Ex parte Faulkner, 1 W. Va. "Redman v. State, 28 Ind. 205;
269; Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W. Va. Dodge v. State, 140 Ind. 284; Bauer
569. V. Betz, 1 How. N. S. (N. Y.) 344,
^- M'Whorter v. Bloom, 3 N. J. L. affirmed in 99 N. Y. 672.
134. '^Withers v. State, 36 Ala. 252.
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professional misconduct generally."^" It is generally conceded that
courts, as a necessary part of their inherent power, and as incident
to their power to admit attorneys to the bar, possess the right to sus-
pend or disbar such attorneys for their misconduct.*'^ It is not neces-
sary that the attorney who is to be disbarred should have committed
the offense or been guilty of the wrong conduct during the session
of court or in its presence. ^^ Appellate courts may take original
jurisdiction and proceed against attorneys guilty of unprofessional
conduct in such courts.^® If, however, the misconduct occurred while
the cause appealed was pending in the lower court, the appellate
tribunal will not take cognizance, there being an adequate remedy in
the lower court by contempt proceedings.®" Where the supreme court
has power to admit to practice generally, a proceeding to disbar is
properly instituted by the attorney-general before that tribunal.''^
Where attorneys are admitted to practice in trial courts, such courts
have power for proper cause to suspend an attorney from practicing
therein.''- Mutilation of a record by an attorney on appeal to the
supreme court is such an offense as will warrant the supreme court
to disbar such attorney; but it must be shown that he was connected
with the act; and the mere fact that he argued the appeal from the
record as filed is not in itself sufficient so to connect him with the
improper act.^^ An attorney may also be proceeded against sum-
marily for failing to pay over money belonging to his client; but
only when it has come into his hands as attorney of the party claim-
ing it, and not when he received it as a mere business agent.^* The
inherent power of courts to disbar an attorney may, however, be re-
'" Weeks Attys. at Law, § 77. For S.) 9; Anonymous, 9 L. T. 299;
other instances of misconduct for State v. Mullins, 129 Mo. 231, 31
which an attorney may be dis- S. W. 744.
barred, see Weeks Attys. at Law, ^ In re , 73 Wis. 602.
§ 81. An attorney may also be dis- *^ In re Whitehead, L. R. 28 Ch.
barred for contempt; but such an Div. 614; People v. Green, 7 Colo.
order should never be made unless 237.
tne offense is of such a nature as to ^ People v. Berry, 17 Colo. 322.
render him unworthy of his office: "State v. Mullins, 129 Mo. 231,
Watson V. Citizens' Savings Bank, 31 S. W. 744.
5 S. C. 159. "- Mattler v. Schaffner, 53 Ind. 245.
"People V. Goodrich, 79 111. 148; "'State v. Mullins, supra.
Rice V. Commonwealth, 18 B. Mon. "* In re Langslow, 167 N. Y. 314, 60
(Ky.) 472; In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. N. E. 591.
67; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. (U.
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stricted by statute; and such power may be vested by the legislature
in a particular court or courts, when the court from which the power
is taken is one of limited or special jurisdiction or is of purely statu-
tory origin.®^ And it seems to have been held in Indiana®^ that where
specific causes are prescribed by statute for which an attorney may l)e
disbarred, he can not be disbarred for any other ;^" but the general
rule and weight of authority seem to be otherwise: statutes prescrib-
ing causes for disbarment are not usually regarded as limiting the
common-law power of courts to disbar for causes not mentioned in the
statute. ®® Where an indictment was pending against an attorney
charging him with a crime, the court refused to disbar him before the
indictment was disposed of.^^ In ISTorth Carolina it is declared by
statute that no attorney shall be disbarred except upon a conviction
for a criminal offense or after confession in open court; and this pro-
vision has.been held valid and constitutional.^""
§ 410. Further as to disbarment of attorneys.—It is not necessary
that professional misconduct should amount to contempt of court
in order to furnish grounds for disbarment proceedings. Thus,
threats made to the judge, directly and personally and on account
of his official action, even out of court, will constitute ground for a
charge looking to disbarment.^"^ But the court will not be justified
in summarily striking an attorney's name from the rolls without the
proceedings prescriljed by statute, if such there be. A contempt of
court may be such as to warrant disbarment, but here, too, there must
be a charge and a hearing before there can be a judgment revoking
the attorney's license.^"- In the federal courts it is held that an attor-
ney may be disbarred for any act showing him to be unfit to practice
in the court as one of the officers thereof,—such as shows bad moral
character, commission of criminal, vicious, or other acts inconsistent
with his official relation to the courts.^"^ One of the acts which has
"'State v. Laughlin, 73 Mo. 443. Delano's Case, 58 N. H. 5, 42 Am.
See also. State v. Harber, 129 Mo. Rep. 555.
271, 31 S. W. 889. ^^ People v. Comstock, 176 111. 192,
^•"Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47; Ex 52 N. E. 67.
parte Trippe, 66 Ind. 531. "^ Ex parte Schenck. 65 N. C. 353.
'' This seems to be the rule also in "' State v. Root, 5 N. D. 487, 67 N.
North Dakota: In re Easton, 4 N. W. 590.
D. 514, 62 N. W. 597. "- State v. Root, supra.
98 Matter of Mills, 1 Mich. 392; '»^ See Ex parte Cole, 1 McCrary(CO 405; In re Wall, 13 Fed. 814.
"N
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been held sufficient ground for the disbarment of an attorney in
Colorado is the advertising for divorce cases: notably the repeated
insertion of such announcements as, "Divorces legally obtained very
quietly, good everywhere."^"* Disbarments have been held justifiable
on the following grounds:—libel ;^"^ purchasing demands for the pur-
pose of instituting suits thereon 5^"^ retaining the funds of a cli-
ent ;^°'^ instituting divorce proceedings on behalf of a wife, at the
instance of the husband, but without authority from the wife;^°^
offering to sell information to the adverse party ;^''^ conviction of fel-
ony;"" obtaining illegal fees in pension cases /^^ conviction of sub-
ornation of perjury ;^^- falsifying records or documents ;^^^ abstract-
ing record from files of court;"* fraudulently altering a receipt ;^^^
forging and filing in court an affidavit for a change of venue ;"*^
appearing in court armed with a deadly weapon ;^^^ swearing falsely
to an affidavit before the court ;^^^ bribing a witness ;^^'' threaten-
ing to chastise the judge of the court, though done outside of court. ^^°
Any matter showing an attorney's unfitness to practice in the court
is sufficient ground for disbarment.^^^
§ 411. Practice in disbarment proceedings.—Proceedings to disbar
an attorney may be instituted by the attorney-general, or by a member
of the bar on his own motion, or the court may appoint an attorney
"^People v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. v. Commonwealth, 18 B. Men. (Ky.)
186, 36 Am. St. 270. See also, on 472; Ex parte Brown, 1 How.
the subject of advertising for di- (Miss.) 303; State v. Mullins, 129
vorce suits, People v. Goodrich, 79 Mo. 231, 31 S. W. 744; State v. Har-
III. 148. ber, 129 Mo. 271, 31 S. W. 889; State
^"= State V. Mason, 29 Or. 18, 43 v. Cadwell, 16 Mont. 119, 40 Pac.
Pac. 651. 176; Matter of Loew, 5 Hun (N. Y.)
'""In re Bleakley, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 462, 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 373; In re
311. Goldberg, 29 N. Y. Supp. 972.
'"In re Titus, 66 Hun (N. Y.) ''* In re Gates (Pa.), 2 Atl. 214.
632, 21 N. Y. Supp. 724. "' In re Serfass, 116 Pa. St. 455.
"« Dillon V. State, 6 Tex. 55. "' Ex parte Walls, 64 Ind. 461.
""' In re Enright, 67 Vt. 351, 31 "' Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. 726.
Atl. 786. "'In re Houghton. 67 Cal. 511, 8
"" In re McCarthy, 42 Mich. 71. Pac. 52.
"' Matter of , an Attorney, "" Walker v. State, 4 W. Va. 749.
86 N. Y. 563. '=" Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.
"= State V. Holding, 1 McCord (S. S.) 335.
C.) 379. '-'State v. Winton (Or.), 5 Pac.
""People V. Leary, 84 111. 190; 337.
People V. Murphy, 119 111. 159; Rice
412 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 428
to prefer and prosecute the charges.^-- The proper practice then is
to serve such attorney with notice, reciting the substance of the charge
or information against him, and requiring him to appear and show
cause why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attor-
neys. ^^^ No one can be legally prosecuted with a view to disbarment
without having been given his day in court; and unless the miscon-
duct is committed in view of the court, the accused must have due and
sufficient notice; and judgment can only be rendered on the process, as
otherwise the judgment against him can not be upheld; a mere mo-
tion, without notice, not being sufficient.^-* The offense must be
clearly charged and proved, as it is but just that in an accusation of so
grave a nature, and likely to lead to such serious consequences, great
particularity should be required.^-^ The accused can only be tried on
the charges contained in the information; the court will not hear or
consider evidence as to conduct not connected with the attorney's pro-
fessional duties ; and the prosecution should be instituted within a rea-
sonable time after the commission of the alleged offense.^-® Disbar-
ment is not a conviction of a crime, in the ordinary sense, and it is not
within the power of the executive to pardon an attorney whose name
has been stricken from the roll, so as to entitle him to restoration.^-'
Even if the accused has been acquitted of the crime constituting the
basis of the proceeding for disbarment, it will be no defense, if the
facts proved sufficiently established his guilt. ^^^
§ 412, Defenses.—Disbarment proceedings for misconduct of an
attorney toward the court are not barred by the statute of limita-
tions.^^'' Where the offense is a supposed contempt consisting of mere
words capable of different constructions, the attorney may, under oath,
disavow his intention to commit a contempt and thus purge himself
so as to entitle him to have the proceedings discontinued;^^" but
^" State v. Mullins, 129 Mo. 231,
31 S. W. 744; State v. Harber. 129
Mo. 271, 31 S. W. 889.
1" Weeks Attys. at Law, § 83.
1^* Weeks Attys. at Law, § 83.
^^-^ People v. Allison, 68 111. 151;
Dickinson v. Dustin, 21 Mich. 561.
^^ People v. Allison, supra.
*" Matter of , an Attorney,
86 N. Y. 569. But in New York a
statute authorizes the supreme
court to vacate an order of disbar-
ment on proof of a pardon: Laws
1890, ch. 258, p. 948.
^^ Matter of , an Attorney,
supra.
>=»In re Lowenthal, 78 Cal. 427;
Ex parte Tyler, 107 Cal. 78.
""In re Woolley, 11 Bush (Ky.)
95. See Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C.
202.
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when the matter is necessarily offensive and insulting, the disavowal
can not justify the act, though it may tend to excuse it.^^^ The fact
that the client has condoned the offense of his attorney is no defense
to the disbarment proceeding ;^^- nor is the settlement of a criminal
prosecution on the same charge. ^^^ That an appeal has been taken
from the decision in the case constituting the basis of the disbarment
proceedings, is no answer to the accusation.^^*
§ 413. Review of proceedings.—Proceedings for disbarment of an
attorney are generally reviewable, either on appeaP^^ or on writ of
error"® or by mandamus ;'^^' and when an attorney has been sus-
pended or disbarred without notice and opportunity to defend, a man-
da miis may issue to compel the trial court to restore the defendant to
his rights as an attorney.^^*
§ 414. Contempts.—An attorney at law may be guilty of a con-
tempt of court for misconduct in the presence of the court or out of
it. The former is said to be a direct contempt, or contempt in facie
curiae,^^^ and the latter an indirect or constructive contempt.^*" The
refusal to pay over money to a client, upon order of court, will consti-
tute a contempt of court for which an attachment may issue. ^*^
The attorney may place himself in contempt also by advising his
client to violate an order of the court, for which the court may in-
flict proper punishment.^"'- And so, it has been held to be a contempt
"^ In re Woolley, 11 Bush (Ky.) 95. fendant's favor: State v. Tunstall,
"-Ex parte Orwig. 31 Leg. Int. 51 Tex. 81; In re Orton, 54 Wis. 379.
(Pa.) 20. '"^Ex parte Biggs. 64 N. C. 202;
"'In re Davies, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 65. Beene v. State. 22 Ark. 149.
"* Matter of , an Attorney, "• Ex parte Robinson, 86 U. S. 513.
86 N. Y. 563. "' People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 143.
'^Winkelman v. People, 50 111. '^Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196;
449; Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 493; Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513; State
Ex parte Trippe, 66 Ind. 531; Tur- v. Woodfin, 5 Ired. L. (N. C.) 199,
ner v. Com., 8 Ky. L. Rep. 350, 42 Am. Dec. 161.
1 S. W. 475; In re Wool. 36 Mich. ^«' Hawkins v. State, 126 Ind. 294;
299; In re Brown, 2 Okla. 590, 39 In matter of Dill, 32 Kan. 668, 688,
Pac. 469; In re H T , 2 49 Am. Rep. 505.
Penny. (Pa.) 84, 14 Lane. Bar (Pa.) "'Smith v. McLendon, 59 Ga.
127; Brooks v. Fleming, 65 Tenn. 523; Cotton v. Sharpstein, 14 Wis.
331; Casey v. State, 25 Tex. 380. 226, 80 Am. Dec. 774.
But no appeal can be taken by the "- King v. Barnes, 113 N. Y. 476,
prosecution from a judgment in de- 655.
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for an attorney to bring a fictitious suit.^*^ Many of the things for
which an attorney will be disbarred are contempts of court, and these,
in the main, have already been noticed.^** An attorney • may be
guilty of contempt by using indecent, defamatory, or other improper
language in the court's presence ;^'*^ filing an indecent petition;^*"
and generally, for disobeying any order or process of court. ^*^ Con-
tempts are punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, and by sus-
pension, temporary or permanent, from practice. Direct contempts
may be punished summarily, without previous proceedings; but in-
direct contempts can only be punished after notice and a hearing.^**
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts, and can
not be taken away by the legislature.^*® A distinction is also drawn
by some courts between a civil and criminal contempt : proceedings in
contempt instituted solely to vindicate the dignity of the court are
criminal; while those instituted by private individuals to protect or
enforce their rights are civil. ^•''" The first class, being an attack upon
the dignity and power of the court, and thus threatening its very ex-
istence, are necessarily primitive and of a more aggravated character
than the second ; while the latter are such as do not directly affect
'
the public business and have to do only with private controversies,
though they, too, may be punished by the court.^^^ At common law
contempt proceedings were not reviewable by a higher court, the court
in which they were had being the exclusive judge of whether the act
was such an interference with its process or the exercise of its powers
;
and neither an appeal nor hahe-as corpus could be resorted to in such
cases.^^- If, however, the court had no jurisdiction, its judgment could
"== Smith V. Junction R. Co., 29
Ind. 546; Smith v. Brown, 3 Tex.
360, 49 Am. Dec. 748.
^^Ante, § 410.
i« State V. Root, 5 N. D. 487, 67
N. W. 590.
i^* Brown v. Brown, 4 Ind. 627, 58
Am. Dec. 641.
"'Mowrer v. State, 107 Ind. 539;
Baldwin v. State, 126 Ind. 24.
"«Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. (U.
S.) 364; Worland v. State, 82 Ind.
49; Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196.
""Little v. State. 90 Ind. 338;
McKinney v. Frankfort, etc., R. Co.,
140 Ind. 95, 97; Ex parte Terry, 128
U. S. 289; People v. Stapleton, 18
Colo. 568; Cartwright's Case, 114
Mass. 230; Arnold v. Common-
wealth. 80 Ky. 300, 44 Am. Rep.
480; Yate's Case, 4 Johns. (N. Y.)
318.
160 Thompson v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 105. See People
v. Court of Oyer, etc., 101 N. Y.
245, 54 Am. Rep. 691.
'^^ Thompson v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., supra.
"=In re Swan, 150 U. S. 637; Ex
parte Maulsby, 13 Md. 625; People
V. Spalding, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 284,
affirmed in Spalding v. People, 7
i
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be reviewed by certiorari, or by appeal, or by habeas cwpus.'^^^ It
is held by some courts, however, that an appeal will lie in a case of
punishment for contempt, though there be no statute authorizing it.^^*
In mo!^t states, however, the proceedings in contempt cases are regu-
lated by statutes, and provision is made for appeals.
///. A Harney's Relatiaii to His Client.
§ 415. In general—The retainer.—The relation of attorney and
client, like that of any other principal and agent, generally grows out
of a contract of employment, which in this case is called a "re-
tainer."^^^ As a general rule, the attorney must be retained before he
can be considered authorized to appear in an action either to prosecute
or to defend ; but, of course, the employment may be established by im-
plication, the same as in other eases of agency. "The payment of a fee
is the most usual and weighty item of evidence to establish the re-
lationship of client and attorney, but it is by no means indispensable
The essential feature of the professional relation is the fact of em-
ployment to do something in the client's behalf. There must be an
agreement, expressed or implied, for compensation, but whether pay-
ment is made in part or in whole by retainer in advance is not ma-
terial. Xor is it even indispensable that the compensation should
be assumed by the client. Ordinarily, it is so from the nature of the
employment, which in the vast majority of cases involves the guard-
ing or enforcement of the client's interest against an adverse one,
and is therefore exclusive. But even advert interests, if to be amica-
bly adjusted, may be represented by the same counsel, though the cases
in which this can te done are exceptional and never entirely free from
danger of conflicting duties."^ ^^^ The appearance of an attorney in
a case in court is, however, in itself prima facie evidence of his au-
thority to appear; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence
of his non-employment or want of authority.^^^ The court may, and
upon proper showing, must call upon any attorney who appears in a
Hill (N. Y.) 301; Jordan v. State, State, 46 Neb. 149; In re Stokes, 5
14 Tex. 436; In re Rosenberg, 90 S. C. 71.
Wis. 581. '''^ See Bouvier Law Die, tit. Re-
i"Ex parte Mollis, .59 Cal. 405; tainer.
People v. Court of Oyer, etc., 101 "^a Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. St.
N. Y. 245, 54 Am. Rep. 691. 532, 57 Am. St. 662.
'"Commonwealth v. Newton, I '^ Great West. Min. Co. v. Wood-
Grant Cas. (Pa.) 453; Hawes v. mas, 12 Colo. 46, 20 Pac. 771.
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case, to show his authority ;^^" but in the absence of such a showing,
authority of the attorney to make such appearance will be presumed.^ ^*
And if a party desires to question the authority of an attorney to ap-
pear, such party should file a written motion verified by affidavit,
stating not only the fact of such lack of authority, but the grounds
for the belief that such is the case;^°^ but the authorit}' can not be
contested by plea or answer. ^^° An affidavit is, however, not always
deemed essential: if the party go on the stand and testify as to such
want of authority, this may take the place of an affidavit. ^''^ Xor can
an attorney in regular practice be called upon to produce his au-
thority to appear in a case unless he has received previous notice
requiring him to do so.^®^
§ 416. Right of attorney to appear—By whom, how, and when it
may be questioned.—The question whether an attorney has the au-
thority to appear may be raised by either party to a suit;^*^^ but the
adverse party can raise the question only by showing that his rights
are in some way prejudiced, or that he has been disturbed or vexed
by being brought into litigation without the consent of the other
party.^"* A mere stranger to the record has no right to question the
authority of an attorney in a cause.^^^ The adverse party can not
1^' Cartwell v. Menifee, 2 Ark. 556;
State v. Houston, 3 Harr. (Del.) 15;
Belt V. Wilson, 29 Ky. 495, 22 Am.
Dec. 88; Roselius v. Delachaise, 5
La. Ann. 481, 52 Am. Dec. 597;
Prentiss v. Kelley, 41 Me. 436; Mc-
Kiernan v. Patrick, 5 Miss. 333; Al-
len V. Green, 1 Bailey (S. C.) 448;
Ex parte Gillespie. 3 Yerg. (Tenn.)
325; Board of Com'rs, etc.. v. Purdy,
36 Barb. (N. Y.) 266; Hollins v. St.
Louis, etc., R. Co., 57 Hun (N. Y.)
139, 11 N. Y. Supp. 27.
'^*Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9
Wheat (U. S.) 738; Wheeler v. Cox,
56 Iowa 36; Kerr v. Reece, 27 Kan.
469; Louisville, etc.. R. Co. v. New-
some, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 174; Postal
Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisville, etc., R.
Co., 43 La. Ann. 522, 9 So. 119;
Steffe V. Old Colony R. Co., 156
Mass. 262.
"' Standefer v. Dowlin, 1 Hemp.
(C. C.) 209; People v. Mariposa
Co., 39 Cal. 683; Valle v. Picton. 16
Mo. App. 178, 91 Mo. 207; People v.
Lamb, 32 N. Y. Supp. 584, 85 Hun
(N. Y.) 171; Watrous v. Kerney, 79
N. Y. 496; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
Newsome, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 174;
Savery v. Savery, 8 Iowa 217.
"" Robinson v. Robinson, 32 Mo.
App. 88; North Brunswick v. Boo-
ream, 10 N. J. L. 305.
'" Bender v. McDowell, 46 La.
Ann. 393.
^" Beckley v. Newcomb, 24 N. H.
359.
103 People V. Mariposa Co., 39 Cal
683.
^^ M'Alexander v. Wright, 3 T. B.
Mon. (Ky.) 189.
•"'^Bryans v. Taylor, Wright
(Ohio) 245.
,
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raise the objection that the opposing counsel has not procured a li-
cense from the United States government.^®® The objection must
always be raised before plea or answer, and at the earliest oppor-
tunity'. ^"^ The question of authority or no authority may be deter-
mined by the court, if there be no jury, or by the jury if there l^e one
;
it being a question of fact such as a jury has the right to pass upon.^®*
When the authority of an attorney is seasonably and appropriately
questioned, it then devolves upon the party who questions such author-
ity to produce some proof of the lack of such authority: the 1)urden
being on the attacking party to prove that the appearance is unau-
thorized.^®^ The presumption in such cases is always in favor of the
authority, as attorneys who are officers of the court must be presumed
to have done their duty ; for in such case the maxim applies that "all
acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done.""'' But
where the party represented by an attorney himself denies such at-
torney's authority under oath, it has been held that the burden is
upon the attorney to prove such authority ;^^^ but where an appear-
ance has been regularly entered by an attorney and an order made, if
the party against whom such order was entered denies the authority
of the attorney to enter such appearance, the burden is on such party
to prove that the appearance by the attorney was without authority."-
The authority may be shown by an express contract of employment,
such as a letter or a power of attorney, or by any parol evidence rais-
ing a reasonable presumption of the existence of proper authority.^^^
When considerable time has elapsed between the performance of the
act and the denial of authority, the presumption in its favor is
'•^Harrington v. Edwards, 17 N. J. Eq. 52; Thomas v. Steele, 22
Wis. 604. Wis. 207: Schlitz v. Meyer, 61 Wis.
'«' Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. 418; Stubbs v. Leavitt, 30 Ala. 352;
Maddy, 103 Ind. 200; People v. Holder v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 19,
Lamb, 85 Hun (N. Y.) 171, 32 N. Y. 29 S. W. 793.
Supp. 584; Beckly v. Newcomb, 24 "° Co. Litt. 6b, 332. See Rex v.
N. H. 359; Rowland v. Gardner, 69 Verelst, 3 Camp. 432, per Ld. Ellen-
N. C. 53. borough, C. J.; Faulkner v. John-
'"^ Henderson v. Terry, 62 Tex. son, 11 M. & W. 581.
281; Newhart v. Wolfe, 2 Penny. "' Dangerfield v. Thruston, 8
(Pa.) 295; Clark v. Holliday, 9 Mo. Mart. N. S. (La.) 119.
711; Howard v. Smith, 33 N. Y. '" Dey v. Hathaway, etc., Co., 41
Super. 124. N. J. Eq. 419.
"'"Bonnfleld v. Thorp, 71 Fed. 924; ^'^ Rogers v. Park, 23 Tenn. 480.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pinner, 43
28
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strengthened by such lapse of time ; and the proof of the want of such
authority must l)e clear l)efore it will overcome the opposing preaimp-
tion. Thus where, after the lapse of six 3Tars, the authority of the
attorney was questioned by the client, who refused to be bound by the
attorney's appearance for him, and the attorney testified that he did
not recollect whether he had authority to appear in the specific action,
though it was unlikely he would have done so without such authority-,
and that he had previously been the counsel of the client ; and the lat-
ter testified that he had no rec-ollection whether he gave the authority
or not,—it was held that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the
presumption of authority furnished by the record itself.^'* And
where the question was whether the attorney had sufficient authority
to bind his client by a notice to take depositions served upon such at-
torney, it was held that proof of the fact that the attorney, who lived
in the same town with the client, had previously represented him in a
criminal prosecution, connected with the civil suit, was sufficient in
the absence of rebutting testimony, to show that he was the authorized
attorney and that the service of such notice was binding. ^^^ It must
be remembered, however, that the mere fact of previous employment
is not sufficient proof of the relation in the particular transaction in
question, and only furnishes evidence of a presumption of such rela-
tion when there is no evidence to the contrary.^^*' And a retainer in
a case never authorizes or requires the attorney to appear for the client
in collateral proceedings ;^^^ it does, however, give the attorney full
power to transact all the business and perform all the acts inciden-
tally necessary to the accomplishment of the main purpose. ^^^
§ 417. How far party bound by act of attorney.—Generally speak-
ing, and in the absence of fraud or collusion, the authorized acts of an
attorney at law are binding upon the client, as in the case of any other
agent, when such acts are within the scope of the authority.^'^ The
client, like any other principal, is responsible for such acts, the same
as if they had been performed by him in person. If the attorney has
been negligent in the conduct of legal proceedings, and the negligence
has proved injurious to the client, the latter can not set up siich neg-
i'*Fisher v. March, 26 Gratt. (Va.) '"« See Scott v. Elmendorf. 12
765. Johns. (N. Y.) 315; Day v. Welles,
"^Coffin v. Anderson, 4 Blackf. 31 Conn. 344.
(Ind.) 395. ^"Beck v. Bellamy, 93 N. C. 129;
i"«Ex parte Lynch, 25 S. C. 193; Wood v. Wood, 59 Ark. 441, 43 Am.
Hoover v. Greenbaum, 61 N. Y. 305. St. 42.
"' Jacobs v. Copeland, 54 Me. 503.
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ligence as an excuse, any more than if he had himself been guilty of
it. Thus, where an attorney, with full authority in the premises, neg-
lects to file and prosecute a claim against the estate of an insolvent
debtor, the Creditor can not be excused for the laches on account of
the failure of his attorney to act.^*" And when an authorized attor-
ney is present in court when an order is made granting a new trial as
of right, under a statute, and fails to object, the client affected there-
by is presumed to have consented to the order.^^^ Not only is the
client deprived of any relief from the injurious consequences natu-
rally following from the negligent or other wrongful conduct of the
attorney, but the client is personally liable to any third party who
sustains an injury which proximately results therefrom,^^^ as we had
occasion to show when we considered the liability of the principal to
third persons. ^^^
§ 418. Duty of attorney to client—Fidelity—Confidential com-
munications.—We have already noticed the duties an attorney owes to
the court, and the consequences that may result to him from a failure
to discharge them.^®* An attorney also owes certain well-defined
duties to his client, which we now propose to consider. Like any
other agent, an attorney at law is bound to observe toward his prin-
cipal, the client, the utmost good faith; the relation between them is
one of the most sacred and confidential that may exist between one
person and another ; he must, therefore, in the language of one of the
statutory provisions, "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself, preserve the secrets of his client."^^^ He can not, as
a general rule, be compelled to reveal his client's secrets, even in a
court of justice. He violates the confidence reposed in him, by dis-
closing the confidential communications that have come to him in the
course of the relation; and this is true whether such communications
were made in a suit or in the course of private negotiations.^^ ^ Such
communications should never be disclosed except with the consent of
the client.^® ^ Attorneys are liable for betraying confidence reposed in
them, and especially for disclosing to the opponent in a cause the evi-
dence in their client's case, or other secrets intrusted to them. In the
""Leo v. Green, 52 N. J. Eq. 1. "^ Burns Ind. Rev. Stat. 1901,
•« Harvey v. Fink, 11 Ind. 249. § 979, cl. 5.
"= Foster v. Wiley, 27 Mich. 244, '^ Weeks Attys. at Law, § 310.
15 Am. Rep. 185. '^^ Jenkinson v. State, 5 Blackf.
^^^ See ante, ^ Z2Z, et seg. (Ind.) 465; Bigler v. Reyher, 43
'^Ante, § 408, et seq. Ind. 112
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first place, they are guilty of gross breach of moral duty; in the
second, they are guilty of gross violation of professional duty and pro-
fessional decency; and in the third place, they are civilly liable in
damages to their clients. It is gratifying to find that the cases on
this subject are exceedingly few.^^® After an attorney has been re-
tained or consulted in a matter by a client, he can not consistently
with professional duty act for the opposing party in the same matter,
or in matters directly connected therewith. ^^^ If, in the course of his
employment, he becomes cognizant of defects in his client's title, he
can not take advantage of it to the latter's detriment without laying
himself liable to him.^^** He should never attempt to represent con-
flicting interests, and if he does so, he may render himself liable to
both his clients in damages. Thus, where an attorney is employed to
borrow money and also assumes to act for the lender, by giving him
advice, etc., though he receives no pay for the same, he will be liable
for wrong advice to the lender, as to the sufficiency of the security,
etc.^"^
S 419. Duty to exercise skill, care, etc.^®^^—Liability for neg-
ligence.—An attorney, as agent of his client, is bound to exercise due
and proper skill and care in the performance of his trust. He holds
himself out as possessing, to a reasonable extent, the knowledge and
skill required in the proper performance of his professional duties;
and if he does not possess these, or fails to exercise proper skill and
care, he will be liable in damages for any injury resulting to his
client.^^^ He is not liable, however, for every mistake that may occur
in his practice, and if he has fair capacities and knowledge, and em-
ploys a reasonable degree of care and attention, he will not be liable.^''^
"^ Weeks Attys. at Law, § 310. "'a See aiite, § 342.
'^Wilson V. State, 16 Ind. 392; ^'^- Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51,
Price v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 5 Am. Dee. 77; Watson v. Muirhead,
18 Ind. 137. 57 Pa. St. 161. 167, 98 Am. Dec. 213;
•'"Ringo v. Binns, 10 Pet. (U. S.) Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 492;
269; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sher- Walker v. Stevens, 79 111. 193; Von
man, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 553; Gal- Wallhoffen v. Newcombe, 10 Hun
braith v. Elder, 8 Watts (Pa.) 81. (N. Y.) 236.
^^^ Donaldson v. Haldane, 7 CI. & ^"^ Kepler v. Jessup, 11 Ind. App.
F. 762. See also, Taylor v. Black- 241; Watson v. Muirhead. 57 Pa. St.
low, 3 Scott 614, 3 Bing. N. C. 235, 161, 98 Am. Dec. 213; Tuley v. Bar-
32 E. C. L. 116; Arnold v. Robert- ton, 79 Va. 387; Cox v. Sullivan, 7
son, 3 Daly (N. Y.) 298. Ga. 144, 148, 50 Am. Dec. 386.
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He is not required to possess a perfect knowledge of the law, and if
doubt exists as to any legal proposition, or if well-informed lawyers
may properly differ as to the same, he will not be held liable for his
error, if such his advice or act should prove to be; nor would he be
liable for any error of judgment as to new and undecided points.^^*
He may, of course, assume the law to be correctly decided by the su-
preme court of his own state, even though such decision be subse-
•quently overruled.^ ^^ He must, however, know the settled rules of
pleading and practice, and must use ordinary care in the preparation
of his cases for trial/^** In New York, where a statute regulating
proceedings m attachment required an affidavit to be filed showing the
existence of a cause of action and that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover the sum stated over and above all counter claims; and an at-
tachment was dissolved because the affidavit did not state the source
of affiant's information,—it was held by the federal court that the
attorney who prepared the affidavit was not liable to his client in dam-
ages for the omission : the decisions of the lower courts being conflict-
ing as to the requirement of such statement in the affidavit, and the
court of appeals not having passed upon the question. ^''^ And in a
case in Indiana, a building and loan association was advised by its
attorney that the title to a parcel of real estate was perfect and avail-
able to secure a loan applied for by one of its shareholders, and it was
shown that the title to such real estate was held by the shareholder
and his wife as tenants by the entireties. The borrower died before
the loan was repaid, and his wife successfully resisted a suit for the
foreclosure of the mortgage given to secure the loan : her defense lac-
ing that she signed the note and mortgage merely as the surety of her
husband. The supreme court decided that although, if the rule that
in such cases a mortgage given by the husband and wife was void as
to both had been clearly established by the decisions of the court be-
fore the advice was given, the attorney would have been liable for the
damages sustained, yet that as such had never been the ruling of
that court up to that time, the mistake of such advice was not such as
>' Stevens v. Walker, 55 111. 151; Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 18
Citizens' Loan, etc., Ass'n v. Fried- Am. St. 320.
ley, 123 Ind. 143, 18 Am. St. 320; ""Citizens' Loan, etc., Ass'n v.
Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 18 Am. St.
16 Am. St. 585. 320.
""> Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. "' Ahlhauser v. Butler, 57 Fed.
(U. S.) 178; Citizens' Loan, etc., 121.
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could be said to have resulted only from the want of ordinary knowl-
edge and skill, or from the failure to exercise reasonable care and
caution. ^^® But an attorney must keep pace with the literature of the
profession; and if a principle of law has been established by the de-
cision of a court which has been reported and published a sufficient
length of time to have become known to those who exercise reasonable
diligence, and such attorney has failed to inform himself thereof, and
his client has suffered from his ignorance, he will be liable for such
damages as the client has sustained thereby.^^® An attorney must
also know the statutes of his state, and the settled rules of pleading
and practice of his court ;-°° and if he undertakes to sue out a writ in
a court of peculiar constitution, he must ascertain the machinery
the court has with which to carry out the objects of the action.-"^
But the skill and knowledge of an attorney must be considered with
reference to the locality in which he practices, unless he undertakes
that he has knowledge of the law of the jurisdiction with reference
to which he is engaged to transact the business. Hence, if he fail
to inform his client that under the law of a foreign state a building
contract must be registered in order to be binding upon the parties
to it, when the law of that state so requires, he will not be liable
on account of his ignorance, although he was employed to draw a con-
tract that would in all respects be binding on the parties; the mere
acceptance of the employment not being a sufficient tacit agreement
that he would draw the contract so as to make it binding by the laws
of such foreign state.^"^ In all cases, it is the client's duty to give the
attorney a true statement of the facts of the case upon which he seeks
advice or action ; and there can be no liability on the part of the prac-
titioner if the facts are wrongly stated to him.-^^
§ 420. Further as to attorney's liability for negligence.—As in
every other case of agency, it is the duty of an attorney at law to en-
ter upon the performance of his undertaking as contemplated by his
employment, and to pursue the task diligently until completed.*"'*
Hence, if an attorney who has a claim placed in his hands for collec-
^'^ Citizens' Loan, etc., Ass'n v.
Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 18 Am. St.
320.
"''Goodman v. Walker, 30 Ala.
482, 68 Am. Dec. 134.
-"'' Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 460,
19 E. C. L. 210.
=«^Cox v. Leech, 1 C. B. N. S. (87
E. C. L.) 617.
=«= li^enaille v. Coudert. 44 N. J. L.
286.
-"^ Lee v. Dixon, 3 F. & F. 744.
=** See ante, § 229.
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tion, delays bringing suit Ijeyond a reasonable time, a right of action
arises against him for damages, if the claim is lost by reason of such
negligence on his part.-"^ But when the attorney has obtained judg-
ment on a claim in favor of the client, and sued out execution, he
will be justified in ceasing to take further steps—such as additional
executions—whenever he is influenced, in good faith, by a prudent
regard for the interest of his client, not to pursue the matter further,
and ^\ill not be liable, though he has not asked for further instruc-
tions, unless he has disobeyed the positive directions of the client ; but,
as a general rule, it may be stated to be the duty of the attorney not
only to sue out mesne and final process, but subsequent writs of
execution, when the first proves inadequate.^"^ He is not bound
to institute new and collateral suits, such as actions against the
sheriff or other officers for failing to do their duty, nor to attend to
the levy of an execution, nor to search for property out of which to
make the debt, as these are the duties of the sheriff.-"" But if there is
a forthcoming bond with surety, it is incumbent upon him to pursue
such surety thereon, and he is guilty of negligence for failing to do
so.^°'^ And where an attorney has undertaken on behalf of a mort-
gagee to see that a mortgage is a first lien on the propert}^ of the mort-
gagor, he is liable to such mortgagee for a failure to use reasonable
care and skill in performing that duty ; and that without reference to
the fact that he was the attorney of the mortgagor and that the lat-
ter paid the fees : the adverse interest not being such as to render the
employment illegal.^*"' And in such case the mortgagee need not
wait until he has foreclosed his mortgage, but may, if he can estab-
lish the injury and damage, sue and recover from the attorney the
difference between the value of the security contracted for and that
actually received ; the cause of action being the breach of duty, and
not the damages, which are only an incident.^^** It is, of course, his
duty, in cases in court, to prepare all the pleadings and take all neces-
sary steps in the progress thereof; and, for a failure to perform
this duty, in whole or in part, he will be liable to his client in such
damages as the latter may have sustained. -^"^ It seems that he is
^"'McArthur v. Baker, 7 Ky. L, ^"^ lUd.
Rep. 440. ='"See Walker v. Goodman, 21
=*> Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212, Ala. 647; Hunter v. Caldwell, 10 Q.
52 Am. Dec. 262. B. (59 E. C. L.) 69.
-"' Ibid. ""a Walsh v. Shumway, 65 111. 471.
=='«Lawall V. Groman, 180 Pa. St.
532, 57 Am. St. 662.
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not liable, however, for the result of any unskillful pleadings filed in
a case by another attorney, and before his connection with it.-" He
is liable for negligence in failing to make proper preparations for the
trial, such as the summoning of witnesses, etc.^^^ Like other agents
employed for the performance of a particular task, he must perform
the same in person. -^^ But the retainer of a member of a legal firm
is equivalent to a retainer of all the members thereof, and, in the ab-
sence of an agreement to the contrary, any one of such members may
conduct the case.^^* Whether an attorney has been negligent in any
matter intrusted to him may be a question of fact for the jury; un-
less the facts are undisputed, in which case it is a question of law for
the court.^^^ The burden of establishing negligence is, of course, on
the party asserting it.-^® To entitle the plaintiff to recover, however,
it must be proved that some injury has resulted to the client.^^'
Thus, where an attorney had a claim for collection, it was held in an
action of negligence against the attorney that the plaintiff was re-
quired to show, not only that it was a valid debt, but that the debtor
was solvent.^^^ Where no injury is shown proof of negligence will
entitle the plaintiff to nominal damages only.-^® The presumption
is always in favor of the attorney having discharged his duty, and
if the contrary be alleged, it devolves upon him who so alleges to
prove the negligence charged. It is, moreover, the duty of the client,
in case of negligence by the attorney, to do all he can to avert the
injury; and hence, if a client discharge an attorney on account of
his negligence, and the judgment taken by said attorney could then
be collected by execution, it is the client's duty to have execution
issued ; and, on failure to do so, he can not recover the damages from
the attorney if the debt l)e ultimately lost, the attorney being liable
for nominal damages only; for, in that case, the client's own negli-
gence must be regarded as the proximate cause of the loss.^^" And
so, where the executors of a client sued an attorney for damages for
=" Lowry v. Guilford, 5 C. & P. 212, 52 Am. Dec. 262; Holmes v.
234, 24 E. C. L. 542. Peck. 1 R. I. 242.
212 Mercer v. King, 1 F. & F. 490. -'"Palmer v. Ashley, 3 Ark. 75;
213 Eggleston v. Boai'dman, 37 Spiller v. Davidson, 4 La. Ann. 171.
Mich. 14, 19. -" Pennington v. Yell. 11 Ark. 212.
"*Ibi(l. 52 Am. Dec. 262.
^>=^ Hunter v. Caldwell. 10 Q. B. ='=» Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318.
(59 E. C. L.) 69; Gambert v. Hart, -"Read v. Patterson, 11 Lea
44 Cal. 542. (Tenn.) 431.
-'" See Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark.
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improper advice, and the trial court refused to charge for the de-
fendant that if the Jury believed the plaintiff's testator had acted
from other motives than the advice given him by the defendant, then
the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, it was held on appeal that
the refusal so to charge was error, as there was some evidence to sup-
port this hypothesis.^-
^
§ 421. Duty of attorney to obey instructions.—Except as to mat-
ters of minor detail, and those things about which the attorney pos-
sesses special and technical information, it is his duty to follow the
instructions of his client; and, for a failure to do so, he renders him-
self liable to the latter for any damages sustained as a result there-
of.--- In case of doubt, it is the duty of counsel to advise his client
what he believes is the best course to pursue; and if thereupon the
client chooses to disregard the advice and pursue his own course, the
attorney may safely follow the client's instructions, and it is perhaps
safer for him to do so than otherwise. -^^ In many things he is bound
at his peril to obey implicitly. Thus, if an attorney be instructed to
sue on a claim placed in his hands, it is not for him to determine as
to the wisdom of such a course: his duty is to obey; and, for a fail-
ure to do so, he will be liable for any loss the client may suffer, with-
out regard to whether or not the attorney acted in good faith and
did what he regarded as being for the best interest of his client.^^*
But, in the absence of specific instructions, the attorney always has a
wide discretion, and where he acts in good faith and according to
what his best judgment dictates as the wisest course to pursue, no
liabilit}' attaches if loss should ensue. ^-^
§ 422. Attorney's duty to account and pay over.--^^—When an at-
torney has collected money or received other property belonging to
his client, it becomes his duty to turn the same over to him at once.
While it is true that the attorney will generally not be liable to an
action for money thus collected until after a demand has been made
"1 Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323. -'Webb v. White, 18 Tex. 572
18 Atl. 698. Morrill v. Graham, 27 Tex. 646
"- Read v. Patterson, 11 Lea Bennett v. Phillips, 57 Iowa 174
(Tenn.) 431; Cox v. Livingston, 2 Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212, 52
W. & S. (Pa.) 103, 37 Am. Dec. 486. Am. Dec. 262.
--^Nave V. Baird, 12 Ind. 318. -^a As to the duty of keeping an
"* Cox V. Livingston, 2 W. & S. account, see Brigham v. Newton
(Pa.) 103, 37 Am. Dec. 486. (La.), 30 So. 849.
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upon and a refusal by him,--'' yet if he fails to use due care in pre-
serving the money or property,—as by placing the funds in an insolv-
ent bank, etc.,—the resulting loss will be the attorney's and not that
of the client.--^ The only safe course for an attorney to pursue when
he has collected money for his client is either to remit the amount col-
lected, retaining any fees or commissions due him out of the same, or
to place the same to the credit of the client in some solvent bank and
advise him thereof without delay. Moreover, there may be circum-
stances under which the necessity for a demand will be dispensed
with; as where the attorney has failed within a reasonable time to
give notice of the collection to the client, or where he has shown a
disposition to withhold the money.^-^ He should use due care and
diligence in making remittances, as forwarding by unauthorized or
unusual modes is always at the risk of the attorney;--^ but he is
always safe in remitting by the mode directed by his client.-^'' Upon
failure to remit or pay on demand, an action will lie against the at-
torney. The client may treat the attorney's failure to remit as a con-
version and sue in trover,- '^^ or he may sue ex contractu, in assumpsit.
The money in the hands of an attorney which has been collected for
the client is a trust fund, and must be kept as such, separate and apart
from the funds of the attorney. The statute of limitations does not
begin to run in such case until after demand and refusal, or acts
equivalent thereto.-^- But if the attorney denies his liability and sets
up a cross-demand exceeding the amount of the funds in his hands,
this would constitute a waiver of the demand. -^^ And it is held that
where an attorney fails to notify his client of the collection, suit may
be maintained by the latter without a previous demand.-^* In Georgia
it has been decided that no demand is necessary as a prerequisite to
the maintenance of a suit in such case;-^^ and in Iowa it was ruled
==«Pierse v. Thornton, 44 Ind. 235;
Claypool V. Gish, 108 Ind. 424; Peo-
ple V. Brotherson, 36 Barb. (N. Y.)
662; Beardslee v. Boyd, 37 Mo. 180.
=" Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss.
268.
=2' Weeks Attys. at Law, §§ 308,
309.
^-^ Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss.
268.
""See Kimmell v. Bittner, 62 Pa.
St. 203.
-^^ Houston v. Frazier, 8 Ala. 81.
''^Sneed v. Hanly, Fed. Cas. No.
13,136. Hemp. 659; Roberts v. Arm-
strong, 64 Ky. 263, 89 Am. Dec. 624;
Cord V. Taylor. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 852.
^^Walradt v. Maj^nard, 3 Barb.
(N. Y.) 584; Krause v. Dorrance. 10
Pa. St. 462, 51 Am. Dec. 496.
"* Jett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462;
Denton v. Embury. 10 Ark. 228.
-^ Shepherd v. Crawford, 71 Ga.
458.
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that the commencement of an action against the attorney was a suffi-
cient demand upon him.'^" In Kansas the rule is laid down that in
the absence of proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that the at-
torney notified the client of the collection and that the latter had de-
manded and been refused the money within a reasonable time.-^^ In
Pennsylvania it was held that where the money is not paid over with-
in a reasonable time, it is culpable negligence for which an action will
lie without a demand.^^^
§ 423. Client's obligations to attorney—Compensation—Contra
for attorney's fees.—As was shown in a previous portion of this
work,-^'' under the common-law system of jurisprudence, counsellors,
advocates, barristers, etc., were not entitled to enforce the payment
of compensation for their services by legal proceedings: such serv-
ices being regarded as honorary, and presumed to have been ren-
dered gratuitously; and this is still the law in England.-**^ Or-
dinary attorneys, however, may recover fees by suit, even in Eng-
land.-*^ But in the United States it is now generally held, al-
though some states formerly followed the English rule,-*- that
lawyers stand upon the same footing as other persons Who render
services, and may, consequently, recover their fees on contracts, ex-
press or implied, to the same extent.-*^ In states in which a license
is required to practice law, an attorney can not usually recover for
services until he has taken out such license.-*'* Compensation may
of course be fixed by express contract, as in other cases, where attor-
ney's fees are recoverable; if not fixed thus, the attorney may re-
cover the value of the services upon a quantum memit.^'^^ And where
the agreement is for a stipulated fee, but the attorney is discharged
without fault of his own, he is entitled at least to pa^auent for the
services rendered, if not to the whole fee.-*° But if the attorney has
abandoned his client's cause without just reason or ground, he can not
^^ Hollenbeck v. Stanberry, 38 "'-Ante, § 253.
Iowa 325. ='^ Calvert v. Coxe, 1 Gill (Md.)
""Voss V. Bachop, 5 Kan. 59. 95, 123; Bracket! v. Sears, 15 Mich.
"'Glenn v. Cuttle, 2 Grant (Pa.) 244; Wilson v. Burr, 25 Wend. (N.
273. Y.) 386.
^ Ante, § 253. =" Hittson v. Browne, 3 Colo. 304;
=^3 Bl. Com. 28; Kennedy v. Tedrick v. Hiner, 61 111. 189.
Broun, 13 C. B. N. S. (106 E. C. L.) =« Weeks Attys. at Law, § 334.
677. =*' Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257;
^' Steadman v. Hockley, 15 M. & French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632.
W. 553.
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recover for services rendered. ^*^ In such case the contract for the
stipulated amount of the fee may be treated as rescinded, by the client,
and the attorney can recover nothing, or at most only as much as the
services were reasonably worth, under the circumstances, and on the
basis of a quantum meruit.^*'^ In case of the death, insanity or other
disability of such attorney before the termination of the employment,
his representative may recover what the attorney has earned.-*® And
generally, in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, an
attorney who is retained in a suit must serve to the end before his
right to compensation attaches, the contract being regarded as en-
^jj.g.250 1^^^ where he withdraws for a justifiable cause he can recover
proportionately, at least.^^^ In addition to the counsel fees, the attor-
ney may recover from the client the reasonable expenses to which he
has been put by reason of the litigation, and recover indemnity the
same as other agents.^^^ But the attorney can not recover fees for
an undertaking which was immoral, illegal, or contrary to public pol-
icy ;^^^ nor for services that were entirely useless.^^* Attornej's' fees
are often provided for in notes, mortgages, etc., the intention being
that the debtor shall pay the expenses of the creditor in case the debt
must be collected by suit. It is generally held that where a mortgage
provides for the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees by the mort-
gagor to the mortgagee, in case of foreclosure, such provision is valid
and may be enforced in the absence of prohibitory statutes.^^^ As to
whether such a stipulation may be enforced when contained in a note,
is a question as to which the authorities are not entirely harmonious,
although the weight of authority is in favor of the validity of such
contracts.^^® As to the amount to be recovered, when the instrument
2" Holmes v. Evans, 129 N. Y. 140.
"'Morgan v. Roberts, 38 111. 65.
=^' Callahan v. Stotwell, 60 Mo.
398.
""Nichols V. Scott, 12 Vt. 47. See
Sessions v. Palmeter, 75 Hun (N.
Y.) 268.
==iTenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y. 524;
Powers v. Manning, 154 Mass. 370.
^'-- Helps V. Clayton, 17 C. B. N. S.
553; Vilas v. Bundy, 106 Wis. 168.
"'"' See Treat v. Jones, 28 Conn.
334; Gammons v. Johnson, 76 Minn.
76, 78 N. W. 1035. See ante. § 264.
254 prenc]! y. Cunningham, 149 Ind.
632, 639. See ante, § 264.
='=Tallman v. Truesdell, 3 Wis.
443, 454; Smiley v. Meir, 47 Ind.
559; Walter v. Dickson, 175 Pa. St.
204; Hermes v. Vaughn, 3 Tex. Civ.
App. 607.
=^ See in favor: Billingsley v.
Dean, 11 Ind. 330; Stoneman v.
Pyle, 35 Ind. 103; Sperry v. Horr,
32 Iowa 184; Wilson Sewing Mach.
Co. V. Moreno. 6 Sawy. (C. C.) 35;
Barton v. Farmers', etc.. Bank, 122
111. 152; Dorsey v. Wolfif, 142 111.
589; Smith v. Silvers, 32 Ind. 321.
On the other hand, it has been de-
cided that such a stipulation in a
note is against public policy, usuri-
d
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provides a stipulated sum or percentage it will be taken, prima facie,
as the correct amount ;^^^ but the courts will not render judgment for
excessive amounts though stipulated in the note or other instrument
:
the amount of the fee, though agreed upon in the contract, will be
allowed only when reasonable ; and the true value of the services may
always be shown, although a larger sum has been agreed upon.^^^
Where the amount is to be a percentage, it will be estimated on the
principal and interest of the note.^^*' When the debt is past due, no
preliminary demand upon the debtor seems to be necessary in order
that the plaintiff may be entitled to recover attorney's fees.^®° In all
such cases the fees are recoverable only on the idea of indemnity; in
principle, therefore, the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover
more than he is required to pay to his attorney ; and such fees belong
to the client, and not to the attorney.-^ ^ When the compensation is
to be valued by quantum, meruit, it is customary and proper to prove
the value of such services by other attorneys at law, who, as profes-
sional experts, are acquainted with the value of such services."*'- But
if such services were rendered under the eye of the court, the amount
may be fixed by the court without hearing testimony;-"^ and the court
has a right to judge of the reasonableness of an attorney's charges
without reference to the opinions of witnesses.-'^'* In estimating the
value of the services, it is proper for plaintiff to prove his ability as a
lawyer, in order to show the value of the services.-*'^ It is also proper
to consider the amount that was recovered in the litigation, as a result
of the attorney's services.^"^ The amount in controversy, the ability
of the party to pay, and the result of the effort, are proper circum-
stances to consider in fixing the compensation of an attorney in a
ous and invalid: Witherspoon v. -"^ Moore v. Staser, 6 Ind. App.
Musselman, 14 Bush (Ky.) 214, 29 364; Goss v. Bowen, 104 Ind. 207.
Am. Rep. 404; Boozer v. Anderson, ^•'^ Knight v. Russ, 77 Cal. 410;
42 Ark. 167. There are statutory Stow v. Hamlin, 11 How. Pr. (N.
provisions in some states regulating Y.) 452; Vilas v. Downer, 21 Vt.
contracts of this character. 419; Blizzard v. Applegate, 61 Ind.
=" Dorsey v. Wolff, 142 111. 589. 368.
'^"^ Moore v. Staser, 6 Ind. App. '"^ Dorsey v. Creditors, 5 Mart. N.
364; Johnston v. Speer, 92 Pa. St. S. (La.) 399; Baldwin v. Carleton,
227. 15 La. 394.
"" Behrens v. Dignowitty, 4 Tex. "* Gaylord v. Nelson, 7 Ky. L.
Civ. App. 201. Rep. 821.
="'' Walter v. Dickson, 175 Pa. St. ="=* Lungerhausen v. Crittenden,
204. See Moore v. Staser, 6 Ind. 103 Mich. 173.
App. 364. 2o«Bgj.ry v. Davis, 34 Iowa 594.
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case.^®'^ As to contingent fees and the doctrine of champerty and
maintenance applicable thereto, they have been fully considered in
another place in this work.^®*
§ 424. Taxation of costs—Attorney's bill.—As to those classes of
legal practitioners known in England as solicitors and attorneys, the
Eoman honorarium theory has never been applied, and such solicitors
or attorneys were consequently at liberty to enter into any contract as
to fees upon which they and their clients could agree, provided such
fees were not exorbitant; but under the judicature acts of 1873
and 1875, the fees which solicitors may charge are prescribed with
great minuteness. And by statute it is also provided that suit for
professional services of an attorney or solicitor shall not be com-
menced until the expiration of one calendar month after the delivery
to the party charged, or sending to him by the post, or leaving at his
last known place of abode, a bill of such fees, charges, and disburse-
ments, subscribed by the attorney or his partner (if a firm), or his
personal representative, if deceased, or inclosed in or accompanied by
a letter subscribed in like manner referring to such bill.^*® It was the
intention of this statute to give the client an opportunity to examine
the bill and take advice upon it before any action is taken. In such
case, it is not sufficient for the attorney to show the bill to the client
:
a copy must be left with him; and no action can be maintained for
such services if this step is omitted.-"'' If within the month allowed
for examination no application is made to have the charges taxed by
the taxing officer, the client can not question the reasonableness of the
bill before a jury. The bill may, within a prescribed time, be sub-
mitted to a taxing officer by the client, who may refer any one or more
items therein to the judge of the court, if he is in doubt as to its cor-
rectness.^^^ It is also held that courts have the power to refer an
attorney's bill to some officer for taxation independently of any stat-
ute.^^^ Courts doubtless have inherent power to regulate the com-
pensation of attorneys for services performed under their immediate'
supervision or observance. The matter of compensation of attorneys
is now, in this country at least, generally left to the parties to settle
-" Lombard v. Bayard, 1 Wall. Jr. ''° Weeks Attys. at Law, § 327.
(C. C.) 196. ^1 Weeks Attys. at Law, § 331.
'^^ Ante, § 256, et seq. "-Ibid.; Filmore v. Wells, 10
»» Weeks Attys. at Law, § 326. Colo. 228.
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by contract, although the courts may exercise a revisory power over
those, so far as their reasonableness is concerned.
§ 425. Further as to fees of attorneys.—Professional men, though
they tacitly hold themselves out as possessing the required skill and
knowledge to practice their professions successfully, are not insurers
of their success as to the result of suits or proceedings in which they
are retained, and hence an attorney may enforce the collection of his
fee though unsuccessful.^'^ But an attorney can not recover com-
pensation for services upon a quantum meruit where the contract with
the client was champertous, contrary to public policy, and the result
of personal solicitation."* "To hold that a party can thus illegally
stir up and instigate litigation," said Mitchell, J., speaking for the
supreme court of Minnesota, in the case cited, "and yet obtain the
benefits of it by ignoring the special contract and bringing suit upon a
quantum meruit for services performed in prosecuting the litigation
which he has unlawfully instigated, would be a travesty on justice,
and to permit a party to do indirectly what he can not do directly."
And Canty, J., in a concurring opinion said : "The great and crying
evil which the courts should condemn most strongly is making a prac-
tice of soliciting such cases. An attorney who does this should, in my
opinion, be disbarred ; and surely he should not be rewarded by aiding
him to recover remuneration for doing the very act, or one of the
series of acts, for which he should be disbarred. On the plainest
principles, the courts should condemn the practice of ambulance-
chasers and prowling assignees who thus stir up litigation, and should
refuse to aid them in recovering fees in such cases." As a general
rule, however, the mere fact that the contract he has made with his
client for fees is champertous, will not defeat the action for compen-
sation upon the quantum meruit.-''^ The court may also, in deter-
mining the value of counsel fees, take into consideration any negli-
gence or other mistake of which the attorney was guilty during the
progress of the suit or other matter in reference to w^hich the fee is
claimed.-^®
§ 426. Attorney's lien.—An attorney, as we have previously
seen,-'^ at common law, had a lien on the property and papers of his
-" See Fenner v. Succession of -" Gammons v. Johnson, 69 Minn.
McCan, 49 La. Ann. 600. 488, 72 N. W. 563.
^'* Gammons v. Johnson, 76 Minn. ^''' Kruger v. Merguire, 130 Cal.
76, 78 N. W. 1035. 621, 63 Pac. 31.
""'Ante, §§ 287-298.
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client, in the hands of such attorney, for his fees. There are two
kinds of common-law liens ; namely, a general lien and a particular or
special lien.^^^ An attorney has a general lien upon the property and
effects of his client, in his hands, for any balance due such attorney for
any services as such attorney;^"'* and he has a particular lien on any
article of property or money for "labor bestowed or money expended
in regard to that particular property."-^" To entitle the attorney to
a general lien, the services for which the debt is owing must te of a
professional character ; and if papers have been delivered to him for a
specific purpose, the lien can not usually extend beyond the purpose.
The lien is frequently subject to the equitable right of set-off; and it
may be waived by a contract inconsistent with that on which the lien
is founded or by an express contract. ^^^ The particular or special
lien of an attorney attaches to the fruits of a judgment or decree pro-
cured by the services of the attorney, as well as to deeds, insurance
policies, and other documents in his hands which he has been em-
ployed to prepare and those he has been engaged to copy, abstract,
peruse, consult, or exhibit to a witness on the trial f^^ it is limited,
however, to the property or thing as to which or in connection
with which the services have been performed, and in this respect it
differs from the general lien, which attaches to all such articles gener-
ally on account of any balance due the attorney for professional ser-
vices.^**^ An attorney has an equitable (particular) lien on the judg-
ment obtained by him for his client, and it only extends to such ser-
vices as were performed in that particular suit.^®* Thus, an attorney
who has in his hands a claim for collection can not hold the money
arising out of such collection for a general debt due him from his
client. And where an attorney received from an agency a claim for
collection, it was held he could not retain from the proceeds thereof
the amount of a debt owing to him for other services rendered such
agency.^®^ But where an attorney obtained a money judgment for his
client, for damages, caused by the wrongful issuing of an injunction,
such attorney having resisted the injunction proceedings and rendered
="An<e, § 288. ''^ Matter of H.. 87 N. Y. 521;
"» McDonald v. Railroad, 93 Tenn. Ward v. Craig. 87 N. Y. 550.
281. =^ Adams v. Fox. 40 Barb. (N. Y.)
=*• Weeks Attys. at Law, § 369. 442: Mansfield v. Borland, 2 Cal.
See Finance Co. v. Charleston, etc., 507; McWilliams v. Jenkins, 72 Ala.
R. Co., 52 Fed. 526; Story Ag., § 383. 480.
•^ Weeks Attys. at Law, § 369. =» McMath v. Manns Bros., etc.,
'''^lUa. Co. (Ky.), 15 S. W. 879.
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other services in connection with the establishment of his client's
right which culminated in the rendition of such judgment for dam-
ages, it was ruled that the attorney's lien on the judgment covered
his fees in all the suits concerning the same matter, all being parts of
a single litigation, though technically there were several suits.^*'' As a
general rule, however, the lien on the judgment extends only to fees in
that particular case, although there may have been other suits in-
timately connected therewith.^"^ An attorney also has an equitable
lien on the distributive share (?f an heir, for services rendered the es-
tate.-^^ But there can be no lien by a prosecuting attorney on a judg-
ment against a defaulting officer for money due the public, for the
public funds can not be taken to satisfy the debts of individuals.^^®
The English practice of taxing attorney's fees as costs once obtained
in some of the American states.- '^^ When this was the rule, the at-
torney's lien extended only to such fees and disbursements as had been
taxed as costs.-® ^ But this practice has been abandoned in nearly
all if not all the states, and attorney's fees are not now taxed as costs
any longer, while the matter of liens for fees is regulated largely by
statutes.-®^ A general lien can not be enforced b}' legal proceedings:
-'^ Butchers' Nairn Slaughter-
house, etc., Co. V. Crescent City
Fine Stock Lending, etc., Co., 41 La.
Ann. 355.
"' Massachusetts, etc., Const. Co.
V. Gill's Creek Tp., 48 Fed. 145.
"* Koons V. Beach, 147 Ind. 137.
-^' Wood V. State, 125 Ind. 219.
-•'* See Ocean Ins. Co. v. Rider, 22
Pick. (Mass.) 210; Wright v. Cob-
leigh, 21 N. H. 339; Mansfield v.
Borland, 2 Cal. 507; Rooney v. Sec-
ond Ave. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 368.
-'" Massachusetts, etc.. Const. Co.
V. Gill's Creek Tp., 48 Fed. 145;
Forsythe v. Beveridge, 52 111. 268,
4 Am. Rep. 612; Miller v. Newell,
20 S. C. 123, 47 Am. Rep. 833, 836.
^=See Warfield v. Campbell, 38
Ala. 527, 533, 82 Am. Dec. 724. In
Indiana an attorney has a lien on a
judgment only if he indorses on the
margin of the order book a notice
of his intention to hold such lien:
29
—
Principal and Agent.
Burns Rev. Stat. 1901, § 7238. Un-
der this statute the supreme court
holds that the notice must be en-
tered within a reasonable time after
the entry of judgment: Blair v.
Landing, 61 Ind. 499; Alderman v.
Nelson, 111 Ind. 255. In Minnesota
it is declared that an attorney has
no lien except such as is given by
statute: Forbush v. Leonard, 8
Minn. 303. In New Jersey the at-
torney's lien on the avails of a
judgment can be satisfied only when
he has received money on the judg-
ment or has arrested it in transitu,
or where the defendant has paid
the judgment after receiving notice
of the attorney's claim: Braden v.
Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518. In New York
the attorney has a lien on the judg-
ment for his costs, and this can not
be released by his client: Haight
V. Holcomb, 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
173. In some cases it is held that
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such a lien, which extends to all papers, documents and vouchers in
his hands, depends wholly on possession, and gives the attorney the
right to retain the same till his bill is paid;-^^ in such cases, posses-
sion is indispensable, and hence, whenever it is parted with, the lien
ceases.^"* Special liens on judgments may be enforced by equitable
proceedings or according to the method pointed out by the statute in
the jurisdiction where the judgment is taken. An attorney's lien on a
judgment amounts to an equitable assignment,-'^^ and may be en-
forced by petition and reference.-^'' The general mode, however, is
by execution for the amount of the lien.-^' This is issued, of course,
in the name of the client.-"*' If an attorney accepts other security
for his claim, he thereby waives his lien.^"® Such lien is a security
for the debt due the lawyer for his services, and if he chooses to ac-
cept other security, he abandons his right to that given him by the
j^^ 3 00 ^jj attorney has no lien on real estate which may have been
recovered in an action in which he has Ijeen retained.^" ^ An attor-
ney's lien on a judgment was not a common-law right;'**- it exists,
however, by statute in most of the American states, though not in all
of them.
an attorney can have a lien on the
judgment only when the amount of
the compensation has been agreed
upon,—never for a quantum meruit:
In re Scoggin, 5 Sawy. (C. C.) 549;
Ex parte Kyle, 1 Cal. 331; Pugh v.
Boyd. 38 Miss. 326; Benedict v. Har-
low, 5 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 347. In
some jurisdictions it is held that an
attorney has no lien on a judgment
in an action for unliquidated dam-
ages: Swanston v. Morning Star
Min. Co., 13 Fed. 215; Henchey v.
Chicago, 41 111. 136; Abbott v. Ab-
bott, 18 Neb. 503, 26 N. W. 361.
^' In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235.
"*Eddinger v. Adams. 4 Kulp
(Pa.) 401; Nichols v. Pool. 89 111.
491.
=»=Koons v. Beach, 147 Ind. 137;
Weeks v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 73
Mich. 256; Marshall v. Meech. 51 N.
Y. 140, 143; In re Wilson, 12 Fed.
235; Andrews v. Morse, 12 Conn.
444.
^ Brown v. New York, 11 Hun
(N. Y.) 21.
"' Ackerman v. Ackerman, 11 Abb.
Pr. (N. Y.) 256.
-'^ See Albert Palmer Co. v. Van
Orden, 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 79.
-'"See 13 Encyc. of PI. & Pr. 151,
et seq.
='^^*'Cowell V. Simpson, 16 Ves. Jr.
275.
'^•Smalley v. Clark. 22 Vt. 598.
But see Smith v. Young. 62 111. 210.
^"-In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235.
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426a. Authority of auctioneer. 431.
427. The statute of frauds—Duty of
auctioneer. 432.
428. Conduct of the sale.
429. Nature of the contract of auc- 433.
tion sale—Are separately ac-
cepted bids separate sales? 434.
430. Rights and liabilities of pur-
chaser and seller.
Duties and liabilities of auc-
tioneer to the vendor.
Duties and liabilities of auc-
tioneer to purchaser.
Duties and liabilities of auc-
tioneer to third persons.
Duties and liabilities of vendor
to auctioneer—Compensation.
§ 426a. Authority of auctioneer.—An auctioneer derives Ms au-
thority principally from the vendor, whose agent he is primarily ;^
although from the time the hammer falls till the close of the bargain
he is also the agent of the purchaser ; though this is only for the pur-
pose of making the memorandum of sale, so as to satisfy the statute
of frauds.^ His authority from the vendor may be conferred, as in
the case of any other agency, by formal power of attorney, sealed or
unsealed, by word of mouth, or by implication.* Such authority may
be dissolved by the revocation of either party at any time before the
fall of the hammer;" and it terminates by accomplishment of the
purpose when the sale has been completed and the purchase-price
paid. It has sometimes been doul)ted whether the authority of an
auctioneer to sell land is not required to be in writing; but the rule
is well established that such authority may be given verbally and
will be sufficient.*' But an auctioneer represents not only the vendor
^ For definition, etc., see ante,
§ 24.
' Story Ag., § 27.
= Gill V. Hewett, 7 Bush (Ky.) 10;
Meadows v. Meadows, 3 McCord (S.
C.) 458, 15 Am. Dec. 645; Episcopal
Church V. Wiley, 2 Hill Ch. (S. C.)
584, 30 Am. Dec. 386; Thomas v.
Kerr, 3 Bush (Ky.) 619, 96 Am. Dec.
262; Simon v. Motives, 3 Burr, 1921,
1 W. Bl. 599.
*Bateman Auctions 20-23.
' Bateman Auctions 30.
"Doty v. Wilder. 15 111. 407, 60
Am. Dec. 756; Yourt v. Hopkins, 24
111. 326.
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at the sale^ but, as we have seen, he is also the agent of the pur-
chaser, for the i^urpose already stated. This relation between the
auctioneer and purchaser is indeed a very unusual one, as generally
an agent can not act for both principals in a sale when their interests
are antagonistic.^ The agency for the purchaser, while it can not
be said to arise or be inferred from the official position of the auc-
tioneer, is generally to be shown by the acts and conduct of the pur-
chaser or bidder at the auction, such as standing by and bidding,
either by means of words or by making signs or responding to signs
given by the auctioneer;^ slight evidence of assent being often suffi-
cient.
§ 427. The statute of frauds—Duty of auctioneer.—The seven-
teenth section of the English statute of frauds provides that "no con-
tract for the sale of any goods, wares or merchandise, for the price
of ten pounds sterling, or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, ex-
cept the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain,
or in part payment, or that -gome note or memorandum in writing of
the said bargain l)e made, and signed by the parties to be charged
by such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.""
By what is commonly known as "Lord Tenterden's Act,"^° it was fur-
ther provided, among other things, that the provisions of the seven-
teenth section "shall extend to all contracts for the sale of goods of
the valve of ten pounds sterling, and upwards, notwithstanding the
goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not
at the time of such contract be actually made, procured, or provided,"
etc. ; and it is lield that the effect of this supplementary' statute is
to suljstitute the Avord "value" for the word "]5rice" in the seventeenth
section." The English statute of frauds has been generally adopted
by the American states ; but they do not all agree as to the amount
necessary to bring a contract within its purview: in Indiana, Xew
York and Massachusetts the amount being $50 ; while in other states
the amount runs from $33.33 upward. Although it was at one time
'Ante, § 54.
'Mews V. Carr, 1 H. & N. 484;
Bartlett v. Purnell, 4 A. & E. 792;
Johnson v. Buck, 35 N. J. L. 338, 10
Am. Rep. 243; Hart v. Woods. 7
Blackf. (Ind.) 568; O'Donnell v.
Leeman, 43 Me. 158; Smith v. Jones,
7 Leigh (Va.) 165, 30 Am. Dec. 498.
' 29 Charles II. ch. 3, ? 17.
" 9 Geo. IV, ch. 14. § 7.
" Scott V. Eastern Counties R. Co.,
12 M. & W. 33: Harman v. Roeve. 18
C. B. 587, 25 L. J. C. P. 257.
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questioned whether auction sales were meant to be included within
the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds, it is now universally
recognized that they are within the statute.^- And this applies to
sales of land as well as personal property.^^ An auctioneer can not
act as such at the sale of his own property and bind the purchaser
by a memorandum without express authority: in that case, he would
be acting as agent for a party to a contract to which he himself was
the adverse party. "The great mischief intended to be prevented l)y
the statute [of frauds]," said Bigelow, J., in Bent v. Cohh/^ "would
still exist if one party to a contract could make a memorandum of it
which could absolutely bind the other. If such were its true con-
struction, it would be a feeble security against fraud, or, rather, it
would open a door for its easy commission. A vendor could fasten his
own terms on his vendee. If it was a written contract binding on the
purchaser, he could not show by parol evidence that the terms of the
bargain were incorrectly or imperfectly stated. He could not vary
or alter it by the testimony of those present at the sale. The pub-
licity of a sale by auction would be no safeguard against false state-
ments of the terms of sale made in a written memorandum signed
by a party acting in the double capacity of auctioneer and vendor.
The chief reason in support of the rule that an auctioneer, acting
solely as such, may be the agent of both parties, to bind them by his
memorandum, is, that he is supposed to be a disinterested person
having no motive to misstate the bargain of both parties. But this
reason fails, where he is the party to the contract and the party in
interest also." If the seller is present in person, directing and con-
trolling the sale, having simply employed a crier to cry the sale and
knock the property off to the best bidder, the crier is not an
auctioneer in the regular sense of the term, and has no author-
ity as such to Ijind the purchaser by a memorandum ; and the
same is true as to the seller. ^° Xor does the fact that the vendor
"Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East Ch. (S. C.) 584, 30 Am. Dec. 386;
558; Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. & Gill v. Hewett, 7 Bush (Ky.) 10;
C. 945; Morton v. Dean, 13 Mete. Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. & C.
(Mass.) 385; People v. White, 6 Cal. 945, per Bayley, J.; Buckmaster v.
75; 2 Kent Com. 540; Hadden v. Harrop. 13 Ves. Jr. 456.
Johnson, 7 Ind. 394; Pike v. Balch, "9 Gray (Mass.) 397, 69 Am. Dec.
38 Me. 302; Ruckle v. Barbour, 48 295.
Ind. 274. ^= Adams v. Scales, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.)
"People v. White, 6 Cal. 75; 337, 25 Am. Rep. 772; Buckmaster
Ruckle V. Barbour, 48 Ind. 274; v. Harrop, 13 Ves. Jr. 456.
Episcopal Church v. Wiley, 2 Hill
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is the owner only by virtue of a trust deed or in the capacity
of trustee for another change the rule that he can not be auction-
eer and vendor at once; this would only add another inconsistent
function to those already exercised by him: it would make him
at the same time the vendor, the auctioneer, and the agent of the pur-
chaser, which are such ineompatil)le positions that he could not
justly discharge the duties of all of them in relation to the same
subject-matter.^^ And so, a guardian, executor or administrator
can not act as auctioneer of the property of his cestui que trust and
bind the purchaser by a memorandum made at the sale, without ex-
press authority to do so." The memorandum need not l3e signed by
the auctioneer himself, but may be made by his clerk if done under
the auctioneer's supervision. The rule applies, it is true, that dele-
gated authority can not be again delegated;"^ and unless the pur-
chaser assents to such act of the clerk he can not be bound by it ; but
the assent maj'' be shown b}' circumstantial evidence; and if the
memorandum is made by such clerk, at the time of the sale, in the
presence of the purchaser and auctioneer, it is sufficient to satisfy
the statute. ^^ The memorandum should contain the names of the
parties, the articles sold, the price, terms of sale, and promise of the
party to be charged.^** Auctioneers usually keep a salesbook in which
such memoranda are entered.-'^ The memorandum, however, need
not be kept in one paper or book, and may, if properly connected, be
contained in two or more such papers, although parol evidence is not
admissible to show the connection.-^ As to the time when the mem-
orandum must be made, to satisfy the statute, the rule is that it must
be done contemporaneously with the sale ; that is, before the proceed-
ings end.-- The reason for the rule is that the bidder, when the
^'^Tull v. David, 45 Mo. 444, 100
Am. Dec. 385.
" See Bent v. Cobb, 9 Gray (Mass.)
397, 69 Am. Dec. 295; Tull v. David,
supra.
'"a Bateman Auctions 29.
^^Doty v. Wilder, 15 111. 407, 60
Am. Dec. 756; Smith v. Jones, 7
Leigh (Va.) 165, 30 Am. Dec. 498.
^»See Cherry v. Long, Phil. (N.
C.) 466: McMullen v. Helberg. 6 L.
R. Ir. Eq. 463: Lewis v. Wells, 50
Ala. 198; Ridgway v. Ingram. 50
Ind. 145; Norris v. Blair. 39 Ind. 90;
Wilstach V. Heyd. 122 Ind. 574;
Morton v. Dean. 13 Met. (Mass.)
385; O'Donnell v. Leeman, 43 Me.
158, 69 Am. Dec. 54. As to what
constitutes a sufficient memorandum
of the sale of land, see McBrayer v.
Cohen, 92 Ky. L. 479, 18 S. W. 123.
^'See Doty v. Wilder. 15 111. 407,
60 Am. Dec. 756; Bateman Auctions
159.
-' Johnson v. Buck. 35 N. J. L.
338. 10 Am. Rep. 243; Bateman Auc-
tions 157.
" Horton v. :McCarty. 53 Me. 394.
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article is knocked down to him, calls on the auctioneer or clerk to
put his name down as the purchaser; and when this is done in his
presence, it is presumed to be done with his consent, and there is but
little danger of fraud or mistake ; whereas, if the auctioneer or other
person were permitted to make the entry afterwards, there might be
danger of substituting other purchasers for the real ones, and upon
different terms, thus defeating rights already vested and imposing
liabilities never contracted.-^ But if a pencil memorandum be made
at the time, and, as soon as possible after the sale, it be entered in the
auctioneer's salesbook, the entry is considered an original one, and it
is sufficient.-*
§ 428. Conduct of the sale.—As shown in the last preceding sec-
tion, an auctioneer can not, as a general rule, sell his own property
at auction, and bind the purchaser by the memorandum, unless notice
of the ownership has l^een publicly given by him at the sale. It some-
times happens that the vendor is obliged to reoffer the property for
sale, where the former bidder has failed to comply with the conditions
or to make good his bid. In the conduct of such a resale, it some-
times becomes a question whether the vendor may become the pur-
chaser of the j)roperty. In a late New York case where the question
was decided,^^ a majority of the court held that, in such a case, if
the sale was fairly conducted, and due notice thereof given, with an
opportunity for inspection of the property, the sale would be valid.
Yann, J., speaking for the majority of the court, said: "While the
courts below recognized this rule, they did not apply it, for they held
that the sale at auction was no sale at all, because a man can not sell
to himself. This would be true of an attempt to make a private sale
to one's self, but it is not true of a sale at public auction, fairly con-
ducted by a licensed auctioneer, and made at a reasonable time and
place, after adequate opportunity to see the property, due advertise-
ment to the public and personal notice to the vendee, when the real
purpose is to ascertain the value of the property. The law is satis-
fied with a fair sale, made in good faith, according to established
business methods, with no attempt to take advantage of the vendee;
such as the jury might have found was the sale under consideration.
='Per Staples, J., in Walker v. 386. See also, McComb v. Wright,
Herring, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 678, 8 Am. 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 659; Gill v.
Rep. 616. Bicknell, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 355.
-* Episcopal Church v. Wiley, 2 ='' Ackerman v. Rubens, 167 N. Y.
Hill Ch. fS. C.) 584, 30 Am. Dec. 405, 82 Am. St. 728.
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The primary object of the sale was not to pass title from the vendor,
but to lessen the loss of the vendee. The subject of the sale had no
market value, and the amount for which it could be sold depended
largely upon taste and fancy. A public competitive sale by outcry
to the highest bidder, duly advertised and made upon notice to the
vendee, is a safer method of measuring the damages than a sale by
private negotiation, which has been held sufficient.^® A fair public
sale, in the absence of other evidence, is competent proof of value.
The plaintiff did not conduct the sale himself, but placed the yacht in
the hands of a public auctioneer for sale without reservation, on ac-
count of whom it might concern. While the auctioneer was his
agent he could not lawfully control him so as to prevent an honest
sale. The defendant had notice and an opportunity to protect him-
self, yet he asked for no postponement, made no request, gave no in-
struction, and did not even appear at the sale. If the plaintiff's agent
had refrained from bidding, the property would have gone to a
stranger for a, less sum than it finally brought, and yet, in that event,
even according to the defendant's theory, the sale would have been
valid. The fact that the plaintiff outbid all competitors did not
render the sale invalid, for he had a right to bid, provided he took no
advantage by trying to prevent others from bidding or by disregard-
ing any reasonable request of the defendant, or in any other way. If
he had acted as auctioneer, or in collusion with the auctioneer, or
there was any evidence of furtive effort on his part, or anything to
challenge the fairness of the sale, the action of the trial court in virtu-
ally withdrawing the cause from the jury might have been justified,
but the mere fact that he was the highest bidder at a public sale, the
fairness of which is not questioned in any other respect, did not war-
rant the direction for nominal damages only. The object of the sale
was to measure the damages caused by the default of the defendant,
and they were diminished instead of being increased by the action of
the plaintiff. W^e forbear further discussion, because the question is
no longer open in this court, as it was involved in a case recently
decided by us upon careful consideration after full discussion by
counsel.-' In that case, as in this, the property was sold at auction to
a representative of the vendor, and the point was distinctly made on
the argument before us that as the vendor was the real purchaser,
'the sale was colorable only and absolutely without effect upon the
^ Citing Van Brocklen v. Smeallie,
140 N. Y. 70.
=' Citing Moore v. Potter, 155 N. Y.
4S1, 63 Am. St. 692.
457 AUCTIONEERS. § 428
rights of the parties.' While we did not discuss the question in our
opinion, it was necessarily involved, was passed upon in consultation,
and decided. Both upon principle and authority we think that the
amount for which the yacht was struck off to the vendor at an auction
sale fairly conducted, upon notice to the vendee, with no suspicion of
fraud or undue advantage, was lawful evidence of the value of the
yacht and presented a case for the consideration of the jury." Haight,
J., with whom concurred Gray and Werner, JJ., dissented on the
ground that the vendor could not sell to himself. "Selling as agent,"
said Judge Haight, "he can not sell to himself. Selling involves con-
tracting, and a person can not contract with himself and bind others
thereby. If he could sell to himself publicly he could privately, and
thus be able to perpetrate a fraud or an injustice which might be dif-
ficult to detect or prove.- ^ In this case the sale was made by the
seller to himself. It was made through the agency of an auctioneer,
it is true, but the auctioneer was his agent and represented him in
the transaction." The dissenting opinion considered that the
question presented here was neither raised nor involved in the case of
Moore v. Potter.-^ All auction sales should be open to full com-
petition; and bids made in good faith by responsible parties should
be accepted, as otherwise the auctioneer might subject himself to the
imputation of fraud, for which he would be liable in damages. But
he is not compelled to receive a bid from one whom he knows, or in
good faith believes, to be irresponsible:^" he may, for that reason, re-
ject the bids of infants, lunatics, drunkards and others under dis-
ability. An auctioneer should not take it upon himself to become a
bidder for others; as that would place him in the attitude of acting
as agent for one whose interest is adverse to that of the seller; and,
besides, would introduce into the transaction circumstances of sus-
picion which would tend to throw doubts upon its fairness. ^^ It is
the duty of the auctioneer to conduct the sale in an open manner, with
fidelity to the seller and fairness to bidders. He has not the right to
employ by-bidders simply to "puff" the property without the intention
=' Citing Van Brocklen V. Smeallie, Am. Dec. 500; Murclock's Case, 2
140 N. Y. 70, 75; Pollen v. Le Roy, Bland (Md.) 461; Holder v. Jackson,
30 N. Y. 549, 557; Dustan v. McAn- 11 U. S. C. C. 546.
drew, 44 N. Y. 78; Hayden v. De- ^' See Randall v. Lantenberger, 16
mets, 53 N. Y. 426; Bain v. Brown, R. I. 158; Veazie v. Williams, 8
56 N. Y. 285. How. (U. S.) 134; Brock v. Rice, 27
'"155 N. Y. 481, 63 Am. St. 692. Gratt. (Va.) 812. But see Scott v.
^Hobbs V. Beavers, 2 Ind. 142, 52 Mann, 36 Tex. 157.
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of buying it, such an act being a fraud upon every genuine bidder, for
which he may avoid the sale;^- but by-bidding or "puffing" will not
always avoid the sale, especially if the bid be a fair one and it be not
the intention to enhance the price unreasonably.^^ At common law,
"puffing" Avould avoid an auction sale, at the option of the bidder, un-
less notice was given.^'* Another thing which will make an auction
sale voidable is what is known as "chilling," which is abstaining from
bidding as the result of an agreement between two or more persons
interested in having the property sell at a low price, not to bid against
each other, and thus to stifle competition.^^ But not every agree-
ment to abstain from bidding will necessarily render the sale voidable
;
thus, a numljer of interested parties may agree that one of them shall
bid for the benefit of all, and the agreement is not illegal unless its
purpose be to prevent competition.^" \Miere an auctioneer discour-
ages bidding so as to be able to secure the property himself, at a low
value, it is such a fraud as will vitiate the sale.^" Every sale at auc-
tion, unless notice be given to the contrar)', means competition; and
an agreement to run up the price unduly, on the one hand, by means
of by-bidding, or to stifle competition on the other, is regarded as
evidence of a fraud, and may avoid the sale at the option of the in-
jured party.^® Fraud, however, is a question of fact for the jury;
and whether the intention was unduly to "puff" or to stifle competi-
tion, so as to amount to a fraud, must be left to them to determine.^®
Of course, fraud on the part of the auctioneer, in whatever manner
^- Springer v. Kleinsovge, 83 Mo.
152; Davis v. Petway, 3 Head
(Tenn.) 667, 75 Am. Dec. 789;
Walsh V. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28;
Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. (U. S.)
134; Curtis v. Aspinwall, 114 Mass.
187; Towle v. Leavitt. 23 N. H. 360,
55 Am. Dec. 195; Peck v. List, 23 W.
Va. 338, 48 Am. Rep. 398.
^^ Reynolds v. Dechaums, 24 Tex.
174, 76 Am. Dec. 101; Latham v.
Morrow, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 630; Davis
v. Petway. 3 Head (Tenn.) 667, 75
Am. Dec. 789.
=>* Towle V. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360,
55 Am. Dec. 195.
='Pike v. Balch. 38 Me. 302. 61
Am. Dec. 248; Phippen v. Stickney,
3 Mete. (Mass.) 385; Hunter v.
Pfeiffer, 108 Ind. 197.
=*Goode V. Hawkins, 2 Dev. Eq.
(N. C.) 393; Stout v. Voorhies. 4
La. 392. See also, Kearney v. Tay-
lor, 15 How. (U. S.) 494.
^" Brotherline v. Swires, 48 Pa. St.
68.
^ See Smith v. Greenlee, 2 Dev.
(N. C.) 126, 18 Am. Dec. 564; Vea-
zie v. Williams. 8 How. (U. S.) 134,
137; Darst v. Thomas, 87 111. 222.
=^Coxe V. Gibson. 27 Pa. St. 160,
67 Am. Dec. 454; Pike v. Balch, 38
Me. 302. 61 Am. Dec. 248; Hopkins
V. Ensign. 122 N. Y. 144; Allen v.
Stephanus, IS Tex. 658.
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it may be accomplished, will render the sale voidable on the part of
the vendor.*" And so, where an auctioneer, who saw a bidder ap-
proaching, at once knocked down the property to his brother, on a
bid that was far less than the real value thereof, in order to prevent
competition, it was held that the owner of the property could avoid
the sale.*^ But a vendor who has employed "puffers" can not him-
self avoid the sale on that account, as that would be taking advantage
of his own wrong."*'
^'' Brock v. Rice, 27 Gratt. (Va.)
812; Myers v. Sanders, 7 Dana (Ky.)
506.
"Jackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. (N.
Y.) no.
'- Small v. Boudinot. 9 N. J. Eq.
381. The authorities are by no
means agreed as to what constitutes
"puffing" in the obnoxious sense, so
as to render the sale voidable. In
England, the law courts usually
held that "pufRng" was a fraud for
which the sale might be avoided,
while the chancery courts so modi-
fied the doctrine as to make pufRng
for the purpose of preventing a sac-
rifice legitimate: See Smith v.
Clarke, 12 Ves. Jr. 477; Flint v.
Woodin, 9 Hare 618. This differ-
ence in the decisions prompted par-
liament to enact a statute in 1867
declaring that whenever a contract
v.'ould be invalid at law by reason
of the employment of a "puffer" it
should be deemed invalid also in
equity. In the United States it is
generally held that "pufRng" is such
evidence of fraud as will avoid the
sale at the option of the purchaser.
But even in this country the deci-
sions upon the subject are not uni-
form. In a recent Georgia case, for
example, it was held that an agree-
ment by those entitled to the pro-
ceeds of land at an executor's sale,
made with a third person, to run
the property up to a certain price,
so as to prevent a sacrifice, was not
such as would avoid the sale, even
though the parties interested agreed
to take the property off his hands,
in case it were knocked down to
him: McMillan v. Harris, 110 Ga.
72, 48 L. R. A. 345. The opinion in
this case, by Cobb, J., contains such
an exhaustive review of the author-
ities that we think it useful to copy
a large portion of it here. The
learned justice said: "The con-
trolling question to be determined
is whether the conduct of Mr. Owen
in entering into the arrangement
with Mr. Seabrook to bid on the
property in behalf of their respect-
ive clients so as to prevent its
sacrifice, and bidding at the sale
for that purpose without the expec-
tation of becoming a purchaser him-
self, was of such a character as to
authorize the court to declare that
McMillan was misled, and that for
that reason the sale was void, and
should be set aside. To properly
determine this it is necessary to
investigate the law of sales at auc-
tion, and determine who is a puf-
fer at an auction, and what conduct
would amount to pufRng so as to
invalidate the sale. There is no de-
cision of this court bearing directly
upon this question. The presence
at auction sales of persons who bid
for the purpose of inflating the value
of the property in behalf of those
interested in the sale is a matter at
the present time of very common
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^ 429, Nature of the contract of auction sale—Are separately ac-
cepted bids separate sales?—Whether purchases of articles at an auc-
occurrence, and has been from the
time that auction sales were first
known. Tliis practice has brought
about many controversies which re-
sulted in numerous cases, and the
effect of such conduct has been dis-
cussed by many judges and text-
writers. A person of the character
referred to is usually denominated
a 'puffer,' but he is sometimes re-
ferred to as a 'by-bidder,' capper,'
'decoy duck,' 'white bonnet,' or
'sham bidder.' The first time
that this question seems to have
come before the English courts,
so far as the reported cases are
concerned, was in the case of Wal-
ker V. Nightingale, 3 Bro. P. C, 263,
which was decided in 1726. It was
held by the house of lords in that
case that a puffer could not recover
compensation for his services, since
they were contrary to good faith.
The next case in point of time was
Bexwell v. Christie, 1 Cowp. 395,
which was decided by the court of
king's bench in 1776. This was a
decision by Lord Mansfield, and, as
it was rendered prior to our adopt-
ing statute, it is controlling author-
ity in this state: Thornton v. Lane,
11 Ga. 459, 500. For this reason it
is necessary to examine that case
with some care. An action was
brought against an auctioneer for
selling a horse at the highest price
bid for him, contrary to the owner's
express direction not to allow him
lo go under a larger sum named,
and it was held that such an action
would not lie, but that it would
have been otherwise if the owner
had directed the auctioneer to put
the horse up at a particular price,
and not lower. The opinion of
Lord Mansfield in the case was as
follows: 'The matter in question is
in itself of small value, but in re-
spect of the principles by which it
must be governed it is a question
of great importance. Since the trial
I have mooted the point with many
who are not lawyers upon the moral-
ity and rectitude of the transaction.
The question is whether a bidding
uy the owner of goods at a sale un-
der these conditions, namely, "that
the highest bidder shall be the pur-
chaser, and if a dispute arise, to be
decided by a majority of the per-
sons present," is a bidding within
the meaning of such conditions of
sale. There is no express under-
taking on the part of the defendant,
nor is it, as has been ingeniously
said, a direction that there should
be no bidding under £15, which
might be fair; but the direction
given to the defendant is "not to
let the horse go under £15," which
implies there might be a bidding
under that sum. The question, then,
is whether the owner can privately
employ another person to bid for
him. The basis of all dealing ought
to be good faith; so, more especially
in these transactions, where the pub-
lic are brought together upon a con-
fidence that the articles set up to
sale will be disposed of to the high-
est real bidder. That could never
be the case if the owner might pri-
vately and secretly enhance the
price by a person employed for the
purpose; yet tricks and practices of
this kind daily increase, and grow
so frequent that good men give in
to the ways of the bad and dishonest
in their own defense. But such a
practice was never openly avowed.
I
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tion, wliich have been made at different times, but which are delivered
at the same time, constitute but a single sale, or more than one, is a
An owner of goods set up to sale at
an auction never yet bid in the room
for himself. If such a practice were
allowed, no one would bid. It is a
fraud upon the sale and upon the
public. The disallowing it is no
hardship upon the owner; for, if he
is unwilling his goods should go at
an under-price, he may order them
to be set up at his own price and
not lower. Such a direction would
be fair. Or he might do as was
done by Lord Ashburnham, who
sold a large estate by auction. He
had it inserted in the conditions of
sale that he himself might bid once
in the course of the sale, and he bid
at once £15,000 or £20,000. Such
a condition is fair, because the pub-
lic are then apprised and know upon
what terms they bid. In Holland
it is the practice to bid downwards.
The question, then, is, Is such a
bidding fair? If not. It is no ar-
gument to say it is a frequent cus-
tom. Gaming, stock-jobbing and
swindling are frequent. But the law
forbids them all. Suppose there
was an agreement to abate so much,
which is the case where goods are
sold by one person in the trade to
another,—they abate sometimes 10
to 15 per cent. Such an agreement
between the owner and the bidder
at sale by auction would be a gross
fraud. What is the nature of a sale
by auction? It is that the goods
shall go to the highest real bidder.
But there would be an end of that
if the owner might privately bid
upon his own goods. There is oio
contract with the auctioneer. He
is only an agent between the buyer
and seller. He may fairly bid for
a third person who employs him,
but not for the owner. In this case
there is another fraud put upon the
public. For by the catalogue the
goods are described to be "the goods
of a gentleman deceased, and sold
by order of the executor." Upon
this representation many people
would attend to bid on a supposition
that the goods were necessarily to
be sold at all events, whether valua-
ble or not valuable; whereas they
might have their suspicions if they
were the property of persons living.
Horses, or any other species of prop-
erty, belonging to persons that are
dead, are not so likely to be faulty
as those which are parted with by
persons in their life-time. We all
remember the sale of a gentleman's
wines, where vast quantities had
been sent in belonging to other per-
sons, and all sold at a very high
price, under an idea they were his.
The consequence was, most of the
buyers were taken in. Therefore,
upon full consideration, I am of
opinion that a bidding by the owner
in the manner contended for, and
agreeable to the directions given in
this case, would have been a fraud
upon the sale; and, consequently,
that this action against the defend-
ant as auctioneer can not be main-
tained.' In Howard v. Castle, 6 T.
R. 642, the decision of Lord Mans-
field in Bexwell v. Christie was fol-
lowed by Lord Kenyon. In Wheeler
V. Collier, Moody & M. 123, a sale
at which there were two puffers was
held to be void; and Lord Tenter-
den stated that the inclination of
his mind was that the employment
of only one puffer would avoid a
sale. In Crowder v. Austin, 3 Bing.
368, it appeared that the vendor of
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question as to which the English and American courts differ. This
question may become important in cases in wliich some dispute has
a horse stationed his servant to join
in the bidding at a public auction,
and the servant bid up to £23 after
a bona fide bidder had bid £12. It
was held that the sale could not be
enforced against a subsequent bid-
der. In Green v. Baverstock, 14 C.
B. (N. S.) 204, it was held that upon
a sale of goods by auction, where
the highest bidder is to be the pur-
chaser, the secret employment of a
puffer on behalf of the vendor is a
fraudulent act and vitiates the sale.
In that case Byles, J., said: 'The
sale is vitiated by the fraud, and
void, unless the vendee, with knowl-
edge of the fact, has acted upon it
so as to deprive himself of the right
to complain. This has been the law
of England, and, indeed, of the
whole of Europe, for a very long
time indeed. It was a law of uni-
versal application even before the
Christian era.' The decisions of
the common-law courts of England
have been almost without exception
in line with the decision of Lord
Mansfield in Bexwell v. Christie.
The principle at the foundation of
this decision was, that for one to
offer his property at public outcry
to the highest bidder, and then se-
cretly arrange with another to bid
on the property in his behalf, with
the distinct understanding that he
was not to incur any liability on his
bid. was a fraud upon the right of
those who attended the sale in good
faith, expecting to come into com-
petition with others like themselves
who really desired to purchase the
property on the best terms possible.
The reason for the rule was the
palpable fraud upon bona fide bid-
ders. Strange as it may seem, the
English court of chancery did not
follow the rule laid down by Lord
Mansfield, but, on the contrary, in
a number of decisions this rule was
criticized, and the fraud incident to
puffing at auctions was not only
tolerated, but approved of by that
court. In Conolly v. Parsons, which
will be found reported in a note in
3 Ves. Jr. 624,—a decision rendered
in 1797,—Lord Chancellor Loughbo-
rough found great fault with the
conclusion reached by Lord Mans-
field, and also with the reasoning
which led him to that conclusion.
According to the rule in that case,
unlimited puflSng was allowable.
While the decision last referred to
was not followed by the court of
chancery in all of its bearings, that
court held on different occasions
that the mere fact that one puffer
was employed to prevent a sacrifice
of the property would not be such
a fraud as would vitiate the sale
when it was otherwise free from
infirmity. In Mortimer v. Bell, L.
R. 1 Ch. 10, 5 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)
310, it was held by Lord Chancellor
Cranworth that the rule said to ex-
ist in equity, allowing one puffer to
be employed, without notice, to pre-
vent a sale at an undervalue, is ab-
stractly less sound than the rule at
law, which declares such employ-
ment to be fraudulent, and rests
only on the authority of decisions in
lower branches of the court. See
also, in this connection, Flint v.
Woodin, 9 Hare 618; Robinson v.
Wall, 2 Phill. Ch. 372; Smith v.
Clarke. 12 Ves. Jr. 477. The con-
flict between the rule laid down by
the common-law and the chancery
courts of England was finally set-
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arisen as to the validity of the sale or sales, owing to the operation of
the statute of frauds. Thus, if purchases were made in different lots,
tied by an act of parliament which
provided that, 'whenever a sale by
auction of land would be invalid at
law by reason of the employment of
a puffer, the same shall be deemed
invalid in equity as well as at law.'
In the case of Peck v. List, 23 W.
Va. 338, 48 Am. Rep. 398, which is
one of the leading American cases
on the subject, the English decisions
above referred to, as well as many
others by the common-law and
chancery courts, are collected and
commented on in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Green. We have re-
ferred to such of those decisions as
we deem necessary to the pi'esent
discussion. The decision of Lord
Mansfield must be treated as bind-
ing authority in this state, as there
are none of our own decisions in
conflict with the rule he there lays
down. Attention was called in the
argument to the fact that the record
in the case of Locke v. Willingham,
99 Ga. 297, 25 S. E. 693, disclosed
that certain charges of the trial
judge bearing upon the subject un-
der consideration in the present
case were under review, and that the
effect of the ruling in that case,
which was merely a head-note, that
no error of law was committed, was
to approve of the charges made by
the trial judge. We have examined
the record in that case, and we find
that the charges of the judge under
review were not only not in conflict
with the rule laid down by Lord
Mansfield, but seem to have been in
accord therewith. The following
decisions and authorities will show
the ruling of some of the American
courts on this subject: 2 Pomeroy
Eq. Jur.. § 934, pp. 1336, 1337; 3
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.)
304, 305; Benjamin Sales (7th ed.),
§ 70, et seq.; 1 Warvelle Vendors
254; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 293; Bis-
pham Eq., § 209; Tiedeman Sales,
§ 165; Rorer Judicial Sales 44; Bate-
man Auctions 131; 1 Wait Act. &
Def. 482; Story Sales 482; Veazie
V. Williams, 8 How. (U. S.) 134, 12
L. ed. 1018; Flannery v. Jones, 180
Pa. St. 338, 36 Atl. 856; Bowman v.
McClenahan, 20 App. Div. (N. Y.)
346, 46 N. Y. Supp. 945; Pennock's
Appeal, 14 Pa. St. 446, 53 Am. Dec.
561; Hartwell v. Gurney, 16 R. I. 78;
Nightingale v. Nightingale, 13 R. I.
113; Reynolds v. Dechaums, 24 Tex.
174, 76 Am. Dec. 101; Davis v. Pet-
way, 3 Head (Tenn.) 667, 75 Am.
Dec. 789; Miller v. Baynard, 2
Houst. (Del.) 559, 83 Am. Dec. 168;
Jenkins v. Hogg, 2 Treadway Const.
(S. C.) 821; East v. Wood, 62 Ala.
313; Woods v. Hall, 1 Dev. Eq. (N.
C.) 411; National Bank &c. v.
Sprague, 20 N. J. Eq. 159; Hinde v.
Pendleton, Wythe (Va.) 354; Curtis
V. Aspinwall, 114 Mass. 187, 19 Am.
Rep. 332; Springer v. Kleinsorge, 83
Mo. 152; Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H.
360, 55 Am. Dec. 195; Staines v.
Shore, 16 Pa. St. 200, 55 Am. Dec.
492. An examination of the author-
ities above cited, as well as of many
others which might be cited, will
show that the conclusions reached
by the American courts on this ques-
tion are far from being uniform.
Some have followed the rule laid
down by Lord Mansfield, others the
rule announced by Lord Loughbo-
rough, and still others are not in
exact accord with either, but are
modifications of one or the other.
It is not possible to reconcile the
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i^ome of which, were bidden in under circumstances which would
render the transaction void under the statute, a delivery and accept-
American decisions on this subject,
and it would not be profitable to
undertake to do this, even if it were
possible. We may lay it down as a
rule without exception that the em-
ployment of a puffer at an auction
sale is such a fraud as will vitiate
the sale. Such being the rule, the
question now to be determined is,
Who is a puffer? Mr. Justice Green,
in Peck v. List, cited above, thus de-
fines a puffer: 'A puffer, in the
strictest meaning of the word, is a
person who, without having any in-
tention to purchase, is employed by
the vendor at an auction to raise
the price by fictitious bids, thereby
increasing competition among the
bidders, while he himself is secured
from risk by a secret understanding
with the vendor that he shall not
be bound by his bids.' This defini-
tion will be found to have been ap-
proved by several of the text-writers
and many of the judges in the au-
thorities and decisions above cited.
It is directly in line with the ruling
made by Lord Mansfield in Bexwell
V. Christie. In order to constitute
one who bids at a sale a puffer it is
not only necessary that he shall be
employed by the owner of the prop-
erty which is being sold, or by some
person having an interest therein,
but it must appear that the person
employing the puffer was so inter-
ested in the auction or act of selling
that there could be made with him
a binding agreement by which the
person bidding incurs not the slight-
est risk of being called upon to
comply with the terms of any bid
that he may make. If he be em-
ployed by the owner of the property,
and the owner has complete control
of the auction and the auctioneer,
as was the case in Bexwell v. Chris-
tie, then no one would question that
he was a puffer, within the meaning
of the law, and his employment
would amount to a fraud upon the
real bidder. If he be employed by
a person interested in the property,
although not the sole owner, and
such person has complete control
over the auction, so that he could
entirely relieve him from all re-
sponsibility for the bid he would
make, then a person employed un-
der such circumstances would be
a puffer, within the principle of the
ruling made in Bexwell v. Christie.
The rule is thus stated by Mr. Jus-
tice Green in Peck v. List, before
referred to: 'But it is obviously
unimportant whether the by-bidder
is employed by the owner of the
land or by some one else having a
pecuniary interest in the auction
about to be made, and who stands
in such a relation to it that he can
make good his assurance to the by-
bidder that he shall not be held
responsible for his bid if it happen
to be the highest bid made. The
real essence of the fraud is not
that the owner is bidding for the
property, but it consists in the fact
that a by-bidder, pretending to be
a bona fide bidder, deceives honest
bidders, raises the price of the
property by fictitious bids increas-
ing competition, while he himself
has good reason to believe and does
believe that he is secure from any
risk of being held personally liable
for his bids. It is immaterial from
whom he derives this assurance of
immunity, provided the party giv-
ing the assurance expressly or im-
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ance of the whole might take the entire purchase out of the operation
of the statute, if it constituted but a single sale. The courts in Eng-
pliedly has the power, either legally
or practically, to make good the as-
surance. It makes no difference
that such puffer or by-bidder was
employed to prevent a sacrifice of
the property, and was directed to
bid it up, to a fixed price only; nor
does it make any difference that the
property only sold at a reasonable
price.' In many of the cases it is
said that a person employed by the
owner to secretly bid upon the
property would be a puffer; in still
others it is said that a person so
employed by the vendor would be
a puffer; in still others it is stated
that a person so employed by the
seller would be a puffer; and in
still others it is declared that a
person employed by those who are
pecuniarily interested in the prop-
erty would be a puffer. In dealing
with this subject the terms 'owner,'
'vendor,' 'seller,' and 'person pecuni-
arily jnterested in the property or
its proceeds' are to be given the
same meaning, and they all refer
to one who, without regard to what
may be his peculiar interest in the
property, must have absolute con-
trol of the auction sale, and is at
liberty of his own volition to dis-
charge any bidder from liability on
account of his bid. If the person
conducting the sale can, notwith-
standing the agreement of one who
has a larger interest in the pro-
ceeds of the sale, hold the bidder
responsible for the amount of his
bid, then a person employed by the
person having such larger interest
in the proceeds would not be a puf-
fer within the meaning of the law.
Bidding by such a person would not
be fraudulent, and therefore the
30—Principal and Agent.
sale would not be affected by the
employment of such a person. An
auctioneer is the agent of the per-
son who directs him to make the
sale. The sale is, therefore, con-
trolled by one who directs the auc-
tioneer. When an auction sale is
declared by the auctioneer to be
without reserve, this is, in effect, a
statement that the person who di-
rects the auctioneer to make the
sale, no matter what his interest in
the property may be, has empow-
ered the auctioneer to sell the prop-
erty to the highest bidder, and that
the person directing the auctioneer
will not himself bid upon the prop-
erty, or employ others to do so in
his behalf. Where the auctioneer
puts up property without any state-
ment as to the conditions of sale,
the bidders have a right to presume
that the sale is to be without re-
serve. The owner, vendor, seller,
or person interested in the sale,
whatever we may call him,—that is,
the person who has directed the auc-
tioneer to sell the property, and w^ho
will be compelled to make good
to the bidder the acceptance of a
bid by the auctioneer,—is not al-
lowed to secretly bid at the sale.
He may bid, however, if public no-
tice be given of the fact, so that
other bidders may know that they
are coming into competition with
the person who has control of the
sale. The mere fact that a person
is pecuniarily interested in the
property which is being sold at auc-
tion does not preclude him from
becoming a bidder, and this is true
of judicial sales as well as private
sales. No matter what interest a
person may have in the proceeds
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land hold that the making and acceptance of each bid constitute a
of the sale, or in the property which
is going to be sold at public out-
cry, either at private auction or ju-
dicial sale, his right to become a
bidder at the sale is well recog-
nized by numerous decisions of this
court, as well as of other courts in
this country, provided the sale is
not under his control. See, in this
connection, Freeman v. Cooper, 14
Ga. 238; White v. Crew, 16 Ga. 416;
Buckner v. Chambliss, 30 Ga. 652;
Kilgo V. Castleberry, 38 Ga. 512, 95
Am. Dec. 406; Kearney v. Taylor,
15 How. (U. S.) 493, 14 L. ed. 787;
Richards v. Holmes, 18 How. (U. S.)
143, 15 L. ed. 304; Pewabic Min. Co.
V. Mason, 145 U. S. 349, 36 L. ed.
732, 12 S. Ct. Rep. 887; Blossom v.
Railroad Co., 3 Wall. (U. S.) 196, 18
L. ed. 43; Smith v. Black, 115 U. S.
308, 29 L. ed. 398, 6 S. Ct. Rep. 50;
Allen V. Gillette, 127 U. S. 589, 32
L. ed. 271, 8 S. Ct. Rep. 1331; Baird
v. Baird, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. (N. C.)
524, 31 Am. Dec. 399; Gulick v.
Webb, 41 Neb. 706, 60 N. W. 13;
Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Met. (Mass.)
384; Pennsylvania Transp. Co.'s
Appeal, 101 Pa. St. 576; Thames v.
Miller, 2 Woods 564, Fed. Cas. No.
13,860; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Mar-
bury, 91 U. S. 587, 23 L. ed. 328.
Such being the right of one who
is interested in the property sold
or in the proceeds of the sale, who
is himself not conducting the sale,
and who has not such control over
the sale as that he can make a
binding agreement with a bidder
that he will not be held responsible
for his bid, it can not be a fraud
for such person to employ one to
bid at a sale in his behalf, even
though the fact that the bidder is
bidding in behalf of one interested
in the property is not disclosed to
the other bidders. The law charges
one who attends an auction sale,
no matter what its character,
whether resulting from a private
agreement or from a judgment of a
court, that any one interested in the
proceeds of the sale or in the prop-
erty, and who has no absolute con-
trol over the sale, may become a
competitor with any other person
at the sale, and bid for the property,
and such a person is under no obli-
gation to disclose to others his in-
tention to bid; and therefore the
employment by such a person of
another to bid in his behalf, without
disclosing that he is representing
the person so interested, could not.
in any sense, be a fraud upon other
bidders. It is true that the law
prohibits certain persons from act-
ing as agents of such a person. A
sheriff can not become a bidder at
his own sale as agent for another:
Harrison v. McHenry, 9 Ga. 164, 52
Am. Dec. 435; Coleman v. Mac-
lean. 101 Ga. 303, 28 Ga. 861: though
it has been held that a sheriff act-
ing as auctioneer at an administra-
tor's sale may make one bid for a
person interested in the property to
be sold, if he discloses the fact that
he is bidding for another, and if
his authority is limited to making
one bid, and he have no discretion
to do otherwise: James v. Kelley.
107 Ga. 446, 33 S. E. 425. The mat-
ter may thus be summed up: If
a person who has such control of an
auction sale that he. of his own
volition, can release a bidder from
all responsibility for his bid, em-
ploys another, upon an understand-
ing of that character, to bid at the
sale, without disclosing for whom
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separate contract;*^ unless, indeed, the several articles purchased are
so related that one article can not be used or enjoyed except in con-
nection with the others, in which case only may the purchasing of the
several articles constitute hut a single contract.'** But in the United
States the rule seems to be otherwise : here it is held that if one per-
son obtains a number of articles as the result of separate bids, all the
purchases together constitute but one sale.*^ "When the purchase
is made at an auction sale of goods, at one and the same time, and
from the same vendor, although the articles purchased are numerous,
and are struck off separately at separate and distinct prices, the whole
constitutes but one entire contract; and the prices of the different
articles fixed on are but part and parcel of it."***
§ 430. Rights and liabilities of purchaser and seller.—A pur-
chaser of property at auction sale has the right to the possession of
the same as soon as he has complied with the terms of the sale; the
title vesting in the bidder eo instante, on being adjudicated to him;*^
tie is bidding, for the purpose of
preventing the property from sell-
ing at a sacrifice, or for the pur-
pose of making the same bring more
than its actual value, the bidding
by one or more persons under such
employment is such a fraud upon
the real bidders that the sale will
be declared void at their instance.
The only lawful way in which such
a person can prevent a sacrifice of
the property sold is to fix a mini-
mum price, of which public notice
shall be given, or make public the
.
fact that he, either by himself or
by others, will be a bidder at the
sale. On the other hand, the mere
fact that the person is interested
in the property to be sold, or in
the proceeds of the sale, will not
preclude him from either bidding
himself or from procuring another
to bid, either openly or secretly, in
his behalf, without regard to what
the agreement may be with such
bidder, if the one employing such
bidder has not himself such con-
trol of the sale that he could ab-
solutely release the bidder from all
responsibility growing out of his
having participated in the sale in
that capacity. Applying the prin-
ciples above announced to the facts
of the present case, Mr. Owens was
in no sense a puffer, and the sale
was not, for any reason set up by
the plaintiff in error, invalid."
^^Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt.
38; Roots v. Dormer, 4 B. & Ad.
77, 24 E. C. L. 43.
" Chambers v. Griffiths, 1 Esp.
150; Gibson v. Spurrier, 2 Peake 49-
^^ Mills V. Hunt, 17 Wend. (N. Y.)
333; Coffman v. Hampton, 2 W. &
S. (Pa.) 377, 37 Am. Dec. 511;
Tompkins v. Haas, 2 Pa. St. 74;
Jenness v. Wendell, 51 N. H. 63. 12
Am. Rep. 48.
^" Per Sergeant, J., in Coffman v.
Hampton, supra.
" Succession of Boudousquie, 9
Rob. (La.) 405; Noah v. Pierce, 85
Mich. 70.
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hence, if property so purchased is destroyed by fire, before it is re-
moved by the j^urchaser, it will be at his loss.*® But as long as the
conditions remain unfulfilled, the purcha.?er has no right to the posses-
sion of the property; hence, if the chattel is offered on a credit, the
purchaser to give his note with good security, drawing interest, etc.,
the purchaser is not entitled to the possession of the property until
such note has been tendered to the seller, or a sum of money equal
to the principal and interest which would have been due upon the
note at maturity.*® The conditions prerec|uisite to a delivery may be
waived, however; and if the seller delivers the property without a
previous compliance with conditions, the delivery passes a good title.^°
As to the right of retraction of a bid, it may be said that a bidder is
not bound to receive the property and pay the price, if he withdrew his
bid before the hammer fell; and this is true, although it is provided
in the terms of sale that bids shall not be withdrawn.'^- A bid is
nothing more than an offer or proposal to purchase at such a price,
and, if not immediately accepted, may be withdrawn, provided the
withdrawal be made before acceptance ; the retraction, however, must
be made publicly, or at least so the crier can hear it, the same as the
bid. On the other hand, if the purchaser does not comply with the
conditions of the sale, the proj^erty having been knocked down to him,
and fails or refuses to take the property thus purchased by him on the
conditions of the sale, he is liable to the vendor for the purchase price,
the vendor holding himself ready to turn the propert}- over to him.'^^
The vendor may, however, treat the contract as rescinded, and resell
the property and sue for damages for a breach of the contract : the
measure of his damages then being the difference between the sale
price and the net proceeds of the resale.^* Before a resale, however.
« Jenness v. Wendell, 51 N. H. 63,
12 Am. Rep. 48.
^» Wainscott v. Smith, 68 Ind. 312;
Mazoue v. Caze, 18 La. Ann. 31.
^"Burt v. Kennedy, 3 Penny. (Pa.)
238; Mitchell v. Zimmerman, 109
Pa. St. 183, 58 Am. Rep. 715; Sween-
ey v. Vaughn, 94 Tenn. 534.
"Fisher v. Seltzer, 23 Pa. St. 308,
62 Am. Dec. 335; Payne v. Cave, 3
T. R. 148.
^^Corlies v. Gardner, 2 N. Y.
Super. 345; Girard v. Taggart, 5 S.
& R. (Pa.) 19, 9 Am. Dec. 327.
"Mount V. Brown, 33 Miss. 566,
69 Am. Dec. 362; Bowser v. Cessna,
62 Pa. St. 148; Waples v. Overaker,
77 Tex. 1, 19 Am. St. 727; Grist v.
Williams, 111 N. C. 53, 32 Am. St.
782. The rule seems to be different^
in case of judicial sales. For ex-
ample, if the sale is by a commis-
sioner appointed by the court, thel
purchaser is not bound to pay un-
til the deed is confirmed: and if the
purchaser refuses to pay, and the
commissioner resells the property,
without reporting the first sale, the
469 AUCTIOXEERS. § 43Q
the vendor should give the original purchaser reasonable notice of his
intention to do so; and the resale must be at public auction. ^^ Or he
may keep the property as his own and sue for the difference between
the market value and the price at which the property was struck off to
the purchaser.^*' If the purchaser refuse to take the property on ac-
count of fraud at the sale, or in the conditions, he must, if he has
taken the property, return it as soon as he. discovers the fraud; but if
he does not, discover it till too late to return it before suit, he can
plead the fraud as a defense, although he has not returned the prop-
erty.^^ In case a right of action exists against the purchaser, it may
be exercised by either the auctioneer or the seller; for the auctioneer
has such a special property in the articles sold that he may bring the
action in his own name without joining his principal, the seller.^*
When a purchaser has given bond for the performance of his con-
tract, and the sale is invalid on account of the statute of frauds, he is
not liable on the bond, as in such case this is also invalid.^'' The
purchaser is entitled to all he has purchased at the sale, and unless the
vendor has title to some portion of such property, however small, the
vendor can not force him to accept the remainder, even though he
offer to secure him in the part to which he has no title.®" Nor can the
vendee be compelled to accept a title which is encumbered, unless
he had notice of such encumbrance.''^ But at a judicial sale
there is no warranty, either of title or that the property is free from
encumbrances; and the purchaser at such sale takes only what title
purchaser at the first sale is not the property for the highest sum
liable: Campe v. Saucier, 68 Miss, he can get, and, after crediting the
278. net amount received, sue for the
^^ Mount V. Brown, supra; Bow- balance of the purchase-money:
ser V. Cessna, supra; Hill v. Hill, 58 Moore v. Potter, 155 N. Y. 481, 63
111. 239; Riggs v. Pursell, 74 N. Y. Am. St. 692, 50 N. E. 271; Dustan
370. V. McAndrew, 44 N. Y. 72."
'^'' Ackerman v. Rubens, 167 N. Y. =*" Staines v. Shore, 16 Pa. St. 200,
405, 82 Am. St. 728. "When the ven- 55 Am. Dec. 492.
dee of personal property, under an '* Hulse v. Young, 16 Johns. (N.
executory contract of sale, refuses Y.) 1.
to complete his purchase, the ven- =" Thomas v. Trustees, 3 A. K.
dor may keep the article for him Marsh. (Ky.) 298, 13 Am. Dec. 165.
and sue for the entire purchase *'" Pontchartrain R. Co. v. Durel, 6
price; or he may keep tne property La. 481.
as his own and sue for the differ- " Porter v. Liddle, 7 Mart. 0. S.
ence between the market value and (La.) 23.
the contract price; or he may sell
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the former owner had. If there was fraud or mistake at the sale, it
may be set aside; but the objection must be made before confirmation,
if then discovered; but in the absence of fraud, the sale will stand
after it has been confirmed.^ ^ As a general rule, there is no warranty
in an auction sale, in the absence of special authority given to the auc-
tioneer; and where an auctioneer, in the absence of the owner, at the
sale, stated publicly that a .horse he was about to offer was sound, and
no authority was shown in the auctioneer to make such statement, it
was held not to be a warranty for which the seller was liable.*^^ And
so the statement by an auctioneer as to sheep offered for sale, that
"here is a nice lot of young, sound sheep," is not a warrant}' that the
sheep are in good health.®*
§ 431. Duties and liabilities of auctioneer to the vendor.—As pre-
viously stated, the auctioneer is primarily the agent of the vendor,
and the rules applicable to principals and agents generally, with re-
gard to the duty of the agent to the principal, are applicable to auc-
tioneers. It is the duty of the auctioneer to obey the instructions of
the vendor, when not contrary to law or public policy; hence, where
an auctioneer is instructed not to sell certain goods below a certain
price, he must start the sale at such price, and has no right to close
such sale if the goods will not bring it f^ and if he sell for less than
the price authorized, it has been held that he will be liable to the
owner for the difference."*' Generally it is the duty of an auctioneer
to conduct the sale in a manner that will make it binding on the ven-
dee ; and if he fail to do so, and on a resale the property sell for less,
he Avill be liable for the difference. But he is said to be answerable
only for "gross" negligence ; and hence, where he failed to comply with
a recent statutory regulation which was of doubtful construction, it
was held that he was not liable."^ Concerning funds in his hands
derived from sales of the vendor's property, he is in duty bound to ac-
count for these, as any other agent,*** and keep them separate from his
^-See Farmers' Bank v. Peter, 13
Bush (Ky.) 591; Hickson v. Rucker,
77 Va. 135; Hunting v. Walter, 33
Md. 60; Wood v. Winings. 58 Ind.
322; Weaver v. Guyer, 59 Ind. 195.
"^ Court v. Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440.
"* McGrew v. Forsythe, 31 Iowa
179.
«* Williams v. Poor, 3 Cranch (C.
C.) 251, Fed. Cas. No. 17.732; Hazul
v. Dunham, 1 N. Y. Super. 655.
^ Steel v. Ellmaker, 11 S. & R.
(Pa.) 86. Compare Pennock's Ap-|
peal. 14 Pa. St. 446. 451.
" Hicks V. Minturn, 19 Wend. (N.J
Y.) 550.
«* Gray v. Haig, 20 Beav. 219.
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own. But where he mingles them with his own funds and those be-
longing to other parties, the seller becomes his general creditor, and
has no preference over other creditors.**® As a general rule, he is not
liable for interest on money received, unless fraudulently witliheld,''*'
or withheld after demand. When it is his duty to insure goods, and
he neglects to do so, the risk is his own.'^^ If, for any reason, he can
not insure, it is his duty to notify his principal thereof. But if he
insure in a solvent company, he will not be liable for any loss that may
occur, though the company subsequently fail to pay the insurance.^^
It is his duty to exercise reasonable care over the property in his hands
which he is to sell ; and for any loss caused by his negligence, he is
liable in damages to the owner or vendor.'^
§ 432. Duties and liabilities of auctioneer to purchaser.—As in the
case of making a contract for an undisclosed principal, by an agent,
an auctioneer is personally liable as vendor if he fails to disclose the
name of the party for whom he is selling.'^* And where the names
of the principals were disclosed in the notices and advertisements,
yet if the bills were made out in the names of the auctioneers, and they
undertook to deliver the goods, it was held they were personally liable
for their non-delivery.'^ So, also, where the auctioneer has sold the
goods without disclosing the name of the owner, and the property
is afterward claimed by a superior title, the auctioneer will be liable to
the purchaser for the purchase-money, in an action for money had and
received.'^® The same was true where the auctioneer signed the con-
tract for a sale of land, but did not disclose the jirincipal: he was
held personally liable for the purchase-money, including his fees, and
the interest. '^^ The auctioneer is also liable to the purchaser for mis-
representation or fraud perpetrated on the purchaser and resulting in
injury to him. Thus, if he received from the purchaser a deposit,
knowing that the vendor's title is defective, and fail to disclose that
«^Levy V. Cavanagh, 2 Bosw. (N. "Mills v. Hunt, 17 Wend. (N. Y.)
Y.) 100. 333, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 431; Thomas
"Turner v. Burkinshaw, L. R. 2 v. Kerr, 3 Bush (Ky.) 619, 96 Am.
Ch. 488. Dec. 262.
'Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 111. "Elison v. Wulff, 26 111. App. 616.
404. '" Seemuller v. Fuchs, 64 Md. 217,
" Johnson v. Campbell, 120 Mass. 54 Am. Rep. 766.
449. "Bush V. Cole, 28 N. Y. 261, 84
' Maltby v. Christie, 1 Esp. 340. Am. Dec. 343.
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fact to him, the auctioneer will be liable to the purchaser for the de-
posit, though he have already paid it over to the vendor.'^®
§ 433. Duties and liabilities of auctioneer to third persons.—An
auctioneer, like any other agent, is never liable to a third party for a
violation of his duty to his principal. But if he commit an injury to
such third person, unless it be a mere nonfeasance, he will be liable.
Thus, if he sell the property of a third party and pay over the pro-
ceeds to the party who has delivered the property to the auctioneer,
the latter will be liable to the owner for its value in an action of
trover.'^* But while this is the weight of authority, there are cases
holding the contrary.^** He has recourse, however, upon his principal
for any loss he may thus sustain.^ ^ He is also liable for goods that
were fraudulently obtained, provided he had notice of the fraud.^^
Even if he had no notice of the fraud originally, but was notified
thereof subsecjuently to the sale, he will be personally liable for such
proceeds as he may thereafter turn over to his principal ; but if he turn
the proceeds over without notice of the fraud, he will not be liable ; and
for any money advanced by him without notice of such fraud, he may
hold the goods until he is reimbursed. ^^ In a Massachusetts case the
facts were that A, the owner of certain goods, sold them conditionally
to B, the latter agreeing to pay for them in installments and not to
sell or mortgage them as long as any payments were due. B mort-
gaged them to C, who took without notice and for value. The mort-
gagee had the goods sold at auction to satisfy the mortgage, which
had been duly recorded. At the time of the execution of the mort-
gage, B was in default according to the agreement, and A had a right
to the immediate possession of the goods without demand or notice.
A sued the auctioneer in trover, and the supreme court held that he
was liable, and that his ignorance and good faith constituted no de-
fense to the action.®* But, in a Tennessee case, it was held that the
"Edwards v. Hodding, 1 Marsh.
(C. P.) 377.
''Kearney v. Glutton, 101 Mich.
106, 45 Am. St. 394; Hills v. Snell,
104 Mass. 173, 6 Am. Rep. 216;
Coles V. Clark, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 399;
Davis V. Artingstall, 49 L. J. Ch.
609, 42 L. T. 507.
«• Rogers v. Huie, 2 Cal. 571, 56
Am. Dec. 363; Frizzell v. Rundle, 88
Tenn. 396, 17 Am. St. 908.
^' Adamson v. Jarvis. 4 Bing. 66,
13 E. C. L. 403.
*- Morrow Shoe Mfg. Co. v. New
England Shoe Co., 57 Fed. 685.
'^^Higgins v. Lodge, 68 Md. 229,
6 Am. St. 437; Lewis v. Mason, 94
1
Mo. 551; Baugh v. Kirkpatrick, 54^
Pa. St. 84, 93 Am. Dec. 675.
'^ Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass. 357,
35 Am. St. 495.
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registration of a chattel mortgage is not notice to an auctioneer, and he
is not liable to the mortgagee even though the mortgagor acted fraud-
ulently, where he has sold the property at the instance of the mort-
gagor and turned the proceeds over to him.®^
§ 434. Duties and liabilities of vendor to auctioneer—Compensa-
tion.—One of the duties the vendor or principal of the auctioneer
owes the latter is to compensate him fpr his services. Where the
compensation is fixed by the agreement between the two this will, of
course, control ;^^ when no compensation has been agreed upon, the
auctioneer will be entitled to recover on the quantum mei'uit; that is
to say, such commissions as are customarily paid for such services.^''
Auctioneer's fees are sometimes fixed by statute; when this is the case,
the statutory compensation covers only the services he performs as
auctioneer. Where he performs other services he is entitled to rea-
sonable compensation for these, or for services beyond the mere selling
in public to the highest bidder.^^ An auctioneer can not recover com-
pensation unless he has actually sold the property; and this is true
although the owner sold it himself, at private sale, the day before the
day on which it was advertised to be sold at auction.^''
«= Frizzell v. Rundle, 88 Tenn. 396, "' Griffin v. Helmbold, 72 N. Y.
17 Am. St. 908. 437.
*" Cochran v. Johnson, 2 McCord ** Russell v. Miner, 61 Barb. (N.
L. (S. C.) 21; Carpenter v. Le Y.) 534.
Count, 93 N. Y. 562. ^» Girardey v. Stone, 24 La. Ann.
286.
CHAPTEE XIII.
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or individual may discharge in person the business which would usu-
ally devolve upon the board of directors in case the bank were a cor-
poration. The ordinary duties devolving upon such board are found
in both the common law and the usage governing l^anks and banking
officers in that connection ; but the duties may be modified or enlarged
by the provisions of the charter or the general statutes under which
the incorporation may have taken place. The directors are elected
by the stoc-kholders at their annual meeting; and it has been held
that all of them must te elected at one and the same time and place
;
and each stockholder has a right to vote for the entire directory.''*'
This statement must, of course, be qualified to the extent that if all
the directors are, by the law, not to be selected at the same time, all
need not l)e voted for at the same time and place; and the same is true
with regard to filling vacancies caused by death, resignation, etc.^^
The duties devolving upon the board of directors are those which de-
volve upon the bank itself ; for the law requires the directors to have
the general superintendence and active management of the concerns
of the corporation. We have already pointed out some of the duties
of bank directors.''- Bank directors are in duty bound to use such care
and diligence as is usually exercised by good business men of the same
kind."^ The corporate functions of the organization exercised by the
board may be and in many instances are delegated to individual agents
for execution, but these are under the immediate control and super-
vision of the board. They are, in a general way, required to know the
system and rules by which the business of the bank is transacted, and
also to perform many duties with regard to the same in person.^* One
of the functions which they are required to perform in person is the
making of discounts: they may say to the cashier or other financial
officer to make such loans as he may wish or as he may see proper,
within a certain time and at certain sums, or at such sums as he may
call for, up to a certain amount at certain rates of interest and upon
designated conditions, and upon specified security; but while in this
manner the responsibility of making the loans and discounts is to
some extent shifted, and while they thus avoid making each discount
or loan in person, they nevertheless are made on the authority of the
=" State V. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513. ^- Ante, § 232.
°^ See Jordy v. Hebrard, 18 La. '^ Hargroves v. Chambers. 30 Ga.
455; Prieur v. Commercial Bank, 7 580.
La. 509. "Morse Banks & Banking, § 116.
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board and on the discretion of its members.®^ But the directors, like
any other agents, can bind the bank only by acts that are within the
scope or apparent scope of their authority.
§ 437. Bank president.—The president of a bank is its chief execu-
tive of^cer, and he has certain responsible duties to perform. He is
generally elected by the directors and is usually one of them.^*^ His
duties and functions are determined by the charter of the corporation,
if the bank be a corporation, or by the general law, or by usage
among bankers, or by the actions of the directors. He can bind the
bank by any act or declaration which is within the scope of his duties,
but not beyond that.®^ It would be difficult to state, in a general way,
the nature and extent of all the duties devolving upon this officer, and
we can not hope to do more than to give a faint outline of the same
;
indeed, as a well-known authority informs us, "ordinarily the posi-
tion is one of dignity and of an indefinite general responsibility,
rather than of any accurately known powers;"^* but, as the same
authority observes, '"the president is usually expected to exercise a
more constant, immediate and personal supervision over the daily af-
fairs of the bank than is required from any other director.""" As to
the validity of his election, it has been held that a majority of the
board of directors constitute a quorum, and that, consequently, if a
majority of such quorum vote for a candidate for president, he is
elected.^ "° And as to his duties, there is much in common with the
chief executive officer of other private corporations. It is not always
necessary that express authority be shown for his acts in order to
render them binding upon the corporation: as a general rule, what-
ever is customary or necessary to be done by the executive officer, if
done by him, will bind the corporation:^"^ but if the act of the presi-
dent of a private corporation is beyond the usual scope of his author-
ity, and yet within the powers of the board of directors to authorize
him to perform, then such authority must be shown. ^*'- Owing to the
difficulty of calling the directors together so often, necessity requires
°5 See Bank of U. S. v. Dunn, 6 '"' Kennedy v. Otoe Co. Nat'l Bank,
Pet. (U. S.) 51. 7 Neb. 59; First Nat'l Bank v. Hoch,
^ Morse Banks & Banking, § 143. 89 Pa. St. 324.
"^ Wharton Ag., § 683. "'= Farmers' Bank v. McKee. 2 Pa.
»» Morse Banks & Banking, § 143. St. 318; Marine Bank v. Clements,
^Ihul. 3 Bos. (N. Y.) 600.
'•» Booker v. Young, 12 Gratt.
(Va.) 303.
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that the president have some general authority to represent and trans-
act business for them in their absence, and this the law accords him
freely. Even when authority from the directors is required it is not
essential that it should be conferred before the act is performed, but it
may as well be subsequently ratified; and this may be done not
only by formal resolution, but by continued acquiescence; provided,
of course, the act be within the powers of the bank and not ultra
vires or illegal. ^"^ But the president has no authority to bind
the bank outside of the ordinary course of the company's busi-
ness;^"* for example, the president of a private corporation has
no power to sell the company's property ;^*'^ nor to assign choses
in action except in the usual course of business. ^"° He may ap-
pear and answer in a lawsuit against the bank and employ coun-
sel to defend.^"" In case of emergency or where the ordinary
course of business warrants, the president of a private corpora-
tion may bring suits on behalf of the company as necessity or
good business judgment dictates.^"* He may call together the board
of directors in special session whenever he desires to place before them
any matter of business requiring their attention. ^°^ ^¥llen he has
the general authority to certify checks conferred upon him, he is not
thereby authorized to certify his own checks ;^^*' nor has he any im-
plied authority to use the funds of the bank with which to pay his in-
dividual obligations."^
§ 438. The cashier.—The cashier of a bank is its chief financial
agent, who has the immediate charge of its currency and bullion as
well as the securities and paper of the bank generally. It is his dut}',
under the direction of the board of directors, to loan money of the
bank, discount notes on 'its behalf, collect its debts, and do whatever is
necessary and proper to receive or pass away the funds of the bank
!"•' Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 4 S. ^"« Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 320.
6 M. (Miss.) 75, 43 Am. Dec. 470; ^'"Savings Bank v. Benton, 2
Kelsey v. Nat'l Bank of Crawford Mete. (Ky.) 240.
Co., 69 Pa. St. 426; Neiffer v. Bank '"'Reno Water Co. v. Leete, 17
of Knoxville, 1 Head (Tenn.) 162; Nev. 203.
Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. " " Union Gold Mining Co. v. Rocky
(U. S.) 46; Rich v. State Nat'l Bank, Mt. Nat'l Bank, 1 Colo. 531.
7 Neb. 201, 29 Am. Rep. 382. "" Claflin v. Farmers', etc.. Bank,
"'' Farmers' Bank v. McKee, 2 Pa. 25 N. Y. 293.
St. 318. "'Chrystie v. Foster, 61 Fed. 551.
"^ Crump V. United States Mining
Co., 7 Gratt. (Va.) 352.
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for banking purposes.^^" The cashier, like the president, is selected
by the board of directors, but need not be and usually is not a member
of such board. He may he elected for a term as fixed in tke charter,
by-laws, or by the vote of the directors, and usually holds until his
successor is elected or until he is removed or dies, or the bank goes out
of existence. He is usually required to give bond for the faithful per-
formance of his duties. ^^^ The cashier has power to bind the bank
by all his acts and conduct that are \^ithin the general scope of his au-
thority; and whether the act is or is not within such scope is con-
sidered to be a question of law, for the decision of the court, and not
for the determination of the jury.^^* The cashier has power to draw
on the funds of the bank deposited to its credit in other banks, for the
purpose of paying its debts, or selling drafts, or discounting notes, etc.
When such a check or draft is ambiguous, parol evidence may be intro-
duced to show that the instrument was drawn by the cashier as such,
and also the purpose for which the draft was made or the check
given.^^^ The cashier has also the inherent power to certify
checks,"*^ and to buy and sell bills of exchange, when the bank en-
gages in this branch of business;"' he may also, as a part of his usual
busincj^s, bind the bank by indorsing negotiable pajjer for collection or
discount or for payment of the debts of the bank;^^® and he has the
general power to pay the debts and obligations of the bank by execut-
ing its paper or using its funds. Although a cashier be forbidden to
do certain acts by the directors, such restriction is not binding on in-
nocent third parties, unless they have notice thereof, or unless the act
bo ultra vires;^'^^ he ha^s no power to bind the bank outside the usual
course of business, however.^-'* As to the foiims of contract by which
he may bind his principal, the subject has already been touched upon
1^^ Wharton Ag., § 684.
'" Morse Banks & Banking, § 16.
"* Peninsular Bank v. Hanmer, 14
Mich. 208. But see Merchants'
Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. (U.
S.) 604; Martin v. Webb, 110 U. S. 7,
14; Gale v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 104
Fed. 214.
"^ Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Co-
lumbia, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 326.
"" Farmers', etc.. Bank v. Butch-
ers', etc., Bank, 16 N. Y. 125: Clarke
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Albion, 52
Barb. (N. Y.) 592; Merchants' Bank
V. State Bank, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 604;
Muth V. St. Louis Trust Co., 88 Mo.'
App. 596, 4 Bank Cas. 416, 67 S.
W. 978.
"' Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8
j
Wheat. (U. S.) 338, 360; Robb v.]
Ross Co. Bank, 41 Barb. (N. Y.)i
586.
"'See West St. Louis Sav. Banki
V. Shawnee Co. Bank, 95 U. S. 557.
"" Merchants' Bank v. State Bank,
10 Wall. (U. S.) 604.
'-' Lamb v. Cecil, 25 W. Va. 288.
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in connection with that of an agent's execution of anthority.^^^ It may
be added here that he may make a valid written contract for his prin-
cipal, either as maker or indorser of paper, by acting ostensibly in the
name of such principal; as, " bank, by , cashier."^^-
But other forms, showing the intention to bind the bank as such, and
not the cashier individually, have been held good for that purpose ; as
simply "A. B., cashier," or "A, B., cashier of bank:"^^^ his
signature as "cashier" being generally interpreted to imply an inten-
tion to bind the bank.^^^* The cashier of a bank may also, as an in-
cident of his power to collect the debts of the bank, turn over to an
attorney, for collection, the notes and claims of the bank, representing
debts due to it by others, if it becomes necessary to do so.^^* He may
borrow money for the bank and execute the company's paper for the
same.^^^ The directors may, indeed, deprive the cashier of this power
by placing it in the hands of some other officer, or one especially ap-
pointed for that purpose ; but it being a common usage among banks
for the cashier to discharge that duty, in the absence of notice of the
deprivation of such power third parties would be protected in dealing
with the cashier on the assumption that he had such authority. ^-'^
Such are a few of, the most generally-recognized inherent powers of
bank cashiers, but they are by no means even the greater portion of
these. A cashier may also perform many acts for his bank which are
not a portion of his inherent authority, but which he has been espe-
cially authorized to do by the charter, or by the vote of the directors,
or even by the custom of bankers in the particular community. He
can only bind the bank by acts within the scope of his employment:
he can not, for example, bind his principal by official indorsement of
his, the cashier's, individual note;^^^ and he can not render the bank
liable for any acts or declarations done or made in the pursuit of his
private business. ^^^
§ 439. Tellers.—Cashiers of all but very small banks have under
them as assistants certain officers called "tellers." These are the
"» Ante, § 207. 23.
'" Spear v. Ladd. 11 Mass. 94. ^' Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Koh-
"'Bank of Genesee v. Patchin ner, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 267.
Bank, 13 N. Y. 309; Robb v. Ross ^-"'' Grain v. First Nat'l Bank, 114
Go. Bank, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 586; 111. 516.
Houghton v. First Nat'l Bank, 26 '-'West St. Louis Sav. Bank v.
Wis. 663. See ante, § 222. Shawnee Go. Bank, 95 U. S. 557.
'='aSee ante, § 222. '=» Allen v. First Nat'l Bank, 127
"* Eastman v. Goos Bank, 1 N. H. Pa. St. 51, U Am. St. 829.
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cashier's subordinates, but they are not subagents in the sense of ren-
dering him liable for their defaults. Tellers, where the business justi-
fies it, are divided into paying tellers and receiving tellers ; and, as the
respective terms indicate, the one is engaged in paying out and the
other in taking in the moneys of the bank. These officers are Irat the
cashier's arms, so to speak, by which different portions of his own
functions are performed. ^^'* They only perform such portions of the
business as would otherwise be intrusted to the cashier, but is not be-
cause he has not the time to do such business himself; and hence,
their functions can not be said to be independent of, but rather are
concurrent with, those of the cashier. Where a statute authorized a
"bank" to receive money on deposit, it was held that the cashier, as the
agent of such bank, was authorized to receive money on deposit, re-
ceipt for the same, and enter it upon the books of the bank, and that
the bank would be bound by his act."" Generally, a person desiring
to make a deposit in a bank should place it with the receiving teller,
as the paying teller is not authorized to receive money for the bank;
and if he receives it nevertheless, he thereby becomes the agent of the
depositor, and renders the l^ank liable only in the event he pays the
money over to the proper officer and it becomes a portion of the funds
of the hank."^
§ 440. Liability of bank for acts of officers.—As between the bank
and its officers, the former is liable for their acts only when they have
been duly authorized or ratified. If an act is done outside the au-
thority conferred on such officer or agent, the latter is responsible to
the injured party in person, and may also be liable in damages to the
bank, if any loss has been incurred hj it. As between the bank and
third persons, the former is liable for all the acts of its agents or
officers performed in the course of the business in which they are
employed, the same as in the case of any other agent."- Even if the
act is outside the real and apparent authority of the officer, but is
subsequently ratified by the bank,—as, for example, by retaining the
benefits derived from it,—the bank will be bound by such act.^^'
And so, the bank will also be bound by notice to or knowledge of its
"» Merchants' Bank v. State Bank,
10 Wall. (U. S.) 604.
""State Bank v. Kain, 1 111. 75;
Squires v. First Nafl Bank. 59 111.
App. 134.
"'Thatcher v. Bank of State of
New York. 5 Sandf. (X. Y. Super.)
121. See East River Natl Bank v.
Gove. 57 N. Y. 597. 602. 603.
'"West V. First Nafl Bank. 20
Hun (N. Y.) 408.
^^Ante, § 96, et seq.
J
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officers or agents, unless the knowledge or information was obtained
outside the scope of the agent's authority.^ ^^
§ 441. Liability of third persons to bank on contracts made with
officer.—As to the liabilit}- of third persons to the bank on contracts
made on its behalf by its officers or agents, with its authority, or
without such authority and subsequently ratified, it is much the same
as in case of individuals or other corporations.^^" Thus, if a cashier
or other officer of a bank use the bank's money in payment of his own
obligations, the third party will be liable to the principal for the
money thus obtained by him, unless such third party be an innocent
holder of such fund, for value, without notice.^^®
^^ Bank of Columbia v. Patterson,
7 Cranch (U. S.) 299; Fleckner v.
Bank of U. S., 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 338.
^^ See chap. 10. ante.
^ Bank of Metropolis v. New Eng-
land Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 212; May
V. LeClaire, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 217;
United States v. State Bank, 96 U.
S. 30.
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§ 442. Their authority.—We have previously given the definition
of a broker and pointed out the various classes. A broker derives
his authorit}' from his principal, the same as other agents, either by
express appointment or by implication ; and it is proved in the same
manner.^^*'^ A letter to a broker by his principal stating that he
had paid a specified price for certain property and would not sell it
for less than a certain other sum, and that the broker could have all
over that sum, is at most an authority to find a bu3'er, but not to
make the sale.^^^ When it is conceded that the broker has a general
authority, the particular authority claimed for him may be shown
by the usages and customs of the business in wliich he is employed.
Thus, where one employs a broker in some particular line of business,
he has such implied authority as usage and custom of the business in
that particular community sanction. But usage can never take the
place of positive instructions;"^ and where such instructions are in
writing and understood by the parties, the law will not tolerate any
deviation from them so as to affect the rights of the parties. ^^* Nor
will usage authorize any contract which is illegal or contrary to public
policy.^**' Whatever is necessary to effect the purpose of his employ-
^^'a See Jesson v. Texas Land &
Loan Co., 3 Tex. Civ. App. 25.
'^''Campbell v. Galloway, 148 Ind.
440.
'^^Ante, § 193; Riday v. Oil, etc.,
Pub. Co., 7 N. Y. St. 31.
(482)
'=^ Parsons v. Martin, 11 Gray
(Mass.) 111.
'*^ Wheeler v. Newbould, 16 N. Y.
392. See Barnard v. Kellogg, 10
Wall. (U. S.) 383.
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nient is included in his implied powers, unless he has instructions
to the contrary: the authority to sign "bought" and "sold" notes
being one of the implied powers of a broker.^*^ And where a broker
sells by sample, he impliedly warrants that the bulk shall correspond
to the sample; and this power is included in his general authority.
In such case, the article itself not being open to inspection, the rule
caveat emptor does not apply.^*^ And so, a loan-broker has im-
plied authority to bind his principal to the party who is to loan the
money, that "full brief of title and searches, with opinion of counsel
will be required ;"^*^ for as said by Mitchell, J., in the case cited in
the note, "Any owner * * * ^^g bound to know that a loan
would not in the ordinary course of business be made on mortgage
without an examination of title, and finding it marketable for mort-
gage purposes, and this was a matter for the opinion of counsel."
A broker ordinarily has no authority to receive payment, not having
the goods in his possession;^** and this is so if he sells by sample.^*^
As we have already seen, a broker can not, as a general rule, act for
both parties to a sale, where there is a conflict of interest such as
there usually is between the purchaser and seller of property ;^**^ if,
however, the injured principal, with a full knowledge of all the facts,
subsequently ratifies the transaction, the contract is binding on him."^
But in respect of points in which their interests are not antagonistic,
such as making the memorandum of sale, etc., the broker may law-
fully represent both parties;^** and certainly he may do so, if both
principals have knowledge of the fact that he is acting for both and
make no objections r^*^ after he has brought the parties together, his
'"Saladin v. Mitchell, 45 111. 79. Hemmer, 1 Allen (Mass.) 494, 79
^"Boorman v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. Am. Dec. 756; Borie v. Satter-
(N. Y.) 566, 27 Am. Dec. 158. thwaite, 12 Montg. Co. L. Rep. (Pa.)
"'Middleton v. Ttiompson, 163 194; Marsh v. Buchan, 46 N. J. Eq.
Pa. St. 112. 595.
^" Story Ag., §§ 61, 106; Higgins '" IMd.
V. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417. Hence a "' Story Ag., § 31. Where a mem-
payment to a broker will not re- orandum is required by the statute
lease the party who pays to him, of frauds, the broker's entry of the
from liability: Wharton Neg., § 714; sale is sufficient to satisfy the stat-
Crosby v. Hill, 39 Ohio St. 100. See ute, and is binding on both parties:
also, Law v. Stokes, 32 N. J. L. 249. Wharton Ag., § 718.
'" Butler V. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298, "" Alexander v. North Western,
30 Am. Rep. 795. etc.. University, 57 Ind. 466.
^*^ Ante, § 244; Farnsworth v.
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employment ends, anjd he may then act for either or both principals.^ ^^
Neither can a broker who is employed to sell purchase of himself.^"^
A broker, like any other agent, should contract in the name of his
principal; and if he contracts in his own name, without disclosing
his principal, he makes himself personally liable; although the third
party may elect to hold the principal when he discovers liim.^°^
When he is authorized to sell, he has no implied power to sell on
credit. ^^^ The authority of a broker may be revoked at any time, as
in other eases of agency; and the revocation may be implied from
the circumstances; as, from the employment of another broker and
the accomplishment by the latter of the object of the employment. ^^*
But where the authority is to sell within a certain time, the principal
can not revoke the authority sooner and escape liability, if the broker
finds a purchaser within such time.^^*^
§ 443. Duty of broker to principal.—It is the duty of a broker,
with reference to the subject-matter of the agency, to obey the prin-
cipal's instructions, to act in good faith, to exercise reasonable
skill and diligence in the performance of his undertaking, and to
account for all the proceeds arising from the business intrusted to
him. Respecting the duty of obedience, it may be stated as an axiom-
atic proposition that the broker, like any other agent, engages to
execute the will and judgment of his principal, and not his own ; and
if the broker is instructed to pursue a certain course, it is his duty
to follow such instruction substantially, or give notice that he will
not continue longer in the principal's employment.^^^ Hence, if he
has instructions to sell the principal's property at a certain price,
and he sells for a less price, he will be liable to the principal for the
difference ;^^^ and when he is directed to sell for cash, he has no dis-
cretion to sell on credit. ^^^ A broker is, of course, not an insurer
of the success of the business in which he engages for his principal:
if he follows the directions of the 2:)rincipal hona fide, this is all he
^^^ See Woods v. Rocchi, 32 La. *" Ahern v. Baker, 34 Minn. 98.
Ann. 210. '"a Blumenthal v. Goodall, 89 Cal.
"^ Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344; 251.
Hughes V. Washington, 72 111. 84; "= Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193.
Taussig V. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425. ^^ See Dufresne v. Hutchinson, 3
'^2 Graham v. Duckwall, 8 Bush Taunt. 117.
(Ky.) 12. "'Boorman v. Brown. 3 A. & B.
"^ Illinois V. Delafield. 8 Paige (N. (N. S.) 511. 43 E. C. L. 843.
Y.) 527. '
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is required to do; and he is not responsible for any loss that may
follow. ^^* The broker is not acting in good faith, if, when he is em-
ployed by one to purchase certain land, he fails to disclose to such
person that he is already employed to sell the same land,^^** and if he
fails to account for a surplus remaining over and above the amount
given him with which to purchase.^^" It is likewise the duty of a
broker to possess reasonable skill and exercise proper care in the
transaction of the business intrusted to him;^''^ thus, if a broker
who is employed to sell real estate, through want of skill or diligence,
sell the same for less than its real value, he will be liable to his princi-
pal in damages ; and he will not be excused because he believed in good
faith he was receiving the full value of the property;^®- and if he
neglects to take sufficient security when he sells on credit, he is liable
to the principal for the loss.^®^ He will, of course, be liable for the
difference if he sell property for less than the authorized price ;^''*
but if he exercise reasonable skill and care under the circumstances,
and act in good faith, he will not be liable although he should make
a mistake.^**^ It is also the duty of a broker to account to his prin-
cipal for all the proceeds of any sale he has made for him; and he is
not permitted to make any profits out of such sale, even though the
principal was willing to sell for a smaller amount.^®" But it has
been held that where the broker was employed to buy property at a
fixed sum, with the understanding that he should receive this price
without reference to what he might pay for it, he can not be made to
account for the difl:erence unless the transaction is, in some way, tinc-
tured with fraud. ^"^
^°« Matthews" v. Fuller, 123 Mass, '^- Price v. Keyes, 62 N. Y. 378.
446. "5 Harlow v. Bartlett, 170 Mass.
1^ Marsh v. Buchan, 46 N. J. Eq. 584.
595. '•« Taylor v. Ketehum, 28 N. Y.
'""Cottom v. Holliday, 59 111. 176. Super. 507.
See further, as to what Is in viola- "^ Matthews v. Fuller, 123 Mass.
tion of good faith of a broker, 446.
Turnbull v. Gadsden, 2 Strob. Eq. '"" Bassett v. Rogers, 165 Mass.
(S. C.) 14; Taylor v. Guest, 45 How. 377; Merryman v. David, 31 111.
Pr. (N. Y.) 276; Lewis v. Denison, 404; Tilleny v. Wolverton, 46 Minn.
2 App. D. C. 387; Love v. Hoss, 62 256; Kerfoot v. Hyman, 52 111. 512;
Ind. 255; Salsbury v. Ware, 183 111. Stearns v. Hochbrunn, 24 Wash.
505. 206.
^" Boorman v. Brown, 3 A. & E. '•'^ Anderson v. Weiser, 24 Iowa
(N. S.) 511, 43 E. C. L. 843; Stewart 428.
V. Muse, 62 Ind. 385„
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g 444. Principal's obligations to broker—Compensation, reimburse-
ment, etc.—The rights of the broker, as between him and his em-
ployer, are to be found in the contract entered into between them.
The chief obligation of the principal to the broker is to compensate
him for his services. If the contract specifies the amount or rate of
compensation the broker is to receive, that will te the amount to
which he will be entitled. A broker's compensation is usualh' made
by way of commissions ; that is, by a percentage on each dollar's worth
of property sold or purchased by him for the principal. If the com-
pensation is not specified, and the services have been fully performed,
the broker will be entitled to such compensation as the usages of the
business in the particular community entitle him to receive under the
particular circumstances. But even where the contract is express, and
stipulates for a certain commission, its construction is not always free
from difficulty. Thus, if the right to receive commissions be quali-
fied, by providing that no commissions shall be paid if the property
be "sold to a party sent by ]\Ir. E."; or if the time within which sales
to such persons might be made be limited,—the broker may or may
not 1)6 entitled to commissions, owing to whether or not the conditions
have been fulfilled. ^''^ Commissions are payable whenever the broker
has produced a party who is ready, willing and able to buy or sell, as
the case may be;^®" and the fact that the sale was actually made or
not is immaterial, if the broker has done his part;^'** when a bringing
together of the parties has thus been effected by the broker, his com-
missions are earned; and a subsequent modification of the contract,
without a new consideration, would not deprive the broker of the
right to recover. Thus, where a building-lot that had been placed
with a broker for sale was withdrawn from market, after it had been
sold by the broker, but he was laboring under the erroneous Ijelief
that the lot to be withdrawn was not the one sold, it was held that
he was entitled to his commissions.^"^ And a subsequent agreement
that no commission is to be paid unless a deed is executed, is without
consideration, and can not be enforced against the broker. ^^^ "Where
'"* Gaty V. Clark, 28 Mo. App. 332. ••" See cases in last note.
i'"See ante, §265; McFarland v. '"' Sayre v. Wilson. 86 Ala. 151. '
Lillard, 2 Ind. App. 160: Pape v, "= Mosko-«itz v. Hornberger. 38 N.
Wright, 116 Ind. 502; Cheatham v. Y. Supp. 114; McComb v. VonEllert,
Yarbrough, 90 Tenn. 77; Oullahan 27 N. Y. Supp. 372.
V. Baldwin. 100 Cal. 648; Telford v.
Brinkerhoff, 45 111. App. 586.
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a broker acts without, or in excess of, authority, he can not generally
recover commissions, unless the act be subsequently ratified.^"' Com-
missions are generally the kind of compensation to which brokers
are entitled; but it has been held that where one renders services in
assisting a broker in bringing about a sale, while, in a proper case, he
may recover compensation for the services, it is not by way of com-
missions.^'^ Compensation can generally only be collected by a
broker for services when the object of his appointment has been ac-
complished ; and when the broker, or his agent, notifies the principal
of his, the broker's, inability to perform the service for which he was
employed, there is an abandonment of the contract, and the principal
will not be liable for the services. ^'^^ ^Yhen there is such an aban-
donment, the broker can collect no commissions, although the prin-
cipal afterward sell the property to the person who was introduced
by the broker to the owner.^^'' The mere fact that the owner of the
property has employed a broker to sell it will not prevent him from
negotiating the sale himself, any more than it will prevent him from
placing the property for sale in another agency ; and in case of sale by
the owner, without the assistance of such broker, and before any sale
by the latter, the owner is not liable for commissions.^'" While a
real-estate broker is not entitled to compensation by either party
when, without their consent, he undertakes to represent two principals
adversely interested,^'* it has been held that where he has a farm for
sale for one principal, and is employed by another to effect an ex-
change of city property for the farm, and he brings the owners to-
gether, who make an exchange, there being no fraud on his part, he is
entitled to collect compensation also from the party who employed liim
to make the exchange.^'® A broker is not complying with the terms of
his employment to sell his principal's real estate by becoming the
purchaser himself or selling to a syndicate of which he is a member;
^"Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397; ^'' Dolan v. Scanlan, 57 Cal. 261;
Nesbitt V. Helser, 49 Mo. 383; Smith Waterman v. Boltinghouse, 82 Cal.
V. Schiele, 93 Cal. 144. 659; Doonan v. Ives, 73 Ga. 295;
"* Hawkins v. Chandler, 8 Houst. Stewart v. Murray, 92 Ind. 543, 47
(Del.) 434, 32 Atl. 464. Am. Rep. 167; Vandyke v. Walker,
1-5 Everett v. Farrell, 11 Ind. App. 49 Mo. App. 381.
185. '"'' Chapman v. Currie, 51 Mo. App.
"*Bouscher v. Larkins. 84 Hun 40; Strawbridge v. Swan, 43 Neb.
(N. Y.) 288, 32 N. Y. Supp. 305; 781; Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. St.
Fairchild v. Cunningham, 84 Minn. 25, 12 L. R. A. 395.
521, 88 N. W. 15. "°Cox v. Haun, 127 Ind. 325.
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and he is not entitled to any commissions in such case, in the absence
of an express agreement with full knowledge of his interest, to pay
such commissions.^®" But where there was an agreement that the
broker might himself become the purchaser, and the broker found a
purchaser to whom the owner refused to convey, and the broker, tak-
ing a deed on his own option, conveyed to the purchaser, it was held
that the broker was entitled to his commissions.^*^ It is sometimes
difficult to decide whether a broker has rendered such services as,
under his contract, entitle him to compensation; the mere fact that
he has contributed somewhat to a sale or purchase is not sufficient
:
he must be the efficient or procuring cause of the same.^*^ And a
broker can not be deprived of his commission, if he has introduced
the purchaser to the seller, although the latter make the sale himself,
voluntarily reducing the price of the property.^*^ In addition to
his compensation, a broker is also entitled to be reimbursed by his
principal for any expenses, losses, or outlays on account of the busi-
ness he was employed to transact, such as expenses and services in
bringing the property to market, etc. ;^** but he is entitled to reim-
bursement only if he effects a sale or purchase, as the case may be;^*'
and he can not recover compensation if he was guilty of such negli-
gence as rendered his services worthless. ^*'^
§ 445. Broker's remedies against principal.—A broker has the
same remedies as other agents, to enforce his right to compensation
against the principal. The common-law remedies of assumpsit and
debt are, of course, open to him; while in code states he may bring
his action on account, or on the special contract for services, for
compensation due him.^**' The broker, besides these ordinary reme-
dies, also has a lien on the fund or subject-matter of the agency, if
the same be in his possession ; and he may retain his commissions, etc..
^^ Hammond v. Bookwalter, 12
Ind. App. 177.
'"Riemer v. Rice, S8 Wis. 16, 59
N. W. 450.
^^-Whitcomb v. Bacon, 170 Mass.
479; Tombs v. Alexander, 101 Mass.
255, 3 Am. Rep. 349; Sussdorff v.
Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319; Zeimer v.
Antisell, 75 Cal. 509; Piatt v. Johr,
9 Ind. App. 58; Hoadley v. Savings
Bank, 71 Conn. 599, 44 L. R. A. 321.
''^Hafner v. Herron, 165 111. 242.
^^ Sentance v. Hawley, 13 C. B.
(N. S.) (106 E. C. L.) 458; Chilton
V. Butler, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 150
Bennett v. Covington. 22 Fed. 816
Wisehart v. Deitz, 67 Iowa 121
Esser v. Linderman, 71 Pa. St. 76.
^"Didion v. Duralde, 2 Rob. (La.)
163.
'"^a Fisher v. Dynes. 62 Ind. 348.
'^'Lockwood V. Rose. 125 Ind. 588;
Wright V. Beach, 82 Mich. 469.
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out of such fund;^^'' but brokers, having usually no possession of the
property which they buy or sell for their principals, have no general
lien; and can enforce a particular lien only when they do have pos-
session of the property or thing on which it is asserted.^^*
§ 446. Liability of principal to third parties.—The principal is
liable on all contracts entered into in his behalf by the broker which
were actually or apparently authorized, but not on contracts that
were either unauthorized or in excess of the actual authority, unless
they were within its apparent scope. ^^"^ Thus, where a broker who
was authorized to sell stock, without special authority to sell it on
credit, nevertheless did sell it on credit, it was held that the owner
of the stock was not bound by the contract.^®" And so, where a
broker deviated from his instructions by taking notes and payments
for a sale different from those mentioned in such instructions, of
which the purchaser had knowledge, the principal was held not bound
by the sale.^^^ Where a broker was directed to sell cotton and deliver
a bill of lading for it only upon payment of a draft drawn on the
purchaser for the goods, but the broker delivered up such bill of
lading upon the acceptance by the purchaser of such draft for such
amount, and without receiving any money for the same,—it was held
that the purchaser took no title to the property, and that an action
would lie by the owner against the third party for the conversion of
^"Vinton v. Baldwin, 95 Ind. 433; tics of a factor, he is entitled to a
Barry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59. An lien upon such property, or on the
insurance broker, at common law, proceeds thereof, if in his posses-
has a general lien on policies for sion, for his commissions:" Per
any balance due him. He is usu- Collins, J., in Peterson v. Hall, 61
ally intrusted with the possession Minn. 268, 63 N. W. 733. A real-es-
of policies so as to enable him to tate broker has no general lien
make adjustment of losses; and if upon title papers in his hands, un-
a policy thus in his possession was less he is an attorney at law, and
effected by him, he may retain it to the relation of attorney and client
secure any balance due him by his subsists between him and his prin-
principal on their mutual accounts cipal: Carpenter v. Momsen, 92
concerning the business: Wharton Wis. 449.
Ag., § 707. '^'Wanless v. McCandless, 38
'^' Barry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59. Iowa 20; Lawrence v. Gallagher, 42
"Where a broker is intrusted with N. Y. Super. 309; Smith v. Allen,
possession of the property in re- 101 Iowa 608.
spect to which he negotiates, thus "" Wiltshire v. Sims, 1 Campb.
combining with his character as a 258.
broker certain of the characteris- ^'•'^ Siebold v. Davis, 67 Iowa 560.
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the goods. The facts in the ease show that the agenc}' was hut a
special one, and the purchaser was bound to know the brokers au-
thority.^'^- Indeed, the agency of a broker is generally a limited one;
and in the absence of circumstances showing that he has a general
authority, parties who deal with a broker are bound to ascertain what
the real extent of his authority is ; and if there are letters they should
ascertain their contents.^**^ But the third party may safely act upon
appearances, if the vendor has created these. ^®* When a sale has
once been completed between a broker and purchaser, and the goods
shipped and bill of lading forwarded directly to the latter, it is not
within the general authorit}' of the jjroker to rescind the contract;
and if in such case the broker receives from the purchaser the bill of
lading indorsed by the latter, and thus obtains possession of the goods
from the carrier or causes them to be delivered to another, the pur-
chaser is not relieved from liability to the seller for the price at which
the goods were sold on the original contract; and this is true not-
withstanding a custom by which such dealings between the broker
and purchaser are recognized and upheld, unless the custom wa~
known to the seller, so that his assent to the usage could reasonably
be inferred.^ "^ The principal is liable for the acts of a broker even
thoiigh the latter had no express authority from the former, but only
did some act or acts from which a holding out could be properly in-
ferred; but the mere fact that a broker erects a sign upon property
advertising it for sale by him, as agent, Init without stating who is
the principal or owner, does not constitute such a holding out by the
principal of the broker to the public as will justify a tliird party to
purchase the property of the broker.^***^ If authority has been prop-
erly granted the broker, and in pursuance thereof he sells property
and receives the required deposit, the purchaser can sue the seller and
recover from him the deposit, if the conditions are broken ; and he
need not, in such case, sue the broker. ^°^ A vendor is also liable to
a purchaser who has incurred loss thereby for fraud or misrepre-
sentation in a sale by the broker who made it; but the purchaser
must have relied upon the fraudulent or false representations, and
^^ Stollenwerck v. Thacher, 115 ''' Kellj- v. Kauffman Milling Co.,
Mass. 224. 92 Ga. 105, IS S. E. 363.
"' Merritt v. Wassenich, 49 Fed. '* Davis v. Gordon. 87 Va. 559.
785. ''' Malone v. Ruffino, 129 Cal. 514.
"" See Association v. Miller, 1
W. N. C. (Pa.) 120.
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not upon some other fact as an inducement.^''* However, in such ease,
if the sale was to a firm of which the broker was a member, the firm
can not recover damages from the principal for the agent's wrong;
for the other members of such firm were parties to the broker's vio-
lation of his trust. ^^® Where goods have been sold by sample, by the
broker, there is, as we have heretofore seen, an implied warranty
that the bulk of the goods will correspond with the sample; and, in
such case, if they do not correspond, the seller is liable to the pur-
chaser for the damage.--"* As a general rule, however, a broker has
no implied power, by the usages of trade, to warrant the goods to be
of a mcrchantiible quality; and his principal will therefore incur no
liability on account of such warranty.-*'^ The principal may, of
course, render himself liable for the unauthorized acts of the broker
by a subsequent ratification; and such ratification will, as in other
cases, relate back to the time the act was performed;-"- and this is
true whether the broker acted altogether without authority or simply
exceeded his powers. The ratification need not be made by the prin-
cipal in person, but may be effected by another agent. Hence, where
a real-estate broker undertook to sell the owner's land without suffi-
cient authority; and the owner sent another agent to make investiga-
tion, instructing him that if he found the contract price was a proper
one, and it was to the principaFs interest to carry it into effect, to
do so in his name; and such agent, upon satisfying himself that the
sale would be l^eneficial to the principal, agreed in writing to carry
out the broker's contract,—it was held that this was a sufficient
ratification to bind the principal, and that the latter might, in a
proper case, be decreed to make specific performance.-''^ A principal
may also estop himself from denying the broker's authority, although
not actually conferred. Thus, where a vendee of a mine accepted
title and made part payment according to the terms agreed upon
between the vendor of the mine and the broker through whom the
sale was made, the court ruled that the vendor could not successfully
deny the broker's authority to make the agreement and that the
vendee had rendered himself liable on such agreement.-*** And where
"'Pineville, etc., Co. v. Hollings- . ="' Dood v. Farlow, 93 Mass. 426,
worth, 21 Ky. L. 899, 53 S. W. 279. 87 Am. Dec. 726.
"''Ibid. ="-Roby v. Cossitt. 78 111. 638;
-"" Boorman v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. Rowan v. Hyatt, 45 N. Y. 138.
(N. Y.) 566, 27 Am. Dec. 158; Beebe ="' Hoyt v. Tuxbury. 70 111. 331.
V. Robert, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 413. ="' Seymour v. Slide & Spur Gold
Mines, 42 Fed. 633.
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a person bought apples through a broker, who examined and accepted
them, it was held that the purchaser was estopped, in an action for
the purchase price, to claim that the quality of such apples was not
what had been bargained for.-"^ "Whatever may have been the kind
and quality of the apples received by the appellee," said the court,
"they were the ones purchased by him through his agent, with full
knowledge of their quality and condition, under an agreement to pay
for them the price sued for. Therefore, if the apples were not as the
appellee ordered, and he has been injured by having put off on him
apples of less value, he must look to his agent, and not to appel-
lants, for the damages," A principal, in dealing through a broker,
may even estop himself from pleading usury by permitting his broker
to represent that a note offered for sale by such broker for the prin-
cipal is "business paper." Thus, where one was indebted to a note-
broker, and, for the purpose of reducing such indebtedness, placed in
the broker's hands his own promissory note to be sold by the broker
at a discount of twelve per cent., the proceeds to be applied on such
indebtedness; and the broker sold the note at such discount, repre-
senting that it was first-class business paper; and the maker of the
note subsequently brought suit against the holder to cancel the note,
as usurious,—it was decided that, the broker being the agent of the
maker of the note, in the sale thereof, the maker was estopped to set
up the usury.-"'' "It appears," said the court, "that Ahern knew
that the first note made by him was to be sold by Bound & Co. [the
brokers]. He also knew, as his testimony shows, that it was to be
sold in pursuance of a prior negotiation, at a discount of twelve per
centum per annum. lie knew that the note was not business paper.
He had been a large purchaa'r of Bound & Co., and hence knew their
mode of effecting sales of paper. It is to be inferred that he knew
tliat in the purchase of paper at a greater rate of discount than seven
per centum per anntim, the buyer usually exacted a representation
that the paper sold was business paper, so that he might rely upon
the fact, if indeed the paper was such, or upon the estoppel if it was
not."
§ 447. Bought and sold notes.—By the usage of trade, when a
broker has negotiated a sale, he makes an entry in his book and gives
each party a copy thereof ; or he may give out such memoranda with-
^'^ Killough v. Cleveland
Civ. App.), 33 S. W. 1040.
(Tex. =« Ahern v. Goodspeed, 72 N. Y.
lOS.
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out an entry in the book. Such memorandum, when delivered to
the purchaser, is called the "bought note," and when delivered to
the seller, the "sold note."^''^ Although there is some conflict in the
authorities, it seems to be the weight of opinion that the bought and
sold notes do not constitute the original contract, but that the best
evidence of this is to be found in the book entry; the bought and
sold notes being sent by the broker to the vendor and vendee more
in the way of information that he has acted upon their instruc-
tions.-"^ But if it be the custom to make no book entry, and to use
the bought and sold notes, as such, these will be sufficient, and the best
evidence of the contract.^*"* When a book entry has been made and
signed by the broker for both parties, it is always the best evidence of
the contract ; and if there be a conflict between its statements and those
of the bought and sold notes, the contents of the entry will be taken as
the evidence of the contract.-^" If there is no entry, or it is not signed,
and the bought and sold notes contain all the terms of the contract,
and there is no variance between them, they are sufficient to satisfy
the statute.^^^ But if, in the absence of a signed entry, there is a
material conflict between the bought and sold notes, the notes will
not be taken to establish the existence of the contract, and the sale is
invalid, or at least may be avoided ;-^^ the variance, however, must
be a material one, or it will not render the contract invalid ;-^^ a mere
difference in language is not a variance if the meaning be practically
the same.^^* And where the vendee himself signed such a note and
through the broker delivered it to the vendor, it was held that he was
bound by it, though it was at variance with the note sent to the
vehdee.2^^ To prove a variance when one note has been introduced
in evidence, the other party may give in evidence the signed entry or
^^ Wharton Ag., § 719; Benjamin ='- Sievewright v. Archibald, 20 L.
Sales, § 276. J. Q. B. 529, 17 Q. B. (79 E. C. L.)
^"^ Sievewright v. Archibald, 20 L. 103; Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend. (N.
J. Q. B. 529, 17 Q. B. (79 E. C. L.) Y.) 341; Butters v. Glass, 31 Up.
103, per Ld. Campbell, C. J.; Mac- Can. Q. B. 379.
lean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722, 13 E. C. ='« pijjppen y. Hyland, 19 Up. Can.
L. 710. C. P. 416; Sievewright v. Archibald,
='^Hawes v. Foster, 1 Mood. & 20 L. J. Q. B. 529, 17 Q. B. (79 E.
Rob. 368. C. L.) 103.
""Benjamin Sales, § 294. =" Benjamin Sales, § 304.
^" Hawes v. Foster, 1 Mood. & Rob. "° Rowe v. Osborne, 1 Stark. 112,
368; Parton v. Crofts, 16 C. B. (N. 2 E. C. L. 61.
S.) (Ill E. C. L.) 11.
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the note held by himself.-^® The authority of the broker may be
revoked at any time before his task has been performed; but when
the broker has once signed the entry or the notes constituting the
bargain, it is too late to revoke his authority, although this might
have been done at any time prior to such signing.-^^
§ 448. Liability for torts.—Both the principal and the broker are
liable for torts, as in case of other agencies. The principal is only
liable, of course, when the wrongful act was committed in the course
of the broker's employment; while the broker is responsible for his
wrongful acts whether they were committed within the scope of his
employment or not. If a broker wrongfully converts a third person's
goods to his own use, he is answerable to him in an action of trover,
or, in a proper case, an action of assumpsit; and this is true, even if
the conversion take place under the direction of his principal.^^®
''"Benjamin Sales, § 298.
"' Idem, § 305.
-"Wharton Ag., § 731.
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§ 449. Who is a factor—Factors' acts.—A factor, as was said in a
previous place, is an agent who, for a commission, sells goods for
his principal which the latter has consigned to him; and he is also
called a "commission merchant" and a "consignee.""^ ^ To consti-
tute a factor the agent must pursue the business as a trade : a jjerson
who makes a single sale for the principal of some particular thing
not 'being a factor unless it is a part of his vocation. But he need
not be confined to the sale of property in the condition in which it is
consigned to him: the property may undergo change by manufac-
turing, etc., before it is offered for sale; thus, a person who kills
hogs and sells the products thereof for others is a factor.-^" A fac-
tor usually transacts his business in some locality other than that of
the principal, and frequently in a different country, though not neces-
sarily so. Ordinarily the factor must have the goods in his posses-
sion, though he may sell by sample only ; and he must be clothed with
the power to sell, but has at common law no incidental power to
pledge or barter the goods. ^-^ What are known as "factors' acts" are
statutory enactments designed for the protection of persons who in
good faith buy goods of factors or other agents and pay for them with-
out knowing that they are the property of some other person than
the agent. ^^^ These acts being in derogation of the common law
^'^ Ante, § 22. "> See Wharton Ag., § 735.
"" Shaw V. F^prguson, 78 Ind. 547. "- Benjamin Sales, § 19.
(495)
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must be strictly construed.--' The protection is confined to cases of
agents or factors wlio have possession of the goods and who, from
the nature of their employment, possess the right to sell.^-* So,
where a valuable opal table was intrusted to one who, as a part of his
known business, also sold such things for other people in his own
name, having them in possession,—but in this particular instance
directions having been given him not to sell the article without first
obtaining authority from the owner, and that the check that might
be received in payment be delivered to the principal intact, the com-
mission to be paid to the principal thereafter,—it was decided by the
English queen's bench that the purchaser was not protected by the
factors' acts.--^ The court, by Wills, J., said: "Do the factors'
acts protect the defendant? I think not. I think it is an essential
condition of validity of a sale protected by them that the goods should
have been intrusted to the agent for sale. I think the factors' acts
would apply, so far as relates to the business which Geddes was car-
rying on, the nature of the article dealt in, and what -was usually
in such a trade. But the defect that the article never was intrusted
to him for sale is fatal. I think there is another difficulty. In or-
der to validate payment to the agent under 6 Geo. IV., ch. 94, § 4,
it must be made in the ordinar}' course of business ; that is, by cash or
check or bill, as the case may be. I do not think that buying up a
judgment from some one else, partly by delivery of a diamond of the
defendant's own, can be considered as payment in the ordinary course
within the section. And there, is good reason for it. If the agent
gets cash, he may be able to hand it to his principal ; but if he does
not get cash, and there is only a transaction of this kind, he can not,
if impecunious, pay the principal; it is out of his power to do so."
That the agent occasionally sells goods, although he generally acts in
some other capacity, does not entitle the person dealing with him to
protection under the statute. These statutes are in part confirma-
tory of the common law and in part alterations of that law.--*' It is
generally held that the statutes are applical)le only to mercantile
transactions.--' But under the present English act a sale by one
"* Victor Sewing Mach. Co. v. Hel- =^ Evans Pr. & Ag. (Bedford's
ler, 44 Wis. 265. ed.) 487, 488.
=" Benjamin Sales, § 19; Thacker -• Levi v. Booth. 58 Md. 305. 42
v. Moors, 134 Mass. 156; H. A. Pren- Am. Rep. 332; Lamb v. Attenbor-
tice Co. V. Page. 164 Mass. 276. ough. 1 B. & S. (101 E. C. L.) 831;
"^ Biggs V. Evans, L. R. (1894) Bush v. Fry, 15 Ont. 122.
1 Q. B. 88.
497 FACTORS. § 450
who holds possession under an agreement to purchase shall have the
same effect as if he were a mercantile agent in possession of the
goods."^^ By the weight of authority one buying in good faith from
a conditional vendor gets no title unless the rule has been changed
by statute.--'^ The common law did not recognize in the agent any
power to pledge the goods consigned to him, whether he had actual
possession or possession constructively by means of documents, such
as bills of lading, etc. ; for he could not give any greater title than he
had. This entailed great hardsliip upon innocent purchasers and
proved injurious to commerce, and these factors' acts were in-
tended to remedy such evils. Factors' acts were first passed in Eng-
land in 1823, and as late as 1889; the latter repealing all former
acts upon the subject and embodying many of the provisions of the
former ones. Similar enactments were adopted in many of the
states of the Union.
§ 450. Factor's authority—How conferred and exercised.—The
authority of a factor from his principal must be by appointment, and
there must be an acceptance on the part of the factor.--'' But the
appointment and acceptance need not be shown by positive evidence,
but may be implied from the circumstances; as, where one sends
goods to a broker of the kind which he generallj^ sells : the presumption
in such case being that they were sent to be sold, and such act being
held to give implied authority to the agent to sell.^^** The principal
may show, however, how the goods came into the factor's possession,
and that they were not consigned to him for sale.-^^ It is not neces-
sary to the validity of the factor's authority that it be conferred in
writing.^^- The sale, in order to bind the principal, must be made in
the ordinary course of business. "Such a construction of his power,"
said the court of appeals in a ISTew York case, speaking of the con-
struction of a factor's power to sell outside the ordinary course of
=^aLee v. Butler, L. R. (1893) 2 ^^'^ Dows v. McCleary, 14 111. App.
Q. B. 318. 137; Smith v. Clews, 105 N. Y. 283.
--'Story Sales, § 313; Armour v. ^^^ Cook v. Beal, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.)
Pecker, 123 Mass. 143; Lanman v. 497; H. A. Prentice Co. v. Page, 164
McGregor, 94 Ind. 301; National Mass. 276.
Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, etc., =" Deshler v. Beers, 32 111. 368, 83
R. Co., 44 Minn. 224, 20 Am. St. 566. Am. Dec. 274.
"' See Rapp v. Livingston, 14 Daly
(N. Y.) 402.
!
32
—
Principal and Agent.
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business, "w/)uld be inconvenient and might lead to great abuses. It
would enable the factor to put his principal's property out of his
hands before any default on the part of his principal, thereby de-
priving the latter of the right to the possession of his property on
discharging the factor's claim. Assuming that the transferee
would himself be held to account, it subjects the principal to the em-
barrassment of calling third parties into the settlement of his trans-
action with his agent. The transaction in this case was out of the
ordinary course of business and has all the earmarks of an irregular
proceeding."^^^ A general usage or custom may, if not contrary to
law or to the express provisions of the broker's instructions or au-
thority, confer authority upon the factor which has not been expressly
delegated; indeed, the larger portion of the authority exercised by
factors is that derived by implication from the usages of trade.
Such a usage, however, must be so notorious as to raise the presump-
tion that it was generally known.-^* A factor's authority is always
governed by the law of the place where the sale or contract of dis-
position is made by him.-^^ But where the parties themselves place
a construction upon the contract, as to whether it is a consignment or
a sale, it is conclusive, without reference to what it actually was un-
der the law.-^'' A factor's business being to sell, all the powers
properly incident thereto are necessarily implied. It is not deemed
necessary to enumerate all or any considerable number of the powers
implied in a factor's authority to sell. It has been held that he may
employ counsel to defend any suits that may be brought against him
concerning the goods consigned to him, and his principal is bound
to reimburse him for the expenses incurred ;^'^ that where the factor
is employed to sell the goods of a manufacturing company and to buy
stock, he has power to buy on credit, but not to give the note of the
corporation;-^^ and that he may give bond when necessary to carry
out the instructions of the principal.'^® But a factor has no author-
ity to compromise a suit;-*" nor to sell a debt due his principal in
-^Per Andrews, J., in Commer- =" Monnet v. Merz, 127 N. Y. 151.
cial Nat'l Bank v. Heilbronner, 108 158.
N. Y. 439. "^ Emerson v. Providence Mfg.
=^Wootters v. Kaufman, 73 Tex. Co., 12 Mass. 237.
395; Lyon v. Culbertson, 83 111. 33. =^'-' Hardee v. Hall, 12 Bush (Ky.)
135 Prank v. Jenkins, 22 Ohio St. 327.
597; Harbert v. Neill, 49 Tex. 143. =*" See Monnett v. Merz, 127 N. Y.
^Pam v. Vilmar, 54 How. Pr. 151; Greenleaf v. Moody, 13 Allen
(N. Y.) 235. (Mass.) 363.
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order to reimburse himself for advances: the party buying such
claim getting no title to the same.-*^ A factor has no implied au-
thority to sell property not in his possession.-*- The power to sell
does not, under common-law rules, include the power to barter or
exchange the property for other goods.-^^ Neither has the factor
any power at common law to pledge such property except to the ex-
tent of his lien for compensation, advances, etc.-*'* Unless the factor
has instructions to the contrary, or the usage of trade is otherwise,
he may sell his principal's goods on a reasonable credit ;^*^ but in
such case it is the duty of the broker to use due care in selling to re-
sponsible parties. He has also the implied authority to warrant the
condition and quality of the goods sold by him f*^ but he has no au-
thority to warrant the goods as to future conditions, etc.^*'^ A fac-
tor has implied authority to insure the goods consigned to him, and
his interest in them is such that he may do so in his own name.-**
He may receive payment for goods sold.-*'' A factor, like any other
agent, is generally prohibited from delegating his authority to an-
other or others: he is a specialist in the business intrusted to him.
-" Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Heil-
bronner, 108 N. Y. 439.
=«Harbert v. Neill, 49 Tex. 143.
And where a factor has learned
that the property intrusted to him
for sale has been sold by his prin-
cipal, his authority to sell the same
is revoked, and he can not sell the
property even to the extent of sat-
isfying his lien for advances or for
liabilities incurred by him in the
attempt to sell such property, unless
the sale becomes necessary to pro-
tect his interest: Walker Co. v.
Dubuque Fruit, etc., Co., 106 Iowa
245, 53 L. R. A. 775.
^" Haas V. Damon, 9 Iowa 589;
Kauffman v. Beasley, 54 Tex. 563;
Victor Sewing Mach. Co. v. Heller,
44 Wis. 265; Trudo v. Anderson, 10
Mich. 357, 81 Am. Dec. 795.
'" Mechanics', etc., Ins. Co. v. Ki-
ger, 103 U. S. 352; Merchants' Nat'l
Bank v. Pope, 19 Or. 35; Allen v.
St. Louis Bank, 120 U. S. 20; Com-
mercial Bank v. Lee, 99 Ala. 493,
19 L. R. A. 705; National Exch.
Bank v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., 79
Ga. 22.
-" Burton v. Goodspeed, 69 111.
237; Roosevelt v. Doherty, 129 Mass.
301, 37 Am. Rep. 356; Daylight
Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H. 56,
12 Am. Rep. 45; Walker Co. v. Du-
buque Fruit, etc., Co., 106 Iowa 245,
53 L. R. A. 775; Foster v. Waller,
75 111. 464.
=*« Nelson v. Cowing, 6 Hill (N.
Y.) 336; Flash v. American Glucose
Co., 38 La. Ann. 4.
=" Upton V. Suffolk Co. Mills, 11
Cush. (Mass.) 586, 59 Am. Dec. 163.
=*'Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 111.
404; DeForest v. Fulton Fire Ins.
Co.. 1 Hall (N. Y.) 84, 110.
^^^ Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38;
Butler V. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298, 30
Am. Rep. 795; Corlies v. Gumming,
6 Cow. (N. Y.) 181; Graham v.
Duckwall, 8 Bush (Ky.) 12.
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and is required to act in person ;^^'' but as in other cases of agency,
mere ministerial and mechanical duties may be redelegated;-^^ and
the usages of trade or commerce frequently sanction a redelegation of
authority.^^^
§ 451. Factor's obligations to principal.—The general duties and
obligations of a factor to his principal are much the same as in other
agencies. He must, first and foremost, act in the utmost good faith
in the discharge of his duties.^"^ He can not, without the consent
of the principal, sell to himself,^^* such sale being prima facie in-
valid.^^^ Such a sale, however, is not absolutely void, and may,
therefore, be ratified at the principal's election.^^® He is required to
render implicit obedience to the instructions of his principal ;^^^ but
he is not in duty bound to follow directions which require him to
go outside of the scope of his employment, and he is not liable to the
principal if he refuses to do so.^^* He may, of course, make a sub-
sequent agreement to do this ; but it is no part of his original under-
taking; and he can not be said to be disobeying instructions for fail-
ure to take upon himself such additional obligations: if he obeys the
legitimate instructions of his principal, it is all he can be required
to do; but as to this he has no discretion. If injury results from
the obedience it is the principal's loss and not his. He must obey
if he can do so ;^^® he is only required to use reasonable diligence, and
if by so doing he is unable to comply, he will be exonerated.-*'' And
it has been held that a factor may sell his principal's goods even in
""McMorris v. Simpson, 21 Wend. ^^' Tilleny v. Wolverton, 46 Minn.
(N. Y.) 610; Kauffman v. Beasley, 256.
54 Tex. 563; Terry v. Bamberger, ^^ Sims v. Miller, 37 S. C. 402, 34
44 Conn. 558; Warner v. Martin, 11 Am. St. 762.
How. (U. S.) 209; Sparks v. Flan- "'Wilkinson v. Campbell, 1 Bay
Bery, 104 Ga. 323. (S. C.) 169; Maggoffin v. Cowan. 11
=^^ McMorris v. Simpson, supra. La. Ann. 554; Strong v. Stewart, 9
252
"Warner V. Martin, s«pm; Terry Heisk. (Tenn.) 137; Maynard v.
V. Bamberger, supra; Strong v. Pease, 99 Mass. 555; Rollins v.
Stewart 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 137, 147; Duffy, 18 111. App. 398.
Trueman v. Loder,. 11 A. & E. 589, "- Thompson v. Woodruff, 7 Coldw.
39 E. C. L. 319. (Tenn.) 401.
="Govan v. Cushing, 111 N. C. ='^' Evans v. Root, 7 N. Y. 186. 57
458; Rice v. Brook, 20 Fed. 611; Am. Dec. 512.
Babcock v. Orbison, 25 Ind. 75. "^ DeTastett v. Crousillat, 2 Wash.
==*Wadsworth v. Gay, 118 Mass. (U.S.) 132.
44.
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violation of instructions, to reimburse himself for advances : provided
he has made reasonable demand therefor of the principal without ob-
taining payment from him ;-*'^ in such case the agent has a special
property in the goods, which gives him such an interest therein as
enables him to make the sale, after proper demand. The English
courts deny the agent's right to make such a sale, however.-*'^ It is
also the factor's duty to inform the principal of everything which is
proper for the principal to know relating to the business intrust^ed
to the factor, and a failure to do so will render the agent liable in
damages.2^' Thus, where goods are sold by a factor on credit, and
the purchaser subsequently becomes insolvent, it is the duty of the
factor, if he have information of such insolvency, to notify the prin-
cipal thereof within a reasonable tinie.'*^'* And where it was the duty
of a factor to insure, and he was unable to do so for any reason, it was
held to be his duty to notify the principal of his inability, and that a
failure to do so would make the factor liable in damages.^® ^ It is
furthermore the duty of such agent to exercise ordinary care as to the
time and manner of selling the goods and transacting the business
of his principal generally.^^® He is not an insurer of the safety of
the goods in his custody, however, and if they are injured without
his negligence he can not be held liable.-*^" He is required to use
such skill and diligence as persons usually exercise in that kind of
business.-^^ So, if the goods naturally depreciate while in his pos-
session, the factor being without instructions to sell in his discretion,
he is not required to notify the principal of the depreciation and can
not be held responsible for it.^**® It is his duty to keep the goods of
his principal separate from his own and those of other owners;-^" but
by usage or custom he may be justified in .storing them with other
'"' Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. -"^ DeTastett v. Crousillat, 2 Wash.
(Mass.) 40; Davis v. Kobe, 36 Minn. (U. S.) 132.
214, 1 Am. St. 663; George Camp- ="« Milbank v. Dennistown, 10
bell Co. v. Angus, 91 Va. 438; Dalby Bosw. (N. Y.) 382; Eaton v. Welton,
V. Stearns, 132 Mass. 230. 32 N. H. 352; Atkinson v. Burton,
='-= Raleigh v. Atkinson, 6 M. & W. 4 Bush (Ky.) 299.
670; DeComas v. Prost, 3 Moo. P. C. -"'Dunbar v. Gregg, 44 111. App.
(N. S.) 158. 527.
-'"^ Howe V. Sutherland, 39 Iowa -•" See Foster v. Bush, 104 Ala.
484; Callander v. Oelrichs, 5 Bing. 662; Vincent v. Rather, 31 Tex. 77,
N. C. 58, 35 E. C. L. 41; DeTastett v. 98 Am. Dec. 516.
Crousillat, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 132. ='' Adams v. Capron, 21 Md. 186,
201 Forrestier v. Bordman, 1 Story 83 Am. Dec. 566.
(U. S.) 43. 2'° Clarke v. Tipping, 9 Beav. 284.
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goods of the same grade.^'^ He is not required, as a general rule, to
insure goods that have been consigned to him ;-'^ but when he is in-
trusted to do so he will be liable if he does not and there is a loss.-'^
Where it is the custom or habit of a factor to- insure, or where the
usage of the community requires it, the agent renders himself liable
for any loss that may occur by reason of his failure to effect such
insurance as will reasonably protect the property.^'* Of course, a
factor is in duty bound to account to his principal for all sales made
and for goods in his possession.^" ^ The duty to account includes
that of remitting the proceeds of sales when requested;-^® but he
need not remit until demand is made; and generally, if he does so,
the remittance will be at his own risk.-''
§ 452. Obligations of principal to factor.—Like other agents, a
factor is entitled from his principal to be compensated for his serv-
ices and to be reimbursed for proper expenditures and indemnified
against all losses properly incurred. He may, however, forfeit his
right to compensation and even to reimbursement, on account of his
misconduct or negligence in the discharge of his duties.-"* The
principal is also liable to the factor for advances made by him to the
principal. Advances are moneys paid by the factor to his principal
on the consignment of goods, and in anticipation of the debt that will
become due to the principal when the goods are sold;^"" and these,
it is held, are made both on the faith of the goods consigned to the
factor and on the principal's personal credit.^* ° The fact that the
goods have been destroyed will not prevent the factor from recover-
ing of the principal his advances.-*^ The principal is liable to the
^^ Davis v. Kobe, 36 Minn. 214, 1 -•'' Johnson v. Martin, 11 La. Ann.
Am. St. 663. 27, 66 Am. Dec. 193.
^'Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 111. =" White v. Chapman. 1 Stark. 113,
404; Lee v. Adsit, 37 N. Y. 78. 2 E. C. L. 51; Fordyce v. Peper. 16
^^ Shoenfeld v. Fleisher. siipi-a; Fed. 516: Fish v. Seeberger. 154 111.
Gordan v. Wright, 29 La. Ann. 812. 30; Norman v. Peper. 24 Fed. 403.
-"* Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, supra; -" Balderston v. National Rubber
Lee V. Adsit, supra; Burbridge v. Co.. 18 R. I. 338, 49 Am. St. 772.
Gumbel, 72 Miss. 370. =^' Stewart v. Lowe. 24 Up. Can.
='^See Fish v. Seeberger, 154 111. Q. B. 434; Perin v. Parker. 126 111.
30; Terwilliger v. Beals, 6 Lans. 201. 9 Am. St. 571; Balderston v.
(N. Y.) 403. National Rubber Co., 18 R. I. 338,
^«See Ferris v. Paris. 10 Johns. 49 Am. St. 772.
(N. Y.) 285; Cooley v. Betts, 24 =«• Kufeke v. Kehlor. 19 Fed. 198.
Wend. (N. Y.) 203; Middleton v.
Twombly, 125 N. Y. 520.
503 FACTORS. § 453
factor for all losses sustained by the latter without his own fault,
by reason of the agency. Thus, where a factor, after having ac-
counted to his principal, is compelled to refund to a purchaser the
price of goods, on account of negligent packing, he can recover the
amount thus paid by him from his principal.--- But he is not en-
titled to indemnity if the transaction from which the loss arose was
unauthorized by the principal,-^^ unless such transaction Avas subse-
quently ratified. A factor has a lien for his compensation or for
advances and other expenses legitimately incurred, upon the goods
consigned to him;^^* if the goods have been sold, the lien is upon the
proceeds or securities for the price of the goods sold.-^^ A factor
has a general lien for any balance due him on the accounts between
him and his principal ;^^^ but before such a lien accrues to the fac-
tor it must be shown that the goods were delivered to him as fac-
tor :^*^ a delivery to him of goods as agent for his principal by a third
person does not give him a lien, as such possession is the possession
of the principal.-** The factor must have possession of the goods
or he can claim no lien.^*^
§ 453. Rights of factor as to third parties.—A factor can main-
tain an action in his own name against a third party to whom he has
sold and delivered goods for his principal, for their price. "^'^ The
provision, found in the varying codes, by which the real party in in-
terest is required to prosecute every civil action in his own name, does
not stand in the way of the factor's right to maintain the action; for
there is generally contained in the codes the further provision, which
forms an exception to that already mentioned, requiring any "trustee
of an express trust" to bring such action in his own name without
=='2 Beach v. Branch, 57 Ga. 362. =^' Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1
See also, Randall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. Cowp. 251; Baker v. Fuller, 21 Pick.
37, 11 Am. Rep. 169. (Mass.) 318; Martin v. Pope, 6 Ala.
"^^ Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 532, 41 Am. Dec. 66; McGraft v.
(N. Y.) 219. Rugee, 60 Wis. 406, 50 Am. Rep.
=='^ Fourth Nat'l Bank v. American 378; Comer v. Way, 107 Ala. 300, 54
Mills Co., 29 Fed. 611; Shaw v. Fer- Am. St. 93.
guson, 78 Ind. 547; Jonnson v. -*' Dixon v. Stansfeld, 10 C. B.
Campbell, 120 Mass. 449; Harrison (70 E. C. L.) 398.
V. Mora, 150 Pa. St. 481. ='''Gurney v. Sharp, 4 Taunt. 242.
^''Vail V. Durant, 7 Allen (Mass.) ='*=' Warren v. First Nat'l Bank, 149
408, 83 Am. Dec. 695; Commercial 111. 9, 36; Baker v. Fuller, 21 Pick.
Nat'l Bank v. Heilbronner, 108 N. Y. (Mass.) 318.
439. ""Toland v. Murray, 18 Johns.
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joining the person for wliose benefit the action is prosecuted.^ ^^
These provisions are usually made applicable, by express statutory
enactment, to any person with whom, or in whose name, a contract
is made for the benefit of another:, such enactments being designed
to preserve the modern common-law right of action which exists by
reason of such conditions.-^- But, as in other suits of this charac-
ter by agents, the principal has the right to intervene and control the
suit: his claim being, of course, superior to that of the factor ;-^^
but the principal can not by such intervention defeat the factor's
right to recover to the extent of his lien.-''* In such suits by the
factor, the defendant can always interpose any defense that would
have been proper had the action been brought by the principal.-^^
Besides the factor's right to sue for the price of goods sold by him
for his principal, he may also maintain an action in his own name
against any wrongdoer for any injury to the goods, or for a breach of
- the contract of sale ;-^^ thus, he may bring suit in his own name
against the carrier of the goods for loss or injury caused by its neg-
ligence.^'*^ But he can not maintain such suit in his own name if he
has no lien.-"^ And to the extent of his lien on such goods for ad-
vances, etc., he may even maintain an qction against an attachment
creditor of liis principal who has taken the goods under a writ of at-
tachment, and recover from him the value of the special property.^^*
§ 454. Rights of principal as to third parties.-!-Xotwithstanding
the factor's right to sue in his own name on matters growing out of
contracts made in the principal's behalf, the latter also has the right,
indeed, he has the primary right, to do so, except so far as the factor
has an interest in the subject-matter of the agency: he may sue, as
any other principal may, on contracts made for him by the factor,
(N. Y.) 24; Graham v. Duckwall, 8 ='= Gibson v. Winter, 5 B. & Ad. 96,
Bush (Ky.) 12. 27 E. C. L. 50.
-'1 Wolfe V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., -"'Groover v. Warfield. 50 Ga. 644;
97 Mo. 473, 10 Am. St. 331. The Allen v. Steers, 39 La. Ann. 586.
factor, by reason of his lien, has -' Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Warrior
such interest as will entitle him to Mower Co., 76 Me. 251; Vose v.
sue in his own name: Dows v. Allen, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 289.
Greene, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 490. -'* Cobb v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.. 88
'^Ihid. 111. 394.
="•5 Jackson Ins. Co. v. Partee, 9 ="' Heard v. Brewer, 4 Daly (N.
Heisk. (Tenn.) 296. Y.) 136.
-^* Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1
Cowp. 251.
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the same as if made by himself ;^''° and this is true although the fac-
tor be a del credere agent.^"^ While the principal can not defeat the
just claim himself, he has the right to make collections of the re-
maining portion of such claim.^"^ And if the factor improperly dis-
poses of the goods,—as by pawning or selling them on his own credit,
—the third party having no knowledge of his being a factor or agent,
the principal may forbid the payment to be made to the factor ; and a
subsequent payment to the latter would be no protection to the pur-
chaser, unless he had given the factor some negotiable security which
had actually been negotiated before notice.^"^^ The rule just stated
does not apply, however, where the factor sells in his own name, being
himself responsible to the principal for the price of the goods sold,
whether collected or not; nor where he sells them to his own cred-
itor, where there are mutual dealings:^*** in these instances the prin-
cipal can look to the factor alone for payment. Where the factor
disposes of the goods consigned, taking in exchange for them shares
of stock in a company in which he is a stockholder, the purchaser ob-
tains no title, and the consignor may recover the goods from such
third party.^°^ If the principal was not disclosed when the sale was
made, and the transaction was in the factor's own name, the prin-
cipal may nevertheless assert his rights against the third party if
the factor did not by his agreement with the principal assume the
responsibility for the price of the goods sold; in such case he may
recover from the third party; and it is not necessary that the prin-
cipal first make a demand of the third party. ^°*^ The principal's claim
in such cases is always subject to any defenses, however, which the
third party would have had against the factor.^"^ And where the prin-
cipal was unknown at the time of the sale, the third party can set off
an antecedent debt which he held against the factor prior to the time
of the transaction by which such third party himself became indebt-
g(l_3os
"Where a factor," said Lord Mansfield, "dealing for a principal,
but concealing that principal, delivers goods in his own name, the per-
son contracting with him has the right to consider him, to all intents
=0" Burton V. Goodspeed, 69 111. 237. ^<^' Foster v. Smith, 2 Coldw.
='^' Moore v. Hillabrand, 37 Hun (Tenn.) 474, 88 Am. Dec. 604.
(N. Y.) 491. ^'George v. Clagett, 7 T. R. 355,
^"^ Morris v. Cleasby, 1 M. & S. 576. 2 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.) 118; Gardner
^^ Kinder v. Shaw, 2 Mass. 398. v. Allen, 6 Ala. 187, 41 Am. Dec. 45.
''^Kelley v. Munson, 7 Mass. 319. ••""• Hogan v. Short), 24 Wend. (N.
'o'Wyeth V. Renz-Bowles Co. Y.) 458.
(Ky.), 66 S. W. 825.
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and purposes, as the princij)al. And though the real principal may ap-
pear and bring an action upon that contract against the purchaser of
the goods, yet the purchaser may set off any claim he may have against
the factor in answer to the demand of the principal."^*'® But if the
principal be known, or if the third party have good reason to sus-
pect that the vendor of the goods is but an agent for some other per-
son, he must make inquiry and ascertain, if he can, in what capacity
or character the seller acts ; otherwise he will not be entitled to a set-
off.^ ^'^ It is not sufficient in such case, to entitle the debtor to a set-
off, that he was ignorant of the identity of the real principal : he must
have been unaware also that the seller was acting as agent.^^^ The
mere fact that the seller was in the commission business would not
of itself be notice to the purchaser, however, that he was a factor in
that particular transaction, if he also carried on business on his own
account. ^^^ Even where the factor takes a note for the purchase-
money payable to himself individually, the principal may sue for the
price unless the same was taken as a payment or amounted to such
in law.^^^ As the title to the goods consigned to a factor remains
in the principal,^" the latter can always maintain an action against
the purchaser for the same unless the proceeds have already been
paid to the factor under circumstances justifying such payment.
The factor holds the goods as trustee of the principal, and the prin-
cipal may follow them into the hands of any person except a bona
fide purchaser, where they can be identified.^ ^^ Under the common
law, one who acquires the principal's goods from a factor by barter
gets no title to them, and the principal may recover them in specie.^ ^®
In such case, the want of knowledge of the third party affords no
protection ; for the factor can give no title to the property, to which
he has none himself, except in the usual course of business.^^' If
2°''Rabone v. Williams, 7 T. R. ^^^ National Cordage Co. v. Sims,
356 n. 44 Neb. 148; Union Stock Yards
*" Miller v. Lea, 35 Md. 396, 6 Am. Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411;
Rep. 417; Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Baker v. National Exchange Bank,
Aid. 137; Cooke v. Eshelby, L. R. 100 N. Y. 31: Clemmer v. Drovers'
12 App. Cas. 271. Nat'l Bank. 157 111. 206; Cady v.
^" Miller v. Lea, supra. National Bank. 46 Neb. 756.
^"Hogan V. Shorb, 24 Wend. (N. ="^ Guerreiro v. Peile, 3 B. & Aid.
Y.) 458. 616, 5 E. C. L. 354.
^"Corlies v. Gumming, 6 Cow. ^''Potter v. Dennison. 10 111. 590:
(N. Y.) 181. Romeo v. Martucci, 72 Conn. 504. 77
''"Baker v. National Exch. Bank, Am. St. 327.
100 N. Y. 31.
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the factor thus dispose of the goods of his principal, even to an inno-
cent purchaser, the principal ma}- maintain against the latter an
action of trover.-''^^^ The principal may, however, estop himself from
denjang the factor's authority, by clothing him with the apparent
muniments of absolute title.^^^ The third party is also liable to the
principal in tort for injury to his property, and he may maintain an
action therefor. Thus, a sheriff or other officer who wrongfully levies
upon or attaches the principal's goods while in the possession of the
factor, for a debt of the factor or other person, is liable to the principal
in trespass.^-"
§ 455. Rights of third parties as to principal and factor.—It is
scarcely necessary to discuss at any length the duties and obligations
of the principal and factor to third parties, and the rights which flow
from these to such third parties. Some of these have been noticed in
connection with the defenses of third persons to actions by the prin-
cipal or the factor. They are in all essential regards the same as those
concerning other agents, and have been heretofore fully considered.
To repeat what has been said l)efore, in suljstance, we may state the
general rule to be that the principal is responsible to third parties
for all the acts of his factor which have been performed within the
scope of the latter's employment, either in contract or in tort.^-^ If,
however, credit was given to the agent knowingly and exclusively,
the principal can not be held liable.^-- And where the factor is
guilty of having committed a fraudulent transaction in behalf of his
principal, and the latter ratifies it or knowingly reaps a benefit there-
from, such principal is responsible to the party injured for such dam-
ages as he may have sustained.^-" In all cases of tort, the obligation is
l)oth joint and several, and the third party may therefore sue both
principal and factor or either alone.
§ 456. Del credere factors.—A del credere commission was defined
by Lord Ellenborough in Morris v. CJeashy/'^'^ as "the premium or
price given by the principal to the factor for a guaranty.''^-^ The
=^' lUd.; 2 Kent Com. 625. See ==i Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S.
also, Neill v. Billingsley, 49 Tex. 671.
161. =^ McCullough V. Thompson, 45 N.
^"Dunlap's Paley Ag.. § 212. Y. Super. 449.
^='' Holly V. Huggeford, 8 Pick. »-' Story Ag., § 179 n.
(Mass.) 73. ^-'M M. & S. 566.
'" See ante, § 22.
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duties of a del credere agent are not materially different from those
of an agent who does not guarantee the risk incident to the sale of
goods. A del credere factor practically insures the collection of the
debts arising from sales of his principal's goods; for which he re-
ceives an extra consideration called a "del credere commission."'^-®
Whether the relation of a del credere factor to the principal exists
may be implied from the course of dealing between the parties.^^^
The cases have not been altogether harmonious as to whether such a
factor is liable to the principal as an original debtor or a surety
would be, or only after a failure on the part of the debtor to pay, as a
guarantor would be. The English cases now hold that the factor
is only a guarantor, and can be rendered liable only after the debt
has become due and there has been a default by the debtor, and the
remedy against him exhausted.^^^ The American decisions generally
hold to the other view: they make the position of the factor one
more in the nature of a suretyship, and render him liable in the first
instance, after the debt has become due.^-® "Although the factor is
absolutely liable, he is not bound to pay until the money becomes due
from the purchaser,"^^" There is, under either view, no liability
until the debt has become due.^*^ The extent of the agent's liability
to his principal is, of course, the full amount of the debt; and if the
agent has accepted depreciated currency or other articles of some or
no value therefor, he must account for the entire sum.*^^ And, al-
though the factor becomes liable to the principal upon the expira-
tion of the credit, the main debtor is still liable to the principal also,
and may be sued by him when the right of action has accrued.^^^
==" Grove v. Dubois, 1 T. R. 112; Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cow. (N. Y.)
Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & S. 566. 645.
"' Sliaw v. Woodcock, 7 B. & C. 73, ^ Wordsworth, J., in Leverick v.
National Cordage Co. v. Sims, 44 Meigs, supra.
Neb. 148; Balderston v. National ^^ Bradley v. Richardson, 2
Rubber Co., 18 R. I. 338, 49 Am. St. Biatchf. (U. S.) 343; Wallace v.
772. Castle, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 106; Lewis
=^' Morris v. Cleasby, 4 M. & S. v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412; Leverick v.
566; Hornby v. Lacy, 6 M. & S. 166; Meigs, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 645.
Peele v. Northcote, 7 Taunt. 478, 2 ="- Dunnell v. Mason, 1 Story (U.
E. C. L. 456. S.) 543; Muller v. Bohlens, 2 Wash.
^-» Lewis V. Brehme, 33 Md. 412; (U. S.) 378.
Greentree v. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. =^ Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cow. (N.
583; Balderston v. National Rubber Y.) 645; Balderston v. National
Co., 18 R. L 338, 49 Am. St. 772; Rubber Co., IS R. I. 338, 49 Am. St.
772.
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The relation between a principal and a del credere factor is, in many-
respects, a peculiar cue. If he becomes primarily indebted to the
principal by virtue of the sale, is he also the owner of the goods, when
the matter is considered in view of his relation to the purchaser ? If
he is only a guarantor, or even a surety, is his undertaking not one
by which he answers for the debt of another, and therefore within
the purview of the statute of frauds? These are important ques-
tions, and the answers that have been given to them are not based
upon the most satisfactory reasoning. True, it is held that the un-
dertaking is not within the statute ;^^^ and the reason given for this
conclusion is that it is in the nature of an original undertaking,
though it has also some of the elements of a guaranty, but that
guaranties do not always have to be in writing.^^^ The factor may
^' Wolff v. Koppel, 5 Hill (N. Y.)
458, affirmed in 2 Den. (N. Y.) 368,
43 Am. Dec. 751; Sherwood v. Stone,
14 N. Y. 267; Swan v. Nesmith, 7
Pick. (Mass.) 220.
"= Wolff v. Koppel. 5 Hill (N. Y.)
458, affirmed in 2 Den. (N. Y.) 368,
43 Am. Dec. 751. In this case
Cowen, J., states the reasons as fol-
lows: "It is objected that the con-
tract of a factor, binding him in
the terms implied by a del credere
commission, is within the statute of
frauds and should, therefore, be in
writing. Such is the opinion ex-
pressed by Theobald Princ. & Surety
64, 65, and in Chitty Conts. (Am.
ed., 1842) 209, 210. The question
was also mooted in Gall v. Comber,
1 J. B. Moore 279; but not decided
as seems to be implied in the care-
less manner in which the case is
quoted by Chitty: S. C. 7 Taunt.
558. All the authority presented on
the argument grows out of the na-
ture of the contract as held by the
king's bench in Morris v. Cleasby,
4 Mau. & S. 566, 574, 575. That case
certainly defines the liability of the
factor somewhat differently from
what several previous cases seem to
have done. The effect of acting un-
der the commission is said to be,
that the factor becomes a guarantor
of the debts which are created; that
is to say, they are debts due to the
merchant, and the factor's engage-
ment is secondary and collateral, de-
pending on the fault of the debtors,
who must first be sought out and
called upon by the merchant. See
also, Hornby v. Lacy, 6 Mau. & S.
166, 171, 172; Peele v. Northcote. 7
Taunt. 478, 484. 1 J. B. Moore 178;
Leverick v. Meigs, 1 Cow. (N. Y.)
645, 664. On this we have the opin-
ion of learned writers that if the
agreement del credere be made
without writing the case comes
within the statute. On the other
hand, approved writers assert that
this is not so: 1 Beawes 46; 3
Chit. Com. L. (6th Lond. ed.) 220,
221. It is true, these latter go on
the more stringent obligation sup-
posed by Lord Mansfield; that of
a principal debtor on the part of
the factor, the accessorial obliga-
tion lying rather on the purchaser.
This view of the matter was no
longer correct after the cases I
have mentioned were decided. The
consequence sought to be derived,
however, by writers, is merely spec-
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collect from the purchaser in his own name, not because he was the
owner of the goods sold, but by reason of his peculiar relation to the
ulative; and the contrary has of
late been directly held by the su-
preme court of Massachusetts, in
Swan V. Nesmith, 7 Pick. (Mass.)
220. It is said this was without the
court being aware of Morris v.
Cleasby. Be that as it may, they
seem to have been fully aware of
the rule laid down in that case, and
to have recognized it as correct.
They considered the obligation as a
guaranty. But a guaranty, though
by parol, is not always within the
statute. Perhaps, after all, it may
not be strictly correct to call the
contract of the factor a guaranty,
in the ordinary sense of that word.
The implied promise of the factor
is merely that he will sell to per-
sons in good credit at the time; and
in order to charge him, negligence
must be shown. He takes an addi-
tional commission, however, and
adds to his obligation that he will
make no sales unless to persons ab-
solutely solvent; in legal effect, that
he will be liable for the loss which
his conduct may bring upon the
plaintiff, without the onus of prov-
ing negligence. The merchant
holds the goods, and will not part
with them to the factor without
this extraordinary stipulation, and
a commission is paid to him for en-
tering into it. What is this after
all, but another form of selling the
goods? Its consequences are the
same in substance. Instead of pay-
ing cash, the factor prefers to con-
tract a debt or duty which obliges
him to see the money paid. This
debt or duty is his own, and arises
from an adequate consideration. It
is contingent, depending on the
event of his failing to secure it
through another—some future ven-
dee, to whom the merchant is first
to resort. Upon non-payment by the
vendee, the debt falls absolutely on
the factor. As remarked by Parker,
C. J., in Swan v. Nesmith, 7 Pick.
(Mass.) 220, the form of the action
does not seem to be material in such
case; that is to say, whether the
merchant sue for goods sold, or on
the special engagement. The latter
is perhaps the settled form; but still
the action is, in effect, to recover
the factor's own debt. In the late
case of Johnson v. Gilbert, 4 Hill
(N. Y.) 178, the defendant, in con-
sideration of money paid for him by
the plaintiff, assigned a chattel note
and guaranteed its payment. In
such a case the declaration must be
on the guaranty to pay the debt of
another; but this is so in form
merely. We held that the contract
was to pay the defendant's own
debt; that it was not a contract to
pay as the surety of another. All
such contracts and many others are,
in form, to pay the debt of another,
and so literally within the statute,
but without its intent. A promise
by A to B, that the former will pay
a debt due from the latter, is not
within the meaning, though it is
within the words: Conkey v. Hop-
kins, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 113; East-
wood V. Kenyon. 11 Ad. & E. 438.
So are a numerous class of cases,
where the promise is made in con-
sideration of the creditor relin-
quishing some lien, fund or security:
Theobald Princ. & Surety 45, and
cases cited. The merchant gives up
his goods to be sold, and pays a
premium. Is not this in truth as
much and more than many of those
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principal and of the special property he has in them. In this way-
only can the doctrine be explained which permits the principal to
intervene if he chooses to exercise that privilege :^^® the property
never becomes that of the factor absolutely; and his right over it,
except to the extent of his vested interests, continues until
after sale, to be followed only by his right to collect the pro-
ceeds. The del credere factor has a lien upon the goods and proceeds
for advances, commissions, etc., the same as any other factor.^^^
While such factor guarantees the solvency of the purchaser to whom he
>ells, the debt is not extinguished as to such purchaser until actually
paid in money to the factor or principal. He does not, on . the
other hand, warrant the payment of the remittance, if under the eon-
tract with his principal he undertakes to remit to him. As to col-
lection and remittance, a del credere factor is under the same obliga-
tions as any other agent whose duty it is to collect and remit : in tliis
regard he is only required to use proper care and diligence in pur-
chasing the remittance: he does not insure its payment.^^^
cases require which go on the relin-
quishment of a security? Suppose
a factor agrees by parol to sell for
cash but gives a credit. His prom-
ise is virtually that he will pay the
amount of the debt he thus makes.
Yet who would say his promise is
within the statute? The amount
of the argument for the defendant
would seem to be, that an agent for
making sales, or indeed, a collecting
agent, can not, by parol, undertake
for extraordinary diligence, because
he may thus have the debt of an-
other thrown upon him. But the
answer is, that all such contracts
have an immediate respect to his
own duty or obligation. The debt
of another comes incidentally as a
measure of damages."
5=^ See Miller v. Lea, 35 Md. 396, 6
Am. Rep. 417.
^'' Miller v. Lea, supra; Holbrook
V. Wight, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 169, 35
Am. Dec. 607; Merrill v. Thomas, 7
Daly (N. Y.) 393.
5'^ Story Ag., § 215.
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§ 457. Who are insurance agents—Their authority.—The term
"insurance agents" is usually applied to those agents of insurers and
insurance companies who solicit applications for risks, issue and de-
liver policies, collect premiums, and generally transact some portion
of the business in which the insurers or companies engage. Such
agent's appointment may JDe in writing, but need not be, and may
rest in parol.^^® It may also be established, as other agencies are, by
the conduct of the principal in holding the agent out as such,^*° or in
ratifying his acts though they had not been originally authorized.'"
Whether the agent i« acting for the insured or the insurer, in a given
case, depends, of course, upon the facts; but when the facts are ad-
mitted, the question is one of law, for the decision of the court.'*-
It is frequently stipulated in the printed application for insurance
that the statements therein, if made to an agent, shall not be binding
on the insurer, and that for the purpose of the application, he shall
^^ See Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. 123 Ind. 177; Phenix Ins. Co. v.
V. Bell, 166 111. 400. 57 Am. St. 140. Lorenz, 7 Ind. App. 266; Sellus v.
^" List V. Commonwealth. 118 Pa. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 105 Ala.
St. 322; Hardin v. Alexandria Ins. 282: Murphy v. Southern Life Ins.
Co., 90 Va. 413. Co.. 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 440, 27 Am.
^ Terry v. Provident Fund So- Rep. 761; National Bank v. Knox-
ciety. 13 Ind. App. 1. ville Fire Ins. Co., 85 Tenn. 76, 4
^ Indiana Ins. Co. v. Hartwell, Am. St. 744.
(512)
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be deemed the agent of the applicant; but it is generally held that
the company can not thus escape the consequences of the acts of its
agents. In some jurisdictions, however, the rule appears to be that
the question as to whose agent one is is a mixed question of law and
fact;^*^ while in other jurisdictions still, it has been ruled that the
question is one of fact for the jury,^*'* Of course, the agent's declara-
tions out of court can not be taken as proof of the agency, when made
in the absence of the principal or without its authority ; and before
such declarations will bind the insurer, the fact of the agency must
be established by the proper evidence. ^*^ Where an agent has a writ-
ten commission from an insurance company authorizing him to re-
ceive applications for insurance, moneys for premiums, and to coun-
tersign, issue and renew policies signed by the president, etc., subject
to the rules and regulations of the company, he is a general and not
a special agent; and if he has private instructions, not attached to
the policy, restricting his authority to take certain risks, . such in-
structions do not render his agency a special one, and third parties
are not bound b}' the limitations;^*^ but if the agent's written com-
mission expressly excludes certain risks, third persons are bound by
it.^*^ And the fact that his agency is limited to a certain locality
does not prevent him from being a general agent with regard to solic-
iting and accepting risks and agreeing upon settlements of terms of
insurance, etc.^*^ And any evidence is competent which tends to
show that the agent had general authority : such as the possession of
policies issued in blank ;^*'' the fact that the agent made and filed
an affidavit for a continuance in a cause to which the company was
a party, etc.^^° And generally, a limitation upon the agent's au-
thority will not be binding upon the insured unless he had notice
thereof, if the agent was one who possessed general authority.^^^
But an insurance broker who has authority only to deliver a policy of
^^Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. ^'Reynolds v. Continental Ins.
Horton, 166 111. 400, 57 Am. St. 140; Co., 36 mch. 131.
Partridge v. Commercial Fire Ins. ^** Continental Ins. Co. v. Ruck-
Co., 17 Hun (N. Y.) 95. man, 127 111. 364, 11 Am. St. 121.
^ Davis v. ^tna Fire Ins. Co., 67 ^ Continental Ins. - Co. v. Ruck-
N. H. 335. man, 127 111. 364, 11 Am. St. 121.
^=^Rahr v. Manchester Fire Ins. ^^^ Parker v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 129
Co., 93 Wis. 355. Pa. St. 583.
"*" Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Co- ^' Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Co-
lumbia Encaustic Tile Co., 15 Ind. lumbia Encaustic Tile Co., 15 Ind.
App. 623. App. 623.
33
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insurance to the insured and receive the premium therefor has no
authorit}' to alter the provisions of the policy ; and if he receives from
the insured an application for such change and undertakes to procure
it, he is in that connection the agent of the insured and not of the
company.^^^ A local insurance agent appointed by the insurance
company to solicit applications can not, at the same time, be the
agent of the applicant for insurance, and he is generally held to be
the agent of the insurer ; and any mistake made by the agent who
writes or directs the application is chargeable to the company and
not to the insured;^"" and a stipulation in such application that the
policy agent is the agent of the insured and not of the company is
not binding on the insured ;^^* and if the agent writes down false
answers without the knowledge of the insured, after he has been
truthfully informed of the matter by the applicant, the applicant
is not bound by it although he signs the application and the policy
makes the statements warranties.^^^ There are eases, however, which
hold that tJhe question as to whose agent the solicitor is depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.^^*
§ 458. Liability of insurer for acts of agent.—The insurer, or
ijLsurance company, like any other principal, is liable for the acts
and representations of its agents, whether on contract or in tort, if
made within the scope, apparent or real, of the agent's authority.^^^
If, however, the authority of the agent was special, or if limited, and
the insured had notice of such limitation,—the company is not liable
beyond the agent's actual authority.^ ^* In practice the question
^ Duluth Nat'l Bank v. Knoxville Mut. Fire Ins. Co.. 31 Minn. 17, 47
Fire Ins. Co., 85 Tenn. 76, 4 Am. St. Am. Rep. 776; Deitz v. Providence
744. &c. Ins. Co., 31 W. Va. 851, 13 Am.
"^ Woodbury Sav. Bank v. Charter St. 909.
Oak Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 517. ^ Davis v. .^tna Mut. Fire Ins.
^ Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Co., 67 N. H. 335.
State, 113 Ind. 331; Indiana Ins. Co. "'Van Werden v. Equitable Life
V. Hartwell, 100 Ind. 566, 123 Ind. Assur. Soc, 99 Iowa 621; Conti-
177; Sprague v. Holland Purchase nental Ins. Co. v. Kasey. 25 Gratt.
Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 128; Pierce v. Peo- (Va.) 268. 18 Am. Rep. 681; New
pie, 106 111. 11, 46 Am. Rep. 683; York Life Ins. Co. v. McGowan.- 18
Eilenberger v. Protective Mut. Fire Kan. 300.
Ins. Co., 89 Pa. St. 464. -* Paine v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
'^Continental Ins. Co. v. Pearce, Co.. 51 Fed. 689; Shaffer v. Mil-
39 Kan. 396, 7 Am. St. 557; Kings- waukee Mech. Ins. Co.. 17 Ind. App.
ton v, .^tna Life Ins. Co., 42 Iowa 204. See Sun Fire Office v. Wich,
46; Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers' 6 Colo. App. 103.
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frequently arises as to the company's responsibility for the acts of
its agents with regard to effecting insurance. If an agent has no au-
thority to issue policies, can he bind the insurer by an agreement to
insure, if based upon a sufficient consideration? This question has
generally been answered in the negative. Where a special agent of
a fire-insurance company has been commissioned to solicit and re-
ceive proposals for insurance and collect premiums, subject to the
rules and regulations of the company and "such instructions as may
be given from time to time by the general agent of the western de-
partment" of the company in this country, a parol contract entered
into by him and an applicant for a policy, sanctioned by such general
agent, is binding upon the company.^"** But where a local agent, who
was not authorized to make contracts of insurance, but only to re-
ceive and forward applications and to deliver policies sent to him
and collect the premiums thereon, entered into an agreement with an
applicant for fire-insurance, the understanding being that on receipt
of the policy the applicant should pay the premium; whereupon the
applicant was informed by the agent that his insurance would take
effect from the date of the application ; which agreement he was
authorized to make with reference to certain property, but subject
to the approval of the general agent, the insured property not falling
within that class, and the general agent not accepting the same, but
rejecting it after the property was burned, but before he had any
notice of the fact,—the supreme court of Wisconsin held that the jury
had no right to find that there was any valid contract for insurance
between the parties, especially as the company never held the agent
out as possessing authority to take such risks for it, or that it had
notice that he was violating his instructions or acting in any way not
authorized about its business.^®'' And where, under similar circum-
V stances, an application was forwarded, accompanied by the cash pre-
xi-mium, to be approved by the directors, and nearly six months' time
elapsed before any reply was made to the proposition for insurance,
Hhe court ruled that it did not constitute an authority to make a
contract of insurance, and that an acceptance could not be presumed
by lapse of time, although the company had agreed that the money
was to be returned if the application was rejected.^^^ The mere fact
^^ Harron v. City of London Fire ^' Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 23
Ins. Co., 88 Cal. 16. Pa. St. 72.
^^ Fleming v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 42 Wis. 616.
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that the company furnished its agent with an advertising card as a
part of his agency supplies, upon which his name was printed as
agent and that he was authorized to countersign policies, where the
agent had no power to issue policies, and was not supplied with such,
—would not confer upon him authority' to bind the company to a
contract of insurance before any policy was issued.^*^- But when an
insurance company clothes an agent with all the indicia of authority,
it is bound by his acts, whether the same were actually authorized or
not: provided the insured had no notice of any limitation of the
agent's authority; and the company is bound by any waiver made by
such agent of conditions in the policy which might otherwise avoid
it.^®^ And so, where an adjuster was specially employed to adjust
one of two losses resulting from the same fire and sustained by the
same person, but under different policies and upon different prop-
erty; and having adjusted the loss as to which he was employed,
agreed with the owner of the property that he need not make proofs
of loss under the other policy, but that the claim should abide the
result of arbitration with other companies, etc.,—the supreme court
of Iowa decided that this amounted to a waiver of the proofs of loss
which bound the company.^®* And where the agent of a company
^'^ Armstrong v. State Ins. Co., 61 brook assumed the same authority-
Iowa 212. See also, O'Brien v. New for adjustment under one policy as
Zealand Ins. Co., 108 Cal. 227. tinder another. The rule of the ap-
^^ Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Car- pellants' contention would require
der, 82 Fed. 986. us to hold that Slater, after dealing
^"^ Slater v. Capital Ins. Co., 89 with him as an authorized adjuster
Iowa 628. In that case the court, with him and Eller in regard to the
speaking through Granger, C. J., loss on the contents of the barn on
said: "What, then, as between the one policy, could not recognize him
plaintiff and the defendant, is the as an adjuster on a loss on another
legal effect of the authority granted policy from the same company to
to Philbrook? The company had him, resulting from the same fire,
sent him to Slater & Eller as their We think that such a rule should
adjuster. Neither the company nor not obtain. Looking to the manner
Philbrook intimated that his au- in which the insurance business of
thority as an adjuster was limited, the country is transacted, through
but, on the contrary, he in the one agents, distant from the home of-
case authoritatively exercised the flees of the companies, by which
usual powers of such an agent, patrons neither see nor know any
The company had said to both other than the soliciting agent, who.
Slater and Eller: "This is my au- upon a written application, either
thorized agent. Deal with him as issues or procures and delivers the
such." In view of the finding of policy, and. after loss, the adjuster,
the jury, we may say that Phil- through whom the business of ad-
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collected the renewal premium on
who paid it that he was insured for
justment is carried on, and the con-
sequences of the rule contended for
will be apparent. The rules of law
are designed to be in harmony with
the natural and reasonable conduct
of parties in their business inter-
course, and with the changed con-
dition in the business intercourse
of the country from time to time
must come such changes in the laws
governing legal rights as will main-
tain such harmony. Philbrook had
been sent to Slater as an adjuster.
It is the law that Slater must, at
his peril, know Philbrook's author-
ity to act as such; but with his
knowledge that he was an adjuster
came the legal right to assume that
his power was commensurate with
the duties of adjustment between
the persons to whom he was sent
and the company, as to all matters
that should reasonably be consid-
ered as intended by the company.
We think, that after the adjustment
of the Slater & Eller loss by Phil-
brook, no reasonable person would
have doubted his pretended author-
ity to adjust the loss on the barn,
particularly in view of the close
identity of the losses as to parties
and circumstances. It was the act
of the company that gave rise to
this reasonable belief on the part
of Slater by sending Philbrook as
adjuster. If an insurance company
does not wish to be bound up by
so broad a presumption as to the
authority of an adjuster, a reason-
able and very just rule, as applied
to the present method of insurance
business, would require that it
should impart to the assured the
limitations upon his authority, by
which means the parties could act
a policy, and informed the party
another year ; and the company or
upon an equality, a condition abso-
lutely forbidden by the rule con-
tended for. The general import-
ance of the rule we are consider-
ing will justify a somewhat extend-
ed quotation from Insurance Co. v.
Wilkinson, in 13 Wall. (U. S.) 22,
where the United States supreme
court has adopted reasoning some-
what similar to ours, with like con-
clusions. We quote therefrom as
follows: 'It is well known,' said
the court, '(so well that no court
would be justified in shutting its
eyes to it), that insurance companies
organized under the law of one
state, and having in that state their
principal business oflice, send these
agents all over the land, with direc-
tions to solicit and procure applica-
tions for policies, furnishing them
with printed arguments in favor of
the value and necessity of the life
insurance, and of the special ad-
vantages of the corporation which
the agents represent. They pay
these agents large commissions on
the premiums thus obtained, and
the policies are delivered at their
hand to the assured. The agents
are stimulated by letters and in-
structions to activity in procuring
contracts, and the party who is in
this manner induced to take out a
policy rarely sees or knows any-
thing about the company or its of-
ficers by whom it is issued, but
looks to and relies upon the agent
who has persuaded him to effect in-
surance as the full and complete
representative of the company in all
that is' said or done in making the
contract. Has he no right to so
regard him? It is quite true that
the reports of judicial decisions are
§ 458 PRIXCIPAL AXD AGENT, 518
agent retained the premium but
thereon as was the custom of the
filled with the efforts of these com-
panies, by their counsel, to establish
the doctrine that they can do all
this, and yet limit their responsi-
bility for the acts of these agents to
the simple receipt of the premium
and delivery of the policy; the argu-
ment being that, as to all other acts
of the agent, he is the agent of the
assured. The proposition is not
without support in some of the
earlier decisions on the subject; and
at a time when insurance companies
waited for parties to come to them
to seek assurance, or to forward ap-
plications on their own motion, the
doctrine had a reasonable founda-
tion to rest upon. But to apply
such a doctrine, in its full force,
to a system of selling policies
through agents, which we have de-
scribed, would be a snare and a de-
lusion, leading, as it has done in
numerous instances, to the grossest
frauds, of which the insurance cor-
porations receive the benefits, and
the parties supposing themselves in-
sured are the victims. The tend-
ency of the modern decisions in this
country is steadily in the opposite
direction. The powers of the agent
are prima facie coextensive with
the business intrusted to his care,
and will not be narrowed by lim-
itations not communicated to the
person with whom he deals. An
insurance company establishing a
local agency must be held responsi-
ble to the parties with whom they
transact business for the acts and
declarations of the agent, within
the scope of his employment, as if
they proceeded from the principal.'
The arguments in that case apply
with strong, if not with equal, force
failed to issue a renewal policy
company, until after a loss by fire
to the business of fire insurance,
and to the duties and authority of
agents acting for the companies af-
ter losses occur. In view of the
business zeal and competition of the
times, with insurance companies we
may say 'no stone is left unturned'
to secure applications, and to this
end agents wait upon desired cus-
tomers in field and shop and home,
to urge their superior claims for
patronage. After a loss occurs,
agents are promptly on the ground
for investigation, conference, and
adjustment. Under the business
education of the times they are fac-
tors by and through which patrons
may know and deal with the com-
panies. The agent is the r^re-
sentative of the company. Now, it
is certainly a reasonable rule that
when an agent approaches a patron
who has met with a loss, he may
know to what extent he can safely
act or deal with him as such agent.
The company has that knowledge.
If they are to do business upon
equal terms, the patron should also
have it. It is hardly to be expected
that the business of adjustment
must await a correspondence be-
tween the assured and the company
to know the fact. But two other
methods are open: First, that the
company shall give notice of the au-
thority possessed by its agent: or,
second, that the assured may law-
fully assume that the agent has au-
thority to transact the business in
hand as if possessing general pow-
ers for that purpose. Such a rule
has full support in Insurance Co. v.
Wilkinson, supra, and also in con-
siderations of both public and pri-
vate good. See also, as bearing on
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had occurred,—^the company was held bound by the renewal contract
;
although the first policy provided that "the company should not be
liable for contracts of its agents before the contract had been ap-
proA^ed and certified to in writing by the secretary."^®^ So, where a
party obtained a policy of insurance on his building from the recog-
nized agent of a company, and paid him the premium, and the agent
reported to the home office and forwarded the premium; and after
waiting the usual time and receiving no reply he delivered the policy
to the owner of the property, wdiich was in accordance with the usual
course of dealing of the company,—it was ruled that the company
was liable on the contract.^*"^ An insurance company can not escape
the result of an agreement by its general agent to waive the condi-
tion of a policy that the payment of the premium in cash shall be a
condition precedent to the validity of the policy, if the agent had real
or apparent authority to make insurance contracts.^^^ But where
the policy contains an express limitation upon the agent's power and
is accepted with it, the agent can not change or waive it so as to bind
the company.^**^ In such case the holder of the policy, by accepting
it, is estopped to rely upon any authority of the agent in opposition to
this question, Silverberg v. Insur-
ance Co., 67 Cal. 36, 7 Pac.
38, and, to some extent. Insurance
Co. V. Gallatin. 48 Wis. 36,
3 N. W. 772. There are very many
cases in which other, but somewhat
kindred subjects are discussed,
wherein, from the reasoning, this
position receives support. Of
those, see Morrison v. Insurance Co.,
69 Tex. 353, 6 S. W. 605;
Cleaver v. Insurance Co., 71 Mich.
414, 39 N. W. 571; Schoener
v. Insurance Co., 50 Wis. 575,
7 N. W. 544; Alexander v. In-
surance Co., 67 Wis. 422, 30
N. W. 727, and cases therein
cited. It should be stated that the
state of Wisconsin has a general
statute on the subject, which con-
trols the decisions of that state to
some extent. We think the facts
of the case justify the application of
such a rule, and that the company is
responsible for failure to make the
proofs of loss. The evidence and
admissions were such that, under
the law as we have expressed it. it
was not error to refuse the motion
to instruct the jury to return a ver-
dict for the defendant." See also,
Weidert v. State Ins. Co., 19 Or. 261,
20 Am. St. 809; Russell v. Insur-
ance Co., 80 Mich. 407; Hoge v.
Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 138 Pa. St.
66; California Ins. Co. v. Gracey,
15 Colo. 70, 22 Am. St. 376.
^^ King V. City of Oshkosh, 75
Wis. 517.
^•^ Mullen V. McKinney, 138 Pa. St.
69.
'" Home Ins. Co. v. Oilman, 112
Ind. 7; Willcuts v. Northwestern,
etc., Co.. 81 Ind. 300.
""- Robinson v. Fire Ass'n, 63
Mich. 90; Cleaver v. Traders' Ins.
Co., 65 Mich. 527.
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the limitation.^®^ But even an act done in violation of the agent's
authority may be ratified by the company, or the proper officer there-
of; and this may be done expressly or it may be implied by the con-
duct of the company or of such qualified agent.^'^"
§ 459. Liability of agent to the insured.—The insured may avoid
the contract of insurance, if it was induced by the false and fraudu-
lent representations of the agent, if they were material. Thus, where
a person executed a premium note to an insurance company for a
policy, on the false and fraudulent representation of the agent that
certain persons named by him and who were well known to the in-
sured would constitute the board of directors, the insured may in-
terpose this as a defense to the note, the representations being more
than the mere expression of an opinion as to the legal effect of the
contract.^" ^ But he may also, if he has paid any premium, sue and
recover from such agent the amount of such premium paid, as the
measure of his damages.^'- And where an applicant for insurance
has paid to an agent the premium for a policy to be issued, on the
false and fraudulent promise to have a policy issued on said applica-
tion, which is not done, the agent is liable to the applicant for the
premium f'^ unless the agent had authority from the company and
the latter failed t© issue such a policy as the applicant contracted
for, in which case the remedy is against the company and not against
the agent. ^"^ Where a policy prohibited the keeping of petroleum
on the insured premises, and the applicant declined to accept it on
that condition, saying he was bound to keep a little, and asked that
the fact be noted in the policy, but was told by the agent that he
should have the privilege of keeping one barrel of petroleum in
connection with the stock of goods insured, and that it was unneces-
sary to mention the fact in the policy, and there was a loss by fire
for which the insured, owing to the violation of the provision of the
policy relating to the keeping of oil on the premises, was not per-
mitted to recover, the court held that the agent was liable to the
*»' Cleaver v. Traders' Ins. Co., ='= Hedden v. Griffin. 136 Mass.
supra. 229, 49 Am. Rep. 25.
2"» Keith v. Globe Ins. Co., 52 111. ="= Collier v. Bedell, 39 Hun (N.
518; Niagara Ins. Co. v. Lee, 73 Y.) 238.
Tex. 641; Howard Ins. Co. v. Owen, ='* Bleau v. Wright. 110 Mich. 183.
94 Ky. 197. See also, Bryan v. Viele, 4 N. Y. St
=' Penn Miit. Life Ins. Co. v. 872.
Crane, 134 Mass. 56.
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assured to the extent of the injury sustained by the misrepresenta-
tions.^'^ Failure or neglect to procure insurance on the part of the
agent, if based upon a sufficient consideration, such as the payment
to such agent of the advance premium, is such a breach of duty as
will render the agent liable to the applicant for all damages result-
ing from the loss;^'** but where there is no premium paid, and conse-
quently no consideration passed, it is doubtful whether the agent
can be held liable.^" An agent may also render himself personally
liable for doing business for a foreign company not authorized to
operate within the state by reason of non-fulfilment of the statutory
requirements, if injury result from his act. Thus, if such agent issue
an insurance policy in such a company, and, in case of loss, the as-
sured is defeated in collecting the proceeds of the policy by reason
of the company's insolvency, the agent is personally liable to the
policy-holder for the loss ; the agent in such case being held impliedly
to warrant the company's solvency.^"^ The agent may render him-
self liable to the assured in other cases of negligence; as where, for
example, he receives from an applicant the premium for a policy,
but before it is paid over to the company the latter becomes insolvent,
and the applicant demands of the agent the return of his premium,
and informs him that he does not rely on the policy issued to him
:
in such case the insured may doubtless recover the premium from the
agent, and this is true although the policy has not been returned
or tendered back before suit.^"^
§ 460. Liability of insurance agent to his principal.—For any
violation of his duty to his principal, an insurance agent is, of course,
liable to such principal in damages to the extent of the injury. For
the purpose of enforcing the more positively the obligations of their
agents to them, insurance companies usually require such agents to
give bond, with surety or sureties, for the faithful performance of
their duties; and a liability will arise on such bond as well as in-
dividually whenever there has been a breach of such duty. Thus,
where an agent had been directed- by his company to cancel a policy
'" Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. '" Morton v. Hart, 88 Tenn. 427.
311, 47 Am. Rep. 718. ^'' Smith v. Binder, 75 111. 492.
^'^ Haight v. Kremer, 9 Phila. But see Farrow v. Cochran, 72 Me.
(Pa.) 50, 29 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 30. 309, as to the necessity of returning
^" See Fraunthal v. Derr, 13 W. or offering to return the policy.
N. C. (Pa.) 485; Stadler v. Trever,
86 Wis. 42.
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which contained a stipulation for its cancelation, and the agent
failed to do so within a reasonable time, and the company suffered
a loss thereby, it was held that the agent was liable to the company for
the damages f^^ and he is not excused in such case by the fact that he
notified the broker who had placed the insurance to cancel it: the
broker being in that case but the agent of the agent.^^^ The question
of what is a reasonable time and effort to have the policy canceled is
usually a question of fact, for the jury;^^^ but where the facts are
undisputed it is a question of law, for the court.^^^ But if the dut}'
of seeing to the cancelation of policies is not contained in the agent's
written contract of appointment, and there is no evidence that he as-
sumed that duty independently thereof, evidence of his failure to
have a policy canceled is not admissible against him, when the suit
is on such written contract of appointment.^^* It is otherwise, of
course, if the performance of that duty is within the scope of the
undertaking, though not expressly enumerated in the written ap-
pointment; as where he engages to perform such duties as he is re-
quested to do. And where an agent himself effects insurance which
the principal declines to accept, it is his duty to have the policy
canceled when directed to do so ; and upon failure to obey such or-
ders, he is liable to the company for negligence ;^^^ in such case he
must obey the instructions of his principal, and he has no right to set
himself up to pass judgment as to the wisdom or expediency of the
OTders given him. He must obey the orders and directions of his
principal with reasonable promptness and fidelity.^^^ Moreover, an
insurance agent, like any other agent, being required to act with
fidelity to his principal, must not act for himself in connection with
the business of his principal : he can not be agent for the company
and deal with himself as principal ; and hence, he is without power to
make a contract with himself for the insurance of his individual
property :^ -'' and hence, if an agent forwards an application far insur-
^"Kraber v. Union Ins. Co., 129 ^Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Sears,
Pa. St. 8, 24 W. N. C. (Pa.) 547; Sun supra.
Fire Office v. Ermentrout, 2 Pa. ^** Norwood v. Alamo Fire Ins. Co.,
Dist. R. 77. 13 Tex. Civ. App. 475.
^^^ Franklin Ins. Co. v. Sears, 21 ^^^Kraber v. Union Ins. Co., 129
Fed. 290; Sun Fire Office v. Ermen- Pa. St. 8, 24 W. N. C. (Pa.) 547.
trout, supra. ''" Ibid.
=-- American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Hag- ''*' Bentley v. Columbia Ins. Co.,
erty, 92 Hun (N. Y.) 26, 36 N. Y. 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 595; May Ins.,
Supp. 558. § 125.
523 INSURANCE AGENTS. § 461
ance on a vessel of which he is a part owner, which fact he conceals
from the company, and procures a polic}^ on the property, and de-
livers it to the insured, the policy is void.^®^ The agent is also liable
for the acts of his subagents appointed by himself, when such acts
are within the scope of their employment; and the sureties on the
agent's bond are responsible for losses occurring from the default
of such subagents.^^** And so, the bondsmen are liable also for a
loss on account of the agent's failure to cancel a policy when directed
to do so.^^° When the action on the bond is for failure to account
for premiums as stipulated therein, the sureties are liable, as well as
the principal, for all the premiums collected by the agent, less his
commissions thereon; but the liability would not include a premium
for which he had improperly given credit to the insured, if he had
not received it.^''^
§ 461. Liability of insurer to agent—Compensation.—Like any
other principal, an insurance company is, by its contract, express or
implied, bound to compensate its agents for their services. Many of
the officers and higher classes of agents of insurance companies receive
their remuneration in stipulated salaries; but those agents who so-
licit applications for policies are customarily paid in commissions, or
salary and commissions, and these frequently extend to the annual
premiums that accrue subsequently to that paid by the insured when
he receives the policy ; but an agent who voluntarily leaves the service
of the company thereby forfeits his commissions on subsequently-ac-
cruing premiums, unless his contract with the company provides oth-
erwise.^"" When an agent is wrongfully discharged before his contract
is terminated, he has his remedy for a breach of contract as other
agents have: if his compensation consists of commissions on future
premiums, he may recover the amount of probable loss on such com-
missions, less what he might have reasonably earned during the unex-
pired period, and it is competent to prove by witnesses in such cases the
probable value of renewals during that time.^"^ A contract providing
that an agent shall receive commissions on renewal premiums will
='*Ritt V. Washington, etc. Ins. "^ Byrne v. iEtna Ins. Co., 56 111.
Co., 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 353. 321.
^'^Phenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. '^^ May Ins., § 576. See Spauld-
Holloway, 51 Conn. 310, 50 Am. Rep. ing v. New York Life Ins. Co., 61
20. Me. 329.
"^ Royal Ins. Co., etc., v. Clark, 61 •'" May Ins., § 576.
Minn. 476.
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terminate with the period of service for which the agent was employed,
where the commissions are limited to "business procured by the agent
under this appointment. "^'** But where the contract gave the agent
authority to effect life-insurance and appoint subagents throughout the
state, for which he was to receive a certain salary and office expenses;
and it was provided that in addition thereto he was to receive a per-
centage upon original and renewal premiums upon all policies pro-
cured by him, the expenses of collection to be deducted when the
premiums were collected by other agents; either party having the
privilege to terminate the agency upon three months' notice, and
the company having given the notice required and thus dissolved
the relation,—it was held by a majority of the court that the right
to commissions on policies procured by the agent continued as long
as the policies were kept in force by renewals, if the renewal premiums
were collected by the company.^"^ Usage becomes a part of every
contract for the compensation of an agent, when from all the cir-
cumstances it appears that it was so intended by the parties, but not
otherwise; for the parties have a right, by their contract, to exclude
the usage. Where this is the case, proof of usage is inadmissible,
and an unreasonable usage does not enter into the contract.^ ''^ The
parties can not by parol evidence of custom or usage establish the
existence of a different contract from that to which they expressly
agreed ;^®^ but where the usage is reasonable and it is not in conflict
with the contract, it will properly enter into the contract for com-
pensation. The principal may, of course, be liable to the agent in
many other particular instances,—as, for a premature discharge and
other breaches of the contract ; but the obligation in such instances is
not different from that of other principals to their agents and requires
no special consideration.
2** Spaulding v. New York Life ^'^ Hercules, etc.. Society v. Brink-
Ins. Co., 61 Me. 329. See also, er, 77 N. Y. 435.
Moses V. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., ^^ Castleman v. Southern Mutual
7 Ohio Dec. R. 609, 4 Wkly. Law Life Ins. Co., 14 Bush (Ky.) 197.
Bull. 214. ^'" Partridge v. Phenix Mut. Ins.
Co., 15 Wall. (U. S.) 573.
CHAPTER XYII.
TRAVELING SALESMEN.
Section Section
462. Definitions. 465. Sales of goods by drummers and
463. Commercial travelers or drum- other agents— Statute of
mers. frauds.
464. Pedlers and hawkers.
§ 462. Definitions.—Traveling salesmen include commercial trav-
elers, or "drummers,'*' and pedlers and hawkers. Commercial travel-
ers or drummers are a large class of modern commercial agents whose
business it is to travel about the country for wholesale houses and
take orders from retail dealers for merchandise to be shipped to the
latter by the respective firms or concerns which such drummer or
agent represents. "The term 'drummer* has acquired a common
acceptation, and is applied to commercial agents who are traveling
for wholesale merchants, and supplying the retail trade with goods,
or rather, taking orders for goods to be shipped to the retail merchant,
upon which merchandise the state collects her revenue."^^® Defini-
tions of the terms "drummer," "commercial traveler," etc., are often
called into requisition by the courts in construing statutes assessing
a license tax on these or on "pedlers," "hawkers," etc. It often
happens in such cases that distinctions are to be drawn between ped-
lers and drummers, as the latter are not usually required to procure
a license. Ordinarily a municipal corporation has power to impose
such a tax upon pedlers and hawkers, because they carry their goods
with them and the same constitute a portion of the bulk of the tax-
able property of the state; while drummers, or commercial travelers,
usually sell from samples and generally for firms or corporations in
other states ; and a license fee or tax imposed upon such goods as they
sell, if from another state or states, would be taxing interstate com-
388 pgj. Turney, J., in Singleton v. Rep. 469; Ex parte Taylor, 58 Miss.
Fretch, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 93. See also, 478, 38 Am. Rep. 336.
State v. Miller, 93 N. C. 511, 53 Am.
(525)
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merce, which under the federal constitution can not be legally done.^^^
So, it has been held that a person who solicits and takes orders for
books issued or published by his principal, who is a resident of another
state, without delivering such books at the time the orders are taken, is
not a hawker or pedler, but a drummer or canvasser, within the mean-
ing of a statute giving municipal corporations the power "to license,
tax, regulate, suppress and prohibit 'hawkers' and 'pedlers.' "*"" Ped-
lers and hawkers are those who travel from city to city or from house to
house, and sell commodities which they ordinarily carry with them,
and deliver at once upon sale, as opposed to those who sell at an
established shop,*"^ or by sample for future delivery. If one thus
goes from house to house to sell goods, though it be on the installment
plan, delivering them as sold, he is a pedler.*°- One may, however,
under exceptional circumstances, be a pedler, although he does not
deliver at once when the order is taken. Thus, butchers who take
orders for meat from house to house, and then deliver it to the con-
sumers, are pedlers.*"^ A person who carries jewelry from county
to county to sell is a pedler.^"* The terms "hawkers," "pedlers" and
"traveling merchants" are in some sense synonymous, meaning those
who go about with goods making or attempting to make sales, and
making delivery,*"^ It seems that hawkers were in ill favor at the
common law; and Jacob designates them as "those deceitful fellows
who went from place to place buying and selling brass, pewter and
other merchandise which ought to be uttered in open market, * * *
and the appellation seems to grow from their uncertain wandering,
like persons that with hawks seize their game where they can find
it."*"** Generally, selling goods by sample is not pedling.*"^ But
"any method of selling goods, wares or merchandise by outcry on the
Briggs (Minn.), 88 N.''^Emmons v. City of Lewiston,
132 111. 380, 22 Am. St. 540; Village
of Cerro Gordo v. Rawlings, 135 111.
36.
^ Ibid. See to the same effect,
City of Kansas v. Collins, 34 Kan.
434.
^1 Emmons v. City of Lewiston,
132 111. 380, 22 Am. St. 540; Com-
monwealth v. Gardner, 133 Pa. St.
284. 19 Am. St. 645, 7 L. R. A. 666.
«"City of South Bend v. Martin,
142 Ind. 31, 29 L. R. A. 531; People
V. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428; City of
St. Paul
W. 984.
*^''^ Davis v. City of Macon, 64 Ga.
128, 37 Am. Rep. 60; City of Duluth
V. Ki'upp, 46 Minn. 435.
^« Wynne v. Wright, 18 N. C. 19.
*"5 Commonwealth v. Edson, 2 Pa.
Co. Ct. 377.
*"* Jacob Law Die.
*•" Commonwealth v. Jones, 70 Ky.
502; State v. Hoffman, 50 Mo. App.
585; Commonwealth v. Eichenburg,
140 Pa. St. 158; City of Davenport
V. Rice, 75 Iowa 74.
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streets or public places in a city, or by attracting persons to purchase
goods exposed for sale at such places, by placards or signals, or by
going from house to house selling or offering goods for sale at retail
to individuals not dealers in such commodities, whether the goods
be carried along for delivery promptly, or whether the sales be made"
for future delivery, constitutes the person so selling a hawker or
pedler within the meaning of the statute."*^^ Soliciting orders for
the making of shirts* "'' or clothing*^'' or sewing-machines*^^ or beer
in bottles*^ ^ to be delivered in the future, is not pedling or hawking,
although an article is occasionally delivered at the time of sale.*^^
§ 463. Commercial travelers or drummers.—This class of agents
have certain duties, obligations and rights in connection with the re-
lation to their principals and to third parties not essentially different
from those of other agents. As a general rule, a drummer's duties are
confined to the soliciting of orders for goods.*^* He has no implied
authority to collect money, not being in possession of the goods or
having other indicia of authority ; and if the purchaser pays such an
agent, he does so at his peril, and the burden is upon him to prove that
the agent possessed such authority.* ^^ This is one exception to the
general rule that the power to sell includes the power to collect pay-
ment on account of the sale :*^*^ the rule does not apply when the agent
has not the possession of the goods. Traveling salesmen have become
such a numerous class of agents that their duties and powers have be-
come a matter of common knowledge in the business world, and par-
ties who deal with them must be presumed to know at least the general
scope of these. In the absence of actual authority to collect payment
for goods sold in such cases, by traveling salesmen who solicit orders,
the principal can only be made liable in the event he holds out the
408 pgj. Mitchell, J., in Graffty v. "^ See also, City of Stuart v. Cun-
City of Rushville, 107 Ind, 502, 57 ningham, 88 Iowa 191, 29 L. R. A.
Am. Rep. 128. 439; Village of Stamford v. Fisher,
^™City of Elgin v. Picard, 24 111. 140 N. Y. 187; Hewson v. Inhabit-
App. 340. ants, etc., 55 N. J. L. 522, 21 L. R. A.
''"Radebaugh v. City of Plain 736.
City, 11 Ohio Dec. 612. "* Ex parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 478;
*" Commonwealth v. Farnum, 114 Chambers v. Short, 79 Mo. 204.
Mass. 267; State v. Moorehead, 42 ^>' Butler v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298;
S. C. 211, 46 Am. St. 419, 26 L. R. A. Chambers v. Short, 79 Mo. 204, 207.
585. *'" Story Ag., § 102.
"^ DuBoistovi^n v. Rochester Brew-
ing Co. (Com. PI.), 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 442.
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agent as possessing such power: it is not implied in the authority to
take orders for goods.* ^^ The purchaser can not with safety rely upon
the statement of the agent that he possesses such authority: a hold-
ing out by the principal can generally be shown only by admissions
or conduct on the part of such principal.*^® Where the agent is in-
trusted with the possession of goods, or sells over the counter, au-
thority to receive payment will generally be implied, unless forbidden
by the seller; in such case, the rule is directly opposite from what
it is in case of a mere solicitor for orders.*^® Xor is it within the
implied powers of such an agent to cancel his contracts for and take
back goods previously sold to the customer which are not satisfac-
tory to him.'*^° The sale between the customer and the principal,
when made by a traveling salesman, unless it be in writing, is com-
plete only from the time the goods are shipped, provided the principal
ships within a reasonable time the amount and quality of the goods
ordered, and in the manner directed. From that time on, if the con-
tract be valid and binding, and the delivery is to be "f. o. b.," the title
to the goods vests in the purchaser, subject only to stoppage in traiv-
sitii. If a different kind or quantity be shipped from those ordered,
or if shipment be delayed an unreasonable time, the purchaser is not
bound to receive the shipment, and may avoid liability therefor by
notifying the seller, within a reasonable time, that he declines to
receive the goods. But if he receive and appropriate the goods, he is
liable for them the same as' if he had ordered them, and he must
pay what they are reasonably worth.*- ^ On the other hand, if the
agent exceed his authority, by agreeing to certain conditions not
within the scope of his powers, the principal may reject them ; but
if he accept the contract of the agent, he will Ix? bound by it; and he
can not accept it in part and repudiate it in part.*-- So, where a
drummer made an unauthorized arrangement with a customer to
discount a bill ten per cent, off list price, the principal was held not
bound by the arrangement; and since the agreement was beyond the
apparent scope of the agent's authority, the purchaser was held liable
" Kornemann v. Monaghan, 24
Mich. 36; Chambers v. Short, 79
Mo. 204, 207.
"* Holland v. Van Beil. 89 Ga. 223;
Kornemann v. Monaghan, supra;
McKinly v. Dunham, 55 Wis. 515.
"Law v. Stokes, 3 Vroom (N. J.)
249. 90 Am. Dec. 655.
-"Diversby v. Kellog, 44 111. 114,
92 Am. Dec. 154.
*^^ Diversby v. Kellog, supra.
" Babcock v. Deford, 14 Kan. 408.
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for the list prices.*-^ In that case, however, the purchaser had notice
that the agent had no such authority, from the fact that the latter
agreed to make good the discount himself, if the principal did not do
so; otherwise it would seem that the purchaser had the right to dic-
tate his own terms of the purchase ; and if such terms were not agree-
able to the seller, he should decline to forward the goods. It is
within the implied powers of such an agent, who is paid a certain
salar}^ and traveling expenses for his compensation, to bind his prin-
cipal for the use of horses and carriages used by him in his prin-
cipal's business;'*^* the reason for this, as we have seen in a previous
place in this work,*^° is that the agent's power to do a thing includes
all the necessary means of doing it; and where an agent is sent by
his house with large trunks and sample-cases, it is but natural that
he should have the means of transporting these over the route of his
travels. Inasmuch as even an agent who has the goods which he is
to sell in his possession has no implied authority to barter or exchange
them for other goods, or articles, or pledge them for his own debt,*^^
it follows that an agent of the character now under consideration
has no such implied powers. And a commercial traveler, even
though he have authority to collect accounts and receive money and
checks payable to his principal, has no implied authority to indorse
his principal's name on such checks; and if a bank pay such checks on
his indorsement, it will be responsible to the principal.*-'^ Established
*^ Taylor Mfg. Co. v. Brown ( Tex.
App.), 14 S. W. 1071.
*^* Bentley v. Doggett, 51 Wis. 224,
37 Am. Rep. 827; Huntley v. Ma-
thlas, 90 N. C. 101, 47 Am. Rep. 516.
59 Am. Dec. 331.
*^Ante, § 326.
"^Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v.
Oivan, 65 Mo. 89.
*^ Jackson v. National Bank, 92
Tenn. 154 The court in that case,
speaking through Holman, J., said:
"No authority will be implied from
an express authority. Whatever
powers will be conceded to the
effectual exercise of the express
powers will be conceded to the
agent by implication. In order,
therefore, that the authority to
34
—
Principal and Agent.
make or draw, accept, and indorse
commercial paper as the agent of
another may be implied from some
other express authority, it must be
shown to be strictly necessary to
the complete execution of the ex-
press power. The rule is strictly
enforced that the authority to exe-
cute and indorse bills and notes as
agent will not be implied from an
express authority tor transact some
other business, unless it is absolute-
ly necessary to the exercise of ex-
press authority: Tiedeman Com.
Paper, § 77. Possession of a
check payable to order, by one
claiming to be agent of the payee,
is not prima facie proof of author-
ity to demand payment in the name
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usage will, however, as in the case of any other agent's authority,
enter into the contract of agency of a drummer, if there be nothing
in that instrument to the contrary; so, where there is a general and
well-known usage that an agent to solicit orders may collect payment,
the agent in the given case will be presumed to possess such authority,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.*^^ Nor has a drummer
an implied authority to sell his samples and take pay for them;
and if he does, the owner may recover their value from the purchaser,
in a proper action.*^^ A drummer's samples are not included in the
ordinary baggage of a passenger for which a common carrier becomes
liable in case of loss or injury to the baggage, unless the baggage be-
came injured or lost by the "gross" negligence of the carrier ; but the
company is liable, even for ordinary negligence, or as an insurer,
where the railroad-agent having control of the receipt of the baggage
had knowledge of what was contained in such baggage, and no mis-
representation as to such contents was made to such railroad agent
of the true owner: Idem, § 312.
A bank is obliged by custom to
honor checks payable to order, and
pays them at its peril to any other
than the person to whose order they
are made payable: Idem, § 431. It
must see that the check is paid to
the payee therein named upon his
genuine indorsement, or It will re-
main responsible: Pickle v. Muse,
88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W. 919. An
authority to receive checks in lieu
of cash in payment of bills placed
in the hands of an agent for collec-
tion does not authorize the agent to
Indorse and collect the check:
Graham v. Institution, 46 Mo. 186;
1 Wait Act. & Def. 284; 1 Daniel
Neg. Inst. 294. The indorsement of
the check was not a necessary inci-
dent to the collection of accounts:
Graham v. Institution, 46 Mo. 186.
It follows that a drummer or com-
mercial traveler, employed to sell
and take orders for goods, to collect
accounts, and receive money, and
checks payable to the order of his
principal, is not by implication au-
thorized to indorse such principal's
name to such checks. No^ equitable
considerations can be invoked to
soften seeming hardships in the en-
forcement of the laws and rules
fixing liability on persons handling
commercial paper. These laws are
the growth of ages, and the result
of experience, having their origin
in necessity. The inflexibility of
these rules may occasionally make
them seem severe, but in them is
found general security."
*"' Meyer v. Stone, 46 Ark. 210,
55 Am. Rep. 577; Janney v. Boyd,
30 Minn. 319. Some courts have
indeed held that a commercial trav-
eler or drummer whose business it
is to solicit orders, has implied au-
thority to collect payment also:
Trainor v. Morison, 78 Me. 160, 57
Am. Rep. 790; Collins v. Newton, 7
Baxt. (Tenn.) 269. But the great
weight of authority is to the con-
trary.
^"Kohn V. Washer, 64 Tex. 131,
53 Am. Rep. 745.
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by the drummer having it in charge.*^" In such case, the contract
is a personal one between the drummer and the carrier, and the
owner of the samples (the drummer's principal) has no right of
action.*^^
§ 464. Pedlers and hawkers.—Statutes and municipal ordinances
requiring pedlers and hawkers to procure a license for the privilege
of selling their commodities, and imposing a penalty for failure to
procure such license, are constitutional as a proper exercise of the
police power: occupations of this character, if not restrained, are
liable to become nuisances, and a license fee may be imposed which
is large enough to act as a restraint, or to limit the number of
persons to engage in it.*^^ But such statutes or ordinances must
make no distinction between classes of citizens or residents of dif-
ferent states or of subdivisions of the same states.*^^ An apparent
exception with regard to some classes of citizens is upheld by the
courts in sustaining provisions granting the exclusive privilege of a
community or neighborhood to physically disabled soldiers and sailors,
or conferring such privilege without pay upon such of these as are
not able to make a livelihood by manual labor, or upon crippled or
disabled persons without reference to whether or not they were for-
merly soldiers or sailors.^^'* Such statutes have been held constitu-
tional although the effect is to exclude all able-bodied persons from
the privilege.'*^^ The holder of a license to peddle can not delegate
"" Humphreys v. Perry, 148 U. S. thorized, unjust and oppressive
627; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217, While the argument of the appel-
56 Am. Dec. 460; Stimson v. Con- lant on this subject is ingenious,
necticut River R. Co., 98 Mass. 83, and shows research and learning,
93 Am. Dec. 140. we do not regard the subject as
*^' Dibble v. Brown, supra. fairly debatable. The recital in the
"- City of Duluth v. Krupp, 46 earlier acts shows by the express
Minn. 435; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. declaration of the lawmakers, what
428, 20 Am. Rep. 12. is quite apparent from the nature
^'^ Commonwealth v. Gardner, 133 of the several provisions they con-
Pa. St. 284, 19 Am. St. 645, 7 L. R. tain, that the purpose of the legis-
A. 666. lation was the protection of society
*^ In re Fisher, 3 Lane. Bar. 391; from the lawless, able-bodied wan-
In re Morris, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 193. derer, whose presence is a source
"^ Commonwealth v. Brinton, 132 of apprehension in any community.
Pa. St. 69. "Especially is it urged," To refuse a license which would
said the court in this case, "that serve as an excuse for visiting pri-
the discrimination in favor of those vate houses and securing access
under physical disability, is unau- thereto, to the able-bodied stranger,
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the rights and privileges thereunder to another, nor is the same
transferable, the rights conferred being of a personal nature; and,
ill such cases as these, the license would be no protection to the
transferee, even though he were an agent or servant of the licensee,
unless the employment of an agent or servant were permitted by
statute.'*^*' In England, it seems that the licensed party may, by
virtue of the statute, employ a servant to drive the wagon and sell
the goods, and the license is a protection to' both.*^^ A license to
peddle may not be conferred upon a corporation, unless there is a
statute which permits it.*^^ A statute authorizing municipalities of
a certain grade to collect license fees, etc., from pedlers, etc., is not
obnoxious to the constitutional provision requiring uniformity of
legislation for the entire state ;*^^ such a fee being held not to be a
tax within the strict sense of the word, but simply a license charge.
Under modern authority pedling and hawking are not considered
immoral in themselves, or contrary to the public interests; and,
hence, they may be regulated or restricted only on the theory of pre-
venting a nuisance. ^^° Some courts hold that it is immaterial whether
the license is required upon the theory of a police power, as a means
of restraining certain occupations, or whether it comes properly
within the taxing power of the legislature, as a means of raising
revenue; that in either case it is a constitutional exercise of the
legislative function, and is accomplished by means of issuing a li-
cense.**^ The better opinion, however, seems to be that the imposing
of a license tax upon pedlers and hawkers for the purpose of raising
revenue would be unconstitutional, and that the power may be exer-
cised only as a police regulation.*'*^ Under this view the license fee
must not be unreasonable or oppressive in amount.**^ Hence, a city
ordinance requiring hawkers or pedlers who travel on foot to take
out a license, paying therefor a fee of ten dollars for the first day,
was an exercise of police power, as "" State v. Wagener, 69 Minn. 206,
clearly as the laws regulating the 65 Am. St. 565.
granting of liquor licenses or the "^ Johnson v. Asbury Park, 60 N.
rule of fire-arms." J. L. 427, 431.
*="> Gibson v. Kauffield, 63 Pa. St. ^" Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361,
168; Temple v. Sumner, 51 Miss. 13, 45 Am. Rep. 85; Easterly v." Irwin,
24 Am. Rep. 615. 99 Iowa 694.
^^'51 & 52 Vict, ch. 33. "'State v. Glavin, 67 Conn. 29;
«' Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. State Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa
Johnson, 84 Ga. 754. 249,
"" Johnson v. Asbury Park, 60 N.
J. L. 427, 431.
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and five dollars for each subsequent day, if traveling on foot; and,
if traveling with one horse, twenty dollars the first day and fifteen
dollars for each subsequent day; but if traveling with two or more
horses, twenty-five dollars for the first day and fifteen dollars for each
subsequent day,—was held invalid by the supreme court of ilichigan,
as being unreasonable and amounting to practical prohibition.*** But
the same court h6ld a license fee of five dollars per week from all
classes of hawkers and pedlers reasonable and valid. **^ There is
in a municipality no inherent power to exact a license fee for ped-
ling or hawking, and such power can be exercised only when granted
by the legislature ;**® and statutes delegating such power to munic-
ipalities should not be construed beyond the natural import of their
language; and when this is doubtful, as to whether or not the power
has been conferred, the statute should be interpreted so as to relieve
the citizen of the burden.**'^ Neither can such power, when properly
delegated, be redelegated by the municipality to a board or committee
or other person, unless the power of redelegation is expressly men-
tioned or clearly implied in such statute. This is upon the familiar
principle that delegated authority which involves the exercise of dis-
cretion and judgment can not be redelegated.**^ The state, within its
constitutional sphere, may prohibit some occupations entireh'^, and the
courts will not interfere with the legitimate exercise of such right. **^
And it is immaterial whether the commodities as to which the license
fee is imposed be manufactured in the same state in which they are
to be sold or not; but there must be no interference with interstate
or foreign commerce, or the statute requiring a license will be un-
constitutional.*^"
§ 465. Sales of goods by drummers and other agents—Statute of
frauds.—The 17th section of the English statute of frauds, and equiv-
alent sections enacted by the legislatures of different states in this
"* Brooks V. Mangan, 86 Mich. "' State v. Glavin, 67 Conn. 29, 34.
576, 24 Am. St. 137. ''' Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.)
^^'^ People V. Baker, 115 Mich. 199, 742.
73 N. W. 115. "" Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S.
'*' Smith Munic. Corp., § 1477; 289; City of Huntington v. Mahan,
Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 540, 68 142 Ind. 695; City of Bloomington
Am. Dec. 143; Van Hook v. Selma, v. Bourland, 137 111. 534; Ex parte
70 Ala. 361, 45 Am. Rep. 85. Thomas, 71 Cal. 204; Ex parte
"'Ex parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 478, Rosenblatt, 19 Nev. 439, 3 Am. St.
38 Am. Rep. 336. See also. Ken- 901.
nedy v. People, 9 Colo. App. 492.
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country, are generally applicable to a contract for the sale of goods
by a drummer or other traveling agent who does not deliver on sale.*^^
As the rule of law differs in different states with respect to the
question whether such a sale falls within the statute at all, and if so,
what will be its construction, etc., the governing rule of law must
always be sought in the jurisdiction where the contract was made or
attempted to be made, and the principles here stated are of general
application only. Under the 17th section of the English statute, a
contract or order for goods of the value of ten pounds sterling
($50.00) or more can not be enforced unless it is in writing, or
unless there has been a delivery, receipt and acceptance of the goods,
in whole or in part, or payment or part payment of the purchase price,
or of some earnest-money.*^^ Wliether the amount is sufficient
or not to bring the case within the statute depends sometimes upon
the question whether the sale of different articles of goods of various
kinds, the value of each of which is less than $50.00 (or whatever
the statutory amount may be), is an entire contract within the mean-
ing of the statute, or whether each article constitutes a separate sale : if
it was all one sale, it of course comes within the provisions of the stat-
ute, unless the value or price of all the articles was less than $50.00;
but if each article was sold separately, and its price or value was less
than $50.00, the statute will not apply.*^^ Whether the subject-
matter of a contract falls within the purview of the statute also
depends upon whether or not the object to be accomplished is a
sale of personal property or a contract for work and labor or material
;
for if an article is contracted for which has as yet no existence,
and, when manufactured and delivered according to the contract,
would not be a sale of personal property, but might simply be
work and labor and material furnished, the statute does not apply.
It has been held in England that "if the contract be such that when
carried out it would result in the sale of a chattel, the party can not
sue for work and labor; but if the result of the contract is that the
party has done work and labor, which ends in nothing that can become
the subject of a sale, the party can not sue for goods sold and deliv-
ered."* ^^^ But the weight of authority in this country is that an
order to manufacture and deliver is not a sale. To employ a per-
son to manufacture and furnish ironwork for a building, for
example, is not a contract within the statute of frauds for the
sale of goods ;*^* but where the essence of the contract is the sale
«i See Hausman v. Nye, 62 Ind. *^^ Allard v. Greasert, 61 N. Y. 1.
485, 30 Am. Rep. 199; Winner v. *"a Lee v. Griffin, 1 Best & S. 272.
Williams, 62 Mich. 363. «* Heintz v. Burlvhard, 29 Or. 55.
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of goods, though they do not exist in the form in which they are to be
delivered, having yet to undergo a process of manufacture, the contract
is within the scope of the statute.*^^ In other words, the contract
must be essentially for the sale of goods, and not for the manufacture
of an article or articles or for the employment of labor.*^® A sale
requiring a delivery, whether present or future, is within the letter
and spirit of the statute; and hence, executory contracts are as fully
within its meaning as others ;*^'^ but when the delivery is made at
the time of the sale, followed by an aceptance, the requirement of the
statute is fulfilled, and no written memorandum is necessary.*^®
On the other hand, when the contract is in writing, or there is a
cash payment, in whole or in part, of the purchase-money, no de-
livery is necessary under the statute to complete the sale.*^^ A de-
livery of a portion of the goods is enough, if accepted by the pur-
chaser ;*'''' but the delivery and acceptance of samples as mere speci-
mens is not sufficient to take the transaction out of the statute.**'^
When a sale is relied upon and no written memorandum is produced,
the burden of proving a delivery and acceptance is upon the party
alleging it; the question being for the Jury.^®^ If there was no
memorandum made or earnest-money paid, three things are necessary
to make the contract binding: (1) a delivery by the seller; (2) a
receipt by the buyer; (3) an acceptance by the bu3^er.'*^^ There
must be an actual receipt of the goods or what is equivalent to it:*®*
it will not be sufficient for the seller to show that the goods were
as represented and that he had otherwise fully complied with his
agreement;***^ hence, the purchaser may refuse to accept the goods
31 L. R. A. 508. See also, Mattison 26 Wis. 511; Edwards v. Grand
V. Westcott, 13 Vt. 258; Winship v. Trunk R. Co., 48 Me. 379.
Buzzard, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 103. '=' Houghtaling v. Ball, 19 Mo. 84,
"^ Prescott V. Locke, 51 N. H. 94, 59 Am. Dec. 331.
12 Am. Rep. 55; Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 ""Pierce v. Gibson, 2 Ind. 408.
N. H. 294, 2 Am. Rep. 218. ""Austin v. Boyd, 23 Mo. App.
*=« Wharton v. Missouri Car Foun- 317; Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 557.
dry Co., 1 Mo. App. 577; Passaic "'Moore v. Love, 57 Miss. 765.
Mfg. Co. V. Hoffman, 3 Daly (N. Y.) "-Johnson v. Watson, 1 Ga. 348.
495; Heintz v. Burkhard, 29 Or. 55, "^Browne Stat, of Frauds, § 316,
31 L. R. A. 508; Meincke v. Falk, 55 et seq.; Benjamin Sales, § 138, et
Wis. 427. seq.
"'Bennett v. Hull, 10 Johns. (N. "''» Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H.
Y.) 364; Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685, 49; Jones v. Mechanics' Bank, 29
40 Am. Dec. 698; Hooker v. Knab, Md. 287, 96 Am. Dec. 533.
"" Stone v. Browning, 68 N. Y. 598.
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and repudiate the sale at any time ; but he must do so before or within
a reasonable time after he receives the goods/*'® or he will be held
to have accepted them. Wliere the purchaser takes possession of
the goods merely for the purpose of inspection, this is not an ac-
ceptance, and he may, within a reasonable time thereafter, repudiate
the contract, upon giving timely notice;*®'^ but if the purchaser,
having the right of inspection, sells the goods without exercising such
right, he thereby waives the right to inspect, and the act amounts
to an acceptance.*®^ Whether a delivery to a common carrier con-
stitutes an acceptance is a question of great importance in the con-
struction of the section. If nothing were required but a deliver}^
to complete the sale, it would be sufficient to deliver to a public
carrier, and especially so if the carrier had been designated by the
purchaser: such a delivery constituting a receipt of the goods by the
purchaser;*®^ but a delivery and receipt, as we have seen, are not
enough, under the statute: there must also be an acceptance by the
purchaser, for the two are not identical. The buyer has the right
of inspection, and this continues until he has had an opportunity
to ascertain whether he desires to receive the goods or not:*'** hence
the delivery to a carrier, though designated by the purchaser, is not
an acceptance of the goods, unless such carrier has been specially
appointed with that end in view, his general designation to transport
the goods not being sufficient. *'^^ The true rule would seem to be
then, that delivery to a carrier designated by the purchaser is a re-
ceipt but not. an acceptance of the goods: the carrier being the pur-
chaser's agent for the one but not for the other purpose ; and that the
right to repudiate the contract continues until the goods arrive at
their destination and have been taken into custody by such purchaser,
either actually or constructively. The buyer may refuse to accept
*«« Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314, 73 Smith v. Brennan, 62 Mich. 349;
Am. Dec. 309. Grimes v. Van Vechten, 20 Mich.
*" Hill V. McDonald, 17 Wis. 97. 410; Johnson v. Cuttle. 105 Mass.
^'Benjamin Sales, § 181; Liggett 447, 7 Am. Rep. 545; Jones v. Me-
& Myers Tob. Co. v. Collier, 89 Iowa chanics' Bank, 29 Md. 287, 96 Am.
144; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 70 Mich. Dec. 533; Billin v. Henkel, 9 Colo.
583; Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314, 73 394; Keiwert v. Meyer, 62 Ind. 587,
Am. Dec. 309. 30 Am. Rep. 206; Lloyd v. Wright,
*«» Bacon v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227. 25 Ga. 215; Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N.
^^ Lloyd v. Wright, 25 Ga. 215; Y. 661; Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N.
Browne Stat, of Frauds, § 327. Y. 519; Wilcox Silverplate Co. v.
*^^Allard v. Graesert, 61 N. Y. 1; Green, 72 N. Y. 17.
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the goods for an}' reason satisfactor}' to himself ; for it is not a ques-
tion of what he ought to do, but of what has been done."*"- The ques-
tion of acceptance, like that of receiving, is generally a question of fact
for the jury -^'^ if, however, the facts are not in dispute, and but one
conclusion may be drawn from them, it is a question of law for the
court.*"'* It is not necessarj', however, that there should be a manual
taking possession of the goods by the buyer in person ; for the accept-
ance may be constructive—although it must be clear and unequiv-
ocal.*^^ What we have said on the subject of the statute of frauds
applies, of course, to the 17th section of the English statute and to
the similar sections adopted by American states ; wherever the provis-
ions vary from this section, they may not be subject to the same con-
struction. In ordinary sales, not within the provisions of this section,
a delivery to a public carrier without condition is sufficient to pass
the title to the property to the vendee ; the carrier being the bailee of
the vendee, and not of the vendor, subject to the right of inspection.^^^
Payment of earnest-money or part payment of the price of the goods
ordered, and written memoranda by the purchaser, are such rare oc-
currences in sales of goods by commercial travelers or drummers that
we do not regard these topics of sufficient importance to enter upon a
discussion of them in a work of this character ; and the reader is re-
ferred to works on sales and the statute of frauds for further in-
formation.
*'=Gibbs V. Benjamin, 45 Vt. 124, v. Labreche, 63 N. H. 397; Stone v.
131; Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S. 363, Browning, 68 N. Y. 598. What is a
372; Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. St. sufficient symbolic delivery,—see
7; Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass. 447. Parker v. Jervis, 3 Keyes (N. Y.)
*"Per Coleridge, J., in Bushel v. 271; Sahlman v. Mills, 3 Strob. L.
Wheeler, 15 Q. B. 442 n.; Tibbetts v. (S. C.) 384, 51 Am. Dec. 630; Dixon
Morton, 15 Q. B. 428, 19 L. J. Q. B. v. Buck, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 70.
382; Borrowsdale v. Bosworth, 99 '"" State v. Wingfield, 115 Mo. 428,
Mass. 378. 37 Am. St. 406; Scharff v. Meyer,
^•* Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H. 133 Mo. 428, 54 Am. St. 672; Kup-
49, 56; Denny v. Williams, 5 Allen penheimer v. Wertheimer, 107 Mich.
(Mass.) 1, 5. 77, 61 Am. St. 317; Barton v. Kane,
*'= Benjamin Sales, § 144, et seq.; 17 Wis. 38, 84 Am. Dec. 728.
Shepherd v. Pressey, supra; Clark
CHAPTEE XVIII.
PUBLIC AGENTS AND OFFICERS.
Section Section
466. Definition and classifications. 470. Judicial and gwcwi-judicial ofB.-
467. Classification of officers accord- cers.
ing to nature of duties. 471. Executive and legislative offi-
468. Right of officer to compensa- cers.
tion. 472. Liability of the public for the
469. Ministerial officers. acts of its officers and agents.
§ 466. Definitions and classifications.—Public agents are those per-
sons who are chosen to jDerforin the duties of the public,—that is,
the government or municipality. They may be divided into two
principal classes; namely, employes and ofBcers. It is true the term
"employe," in a sense, applies also to officers, for it may be said
that every officer is an employe; but, on the other hand, a public
employe is not necessarily a public officer; thus, a mere janitor of
county or state buildings, a county physician, and other emplo5'es
who do not take an official oath nor file an official bond, are not
officers but employes.^ An employe of the government usually owes
his position to some officer whose duty it is to make the employment,
and it is based entirely upon contract.^ On the other hand, an officer
owes his selection to a source fixed by the constitution or statute,^
and not by contract.* j\Ioreover, the term "public office" embraces
the idea of tenure and duration, while a mere public employment
may involve only transient or incidental duties.^ An office is an
entity wliich may continue even after the death or withdrawal of
^Trainor v. Board of County * State v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477, 63
Auditors, 89 Mich. 162, 15 L. R. A. Am. St. 174; Water Commissioners
95; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. v. Cramer, 61 N. J. L. 270.
5; Opinion of Judges, 3 Maine 481. ^ In re Oaths, 20 Johns. (N. Y.)
= See Hall v. Wisconsin, supra. 492; Olmstead v. Mayor, 42 N. Y.
'Herrington v. State, 103 Ga. 318, Supr. 481; United States v. Hart-
68 Am. St. 95. well, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 385.
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the incumbent.® A public office involves the delegation to the in-
cumbent of a portion of the sovereign power of the state, either to
make, administer, or execute the laws; and it signifies that the
incumbent is to exercise some functions of that nature, and take
the fees and emoluments belonging to the position.*^^ On the other
hand, there may be and are many employments by the national,
state, city or town government which do not constitute the employe
a public officer. "The work of the commonwealth," said the supreme
judicial court of ]\Iassachusetts, "and of the cities and towns must
be done by agents or servants, and much of it is of the nature
of an employment. It is sometimes difficult to make the distinction
between a public office and an employment, yet the title of 'public
officer' is one well known to the law, and it is often necessary
to determine what constitutes a public office. Every copying-clerk
or janitor of a building is not necessarily a public officer."^ A
mere employe may, of course, be engaged by the appointing power
for a definite time, or to accomplish a definite purpose, and in
that sense his position may involve the nature of duration also ; while,
on the other hand, his employment may be altogether for an indefinite
period, and he be subject to removal at any time. An employe
under contract may be discharged without cause, unless the statute
or constitution directs otherwise, but a public officer can not generally
be removed without cause, although the power of removal is inherent
in the appointing power: the reason being that the power of removal
is generally restricted by constitutional or statutory provisions.^
The English notion that an office is hereditary does not obtain in
this country, though it is true that the rights and privileges of an
officer are the rights and privileges of the incumbent ; in this country
both the power of appointment and that of removal inhere in the
people and are subject to their control by constitutions and statutes.®
An office not being the creature of a contract, but simply a delegation
of a portion of the sovereign power, it follows, according to the
« State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 347; State v. Hewitt, 3 S. D. 187, 16 L.
People v. Stratton, 28 Cal. 382. R. A. 413; Jacques v. Little, 51 Kan.
"a See the opinion of Marshall, C. 300; Board of Com'rs v. Johnson,
J., in United States v. Maurice, 2 124 Ind. 145, 19 Am. St. 88; State
Brock. 96, 102; State v. Jennings, 57 v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 41 Am.
Ohio St. 415. St. 788; State v. Johnson, 57 Ohio
'Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14. St. 429.
* Trainor v. Board of County Au- ° State v. Davis, 44 Mo. 129.
ditors, 89 Mich. 162, 15 L. R. A. 95;
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weight of authority, that the incumbent has no right of property
in the office.^"
§467. Classification of officers according to nature of duties.—
For the purposes of our presentation public officers may be divided
into ministerial, executive, legislative, and judicial officers. Those
public servants of the government who have only or mainly minis-
terial duties to perform are denominated "ministerial officers."
Ministerial duties and functions are those performed in obedience
to the dictates or directions of superiors, and which involve the
exercise of no discretion on the part of those charged with their
performance or execution. ^^ An executive officer is one whose chief
duties consist in the execution of the laws,^^—such as the president of
the United States, the governors of the states and territories, sheriffs,
constables, marshals and police officers. Legislative officers are those
who enact the laws,—such as members of congress, of the state legis-
latures, councilmen, etc., of cities, etc. Judicial officers are intrusted
with the duties of hearing and deciding private judicial controversies
in litigated cases called lawsuits, and in public controversies where
accusations are preferred and tried for the commission of public
offenses.^^ It is not within the scope of this work to enter upon any
discussion as to the mode of selection of these various officers, or their
tenures and the duration and termination thereof: what we are
chiefly concerned with is in respect of their duties and the per-
formance thereof, and the effect upon the officers themselves and upon
others.
§ 468. Right of officer to compensation.—An office may or may
not be accompanied by emolument, though it is a usual element
thereof.^'* The compensation of .an officer is usually provided for
by statute or city ordinance. When no compensation is fixed the
office may be a merely honorary one and the officer will not be
entitled io receive any. When the statute fixes the compensation,
it is usually by way of fees or a specified salary, and when that is
the case the compensation laid down in the statute will, of course,
"State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. ^^ See Bouvier Law Die; People v.
98. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463
" Pennington v. Streiglit, 54 Ind. " State v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477,
376. 63 Am. St. 174; State v. Kennon, 7
12 Bouvier Law Die. Ohio St. 546; State v. Stanley, 66
N. C. 59, 8 Am. Rep. 488.
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govern.^ ^ If there is no dispute as to the title of the incumbent
to the particular office, and the fees or s-alary is fixed by statute,
no difficulty can occur with regard to the officer's compensation;
but when a controversy arises over the right to hold an office,
the question as to who is entitled to the salary may also become in-
volved. In this connection it may be well to point out a distinction
between a de jure and a de facto officer. An officer is said to be de
jure when he is legally entitled to hold the office although some
other claimant of the office may be actually in possession thereof;
while a de facto officer is one actually in the exercise of the power
and functions of the "office under color of right, without having
the legal title thereto.^" Whether a de facto officer who has in good
faith and without fraud or dishonesty in connection with the title
and possession of the office discharged some of the duties thereof is
entitled to its fees and emoluments, is a question as to which the
decisions are not in entire harmony. In some of the states it is held
than an officer de facto who is not tainted with fraud or dishonesty
is entitled to the emoluments of the office as long as he actually
discharges the duties thereof ;^'^ and that if during the incumbency
of the de facto officer his salary is paid to him, before any judgment
of ouster has been rendered against him, the officer de jure has lost
his right to such compensation: the reasons given being that the
right to compensation depends, not upon the title to the office, but
upon the performance of the services, and that while the de facto
officer is in possession the officer making payment can not be expected
to determine who has the actual title to the office, but has a right
to assume the legality of the title of the occupant.^^ But, on the
other hand, it has been repeatedly decided that an officer de facto
can not maintain an action for the salary of the office;^® that if the
salary is actually paid to such officer, such payment constitutes no
defense to a claim for the same by the officer de jure;^*^ and that
"Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5. 38 Ohio St. 18; State v. Milne, 36
^"Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Or. 456, Neb. 301.
3 Am. St. 176; Wilcox v. Smith, 5 ^^ McCue v. Wapello Co., 56 Iowa
Wend. (N. Y.) 231. 698, 41 Am. Rep. 134; Dolan v.
"Erwin v. Jersey City, 60 N. J. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 274, 36 Am. Rep.
L. 141, 64 Am. St. 584. 168.
"Auditors of Wayne Co. v. Be- =° State v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44, 13
noit, 20 Mich. 176, 4 Am. Rep. 382; L. R. A. 177; McVeany v. Mayor, 80
McVeany v. Mayor, 80 N. Y. 185, 36 N. Y. 185, 36 Am. Rep. 600.
Am. Rep. 600; Steubenville v. Culp,
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the officer de jure may recover of the officer de facto the fees and
salaries collected by the latter, after it has been determined judi-
cially that the former is the party entitled to the office.^ ^ These cases
proceed upon the theorv' that an office is property, and that the
right to enjoy the proceeds thereof is not dependent upon the per-
formance of its duties, but upon the title to the office. The diffi-
culty arises from the variety of judicial views as to the nature
of the right enjoyed by one who has been chosen to fill a public
office,—whether such right is one of property which he has a right
to secure to himself as in other cases where property rights are
invaded, or whether it is a mere inchoate right which does not
become absolute until he has actually performed the services. The
latter view would seem to be the better one, or at least the one more
in harmony with the theory upon which the right to hold office in
this country rests.^^
§ 469. Ministerial officers.—Many public officers have duties to
perform which are of a mixed nature, having the elements of minis-
terial, judicial, executive and legislative duties; but in the main the
separation of the various functions and powers into departments
is one of the distinguishing features of our American form of gov-
ernment. N'evertheless, it is often the case even in this country,
that the duties of a public officer are so near the dividing line that it
is very difficult to determine upon which side to place them. Where
the duties are prescribed and defined by law or by the mandate of
a superior officer, leaving no room for the exercise of judgment or
discretion, they are ministerial; and so it is held that if the time,
mode and occasion of the performance of the act or acts are pre-
scribed with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or
discretion, the act is ministerial.-^ As we have several times pointed
out, duties which are strictly ministerial, as well as those which
are mechanical, may be delegated to be performed by some one else
than the person selected to perform them;^* hence, a ministerial
^^Mayfield v. Moore, 53 111. 428, 4 484, 10 Am. St. 280, and note on
Am. Rep. 52; Douglas v. State, 31 p. 284.
Ind. 429; Hunter v. Chandler, 45 " Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54
Mo. 452. Am. Rep. 65.
^ See also, Romero v. United "* See Birdsell v, Clark, 73 N. Y.
States, 24 Ct. of CI. 331, 5 L. R. A. 73, 29 Am. Rep. 105; Hope v. Saw-
69; Andrews v. Portland, 79 Maine yer, 14 111. 254; Williams v. Woods,
16 Md. 220.
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officer may, without express authority to do so, appoint a deputy
to perfonn any or all of the functions of the office.-^ Powers and
functions not in themselves ministerial may, however, be delegated
by legislative authority; thus, legislative and judicial duties are
frequently conferred upon the subordinate branches of government
by laws enacted by the state and national legislatures,—thus confer-
ring upon municipal and other public corporations such powers as the
general legislative body can not conveniently execute itself.-^ Where
the implied power of an officer exists to appoint a deputy, the
latter must perform all acts as such in the name of his principal
;
otherwise the performance is by some courts held to be a nullity;-^
as in such case the authority rests nominally in the principal officer,
and must therefore be executed in his name.^^ If, however, the
office of deputy is created by express provision of law, the deputy
may act in his own name, and use his own official signature, and
designation, instead of that of his principal officer.-'' The better
view would seem to be, however, that the use of the deputy's
name is a mere matter of form; and whether the act is done in the
name of the principal or agent, it will in neither event, perhaps,
vitiate the act.^° A ministerial officer, like any other, must per-
form his duties with fidelity to liis principal (the government or
municipality) ; and he can not, as a general rule, lawfully act at
all, if he is adversely interested.^^ When an office is purely minis-
terial its duties may be enforced by mandamus.^^ Any violation of
duty on the part of a ministerial officer resulting in injury to the
public, as such, may be redressed only by a public prosecution, either
at common law or under statutory provisions ;^^ but if the officer
owes a duty to some person individually, which he neglects to perform,
he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from such negli-
^^Abrams v. Ervin, 9 Iowa 87; ^ Westbrook v. Miller, 56 Mich.
Hope V. Sawyer, supra; Attorney- 148; Eastman v. Curtis, 4 Vt. 616.
General v. Detroit, 58 Mich. 213, 55 ^ Westbrook v. Miller, supra.
Am. Rep. 675; Roberts v. People, 9 ^ Woods v. Gilson, 17 111. 218;
Colo. 458. Mills v. Young, 23 Wend. (N. Y.)
^Tilley v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 314; Boykin v. Edwards, 21 Ala.
5 Fed. 641; Richland Co. v. Law- 261.
rence Co., 12 111. 1; Cincinnati, etc., =>= Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54
R. Co. V. Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St. 77. Am. Rep. 65.
*'Glencoe v. Owen, 78 111. 382; ^Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns.
Arnold v. Scott, 39 Tex. 378. (N. Y.) 439, 8 Am. Dec. 428.
=« Talbot v. Hooser, 12 Bush (Ky.)
408.
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gence.^* If, however, the officer acts with due care, and within the
scope of his authority, he is not liable to an individual for any
resulting injury.^^ If a ministerial officer execute the process
of a court, regular on its face, he will be protected although it
was issued without jurisdiction as to person and place ;^® but if the
want of jurisdiction is of the subject-matter,^^ or even of parties,
but apparent on the face of the process,^ ^ or if the process was
based on an unconstitutional statute,^®—it furnishes no protection.
The officer is not liable for the acts of his subordinates where they
are appointed by virtue of a statute and are thus created inde-
pendent public officers.^'' The office of sheriff seems to be an ex-
ception to this rule ; and that officer is liable for the official acts of his
deputies, as at common law the deputy was considered the private
servant of the officer, and officers were liable for the acts of such
servants.*^ We have already seen that a public officer is not generally
liable individually on contracts entered into on behalf of his prin-
cipal, unless it be the intention to bind him individually;*^ this
exemption, of course, includes ministerial offices as well as others.
A ministerial officer may, in the commission of some wrongful act,
so far depart from the line of his office as to be entirely outside of
any official relation; and where this is the case, while he will
doubtless be individually liable for the consequences of such act,
he can not be said to be officially responsible, and therefore the
sureties on his official bond will not be answerable therefor.'*^
If the negligent act or failure occurred in the line of the officer's
employment, the officer may be liable civilly, notwithstanding the same
act or omission also constituted a criminal offense for which he may
be indicted and prosecuted criminally.** A public officer is generally
indictable as for a crime for any omission or failure in the performance
^Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N. Y. Parker v. Walrod, 16 Wend. (N. Y.)
302; State v. Harris, 89 Ind. 363, 46 514, 30 Am. Dec. 124.
Am. Rep. 169; Hayes v. Porter, 22 ^'^ Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341,
Maine 371. 19 Am. Rep. 718.
^^Mechem Pub. Off., § 661. ^"Foster v. Metts, 55 Miss. 77, 30
='' Young V. Wise, 7 Wis. 128; Can- Am. Rep. 504.
non V. Sipples, 39 Conn. 505; Tay- *^1 Bl. Com. 344, 346; 3 Minor's
lor V. Alexander, 6 Ohio 144. Inst. (3d ed.) 254.
2" Smith V. Shaw, 12 Johns. (N. *- Aiite, § 299.
Y.) 257; Wilmarth v. Burt, 7 Met. ^^ McLendon v. State, 92 Tenn.
(Mass.) 257; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 520, 21 L. R. A. 738.
Ind. 370. "Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich.
^ Davis V. Wilson, 65 111. 525; 342, 38 Am. Rep. 198.
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of his duties,
—
^particularly those duties which are purely ministerial
and leave the officer no discretion in their performance.*^ If the
officer has the privilege of exercising judgment or discretion in the
case, and he follows such judgment or discretion honestly, and does
not act maliciously or wantonly or corruptly,*^ he is not indictable.
§470. Judicial and quasi-judicial officers.—Judicial officers rep-
resent that division in our governmental system known and designated
as the judicial department of government of the state or nation.
Judicial officers necessarily have the largest share of discretionary
powers coniided to them. Such an officer necessarily has other powers
also, as executive and legislative, hut he is called a judicial officer
because his main functions are judicial. Such officers have many
privileges and immunities not common to other officers, var}ang
with the degrees of importance of the courts which they respectively
represent. Thus, a justice of the supreme court of the United
States is entitled to the protection of the government from personal
violence, not only while on the bench or holding court, but while
traveling through the country to and from the place where his
court may be in session.'**'^ Such functionaries, like legislative and
executive officers, are privileged from arrest and from civil process
while holding their courts and traveling to and from the same.'*'^
At common law a judicial officer may excuse himself from testifying as
a witness in a case in which he is the presiding judge.** He can not be
arrested on common-law process issued out of his own court, but
must be proceeded against by bill, if at all.*'' But while they are en-
titled to many privileges, as such officers, they are also placed by
the law under certain restraints and disabilities in consequence of
their official positions; thus, a judge who has ordered the sale of
a piece of land, subject to his confirmation or disapproval, can not
become a purchaser at such sale, as he comes within the reason of the
rule that trustees and other fiduciaries can not purchase at a sale
** State v. Glasgow, Cam. & N. (N. " Lyell v. Goodwin, 4 McLean (U.
C.) 38, 2 Am. Dec. 628; Stone v. S.) 44.
Graves, 8 Mo. 148, 40 Am. Dec. 131. ** Welcome v. Batchelder, 23 Maine
^ State v. Williams, 12 Ired. (N. 85; People v. Miller, 2 Parker Cr.
C.) 172; People v. Coon, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 197.
(N. Y.) 277. "In re Livingston, 8 Johns. (N.
^'a In re Nagle, 135 U. S. 1. Y.) 351.
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in connection with which they have official duties to perform.^**
Judges and judicial officers are generally prohibited by statute or
constitutional provisions from acting as attorneys during their terms
of office or from holding any other office, though this inhibition is
limited in some states to other than judicial offices. Constitutional
provisions are also made by which the compensation of judges may
not be reduced during their terms of office ; and in the federal courts
and in the courts of Massachusetts the tenure of office is for life or dur-
ing good behavior. As to their liabilities, it may be laid down as the
general rule that such an officer is not liable to any individual for dam-
ages for any erroneous decision or judgment he may render, if at the
time he was within the jurisdiction as to person and subject-matter.^^
The officer may go far astray in the exercise of his functions and not
render himself liable, for the law has a tender regard for the imper-
fections of men's judgments and decisions. Public policy forbids
that any one should be punished for every mistake, as in that event
no one could be secured who would be willing to fill such places.^^
A judge or justice of the peace may innocently commit an injury
upon some individual without being liable; thus, where such an offi-
cer wrongfully but innocently orders a person ejected from the
court-room, which order is obeyed, there can be no liability on the
part of the judge, if he acted under the erroneous belief that the
case was one in which he had a right to sit with closed doors.^^
If the officer is actually within his jurisdiction when the act is
committed there can be no doubt that he is exempt from liability;
but it does not necessarily follow that when a judicial officer acts
without jurisdiction, he is always liable, as is seen by the case last
cited. Much depends upon the intention of the officer, and if he be-
lieves in good faith that he has jurisdiction, having reasonable grounds
for so believing, he is exempt from liability.^* The act, however,
must be a judicial one; for if it be ministerial only, the good faith
of the officer will not protect him; thus, if a police officer order the
arrest of a person for an act which does not constitute a crime at
™ Tracy v. Colby, 55 Cal. 67. See =- See opinion of Lord Tenterden,
also, Hopkinson v. Jacquess, 54 111. in Garnett v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C.
App. 59. 611.
" Chickering v. Robinson, 3 Cusb. ^^ Williamson v. Lacey, 86 Maine
(Mass.) 543; Walker v. Hallock, 32 80, 25 L. R. A. 506.
Ind. 239; Jordan v. Hanson, 49 N. "Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa
H. 199, 6 Am. Rep. 508; Cooley 376; Scott v. Fishplate, 117 N. C.
Torts 408. 265.
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law, or is not punishable by arrest and imprisonment, he is liable
to the party arrested for damages sustained, his motives being imma-
terial.^^ If he were a judicial officer he would not be liable in
such a case if he believed he was acting within his jurisdiction
and had reasonable grounds for such belief; for the mere assertion
of good faith without reasonable grounds therefor is no defense to
an act committed even by a judicial officer who is palpably without
jurisdiction; thus, if the judge of a court should, without any color
or semblance of jurisdiction, sentence a person to imprisonment for
an offense which he had never committed, such officer would doubt-
less be liable. Courts do not always discriminate between judicial
and non-judicial acts in determining an officer's liability; hence, an
elective officer who refuses to receive an elector's vote is in some
states held liable regardless of his motive;^® but in other courts
the act has been regarded as purely judicial and the officer exempt. ^^
An officer who is guilty of corruption while in office, or who acts
from any unlawful motives, may be held accountable by the , state
or other government in a proceeding to impeach him, or in a public
prosecution for such an offense; but even in that case he would not
necessarily be liable to an individual who suffered by reason of his
infamy. An officer having quasi-judicial powers is entitled to the
same immimity as those exercising purely judicial functions, if the
act complained of was done within the limits of authority conferred
upon the officer.^'^ And if a judicial officer himself has to determine
whether or not he has jurisdiction, and in determining the facts
relied upon to give jurisdiction he makes an erroneous decision
in reference thereto, an action will not lie against him.^* But it
has been held that this rule does not apply to a judicial officer of
an inferior court. ^® Where a judicial officer also has ministerial
duties to perform, he may render himself liable for a wrongful
exercise of the latter. ''^ Thus, a county judge whose duty it is to
appoint guardians, administrators, etc., and approve their bonds,
while not liable for erroneously determining that an insolvent bond
is good, when such determination is made after a judicial investiga-
>>= Bolton V. Vellires, 94 Va. 393, 64 '"a East River Gaslight Co. v. Don-
Am. St. 737. nelly, 93 N. Y. 557.
^Larned v. Wheeler, 140 Mass. ^Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393,
390, 51 Am. Rep. 43; Jeffreys v. 25 Am. Rep. 688.
Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372. =*" Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728.
" Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duv. (Ky.) "' Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54
63, 85 Am. Dec. 603. • Am. Rep. 65.
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tion of the facts as to solvency, is liable civilly to the injured party,
where he has accepted such a bond without first properly deter-
mining its sufficiency, unless he knows the bond to be sufficient with-
out investigation. ''^ A probate Judge upon whom devolves the duty
of accepting such a bond can not escape liability for any omission
of a ministerial duty,—such as requiring a bond to be filed when
the law enjoins that he shall have this done;^^ or the ordering of
a renewal of such bonds every two years, when the failure to order
a renewal is the result of willful or malicious negligence.®^
§ 471. Executive and legislative officers.—Many of the privileges
and immunities granted by law to judicial officers are also accorded
to executive and legislative officers; such, for instance, as freedom
from arrest or from service of civil process while actively engaged
in the discharge of their duties are common to all public officers.®*
As to the liabilities of such officers for injury caused by their official
acts it may be truly stated that they are not generally liable if the act
performed was within the scope of the official business. Such officers
have a large discretion in determining whether their acts are wise
or unwise, proper or improper; and when exercised within the limits
mentioned the officer is not liable, nor even subject to have his mo-
tives questioned, in a suit by an individual for damages, although
it be asserted that he acted corruptly or maliciously.®^ And a legis-
lator can not be held accountable in a civil action for what he does
or says on the floor of the legislative hall,—such immunity being guar-
anteed to him upon grounds of public policy.®® "It would be a doc-
trine fraught with consequences of incalculable mischief," said
Frazer, C. J., in the case cited in the last note, "if a public officer
could be held personally responsible, either civilly or criminally, for
his judgment upon such questions." If that were the rule men of
character and responsibility would refuse to serve as members of
public deliberative bodies, and the public business of the community
would fall into the hands of irresponsible administrators.
§ 472, Liability of the public for the acts of its officers and
agents.—No contract executed by a public officer or agent will bind
"Colter V. Mclntyre, 74 Ky. 565; "= Boyd v. Ferris, 29 Tenn. 406.
Mclntyre v. Gritton, 5 Ky. L. Rep. " Miner v. Markham, 28 Fed. 387;
686. Secor v. Bell, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 52.
"^ State Bank v. Davenport, 19 N. "= Cooley Torts 376.
C. 45; Boggs v. Hamilton, 2 Mill ^Walker v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239.
Const. (S. C.) 382.
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his principal unless it is within the scope of his actual authority;®^
the government can only be bound in the manner it has agreed to
be bound, and its agents must follow the prescribed formalities to make
it liable ;^^ hence, where the law requires a contract for government
supplies to be in writing, the requirement is mandatory, and there
can be no recovery on such contract if it is oral.^^ If the supplies
have been furnished, however, in whole or in part, the claimant may
recover their fair value upon the implied contract.'^*' A private agent
might render his principal liable upon mere appearances, or the
principal might estop himself from denying the agent's authority
by acts in pais; but this is not true of public agents; and the state or
government can not be bound by an estoppel m pais or by laches.'^^
The state or federal government can not be sued without its consent, as
we learned in a former place ;^^ but when it permits itself to be
brought into court by legislative enactment, or voluntarily appears to
an action against it, it will be subject to the same rules as other de-
fendants and will be bound by the judgment, although the orders of a
court may not be enforced by execution against it. A public principal,
such as a state or municipality, or the general government, may
ratify the act of its agent and thus render itself liable the same
as if it had authorized it in the first instance. ^^ The government,
whether national or state, can not be held liable, however, for the
torts of its agents.'^* Municipal corporations are not generally liable
for the acts of their servants except when they were committed in con-
nection with some ministerial duty, in which case they stand upon
the same footing as private corporations or individuals.'^
"Brady v. Mayor, etc., 20 N. Y. "Bishop Cents., § 993; United
312; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. (U.
199, 87 Am. Dec. 423; Sutro v. Pettit, S.) 720.
74 Cal. 332, 5 Am. St. 442; McCaslin '^ Ante, § 348.
V. State, 99 Ind. 428. See also, " Cook Co. v. Harms, 108 111. 151;
ante, §§ 299, 348. Rock Creek v. Strong, 96 U. S. 271.
«« Camp V. United States, 113 U. S. '* Story Ag., § 319; Gibbons v.
648. United States, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 269.
«' Clark V. United States, 95 U. S. " See Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt.
539. (Va.) 375, 94 Am. Dec. 461; Cooley
'"Ibid. Torts 122.
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§ 473. General statement.—It must have been noticed by the
reader of this work that the terms "principal and agent" and "master
and servant" have often been used interchangeably, and that many of
the rules governing the one relation have sometimes been applied
Mdthout discrimination to the other. This was necessarily so because
many of the modern rules controlling these respective relations are
practically identical, albeit the two systems are traceable to different
origins. Indeed, it is certain that our modern law of principal and
(550)
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agent is largely the result of two main influences; namely, (a) the
Eoman law of mandatum, modified and molded by the usages of
modern commerce, and (b) the ancient English law of master and
servant. Anciently the servant was a slave; his services were com-
pletely at the disposal and under the control of the master; and the
master was responsible for the servant's acts. The idea of contract
did not enter into the relation between the two; it was essentially
a relation of status. Even in the old Eoman law of agency the idea
of a contract was of only minor importance,^ Gradually slavery be-
came extinct, and in its place was adopted the system of hired
service ; but many of the ancient rules applying to slavery remained
:
men and women were no longer owned by their masters permanently,
but they would, for a consideration, sell their services, and with them
largely their freedom and discretion ; the master continuing to control
the services and conduct of the servant and to be responsible for
his acts. As the desire for liberty of action was enforced by the in-
fluence which the laboring-man came to exert, the idea of status
gave -way to that of contract. On the other hand, as commerce grew
and men needed assistants to aid them in carrying on their business,
agents were employed by them for that purpose. These were neces-
sarily men of higher mental endowments than the mere servants
whose chief occupation was manual labor, performed under the im-
mediate direction of the master. The agent was accorded a large
share of discretion and judgment, for to him was left in a degree the
management of his principal's business. Wliile these fundamental
principles still inhere in these respective systems, it is only so in a
relative measure. Commerce and labor have come to travel hand in
hand, and the employes of one have many things in common with
those of the other. The conductor of a railroad-train is in many re-
spects a servant, for he has to perform many duties that are but
menial and as to which he has no discretion whatever. But he is also
an agent, for his menial duties are by no means the only ones : he rep-
resents the company he serves in many transactions requiring a high
degree of skill, judgment and discretion; and much is left to his in-
dependent determination with which a mere servant would not be in-
trusted. And this is true of numerous other employes. It must be
obvious that as time advances the laws governing the subjects of
"principal and agent" and "master and servant" will become still more
^ Story Ag., § 4.
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homogeneous, and the distinctions now obtaining in many of the
rules acting upon these respective relations will become less apparent
as well as less important.
§ 474. The relation of master and servant.—Whether the relation
between an employer and employe is that of master and servant or not
is still a matter of considerable importance. The importance is not
so much, however, in tracing the distinction between a servant and
an agent as it is in ascertaining the distinction between a servant and
a contractor. The doctrine of respondeat superior renders the master
liable for those acts of his servant which have been committed in
the course of the service he was employed to render; and the same
liability obtains on the part of the principal for the acts of his
agent done in the line of such agent's employment. But a con-
tractor, being neither a servant nor an agent, sustains no such rela-
tion to his employer as will render the latter liable for his acts,
whether they be performed in or out of the scope of the employment.
The rule respondeat superior has no application to an independent
contractor who is employed, for instance, to do a piece of work for
the employer, during the performance of which a third party is in-
jured.- The distinction between a servant and an agent, however, or
between a master and a principal, is not without moment. "Master
and servant expresses the relation in private life, founded in con-
venience, whereby a man calls in the assistance of others when his
own skill and labor is not sufficient to answer the cares incumbent
upon him." ^ "A master is one who stands to another in such a
relation that he not only controls the results of the work of that
other, but also may direct the manner in which such work shall be
done." * A servant is a person hired or emploA'ed by another to
work and labor for him, either at so much per hour, day, week,
month, 5'ear or other period, or at some agreed price for the entire
piece of work, though the latter idea is more in the nature of a
contract than of hiring. The term "servant" ordinarily indicates
a person hired for wages, to work as the employer may direct; and
the control which thus exists in a superior over the subordinate is
the principal feature which distinguishes between him and a con-
tractor.^ "The relation of master and servant exists whenever the
- Robinson v. Webb, 11 Bush * 20 Am. & Eng. Encyc. L. 10.
(Ky.) 464; Bailey v. Troy, etc., R. = Morgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo. 538;
Co., 57 Vt. 252, 52 Am. Rep. 129. 1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), §§ 578,
^Anderson Law Die, tit. Master. 579.
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employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business
shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other
words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done." *
"One may be employed without being a servant, and have an em-
ployer who is nevertheless not the master, * * * The relation
exists where the employer selects the workman, may remove or dis-
charge him for misconduct, and may order not only what work
shall be done, but the mode and manner of performance." ' The
® Per Gray, J., in Singer Mfg. Co.
V. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518.
' Per Finch, J., in Butler v. Town-
send, 126 N. Y. 105. The control-
ling question in determining the ex-
istence of the relation is that the
employe is so far under the immedi-
ate direction of the master, with
reference to the work in which the
employe is engaged, as to be alto-
gether subject to the former's will
or approval. He must have the
right to give direction in the meth-
od and manner of the execution of
the work and to employ and dis-
charge workmen of that class:
Wood Master & Serv., § 306; Cooley
Torts 533; Mound City Paint &
Color Co. v. Conlon, 92 Mo. 221;
Fell V. Rich Hill, etc., Co., 23 Mo.
App. 216; Wiltse v. State Road
Bridge Co., 63 Mich. 639. "He is
to be deemed the master who has
the superior choice, control, and di-
rection of the servant, and whose
will the servant represents, not
merely in the ultimate result of his
work, but in all its details:" Shear-
man & Redf. Neg. 83. It is not nec-
essary that the servant be in the
regular employment of the master.
Thus, the porter of a palace-car
company, though regularly em-
ployed by the latter to serve on its
cars, is yet regarded for some pur-
poses as the servant of the railroad
company of whose train the Pull-
man car is a part; and such com-
pany is liable for the wrongful acts
of such porter in all matters per-
taining to the safety of passengers:
Williams v. Pullman Palace-Car Co.,
40 La. Ann. 417, 8 Am. St. 538. And
where a person hired a team and a
driver, the latter being sent with the
team by the owner, at the special re-
quest of the person hiring the team,
and there was an injury to a third
party, due to the driver's negligence,
it was held that the owner was not
liable, as the driver was the serv-
ant of the hirer and not of the
owner: Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice
Co., 50 Mich. 516, 45 Am. Rep. 54.
But where a horse and driver were
hired by the owner of the horse
to a city by the day to work at im
proving the streets, it being the du
ty of such driver, who had the ex
elusive management of the horse
to see that he was properly shod
and to have him shod at all times
when it was needed; and the horse
being violently struck by the driver
kicked a loose shoe through a large
plate-glass window to the damage
of the owner of the building,—it
was ruled that the driver was the
servant of the owner of the horse,
and that such owner was responsi-
ble for any acts of negligence com-
mitted by the driver: Huff v. Ford,
126 Mass. 24, 30 Am. Rep. 645. And
where a railroad company operates
a road over the tracks of another
company, which owns it, the lessee
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relation is now always established by contract, express or implied.^
The contract may be in writing, but it need not be. In such a
contract the master obligates himself to supply the servant with
work of a certain character and to pay him a certain compensation
therefor, the nature and amount of which may or may not be ex-
pressly stipulated; while the servant agrees on his part to render
services.® As to who is competent to enter into the relation, it may
be stated as the general rule that those who are competent to become
principals and agents may assume the relation of master and serv-
ant.i*'
/. Duties^ Obligations and Liabilities of Master to Servayit.
§ 475. Duty to furnish employment.—One of the master's obli-
gations to the servant is to furnish him employment so long as his
contract requires it. If he has hired the servant for a definite time,
it is his duty, unless the servant by his misconduct has merited a
prior discharge, to supply him with work of the character of that
which he was employed to perform, during that time, at the contract
rate.^^ It is no excuse that the master has discontinued the busi-
ness for which the servant was employed ;^^ nor that the business if
continued would be unprofitable;^^ nor that the master's building,
the place in which the servant had been at work, was partially
destroyed by fire:^* his undertaking being an absolute one, nothing
but the fault of the servant will excuse him from performing it.
Where the contract is indefinite as to the duration of the employ-
ment, the courts in this country generally hold that it is terminable,
prima facie at least, at the will of either party. Thus, a contract
by which a party was to secure the services of another "during the
term of not exceeding three years" was held to be terminable by
company that uses the tracks accept- of "principal" and "agent," see
ing the services of the gatemen em- ante, §§ 11, 12.
ployed by the company owning the ° 2 Kent Com. 258.
road, instead of employing gate- " See ante, § 30, et seq.
men of its own, the lessee company " Goddard v. Morrissey, 172 Mass.
sustains the relation of master to 594; Wright v. C. S. Graves Land
such gatemen while M^orking under Co., 100 Wis. 269.
its direction, and is responsible for ^-Vail v. Jersey Little Falls Mfg.
their negligence: Railway Co. v. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 564.
Schneider, 45 Ohio St. 678. " Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84
*2 Kent Com. 258; Growcock v. Ga. 714.
Hall, 82 Ind. 202. For definitions "Eastman v. Eastman, etc., Co.,
1 N. Y. Supp. 16.
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the employer at any time by giving the other reasonable notice.^^
And where an insurance company employed an officer in its real-
estate department at a salary of so much per year, payable monthly,
it was decided by the court of appeals of New York that this was
a hiring at will, which either party might terminate at any time.^'
The mere fact that the agreement provides for the payment of
services by the year or other period will not conclusively prove a
hiring by the year or such other period, ^'^ but it is a circum-
stance strongly indicative of the period of service contracted for;
and if the agreement to pay periodically is the only evidence as to
the duration of the period of employment, it will be taken to be a
hiring for that time.^® Where a contract based upon a sufficient
consideration provides for "steady and permanent employment" at
a stated compensation, the agreement is not terminable as long as
the employe is ready, willing and able to perform such work as the
employer may have to give him.^'' In England, however, the rule
seems to be that a hiring as to which no time is fixed is a hiring
by the year;^" but the English rule is founded on usage, and there
being no such usage in the United States, the rule does not operate.^^
Like any other fact in the case, the hiring and length of time of the
employment may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Thus, if an
employe is hired for a year and continues in the service without a new
arrangement, the presumption is that he was employed for the next
year on the same terms ;-^ which presumption may, however, be
rebutted by evidence to the contrary. ^^ And where a merchant em-
" Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. Foxall v. International Land Credit
187. Co., 16 L. T. N. S. 637; Wood Master
"Martin v. New York Life Ins. & Serv. (2d ed.), § 136.
Co., 148 N. Y. 117. See, to the same -^ Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Roberson,
effect, Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. St. 3 Colo. 142. See Harnwell v. Parry
426; Franklin Min. Co. v. Harris, Sound Lumber Co., 24 Ont. App. 110,
24 Mich. 115; East Line, etc., R. Co. 115.
v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 13 Am. St. 758. - Wright v. Elk Rapids Iron Co.
"Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131. (Mich.), 89 N. W. 335; Tatterson v.
"Beach v. Mullin, 34 N. J. L. 343. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56; Ad-
'" Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 ams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N. Y. 124;
Ind. App. 109; Harrington v. Kan- Ingalls v. Allen, 132 111. 170; Thomp-
sas City, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. App. son v. Detroit, etc., Copper Co., 80
223; Hobbs v. Brush Elec. Light Mich. 422.
Co., 75 Mich. 550; Thomas v. Ham- =' Ingalls v. Allen, supra; Ewing
mond, 47 Tex. 42. v. Janson, 57 Ark. 237.
^"King V. Worfield, 5 T. R. 506;
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ployed a clerk at so miicli per month, and the clerk, after a time,
expressed a desire to have his employment made more permanent,
whereupon an agreement was made by which he was to receive so
much a year, it was held that the jury would have a right to infer
that this constituted a contract for a year.^* A hiring for a certain
sum per month is a hiring for at least one month, which may be
terminated by either party at the end of any month. ^^ When an
employe has been hired for a definite period of time provided his
services are satisfactory to the employer, it is held that the employer
may exercise the right to discharge him whenever he, in good faith,
becomes dissatisfied with the services, whether he have good reasons
for it or not.^*^ Some of the courts hold, however, that upon such
a contract the master may not, at his mere whim and caprice, dis-
charge the servant, whether he has any ground for it or not, but that
he must be dissatisfied in good faith and for good reason before he
will be warranted to exercise that privilege.^^ It seems the courts
are not in entire harmony as to whether a contract for "permanent
employment" is a definite contract or not. Some tribunals have ruled
that a contract for permanent employment does not mean for life or
for any fixed or certain period, but only that it shall continue until
one of the parties shall wish, for good reason, to terminate it.^^ On
the other hand, it is held that where the contract stipulates for "steady
and permanent" employment, at a fixed price,^^ or for "steady and
constant" employment as long as the employe shall properly do the
work assigned to him,^° or for whatever length of time the employe
may desire to serve,^^ the contract is not indefinite, and, if based upon
a sufficient consideration, may be enforced as long as the employe
is ready and able to perform the services and presents himself for
that purpose.
^Bascom V. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. Y.) 422; Hotchkiss v. Gretna Gin-
431. nery, etc., Co.. 36 La. Ann. 517.
^^ Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. " Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Offutt,
Pierce, 26 C. C. A. 632, 81 Fed. 814. 99 Ky. 427, 59 Am. St. 467; Lord v.
=«Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 496; Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 15 Am. St. 82.
Crawford v. Mail, etc., Pub. Co., 163 -" Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6
N. Y. 404; Alexis Stoneware Mfg. Ind. App. 109, 51 Am. St. 289.
Co. V. Young, 59 111. App. 226. ^ Harrington v. Kansas City, etc.,
" See Rhodes, etc., Furn. Co. v. R. Co., 60 Mo. App. 223.
Frazier (Tex. Civ. App.), 55 S. W. ^^ East Line. etc.. R. Co. v. Scott,
192; Grinnell v. Kiralfy, 55 Hun (N. 72 Tex. 70, 13 Am. St 758.
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§ 476. Duty to compensate servant.—As in the case of an agent,
so a servant is entitled to receive compensation from his employer.
Where the contract expressly provides for the nature and amount
of compensation, that must, of course, control ; otherwise the servant
or employe is entitled to recover on a quantum, meruit, or what the
services are reasonably worth.^^ The contract may stipulate that the
amount of the compensation shall be determined and fixed by the
employer, after the services have been performed; and, when this
is the agreement, the amount fixed by him is conclusive, unless there
is fraud or bad faith on the part of the master in fixing the
amount.^^ But it has been held that an agreement to pay the servant
what the master thinks he is worth to liim does not mean that the
master shall fix the compensation at any low rate he chooses, after
the services have been rendered, although such an agreement would
be upheld if clearly proved ; it amounts to no agreement at all, and the
law implies that the master shall pay what the services are reasonably
worth.^* The law as to the duty of a master to compensate his serv-
ant is in most all respects identical with that which determines the
compensation of a principal to his agent, and it is unnecessary to
repeat what has been said upon the subject.^^
§ 477. Master's duty to provide and maintain safe place for em-
ploye in which to v^ork, and suitable and safe machinery and ap-
plianc-es with which to work.—This is one of the duties peculiar to
the relation of master and servant which, from the nature of the
employment, does not apply to the relation of principal and
agent. The master being entitled to the services of his servant,
and to control and direct him in the performance thereof, as-
sumes the reciprocal obligation of exercising reasonable care in
providing for his safety. As a branch of this obligation he must
use reasonable diligence in seeing that the place set apart for him
to work in is safe;^® but the master does not insure the safety of
^^Ruckman v. Bergholz, 38 N. J. 159 Pa. St. 403; Richmond, etc., R.
L. 531; Kent Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Co. v. Norment, 84 Va. 167, 10 Am.
Ransom, 46 Mich. 416. St. 827, and note on p. 835; Cadden
'^ Butler V. Winona Mill Co., 28 v. American Steel Barge Co., 88 Wis.
Minn. 205, 41 Am. Rep. 277. 409; Williams v. St. Louis, etc., R.
»^ Millar v. Cuddy, 43 Mich. 273, Co., 119 Mo. 316; Gustafsen v.
38 Am. Rep. 181. Washburn, etc., Mfg. Co., 153 Mass.
''See ante, §§ 253-278. 468; Kelley v. Ryus, 48 Kan. 120;
^"Vanesse v. Catsburg Coal Co., O'Neal v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 132
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the place, and is required to use only ordinary care and diligence
in making it safe.^^ What is ordinary care and diligence must
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case: the care
must be commensurate with the apparent danger. The rule is aptly
stated by Circuit Judge Sanborn in a case decided by the circuit
court of appeals of the eighth circuit;^® he says: "The care and
diligence required of the master is such as a reasonably prudent
man would exercise under like circumstances in order to protect
his servants from injury. It must be commensurate with the charac-
ter of the service required, and with the dangers that a reasonably
prudent man would apprehend under the circumstances of each
particular case. Obviously, a far higher degree of care and diligence
is demanded of the master who places his servant at work digging
coal beneath overhanging masses of rock and earth in a mine, than
of him who places his employe on the surface of the earth, where
danger from superincumbent masses is not to be apprehended. A
reasonably prudent man would exercise greater care and watchful-
ness in the former than in the latter case, and, throughout all
the varied occupations of mankind, the greater the danger that a
reasonably intelligent and prudent man would apprehend, the higher
is the degree of care and diligence the law requires of the master
in the protection of the servant. For a failure to exercise this
care, resulting in the injury of the employe, the employer is liable;
and this duty and liability extend, not only to the unreasonable and
Ind. 110; Cheeney v. Ocean Steam- the company is liable for the injury
ship Co., 92 Ga. 726, 44 Am. St. 113; sustained. The servant undertakes
St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Eggmann, the risks of the employment as far
161 111. 155; Bethlehem Iron Co. v. as they spring from defects incident
Weiss, 40 C. C. A. 270, 100 Fed. 45; to the service, but h^ does not take
Mellors v. Shaw, 1 B. & S. (101 E. the risks of the negligence of the
C. L.) 437; Seymour v. Maddox, 16 master itself. The master is not
Q. B. (71 E. C. L.) 326; Caldwell v. to be held as guaranteeing or war-
Mills, 24 Ont. 462. ranting absolute safety under all
*^ Union Pac. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 161 circumstances, but it is bound to
U. S. 451, 457. "The general rule exercise the care which the exi-
undoubtedly is," said Chief Justice gency reasonably demands in fur-
Fuller, in this case, "that a railroad nishing proper road-bed, track and
company is bound to provide suita- other structures, including sufficient
ble and safe materials and struc- culverts for the escape of water col-
tures in the construction of its road lected and accumulated by its em-
and appurtenances, and if, from a bankments and excavations."
defective construction thereof, an ^ Union Pac. R. Co. v. Jarvl 53
injury happen to one of its servants, Fed. 65.
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unnecessary risks that are known to the employer, but to such as
a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of ordinary diligence
—
diligence proportionate to the occasion—would have known and ap-
prehended." What is due and proper care under the circumstances
is usually a question of mixed law and fact; but if the facts acre
undisputed and the inferences to be drawn from them are unequivocal,
then the question is generally one of law for the determination of
the court ;^^ the court, however, always determines the law of the
case, and in proper circumstances must charge the jury "br decide
the case upon the facts specially found. If the injury to the em-
ploye was the result of a pure accident, or was not attributable to
the failure of the master to provide against probable danger, the
master is not liable. That it was possible for such an injury to
happen is not enough to charge the master with negligence in failing
to guard against it: it must appear that the injury was likely to
occur if not projDerly guarded against;*'' the master is not bound
to guard against all possible dangers, but only to exercise ordinary
and reasonable care against those which are probable. The servant
has a right to rely upon the fact that the master will do his duty
in making reasonable inspection of the place and seeing that it is
free from danger, and to assume that this has been done; for it is the
master's duty to make reasonable inspection, and the servant is not
required to do so.*^ And this is true also as to machinery and ap-
pliances. But where the servant knows of the danger or has an oppor-
tunity of knowing it equal to that of the master, he can not recover, as
he would then be guilty of contributory negligence or would be assum-
ing the risk.*^ Whether the defect was thus obvious to the employe is,
in doubtful cases at least, a question for the jury.'*^ The duty to pro-
tect the servant in his place of work is a continuing one, and requires
the master to use ordinary care and diligence to keep it safe ; and if
5«See Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Stone Co. v. Wolf, 138 Ind. 496;
Grames, 8 Ind. App. 112, where the Island Coal Co. v. Greenwood, 151
authorities are collected and re- Ind. 476; Fisk v. Central Pac. R.
viewed. Co., 72 Cal. 38, 1 Am. St. 22; Sulli-
*° McKee v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., van v. Simplex Elec. Co., 178 Mass.
83 Iowa 616. 35, 59 N. E. 645; Clark v. St. Paul,
"Ross V. Shanley, 185 111. 390; etc., R. Co., 28 Minn. 128; De For-
National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 155 est v. Jewitt, 88 N. Y. 264.
111. 210; Soltenberg v. Pittsburg, *^Amato v. Northern Pac. R. Co.,
etc., R. Co., 165 Pa. St. 377. 46 Fed. 561; Lasch v. Stratton, 101
^Vincennes Water Supply Co. v. Ky. 672; De Maio v. Standard Oil
White, 124 Ind. 376; Big Creek Co., 74 N. Y. Supp. 165.
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he neglects to do so he is answerable in damages;** and he can not
delegate this duty to another and escape liability if the party thus
delegated fails to perform the duty.*^ But the employe must ex-
ercise his senses of observation; and if he had notice of the de-
fects, or if the dangers were so obvious and patent that a man of
his experience and understanding ought to have noticed them, he
will be held to have assumed the risk; and the question is then
one of law for the court, and not one of fact for the jury.*^ All
varieties of manual labor are attended with some danger, some more
and some less than others. The servant or employe assumes the
risk of many dangers incident to the employment, and this is es-
pecially true when they are obvious or apparent; but he does not
assume the risk of defects that axe latent or of dangers that are
hidden and that could not with the exercise of ordinary care have
been observed, but which it is the duty of the master to know or
use ordinary diligence to discover,*^ It is always the duty of
the employer to warn the employe of the danger of the place
or the work about which he is engaged; and the former can not
relieve himself from responsibility by delegating the performance
of that duty to a foreman, who is in a sense a fellow servant of the
injured party.*^ But when the employe has once been notified as to
the danger and instructed how to avoid it, the employe, by accepting or
continuing in the employment, assumes the risk, and the employer
is not liable in case he is injured;*^ but the warning must be given
in such plain and comprehensive language as to enable the servant
to comprehend the dangers of the situation.^" And if the servant
"Nail V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 632; Huda v. American Glucose Co.,
129 Ind. 260; Racine v. New York 154 N. Y. 474; Throckmorton v. Mis-
Cent, etc., R. Co., 70 Hun (N. Y.) souri, etc., R. Co., 14 Tex. Civ. App.
453. 222; Williamson v. Sheldon Marble
"Elliott Railroads, § 1268. Co., 66 Vt. 427; Herold v. Pfister. 92
*« Lindsay v. New York, etc., R. Wis. 417; Dillenberger v. Weingart-
Co., 50 C. C. A. 298, 112 Fed. 384; ner, 64 N. J. L. 292.
Bethlehem Iron Co. v. Weiss, 40 C. *^ Union Pac. R. Co. v. O'Brien,
C. A. 270, 100 Fed. 45; Money v. 161 U. S. 451; Millard v. West End
Lower Vein Coal Co., 55 Iowa 671; St. R. Co., 173 Mass. 512.
Andrews v. Tamarack Min. Co., 114 *»Tedford v. Los Angeles Elec.
Mich. 375. See Judkins v. Maine Co., 134 Cal. 76, 54 L. R. A. 85.
Cent. R. Co., 80 Me. 417, and note "Hill v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co.,
at end of case; McGuirk v. Shat- 140 Mo. 433; Daester v. Mechanics'
tuck, 160 Mass. 45, 39 Am. St. 454; Planing Mill Co.. 11 Mo. App. 593.
Illick V. Flint, etc., R. Co., 67 Mich. '" Yeager v. Burlington, etc., R.
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has knowledge or information of the danger, though latent, and
though his information was not derived from the master, the servant
can not recover damages.^^ In case the servant, by reason of his
youth, or for other reasons, is unable, after instruction, to appreciate
the danger, the master has no right to keep him in his emplov-
ment, and will be liable thereafter for any injury incident to the
employment, although the servant has been warned of such danger.^^
The master's duty also requires him to make proper and reasonable
inspection for such defects as are likely to arise and endanger the
employe's safety; and it is not sufficient that competent inspectors
have been employed by the master, but the inspection must actually
be made, when the circumstances are such as to require it.^^ The
presumption always is that the master has performed his duty in this
respect, and the burden is on the plaintiff who sues for damages to
prove the master's negligence.^* The term "place," in connection
with the work of the employe, indicates the locality of the employ-
ment; it is very comprehensive, and embraces a great variety of
objects; thus, the rule applies to buildings and objects within
them, in and about which the servant is employed ;^^ to walks
and ways about buildings ;"•' to mines ;^^ to excavations of various
kinds, such as ditches, sewers, quarries, etc. ;^^ to railway-tracks and
road-beds ;^^® to railroad-bridges;*"* to switch-yards or yards where
Co., 93 Iowa 1; Sullivan v. India =^ Sansol v. Compagnie Generale
Mfg. Co., 113 Mass. 396; Tinkham Transatlantique, 101 Fed. 390; The
v. Sawyer. 153 Mass. 485. Saratoga, 87 Fed. 349; W. C. De
" Taylor v. Wootan, 1 Ind. App. Pauw Co. v. Stubblefield, 132 Ind.
188, 50 Am. St. 200. 182; Harding v. Railway Transfer
^^HincVley v. Horazdowsky, 133 Co., 80 Minn. 504.
111. 359, 23 Am. St. 618; Taylor v. =« United States Rolling Stock Co.
Wootan, 1 Ind. App. 188, 50 Am. St. v. Weir, 96 Ala. 396.
200; Louisville Bagging Co. v. Do- "Linton Coal, etc., Co. v. Persons,
Ian, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 493. 11 Ind. App. 264.
" Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Thomp- ^^ Taylor v. Star Coal Co., 110
son, ?7 C. C. A. 333, 82 Fed. 720. Iowa 40; Hancock v. Keene, 5 Ind.
See also, Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co., App. 408; Fitzsimmons v. Taunton,
110 Mass. 240, 14 Am. Rep. 598; 160 Mass. 223.
Pennsylvania, etc.. Canal & R. Co. v. ^^ Union Pac. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 161
Mason, 109 Pa. St. 296, 58 Am. Rep. U. S. 451; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v.
722. Morrissey, 177 111. 376; Torian's
" Snodgrass v. Carnegie Steel Co., Adm'r v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 84
173 Pa. St. 228; Sappenfield v. Main Va. 192; Elliott Railroads. § 1268.
St., etc., R. Co., 91 Cal. 48. «" Elliott Railroads, § 1270.
36
—
Principal and Agent.
§ 477 PEIXCIPAL AND AGENT. 562
trains are made up f''- and to many other places and things which
we can not undertake to enumerate. Wherever the emploj'e is at
work, whether the place be stationary,—as a building, mine, quarry,
yard, street or walk, etc.,—or moving,—as a steamboat, railway-
car, or other vehicle,—the master must use due care in protecting
the servant, or he will be liable for damages, if injury results. Not
only does the law require the master to provide the servant with a safe
place in which to work, but also to furnish him with reasonably safe
appliances and machinery. This duty is not absolute in the case
of machinery and appliances, any more than it is with regard to
the place designed for the servant in which to work: all he is re-
quired to do is to use ordinary care in the selection and repairs
thereof.®- The appliances need not be of the latest invention: if
the master employs those in general use, and keeps them in reason-
ably safe condition and repair, he is not guilty of negligence because
of the use of defective machinery and appliances.®^ It is held, how-
ever, that if the occupation is attended with great and unusual
danger, the master is bound to use all appliances known to science
which are readily attainable, in order to prevent accidents;®* indeed,
it may be stated as a rule without any exceptions, that the degree
of diligence and precaution required in the selection and keeping
of appliances, like that of furnishing and maintaining a place to
work in, must always be proportionate to the danger involved.®^ And
in all cases of negligence, Ijefore there can be any recovery by the
servant on account of the unsafe condition of the place of work
or the machinery or appliances, the injured party must show that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.®® The
statutory obligation of railroad companies to fence in their tracks,
it seems, is not one of the duties they owe to their employes, unless
"Elliott Railroads, § 1272. 58 Am. Rep. 227; Lloyd v. Hanes,
«= Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Napole, 126 N. C. 359.
55 Kan. 401. " Mather v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 391.
"^ Pennsylvania Co. v. Congdon, ^^ Union Pac. R. Co. v. Daniels,
134 Ind. 226, 236, 39 Am. St. 251; 152 U. S. 684; Mather v. Rillston,
Sappenfield v. Main St., etc., R. Co., supra.
91 Cal. 48; Smith v. St. Louis, etc., ««Kauffman v. Maier, 94 Cal. 269;
R. Co., 69 Mo. 32, 33 Am. Rep. 484; Carr v. North River Const. Co., 48
Sisco V. Lehigh, etc., R. Co., 145 N. Hun (N. Y.) 266; Avery v. Meek,
Y. 296; Kern v. De Castro, etc., 96 Ky. 192; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v.
Sugar Ref. Co., 125 N. Y. 50; Burns Lynch, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 336;
V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 69 Iowa 450, Youngbluth. v. Stephens, 104 Wis.
343.
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the statute in terms so provides.^^ There is some conflict of authority,
however, upon this point, and there are well-considered cases which
hold to the opposite view.^^
§ 478. Master's obligation to furnish medical and surgical aid to
servant.—As a general rule, no obligation rests upon the master to
provide surgical or medical aid for his employes, who become ill
or injured while in his employment.*''' Many of the modern cases
decide, as we have heretofore seen, that a railroad company may, in
cases of great emergency, render itself liable for the employment
of a surgeon by one of its principal officers, to wait upon an injured
employe of the company, although no express authority has been
conferred upon such officer to make the employment. ''' Eailroad
companies and other corporations who thus provide surgical aid for
an employe are not liable for negligence on account of malpractice
on the part of a physician or surgeon, if due and proper care has
been exercised in the selection of such surgeon or physician. When
the company voluntarily undertakes to procure surgical aid for an
injured servant, it is required to use only ordinary care and dili-
gence in the selection of a competent physician or surgeon: it is not
required to select one possessing the highest skill or longest ex-
perience.'^^ And it was held by the supreme court of Tennessee
that the company is not liable even for the malpractice of its regu-
larly-employed surgeon who treats one of its employes under the
circumstances alluded to, because the relation of master and servant
does not exist between the railroad company and such surgeon."^
This ruling, it seems to us, rests upon sound principles. "If it be,"
said Beard, J., speaking for the court in that case, " * * * that
the decisive test of this relationship, or even one of its decisive
tests, is that the master has the right to select the end of the
servant's employment^ and that the master's uncontrolled will is
"Cowan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 35 Davis v. Forbes, 171 Mass. 548; Den-
Fed. 43; Fatten v. Central Iowa R. ver, etc., R. Co. v. lies, 25 Colo. 19;
Co., 73 Iowa 306; Sweeney v. Cen- Cairo, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney, 82
tral Pac. R. Co., 57 Cal. 15. III. 73; Elliott Railroads, § 222.
«» Dickson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., ''° Ante, § 85.
124 Mo. 140, 25 L. R. A. 320; Blair "Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Sulli-
V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 20 Wis. van, 141 Ind. 83, 50 Am. St. 313;
254; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Rees- Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Early, 141 Ind.
man. 60 Fed. 370. 73.
°» Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Sulli- " Quinn v. Railroad, 94 Tenn. 713,
van, 141 Ind. 83, 50 Am. St. 313; 45 Am. St. 767,
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the law of the servant, 'in the means and methods' by which this
end is to be reached, then it can not be maintained that these sur-
geons were the servants of the corporation. They were not employed
to do ordinary corporate work, but to render services requiring special
training, skill and experience. To perform these services so as to
make them effectual for the saving of life and limb it was necessary
that those surgeons should bring to their work not only their best
skill, but the right to exercise it in accordance with their soundest
judgment and without interference. ISTot only was this the right
of these surgeons, but it was as well a duty that the law imposed.
If the railroad authorities had undertaken to direct them as to the
method of treatment of the injured man, and this method was re-
garded by them as unwise, they would have been 'bound to exercise
their own superior skill and better judgment, and to disobey their
employers, if, in their opinion, the welfare of the patient required
it.'^^ In accordance with this view it has been uniformly held, so
far as we have been able to discover, that, having selected surgeons
skilled and competent in their profession, the corporation has dis-
charged every duty that humanity or sound morals impose, and that
it is to no extent liable for the mistakes they may subsequently com-
mit." If a company or individual were to carry on a hospital for
the treatment of injured persons for profit, such company or person
would doubtless be liable for any malpractice committed by the
surgeons therein employed; and the same is perhaps true where for
a sufficient consideration a railroad company or other employer of
laborers agrees to see that these have proper surgical treatment in
case of injury.''* But where the treatment is voluntarily furnished
by a corporation or individual gratuitously, or even where it is re-
quired to be done by the law, tlie master is required to do no more
than to exercise ordinary care in the selection and retention of the
surgeon, and is not responsible for his negligence if it has ful-
filled its own obligation in employing and keeping such surgeon.
Thus, a steamship company required by law to provide a surgeon
for its ship is not liable even to a passenger, for the negligent setting
of a fractured limb received on board the ship, if such company exer-
cised reasonable care in the selection and retaining of the surgeon;
nor is it required to employ men of the highest skill and widest
" Citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ar- Coal Co., 10 Wash. 648, 20 L. R. A.
tist, 60 Fed. 365. 338.
'* See Richardson v. Carbon Hill
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experience.^ ^ The company is responsible only for its own negli-
gence in employing and keeping an incompetent surgeon, but is
not responsible for such surgeon's negligence, the relation of master
and servant not existing between the company and the surgeon."*
But where a railroad company maintained a hospital for the care
and treatment of those of its employes who might be injured while
in its service, by means of funds raised in assessments upon its em-
ployes and deduction of the sum from their wages, it was held liable
for the malpractice of one of its surgeons, rendered incompetent by
habits of intoxication and the use of narcotics, of which the company
had notice.'^'^ And where the company, by reason of deducting certain
amounts from the wages of its employes, derives a profit, in con-
sideration of which it undertakes to furnish surgical treatment to
its injured servants, the company will be liable for an injury incurred
by an employe by reason of improper treatment administered by its
surgeon.'^ ^ This liability, however, can not be said to arise out of
the relation of master and servant, but doubtless by force of the
contract entered into between the employer and employe, providing-
for the treatment of the latter. A hospital maintained by a railroad
corporation for the free use of its servants who have been injured
in its employment is a charitable institution ; and this is true although
the company derives a portion of the maftitenance fund by receiving
contributions from the employes; and unless the company derives
a profit out of such maintenance, it will not be liable for injuries
caused by the negligence of hospital attendants, unless the company
failed to use ordinary care in their selection."^
§ 479. Liability of master to servant for negligence of fellow
servant.—As a general rule, every person is responsible only for his
own wrongs and not for those of others. If a person is guilty of
a tort, he is responsible for all its proximate injurious consequences,
to any one to whom he owed the duty of protection, ot, at least;
the duty of not doing or omitting to do that which would injure
him. One may render himself liable, however, for the conduct or
omission of another than himself, when there is such a relation be-
" Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N. "^ Wabash R. Co. v. Kelley, 153
S. Co., 107 N. Y. 228, 1 Am. St. 815. Ind. 119.
" Allan v. State Steamship Co., '*' Texas, etc., Coal Co. v. Con-
132 N. Y. 91, 28 Am. St. 556; Louis- naughten, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 642.
ville, etc., R. Co. v. Foard, 104 Ky. '"Union Pac. R. Co. v. Artist, 60
456, 47 S. W. 342. Fed. 365.
§ 479 PEIXCIPAL AND AGENT. 566
tween liim and that other person that the rule respondeat superior
is applicable. Thus, as we have seen, the master is responsible to
third parties for the torts of his servant, and the principal for those
of his agent, when committed within the scope or course of the busi-
ness or labor in which such servant or agent was employed. And
while the master is personally responsible for any wrongful act com-
mitted by himself and resulting in injury to his servant, he is not
liable, as a general rule, for an injury inflicted by one of his servants
upon another or fellow servant, although the wrongful act resulting
in such injury was committed in the performance of the master's
work. If, when the master employed the coservant, he was not
guilty of negligence in selecting him, or, in other words, if he exer-
cised reasonable care in securing a servant who was competent and
qualified to do the work for which he was chosen, he has done all
the law requires him to do; unless, indeed, he retains the emplo3'e
in his service after he discovers the incompetency.^*^ It is as much the
duty of the master to employ and keep in his service competent co-
servants as it is to furnish his employe a safe place in which to
work and proper and adequate machinery and appliances for his
work:**^ if he fails in this he is guilty of negligence. But the negli-
gence of coemployes is not the master's negligence ; the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply between the master and coservant.
The general rule is that he who engages in the service of another to
perform certain specified duties for compensation assumes the natural
and ordinary perils and risks that are incident to such employment,
including those which result from the negligence of other persons en-
gaged in the performance of the same work with him. It is said that
these rules rest upon a basis of sound public policy and general con-
venience, and tend to promote the safety and security of all parties
concerned.®^ The rule and reasons therefor are very ably and tersely
stated by Chief Justice Shaw in an early and leading Massachusetts
*"
"Nor is the master who uses due tween two servants in the same
diligence in the selection of his service, and giving an action
servants answerable to one of them against the master for an injury
for an injury received by him in by one to the other:" 2 Kent Com.
consequence of another's careless- (13th ed.) 260, note,
ness while both were engaged in the " Laning v. New York Cent. R.
same service. There is no express Co., 49 N. Y. 521.
or implied contract or principle of *- Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Donnelly,
policy applicable to the case as be- 88 Va. 853.
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case,^^ in which he says, among other things, that "one who enters the
^ Farwell v. Boston, etc., R. Corp.,
4 Met. (Mass.) 49, 38 Am. Dec.
339. We deem the opinion of the
learned Chief Justice of sufficient
importance to give it here prac-
tically in its entirety. He says:
"This is an action of new im-
pression in our courts, and in-
volves a principle of great impor-
tance. It presents a case where two
persons are in the service and em-
ployment of one company, whose
business it is to construct and main-
tain a railroad, and to employ their
trains of cars to carry persons and
merchandise for hire. They are ap-
pointed and employed by the same
company to perform separate du-
ties and services, all tending to the
accomplishment of one and the same
purpose,—that of the safe and rap-
id transmission of the trains; and
they are paid for their respective
services according to the nature of
their respective duties, and the la-
bor and skill required for their
proper performance. The question
is, whether, for damages sustained
by one of the persons so employed,
by means of the carelessness and
negligence of another, the party in-
jured has a remedy against the
common employer. It is an argu-
ment against such an action, though
certainly not a decisive one, that
no such action has before been main-
tained. It is laid down by Black-
stone, that if a servant, by his neg-
ligence, does any damage to a stran-
ger, the master shall be answera-
ble for his neglect. But the damage
must be done while he is actually
employed in the master's service;
otherwise, the servant shall answer
for his own misbehavior: 1 Bl.
Com. 431; M'Manus v. Crickett, 1
East 106. This rule is obviously
founded on the great principle of
social duty, that every man, in the
management of his own affairs,
whether by himself or by his agents
or servants, shall so conduct them
as not to injure another; and if he
does not, and another thereby sus-
tains damage, he shall answer for
it. If done by a servant, in the
course of his employment, and act-
ing within the scope of his author-
ity, it is considered, in contempla-
tion of law, so far the act of the
master, that the latter shall be an-
swerable civili'ter. But this pre-
supposes that the parties stand to
each other in the relation of stran-
gers, between whom there is no
privity; and the action, in such case,
is an action sounding in tort. The
form is trespass on the case, for the
consequential damages. The max-
im 'respondeat superior' is adopted
in that case, from general consider-
ations of policy and security. But
this does not apply to the case of a
servant bringing his action against
his own employer to recover dam-
ages for an injury arising in the
course of that employment, where
all such risks and perils as the em-
ployer and the servant respectively
intend to assume and bear may be
regulated by the express or implied
contract between them, and which,
in contemplation of law, must be
presumed to be thus regulated. The
same view seems to have been
taken by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff, in the argument; and it
was conceded, that the claim could
not be placed on the principle indi-
cated by the maxim 'respondeat
superior,' which binds the master to
indemnify a stranger for the dam-
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service of another takes upon himself the ordinary risks of the em-
age caused by the careless, negli-
gent or unskillful act of his servant
in the conduct of his affairs. The
claim, therefore, is placed, and must
be maintained, if maintained at all,
on the ground of contract. As
there is no express contract between
the parties, applicable to this point,
it is placed upon the footing of an
implied contract of indemnity, aris-
ing out of the relation of master
and servant. It would be an implied
promise, arising from the duty of
the master to be responsible to each
person employed by him in the con-
duct of every branch of business
where two or more persons are em-
ployed, to pay for all damage oc-
casioned by the negligence of every
other person employed in the same
service. If such a duty were es-
tablished by law,—like that of a
common carrier, to stand all losses
of goods not caused by the act of
God, or of a public enemy—or that
of an innkeeper, to be responsible,
in like manner, for the baggage of
his guests,—it would be a rule of
frequent and familiar occurrence,
and its existence and application,
with all its qualifications and re-
strictions, would be settled by ju-
dicial precedents. But we are of
opinion that no such rule has been
established; and the authorities, as
far as they go, are opposed to the
principle: Priestley v. Fowler, 3
M. & W. 1; Murray v. South Caro-
lina R. Co., 1 McMull. L. (S. C.)
385. The general rule, resulting
from considerations as well of jus-
tice as of policy, is, that he who en-
gages in the employment of another
for the performance of specified
duties and services, for compensa-
tion, takes upon himself the natural
and ordinary risks and perils inci-
dent to the performance of such
services; and, in legal presump-
tion, the compensation is adjusted
accordingly. And we are not aware
of any principle which should ex-
cept the pierils arising from the
carelessness and negligence of those
who are in the same employment.
These are perils which the servant
is as likely to know, and against
which he can as effectually guard,
as the master. They are perils in-
cident to the service, and which can
be as distinctly foreseen and pro-
vided for in the rate of compensa-
tion as any others. To say that
the master shall be responsible be-
cause the damage is caused by his
agents, is assuming the very point
which remains to be proved. They
are his agents to some extent, and
for some purposes; but wliether he
is responsible, in a particular case,
for their negligence, is not decided
by the single fact that they are, for
some purposes, his agents. It
seems to be now well settled, what-
ever might have been thought for-
merly, that underwriters can not ex-
cuse themselves from payment of a
loss by one of the perils insured
against, on the ground that the loss
was caused by the negligence or un-
skillfulness of the officers or crew
of the vessel in the performance of
their various duties as navigators,
although employed and paid by the
owners, and, in the navigation of
the vessel, their agents: Copeland
V. New England, etc., Ins. Co., 2 Met.
(Mass.) 432, 440-443, and cases
there cited. I am aware that the
maritime law has its own rules and
analogies, and that we can not al-
ways safely rely upon them in ap-
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ployment in which he engages, including tlie negligent acts of his fel-
plying them to other branches of
law; but the rule in question seems
to be a good authority for the point,
that persons are not to be responsi-
ble, in all cases, for the negligence
of those employed by them. If we
look from considerations of justice
to those of policy, they will strong-
ly lead to the same conclusion. In
considering the rights and obliga-
tions arising out of particular re-
lations, it is competent for courts
of justice to regard considerations
of policy and general conveni-
ence, and to draw from them
such rules as will, in their prac-
tical application, best promote the
safety and security of all parties
concerned. This is, in truth, the
basis on which implied promises are
raised, being duties legally inferred
from a consideration of what is best
adapted to promote the benefit of
all persons concerned, under given
circumstances. To take the well-
known and familiar cases already
cited: A common carrier, without
regard to actual fault or neglect in
himself or his servants, is made
liable for all losses of goods con-
fided to him for carriage, except
those caused by the act of God or
of a public enemy, because he can
best guard them against all minor
dangers, and because, in case of ac-
tual loss, it would be extremely diffi-
cult for the owner to adduce proof of
embezzlement, or other actual fault
or neglect on the part of the carrier,
although it may have been the real
cause of the loss. The risk is
therefore thrown upon the carrier,
and he receives, in the form of pay-
ment for the carriage, a premium
for the risk which he thus assumes.
So of an innkeeper; he can best se-
cure the attendance of honest and
faithful servants, and guard his
house against thieves; whereas, if
he were responsible only upon proof
of actual negligence, he might con-
nive at the presence of dishonest
inmates and retainers, and even par-
ticipate in the embezzlement of the
property of the guests, during the
hours of their necessary sleep, and
yet it would be difficult, and often
impossible, to prove these facts.
The liability of passenger-carriers
is founded on similar considera-
tions. They are held to the strict-
est responsibility for care, vigilance
and skill, on the part of themselves
and all persons employed by them,
and they are paid accordingly. The
rule is founded on the expediency
of throwing the risk upon those
who can best guard against it:
Story Bailm., § 590, et seq. We
are of opinion that these considera-
tions apply strongly to the case in
question. Where several persons
are employed in the conduct of one
common enterprise or undertaking,
and the safey of each depends
much on the care and skill with
which each other shall perform his
appropriate duty, each is an ob-
server of the conduct of the others,
can give notice of any misconduct,
incapacity, or neglect of duty, and
leave the service, if the common em-
ployer will not take such precau-
tions, and employ such agents, as
the safety of the whole party may
require. By these means, the
safety of each will be much more
effectually secured, than could be
done by a resort to the common
employer for indemnity in case of
loss by the negligence of each other.
Regarding it in this light, it is the
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low workmen in the course of the employment." For further cases
ordinary case of one sustaining an
injury in the course of his own em-
ployment, in which he must bear
the loss himself, or seek his rem-
edy, if he have any, against the
actual wrongdoer. In applying
tnese principles to the present case,
it appears that the plaintiff was em-
ployed by the defendants as an en-
gineer, at the rate of wages usually
paid in that employment, being a
higher rate than the plaintiff had
before received as a machinist. It
was a voluntary undertaking on his
part, with a full knowledge of the
risks incident to the employment;
and the loss was sustained by means
of an ordinary casualty, caused by
the negligence of another servant of
the company. Under these cir-
cumstances, the loss must be deem-
ed to be the result of a pure acci-
dent, like those to which all men,
in all employments, and at all times,
are more or less exposed; and, like
similar losses from accidental
causes, it must rest where it first
fell, unless the plaintiff has a rem-
edy against the person actually in
default, of which we give no opin-
ion. It was strongly pressed in the
argument, that although this might
be so where two or more servants
are employed in the same depart-
ment of duty, where each can exert
some influence over the conduct of
the other, and thus, to some extent,
provide for his own security, yet
that it could not apply where two or
more are employed in different de-
partments of duty, at a distance
from each other, and where one can
in no degree control or influence
the conduct of another. But we
think this is founded upon a sup-
posed distinction; on which it would
be extremely difficult to establish a
practical rule. When the object to
be accomplished is one and the
same, when the employers are the
same, and the several persons em-
ployed derive their authority and
their compensation from the same
source, it would be extremely diffi-
cult to distinguish what constitutes
one department and what a distinct
department of duty. It would vary
with the circumstances of every
case. If it were made to depend
upon the nearness or distance of the
persons from each other, the ques-
tion would immediately arise, How
near or how distant must they be, to
be in the same or different depart-
ments? In a blacksmith's shop,
persons working in the same build-
ing, at different fires, may be quite
independent of each other, though
only a few feet distant. In a rope-
walk, several may be at work on the
same piece of cordage, at the same
time, at many hundreds feet dis-
tant from each other, and beyond
the reach of sight and voice, and
yet acting together. Besides, it ap-
pears to us that the argument rests
upon an assumed principle of re-
sponsibility which does not exist.
The master, in the case supposed, is
not exempt from liability because
the servant has better means of
providing for his safety when he is
employed in immediate connection
with those from whose negligence
he might suffer, but because the im-
plied contract of the master does
not extend to indemnify the servant
against the negligence of any one
but himself; and he is not liable in
tort,—as, for the negligence of his
servant,—because the person suffer-
ing does not stand towards him in
the relation of a stranger, but is
one whose rights are regulated by
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stating and illustrating the rule as laid down by Chief Justice
contract express or implied. The
exemption of the master, therefore,
from liability for the negligence of
a fellow servant, does not depend
exclusively upon the consideration,
that the servant has better means
to provide for his own safety, but
upon other grounds. Hence the
separation of the employment into
different departments can not create
that liability, when it does not arise
from express or implied contract,
or from a responsibility created by
law to third persons and strangers,
for the negligence of a servant. A
case may be put, for the purpose of
Illustrating this distinction. Sup-
pose the road had been owned by
one set of proprietors, whose duty
It was to keep it in repair and have
it at all times ready and in fit con-
dition for the running of engines
and cars, taking a toll, and that the
engines and cars were owned by
another set of proprietors, paying
toll to the proprietors of the road,
and receiving compensation from
passengers for their carriage; and
suppose the engineer to suffer a loss
from the negligence of the switch-
tender. We are inclined to the
opinion that the engineer might
have a remedy against the railroad
corporation; and, if so, it must be
on the ground that, as between the
engineer, employed by the proprie-
tors of the engines and cars, and
the switch-tender, employed by the
corporation, the engineer would be
a stranger, between whom and the
corporation there could be no priv-
ity of contract, and not because the
engineer would have no means of
controlling the conduct of the
switch-tender. The responsibility
which one is under for the negli-
gence of his servant, in the con-
duct of his business, towards third
persons, is founded on another and
distinct principle from that of im-
plied contract, and stands on its
own reasons of policy. The same
reasons of policy, we think, limit
this responsibility to the case of
strangers, for whose security alone
it is established. Like considera-
tions of policy and general expedi-
ency forbid the extension of the
principle so far as to warrant a
servant in maintaining an action
against his employer for an indem-
nity which, we think, was not con-
templated in the nature and terms
of the employment, and which, if
established, would not conduce to
the general good. In coming to
the conclusion that the plaintiff, in
the present case, is not entitled to
recover, considering it as in some
measure a nice question, we would
add a caution against any hasty
conclusion as to the application of
this rule to a case not fully within
the same principle. It may be
varied and modified by circum-
stances not appearing in the pres-
ent case, in which it appears, that
no willful wrong or actual negli-
gence was imputed to the corpora-
tion, and where suitable means were
furnished and suitable persons em-
ployed to accomplish the object in
view. We are far from intending
to say that there are no implied
warranties and undertakings aris-
ing out of the relation of master
and servant. Whether, for in-
stance, the employer would be re-
sponsible to an engineer for a loss
arising from a defective or ill-con-
structed steam-engine; whether
this would depend upon an implied
warranty of its goodness and suffi-
ciency, or upon the fact of willful
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Shaw, see the cases cited in the foot-note.^* The first reported
case which declared the fellow-servant doctrine in this conntr}- was
decided by the supreme court of South Carolina.^^ The enuncia-
tion, in that case, by Evans, J., of the principle that the sen-ant
assumes the risk of injury resulting from the negligence of a co-
servant, was concurred in only by a majority of the court. The
action was by the fireman of a locomotive-engine, for an injury
received by him by reason of the engine being thrown from the
track, in consequence of the negligent conduct of the engineer.
The same doctrine was declared shortly afterward by the supreme
judicial court of Massachusetts in the case already cited and quoted
from.**^ The opinion in the Massachusetts case by Chief Justice
Shaw is pronounced by able law-writers^'^ as "one of the most profound
and masterly that ever emanated from the pen of that distinguished
jurist." Mr. Freeman further says of it: "It has commanded
the admiration and elicited the encomiums of judges and text-writers
alike, and has been cited and approved by the courts of justice of
two continents. The learning, ability and reputation of Chief Justice
Shaw, and the surpassing strength and force of his deductions in
that case, together with the circumstance that it was a very early
one involving the principle, have rather overshadowed the opinion
of Judge Evans in Murray v. South Carolina R. Co.f'^ and the Massa-
chusetts case, though of later date, has attained the dignity of a lead-
ing case upon this subject, and has by some writers been regarded,
misconduct or gross negligence on Brady v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
the part of the employer, if a natu- 113 Fed. 909; New Pittsburgh, etc.,
ral person, or of the superintendent Coke Co. v. Peterson, 136 Ind. 398,
or immediate representative and 43 Am. St. 327; Spees v. Boggs, 198
managing agent, in case of an in- Pa. St. 112, 82 Am. St. 792; Maltbie
corporated company,—are ques- v. Belden, 167 N. Y. 307, 54 L. R. A.
tions on which we give no opin- 52.
ion." "= Murray v. South Carolina R.
" Coombs V. New Bedford Cord. Co., Co., 1 McMull. L. (S. C.) 385, 36 Am.
102 Mass. 572; Grimsley v. Hankins, Dec. 268.
46 Fed. 400; Blondin v. Oolitic ^ See note 83, SMpra.
Quarry Co., 11 Ind. App. 395; Chi- "See the note of Mr. Freeman, in
cago, etc., R. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 111. 36 Am. Dec. 280. See also, the ar-
458, 43 Am. St. 259; Schaub v. Han- tide of John F. Dillon, on "Ameri-
nibal, etc., R. Co., 106 Mo. 74; Dallas can Law Concerning Employers'
V. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 61 Tex. 196; Liability" in 24 Am. L. Rev. 175.
Johnson v. Portland Stone Co. (Or.), »^a i McMull. L. (S. C.) 385, 36 Am.
67 Pac, 1013; Shugard v. Union Dec. 268.
Traction Co. (Pa.), 51 Atl. 325;
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although erroneously, as being the first case in which the doctrine
was declared." A still earlier case containing what is frequently
claimed as the first promulgation of the fellow-servant rule, was de-
cided by Lord Abinger in 1837.*^^ In this case the plaintiff, who
was a servant of the defendant, was sent by the latter with cer-
tain goods in a van, in charge of another servant. The van, being
overloaded, broke down, and the plaintiff, who was riding in it, was
injured, and it was held that under these circumstances the defendant
was not liable. But as Mr. Dillon points out in an article in the
American Law Revieiv, the case was really not one involving the
fellow-servant doctrine, and therefore can not be claimed as the
pioneer case upon the subject.*^ But whatever may have been the
origin of the fellow-servant doctrine, it is now universally recog-
nized, in its general scope, in all common-law jurisdictions. The
reason for the fellow-servant rule is usually given, as we have seen,
as being the assumption of the risk by the servant injured. When the
injured servant entered into the contract with the master and agreed
to the compensation he was to receive, he must have done so with
reference to the risks of the employment, not the least of which was
the probable or possible negligence of the servants who were to work
with him in the same employment.^*' "The bed-rock of that doc-
trine is," say the supreme court of North Dakota, in speaking of the
basis of the fellow-servant rule, "that every employe assumes the
risk of his coemploye's negligence as one of the ordinary risks of his
work."**^ "The reason usually given in the cases for the rule, as we
have stated it," said Niles, J., speaking for the supreme court of
California, "is that a servant, in bargaining with his employer, is
presumed to know the ordinary risks of the business in which he is
to engage, and can obtain a compensation in accordance witli the
risks, or, at his option, decline the employment. Among the or-
dinary perils of the service are those arising from the carelessness
or negligence of colaborers, and they are presumed to be provided for
in the bargain which he makes. He assumes the risk as a part of his
contract of service. The duty of the employer in this regard extends
no further than to the use of due care and prudence in the selection of
competent sen'-ants in the several departments of the business."" ^^
=' Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1. 8 Am. St. 311; Lewis v. Seifert, 116
"" See "American Law Concerning Pa. St. 628, 2 Am. St. 631.
Employers' Liability," 24 Am. L. "' Ell v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 1
Rev. 175. N. Dak. 336, 26 Am. St. 621.
•"Anderson v. Bennett, 16 Or. 515, "'a Yeomans v. Contra Costa S. N.
Co., 44 Cal. 71, 81.
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To these reasons may doiibtless be added that of public policy; for,
as said by the supreme court of Iowa, "the moral effect of devolving
these risks upon the employes themselves, would be to induce a
greater degree of caution, prudence and fidelity, than would in all
probability be otherwise exercised by them/'^^ The fellow-servant
rule, however, does not apply to cases in which the master owed the
injured servant a positive duty which the law imposed on him and
which he failed to discharge ; for in such cases, the master can not es-
cape liability by shifting the duty upon a colaborer of the employe to
whom such duty is owing; and if he undertakes to do so, and the
servant intrusted with the discharge of the duty either fails to do
it or does it in a wrongful manner, from which injury results,
the master is liable. Thus, it is the duty of the master, as has been
seen, to provide the servant with a reasonably safe place in which
to work and with reasonably safe appliances and machinery, as well
as a sufficient number of competent coservants; and if he omits to
do this, the law will hold him accountable, and he could not be heard
to say that he had directed another servant to do it, but that the
latter had forgotten the task, or had performed it in such a manner
as to result in injury to the complaining servant. Hence, it is held
that where it is the duty of a railroad company suitably to prepare
its car, whether passenger or freight, for the use to which it has been
assigned, and the company fails to do this, but leaves the matter to
a fellow servant of the one who is injured by the defect in such car,
the company is liable to the injured servant.®^ And so, the duty of
furnishing a locomotive-engineer with a safe track upon which to
operate his engine can not be delegated by the master so as to exon-
erate him; and if a rail be removed and the engineer not notified of
the fact, and an injury occur to the engineer, the company will be
liable, notwithstanding, under different circumstances, the servant
guilty of the wrongful act might have been only a fellow servant of
the one injured.®* Without enumerating individual cases, we may
summarize by stating that whenever a positive duty devolves upon the
master to one of his servants, the master's obligation is either to per-
form the task himself or to see that it is actually performed ; and he
will be liable for all negligence in connection therewith, if it be the
proximate cause of the injury complained of.®^
*=' Sullivan v. Mississippi, etc., R. ^Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Eaton,
Co., 11 Iowa 421. 194 III. 441, 62 N. E. 784.
"* Bushby v. New York, etc., R. "= See Myers v. Hudson Iron Co..
Co., 107 N. Y. 374, 1 Am. St. 844. 150 Mass. 125, 15 Am. St. 176; Pull-
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§ 480. Master's liability for employment and retention of incom-
petent coservants.—In the previous section we showed the rule to
be that if the master exercised reasonable care in securing competent
servants, he would not generally be liable to any of them for injury
resulting from the negligence of any other of such servants. But
the duty of employing and retaining competent colaborers is one he
owes to each of his employes, and for a failure to perform it with
proper and reasonable care he is answerable to the injured servant in
damages, except in cases in which such injured servant has assumed
the risk."^ The rule is universally recognized in this country. Judge
Thompson, in his work on ISTegligence, states it as follows: ''If
the master has failed to exercise ordinary or reasonable care in
the selection of his servants, in consequence of which he has in his
employ a servant who, by reason of habitual drunkenness, negligence
or other vicious habits, or by reason of want of the requisite skill to
discharge the duties which he is employed to perform, or for any
other cause, is unfit for the service in which he is engaged, and if,
in consequence of such unfitness, an injury happens to another serv-
ant, the master must answer for the damages suffered by such serv-
ant."" The master is not an insurer of the competency of his
servants :^^ he is required to exercise only ordinary or reasonable
care and diligence. "The exceptional cases," said the supreme court
of Illinois, "are only * * * where the injury is imputable directly
man Palace-Car Co. v. Laack, 143 109 Ala. 130; Colorado Midland R.
111. 242; Young v. New Jersey, etc., Co. v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219; Nor-
R. Co., 46 Fed. 160; Tedford v. Los folk, etc., R. Co. v. Nuckols, 91 Va.
Angeles Elec. Co. (Cal.), 54 L. R. A. 193; Anderson v. New York, etc.,
85; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v, Eaton, S. S. Co., 47 Fed. 38; Northern Pac.
96 111. App. 570, affirmed in 194 111. R. Co. v. Mares, 123 U. S. 710;
441. Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Guyton,
Mparwell v. Boston, etc., R. Corp., 115 Ind. 450; Hall v. Bedford Stone
4 Met. (Mass.) 49, 38 Am. Dec. Co., 156 Ind. 460; Indianapolis Frog,
339 (see note S3, supra) ; McPhee v. etc., Co. v. Boyle, 18 Ind. App.
Scully, 163 Mass. 216; Huntsinger v. 169; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Beatty,
Trexler, 181 Pa. St. 497; Campbell v. 13 Ind. App. 604; Union Pac. R. Co.
Cook, 86 Tex. 630, 40 Am. St. 878, v. Young, 19 Kan. 488.
and note; Fast Line, etc., R. Co. v. "2 Thompson Neg. (1st ed.) 974.
Scott, 71 Tex. 703, 10 Am. St. 804; °* Keith v. Walker Iron, etc., Co.,
Western Stone Co. v. Whalen, 151 81 Ga. 49, 12 Am. St. 296; Reiser v,
111. 472, 42 Am. St. 244; Slater v. Pennsylvania Co., 152 Pa. St. 38, 34
Chapman, 67 Mich. 523, 11 Am. St. Am. St. 620; Stephens v. Doe, 73
593; Davis v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., Cal. 26.
20 Mich. 105, 124; Conrad v. Gray,
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to the personal negligence of the defendant [the master] in the
selection of the servant, or in retaining him in service after the in-
competency was known. The master does not warrant the compe-
tency of any of his servants, to the others. The extent of the under-
taking is, the company will exercise reasonable care in the selection
of an emplo3'e, and if his incompetency is discovered, it will dismiss
him from its service."®^ The court further said: "The case of
Wi'ight v. New York Cent. R. Co.^"" is a well-considered case on this
subject. It is there distinctly declared the employer does not under-
take with his emplo3'es for the skill and competency of the other
employes in and about the same service. The liability is placed on
the ground of personal negligence of the company in the selection of
its servants. In cases of injury to passengers, the fault of the agent
is imputed to the company on grounds of public policy, but the rule
is different where it is sought to make the company responsible for
an injury to one of its own employes, unless the case can be brought
within the exception to the general doctrine. The principle is cer-
tainly sustained by the weight of authority." ^"''^ "The master, in
relation to fellow servants, is bound to exercise diligence and care that
he brings into his service only such as are capable, safe, and trust-
worthy, and for any neglect in exercising that diligence he is liable to
his servant for injuries sustained from that neglect.""^ The in-
competency of the servant may be shown by the testimony of witnesses
who know the fact to be true. If the master knew of the unfitness of
the servant for the particular work in hand, this is of course the
strongest evidence of his culpability. But it is not essential that
actual notice of the servant's incapacity be brought home to the
master; it is sufficient if he might by the exercise of ordinary and
reasonable diligence have discovered the incompetency; and ig-
norance of the fact, if he had sufficient opportunity to be in-
formed, is itself evidence of negligence on the part of the mas-
"^ Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. the same effect, McLean v. Blue
Troesch, 68 111. 545, 18 Am. Rep. Point Gravel Min. Co., 51 Cal. 255;
578, citing Shearman & Redf. Neg., Jungnitsch v. Michigan Malleable
§ 86. Iron Co., 105 Mich. 270; Ohio, etc.,
"^ 25 N. Y. 562. R. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261, 38 Am.
^""a Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Rep. 134; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v.
Troesch, supra. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 47 Am. St. 392;
"1 Isham, J., in Noyes v. Smith, Tyson v. South, etc., R. Co., 61 Ala.
28 Vt. 59, 65 Am. Dec. 222. See, to 554, 32 Am. Rep. 8.
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ter.^°- The incompetency or unfitness of the servant may be proved
"by the letter's general reputation for intemperance or whatever is
the peculiar trait rendering him disqualified or unfit for the dis-
charge of the particular duties of the employment.^*^^ "Want of
ordinary care" is defined as want of ordinary attention to the busi-
ness in hand.^"* "The decisions, with few exceptions not important
to mention," said Justice Harlan, in a carefullj'-considered case,^'^^
''are to the effect that the corporation must exercise ordinary care.
But according to the best-considered adjudications, and upon the
clearest grounds of necessity and good faith, ordinary care in the
selection and retention of servants and agents implies that degree of
diligence and precaution which the exigencies of the particular service
reasonably require. It is such care as, in view of the consequences
that may result from negligence on the part of the employes, is fairly
commensurate with the perils and dangers likely to be encoun-
tered."^"*' It must not be inferred, however, tliat the servant who
labors with an incompetent coservant does not assume some risk, even
where the master was negligent in employing or retaining the incom-
petent servant ; for if the serv^ant who asks for damages had knowledge
of the incompetency of the fellow servant and continued in the com-
mon service of the master with the other servant, without complaint,
he can not recover, as in such case he is held to have assumed the
xisk, just the same as if he had continued in the employment after
having discovered the unsafe condition of his place of work or his
appliances, machinery, etc.^°^ Some courts hold, especially where
the injured servant held a position above that of the incompetent
"= Davis v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 20 ^"^ Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels,
Mich. 124, 4 Am. Rep. 364; Western 107 U. S. 454.
Stone Co. v, Whalen, 151 111. 472, 42 ^»« See, to the same effect, Balti-
Am. St. 244; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. more, etc., R. Co. v. Henthorne, 19
V. Henthorne, 19 C. C. A. 623, 73 C. C. A. 623, 73 Fed. 634; Haworth
Fed. 634; Harper v. Indianapolis, v. Seevers Mfg. Co., 87 Iowa 765;
etc., R. Co., 47 Mo. 567, 4 Am. Rep. Kansas, etc., Coal Co. v. Brownlie,
353. 60 Ark. 582; Evansville, etc., R.
"= Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Hoover, Co. v. Guyton, 115 Ind. 450.
79 Md. 253, 47 Am. St. 392; West- "> Hatt v. Nay, 144 Mass. 186;
ern Stone Co. v. Whalen, supra; Spencer v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 130 Ind.
Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Henthorne, 181; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cham-
19 C. C. A. 623, 73 Fed. 634. pion, 9 Ind. App. 570; Bolton v.
^»* White V. Dresser, 135 Mass. 150, Georgia Pac. R. Co., 83 Ga. 659.
46 Am. Rep. 454.
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servant, that where the injured servant and the master had equal
means of ascertaining the incompetency of the coemploye, the in-
jured employe can not recover ;^°* but this doctrine is not recognized
by all the courts, and is expressly repudiated by some.^''^
§ 481. Vice-principal and superior agent or servant.—As has al-
ready been stated, the master can not exonerate himself from responsi-
bility to his servants where a positive duty rests upon him requiring
him to do or omit to do something concerning the servant, or his work,
—such as supplying him with safe places in which to work, safe and
snitable appliances, competent fellow workmen, etc.,—by delegating
such duty to another. Of course, it frequently happens that the
master can not discharge that duty in person,—as, for example, in
the case of a corporation, which can act only through the instru-
mentality of an agent ; and it is not meant that the duty must be per-
formed by the principal in person; the meaning of the rule is that it
is incumbent on the master to see that such duty is actually per-
formed, whether by himself or by some one else to whom he may see
proper to intrust the matter; and for the failure to discharge such
duty, or negligence in its performance, the master is liable in
damages, whether the duty is undertaken by the master in person, or
by some other person to whom he has delegated the performance of
the duty.^^'^ Great confusion exists among the decided cases con-
cerning the terms "vice-principal," "superior agent," or "manager."
We can not undertake, within our limits, to attempt a review of
the numerous decisions upon the subject; but we think that, ac-
cording to the great weight of modern authority, a vice-principal
is an employe of the master to whom has been intrusted by the latter
the performance of some duty which the master owes to his servant
"« Davis V. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 20
Mich. 105, 4 Am. Rep. 364. See In-
diana, etc., R. €o. V. Dailey, 110
Ind. 75.
^"'Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kelly,
63 Fed. 407; Western Stone Co. v.
Whalen, 151 111. 472, 42 Am. St. 244.
"" Davis V. Central Vermont R.
Co., 55 Vt. 84, 48 Am. Rep. 590;
Harrison v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 79
Mich. 409, 19 Am. St. 180; Mobile,
etc., R. Co. V. Godfrey, 155 111. 78;
Nord Deutscher Lloyd S. S. Co. v.
Ingebregsten, 57 N. J. L. 400; Ran-
dall V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 109 U.
S. 478, 483; Prevost v. Citizens' Ice,
etc., Co., 185 Pa. St. 617; Dwyer v.
American Express Co., 82 Wis. 307,
33Am. St. 44; Colorado, etc., R. Co.
v. Naylon. 17 Colo. 501, 31 Am. St.
335; Sweeney v. Gulf, etc., R. Co..
84 Tex. 433, 31 Am. St 71; Louis-
ville, etc., R. Co. V. Manning, 131
Ind. 528, 31 Am. St. 443; Cole Bros.
V. Wood, 11 Ind. App. 37.
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or servants."^ It is immaterial whether the servant to whom the
duty had been intrusted was superior in rank to the injured employe
or not: the only question is whether the master owed the duty in the
performance of which the negligent act was committed. If he did,
then the employe so selected was a vice-principal, although he repre-
sented the employer only in that single task and not in a general
way.^^^ If, however, the servant who committed the negligent act
was not in the performance of a duty which the master owed directly
to the injured servant,- then the negligence was that of a fellow serv-
ant, and there is no liability on the part of the master, even if
the injured servant was inferior and acting in obedience to the
command of the negligent servant, who was the superior in rank,
in the sense of having authority to direct and control the other with
regard to such service. This is what is sometimes denominated the
English doctrine, and is severely criticised by some text-writers as
being founded upon some early cases of inferior English courts, which
were "ill-considered and ill-reasoned."^ ^^ However that may be, the
doctrine seems to be firmly established in Great Britain by numerous
modern decisions, only a few of which are cited in the note.^^* The
rule referred to seems to prevail with more or less variation and with
many dissenting opinions by individual judges, in the states of
Massachusetts, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Wiscon-
sin, Maine, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, North Dakota, Iowa,
Connecticut, and perhaps other states.^ ^^ To this array of state
"^ See the cases cited in last note; 44; Blake v. Maine Cent. R. Co.,
also, Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Godfrey, 70 Me. 60, 35 Am. Rep. 297; Nor-
155 111. 78. folk, etc., R. Co. v. Hoover, 79 Md.
"=See Elliott Railroads, § 1317. 253, 47 Am, St. 392; Kimmer v.
"=* Shearman & Redf. Neg., § 227. Weber, 151 N. Y. 417; O'Brien v.
"* Wilson V. Merry, L. R. 1 Sc. American Dredging Co., 53 N. J. L.
App. 326; Wigmore v. Jay, 5 Ex. 291; Ell v. Northern, etc., R. Co., 1
354; Lovegrove v. London, etc., R. N. Dak. 336, 12 L. R. A. 97, 26 Am.
Co., 16 C. B. N. S. (Ill E. C. L.) St. 621; Houser v. Chicago, etc.,
669, 33 L. J. C. P. 329. Co., 60 Iowa 230, 46 Am. Rep. 65;
"^ Moody v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., Darrigan v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
159 Mass. 70, 38 Am. St. 396; New 52 Conn. 285, 52 Am. Rep. 590.
Pittsburgh Coal, etc., Co. v. Peter- See also, McMaster v. Illinois Cent,
son, 136 Ind. 398, 43 Am. St. 327; R. Co., 65 Miss. 264, 7 Am. St. 653;
Beesley v. Wheeler, etc., Co., 103 McBride v. Union Pac. R. Co., 3
Mich. 196; Brown v. Winona, etc., Wyo. 183, 21 Pac. 687; Anderson v.
R. Co., 27 Minn. 162, 38 Am. Rep. Bennett, 16 Or. 515, 8 Am. St. 311;
285; Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. St. 42, Deserant v. Cerrillos Coal R. Co.,
23 Am. St. 160; Dwyer v. American 9 N. Mex. 495, 55 Pac. 290.
Express Co., 82 Wis. 307, 33 Am. St.
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courts of final jurisdiction must now be added, with its great weight
and influence, the supreme court of the United States. Although
that tribunal and all the other federal courts were, up to the time
of the decision of what is generally known as the Ross Case/^® re-
.garded as being on the side of those courts which hold to the superior-
servant doctrine, the more recent decisions have practically over-
thrown the rule asserted in the earlier cases, so far as the federal
tribunals are concerned, which now recognize and assert, in substance,
the fellow-servant doctrine as administered by the greater numter
of the state courts. ^^^ Over against this doctrine stands what is gen-
erally known as the Ohio rule, applied in its fullest and most liberal
scope by the supreme court of that state, and followed, in a more
limited measure, by the courts of Kentuck}', Tennessee, Missouri,
Texas, Louisiana, IsTorth Carolina, Kansas, Illinois, and perhaps other
states. The Ohio rule is stated by the supreme court of that state as
follows : "Where one servant is placed by his employer in a position
of subordination to, and subject to the orders and control of another,
and such inferior servant, without fault, and while in the discharge of
his duties, is injured by the negligence of the superior servant, the
master is liable for such injury.'^^^® And the fact that the superior
servant was then performing the services of a common workman and
not those strictly pertaining to the duties of a foreman or superior
officer, the court declares, in no wise relieves the master from liabil-
ity.^^® It must be confessed that the courts which have generally
applied the Ohio doctrine have not always been consistent in their
rulings upon the subject, and many of their decisions are difficult to
reconcile ; which is perhaps to be explained upon the ground of fre-
quent changes in the personnel of the respective courts. We cite only
a few of the cases which, in a general way, apply the Ohio rule.^^** It
"" Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ross, 112 "" Ibid., citing Little Miami, etc.,
U. S. 377. R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415;
"' See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Keary, 3
Peterson, 162 U. S. 346; Northern Ohio St. 201; Mad River, etc., R.
Pac. R. Co. v. Charless, 162 U. S. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541; and
359; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. other Ohio decisions.
Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; Alaska Min. '=« Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
Co. V. Wheelan, 168 U. S. 86; Mar- Cavens. 9 Bush (Ky.) 559; Louis-
tin V. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 166 U. ville, etc., R. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk.
S. 399. (Tenn.) 886; Coal Creek Min. Co.
"*Per Boynton, J., in Berea Stone v. Davis, 90 Tenn. 71; Sweeney v.
Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 84 Tex. 433, 31
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must be admitted that the tendency of recent adjudications, under the
common law, is clearly to the effect that mere difference in rank be-
tween the injured and the offending servant does not determine the
master's liability, although the inferior employe's injury was received
as a result of obedience to the superior servant's commands, which the
latter had a right to give, and which it was the duty of the former to
obey. All the cases agree that the master is liable for the negligence
of a fellow servant, whether superior or not, if such negligence con-
sisted in the careless performance of some act which the master was in
duty bound to perform, or in the omission of such act entirely. There
is also practically unanimous agreement that if, as to the particular
service in the performance of which the injury was received, the
negligent and the injured servant were of equal rank, and were en-
gaged in a common employment, and if the negligent servant was
not at the time ^^ndertaking to perform a duty which the master
owed to the injured servant, there is no liability on the part of the
master. The greatest difference of opinion is as to the superior-
agent rule. Many of the cases confuse the terms "vice-principal"
and "superior agent" or "servant." But a vice-principal is not neces-
sarily a superior agent or servant ; for a servant may be a vice-prin-
cipal without holding any superior rank over the other employes of
the master. According to the superior-servant doctrine, a superior
agent or servant must exercise control and direction over the other
employes. It is not essential that he should be intrusted with the
performance of duties which the master owes to other employes, ex-
cept the general duty of protection. The master is responsible for
the general management of the business as to which the superior
agent or servant has been appointed. "When the servant by whose
acts of negligence or want of skill other servants of the common em-
ployer have received injury is the alter ego of the master, to whom
the employer has left everything, then the middleman's negligence
is the negligence of the employer, for which the latter is liable. The
Am. St. 71; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. 300; Dobbin v. Richmond, etc., R.
Williams, 75 Tex. 4; Houston, etc., Co., 81 N. C. 446 (but see Turner v.
R. Co. V. Stuart (Tex. Civ. App.), Goldsboro Lumber Co., 119 N. C.
48 S. W. 799; Van Amburg v. Vicks- 387); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Pere-
burg,- etc., R. Co., 37 La. Ann. goy, 36 Kan. 424; Walker v. Gillett,
650; Miller v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 59 Kan. 214; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
109 Mo. 350, 32 Am. St. 637; Dowl- May, 108 111. 288; Wabash, etc., R.
ing v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13; Hutson Co. v. Hawk, 121 111. 259, 2 Am. St.
V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 50 Mo. App. 82.
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servant in such case represents the master, and is charged with the
master's duty."^^^ If the master were himself in control of the
workmen and guilt}^ of negligence in giving directions, he would
doubtless be liable for any proximately-resulting injury to the servant
if the latter used due care.^"~ "The servant does not stand on the
same footing with the master. His primary duty is obedience, and
if, when in the discharge of that duty, he is damaged through the
neglect of the master, it is but meet that he should be recom-
pensed."^-^ What the master may do himself, he may do by another;
he is therefore liable for the conduct of his representative. If the
master is not, or from the nature of the case, can not be present in
person, but has intrusted the particular business to a superintendent,
who has power to employ and discharge the workmen, the superin-
tendent is not a fellow servant, but a representative of the master,
sometimes improperly called a "vice-principal."^^* "VMiere the super-
intending servant is in charge of a distinct department, this is also
true.^^^ The fellow-servant rule does not prevent a faithful and
obedient employe from yielding obedience to the orders of the mas-
ter or his representative who is urging him to hurry his work and
directs him suddenly to assume a position of great danger; and the
employe will not be guilty of contributory negligence for obeying the
command, although he had some knowledge of the additional danger,
but, owing to the suddenness of the order, had not time nor oppor-
tunity to deliberate upon it.^^^
§ 482. Statutory enactments.—Wliile the tendency of the courts
of this country and England in the application of common-law prin-
ciples is to exonerate the principal from liability for the negligent
acts of superior servants, the legislatures of the different states as
well as that of England have shown a disposition to counteract these
adjudications by the adoption of statute-laws holding the em-
ployer to a more strict accountability for the negligence of fellow
servants who are intrusted with power to superintend, though they
^='Per Allen, J., in Malone v. dall, 100 Ind. 293; Foley v. Chicago,
Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5. etc., R. Co., 64 Iowa 644; Willis
'"Haley v. Case, 142 Mass. 316; v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 11 Or. 257.
Kehler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa. St. 505. '-= Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Driscoll,
i^'^Per Gordon, J., in Patterson v. 12 Colo. 520, 13 Am. St. 243.
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 76 Pa. St. '=" Lee v. Woolsey. 109 Pa. St. 124;
389. Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind.
«* Mitchell v. Robinson, 80 Ind. 181; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v.
281; Atlas Engine Works v. Ran- Adams, 105 Ind. 151.
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may also be fellow servants. ^-'^^ These so-called "employers'-liability
acts" frequently apply onty to railroad corporations and sometimes
to these and other corporations, except municipal; and render the
employer liable in damages when an employe is injured while in
the exercise of due care, where the injury results from the negli-
gence of any servant of the corporation to whose orders the injured
employe is bound to conform and does conform. Though consid-
erable difference exists in many of these statutes, many of them are
modeled after that of England adopted in 1880.^-'^ These acts also
contain provisions rendering the employer liable for defects in ma-
chinery, toqls, etc., due to the negligence of the master or the servant
intrusted with the duty of keeping them in proper condition; for
injuries to servants received by them while acting in obedience to the
rules or particular instructions of any person to whom such duty
has been delegated; and for injuries due to the negligence of those
having charge of signals, telegraph-offices, switch-yards, etc.^-® Some
of the provisions of these statutes are but reassertions of common-
law principles, and add little, if anything, to the liability of masters
to servants for the negligence of their coservants, while others make
radical changes in the rules. Among the important provisions of
such statutes are those pertaining to the master's responsibility for
injuries due to the negligence of coemployes who are at the time act-
ing as superintendents or superior servants, and whose commands
the injured employe is bound to obey; and it is generally held by
the courts, in construing such provisions, that the negligent employe
must be engaged in an act of superintendency when the negligent
act is committed by him which results in the injury of the servant
under him.^^® "We think there can be no doubt," said Hackney, J.,
in a recent Indiana case, "that it was intended by the third sub-
division to make corporations liable where the servant does an act
or omits action in obedience to the command of the corporation given
by rule, regulation or by-law, or through any person delegated with
^^•'a See Appendix for a few of ^-'> Whelton v. West End St. R. Co.,
these acts. 172 Mass. 555; Cashman v. Chase,
^-M3 & 44 Vict., ch. 42; Appendix, 156 Mass. 342; Fitzgerald v. Bos-
p. 605, post. ton, etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 293;
>='See Burns R. S. Ind. 1901, Whittaker v. Bent, 167 Mass. 588;
§ 7083; Code of Ala. 1896, §§ 1749, Dantzler v. De Bardeleben Coal, etc.,
1751; Stat. Mass. 1887, ch. 270; Gen. Co., 101 Ala. 309; Baltimore, etc.,
Laws Minn. 1895, ch. 173. See these R. Co. v. Little, 149 Ind. 167; Kel-
acts in the Appendix, post. lard v. Rooke, 21 Q. B, Div. 367.
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authority from the corporation to make the command, and such act
or omission results in injury to another."^^° These statutes are
doubtless intended to enlarge the common-law liability of the master
for the negligence of his superintending servants, or at least to render
definite and certain the answer to the . much-mooted question, Who
are superintendents or superior servants? but the same tendencies
toward liberal or narrow construction of the common law with refer-
ence to the master's liability for injuries which prevailed in the
courts of particular states prior to the enactment of these various
statutes obviously continue to manifest themselves in connection with
their construction, and hence the answer to the question, "What is a
"superintendence" ? according to the views of one court might not be
the same as in the judgment of another.^^^ The employers'-liability
acts were doubtless intended to limit the common-law exemption of
the master for negligence of one of his servants who was in a com-
mon employment with another. Some of the statutes enacted by
state legislatures providing for the liability of corporations for the
negligence of fellow servants apply exclusively to railroad com-
panies. Such statutes are held not to be in violation of those con-
stitutional inhibitions against class legislation contained in the
organic law of many states, inasmuch as they supply a necessity
for protection to employes whose employers expose them to pe-
culiar hazards and dangers. ^^^ By the construction usually given
these provisions, when the superintendent voluntarily performs the
act resulting in the injury of the coemploye, without the direction
or approval of the employer, the latter is not liable. ^^^ The law is
not changed with reference to the assumption of the risk by those
servants who know of the danger and voluntarily continue in the
service, or are guilty of contributory negligence i^^* they can not re-
cover damages for injuries thus sustained.
"" Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Little,
supra.
^^^ Compare, for example, Kansas
City, etc., R. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala.
240, with Cashman v. Chase, 156
Mass. 342, and O'Neil v. O'Leary,
164 Mass. 387.
"- Schus v. Powers-Simpson Co.
(Minn.), 89 N. W. 68; Johnson v.
St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 222,
8 L. R. A. 419; Chicago, etc., R.
Co. V. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209; Mis-
souri Pac. R. Co. V. Mackey, 33
Kan. 298, affirmed in 127 U. S. 205;
Campbell v. Cook, 86 Tex. 630; Her-
rick V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 31
Minn. 11.
"^Shea V. Willington, 163 Mass.
364.
'=** Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Stutts,
105 Ala. 368; Larkin v. New York,
etc., R. Co., 166 Mass. 110; Cassaday
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§ 483. Duty to promulgate rules and regulations and to give warn-
ing to employes—Duty of inspection.—As a part of the general ob-
ligation of the master to afford reasonable protection to his servants,
it is his duty to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for car-
rying on the business in which his servants are engaged. This duty
is incumbent more particularly upon persons, firms, and corporations
having a large number of employes and carrying on a specially
hazardous business, such as railroading, manufacturing, etc. If in
such instances the employer fails to discharge the duty incumbent
upon him, and there is a resulting injury to a servant, he is liable
in damages.^^^ This duty, like that of furnishing safe places in
which to work, etc., is one which the employer must perform or
see that it is performed; and he can not exonerate himself by the
plea that he had delegated the duty to a servant who had failed to
discharge it, or had discharged it negligently. But, before the in-
jured servant can recover, he must prove that the failure to promul-
gate such rules and regulations was the proximate cause of the in-
jury.^^® The master, in this respect, as in others relating to his
business, must guard against probable and not against possible casual-
ties : if the rules are such as are usually adopted by prudent employers
in the same line of business, they are sufficient to meet the require-
ment :^^^ the master can not be expected to anticipate everv' emergency,
and is required to make only such reasonable rules and regulations as
an ordinarily prudent person would make under the circumstances, or-
dinary care being all he is required to exercise. ^^^ Where the business
is not specially hazardous or complicated, failure to promulgate rules
and regulations is not negligence in the master. ^^^ The rules and
regulations must be promulgated in such manner as to afford employes
v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 164 Mass. 198; Ohio St. 222; Missouri, etc., R. Co.
Trinity, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell, 72 v. McElyea, 71 Tex. 386, 10 Am. St.
Tex. 609; Murphy v. Chicago, etc., 749; Evansville, etc., R. Co. v.
R. Co., 45 Iowa 661; Weblin v. Bal- Holcomb, 9 Ind. App. 198; Smith
lard, 17 Q. B. Div. 122. v. Oxford, etc., Co., 42 N. J. L. 467.
'^ Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 628, ^^ Doing v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
2 Am. St. 631; Reagan v. St. 26 N. Y. Supp. 405.
Louis, etc., R. Co., 93 Mo. 348, 3 ^^'Abel v. Delaware, etc.. Canal
Am. St. 542; Doing v. New York, Co., 128 N. Y. 662.
etc., R. Co., 151 N. Y. 579; Ford v. ""Berrigan v. New York, etc., R.
Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 124 N. Y. Co., 131 N. Y. 582; Atchison, etc.,
493, 12 L. R. A. 454; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Caruthers, 56 Kan. 309.
R. Co. v. Taylor, 69 111. 461; Lake ^'^ Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Echols, 87
Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Lavalley, 36 Tex. 339.
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a reasonable opportunity to acquaint themselves with them;^*° but if
the employe obtains knowledge of such rules, however it may be
acquired, it will be sufficient to absolve the employer.^*^ Failure to
enforce such rules is likewise culpable negligence on the part of the
master; and proof that it is customary on his part to disregard the
rules is evidence of the failure to enforce them.^*- It is the duty of
the servant, however, to obey such rules, whether others do so or
not, and a failure to do so on the servant's part will generally ex-
cuse the employer from liability: he does not insure their observ-
ance.^*^ It is also the duty of the employer to warn the employe
of the dangers of the employment, particularly^ those not in open
view, but which are known to the employer, or could with reason-
able diligence have been ascertained by him, and which the em-
ploye, on account of his ignorance, inexperience or youth, may
not be able to appreciate readily.^** The duty to warn the employe
applies with particular force to cases where a change has taken place
in machinery or appliances, and the hazard has thereby been in-
creased to which the servant will be exposed and which he would not
probably observe.^*^ If, however, the defects are obvious and patent
to a person of ordinary intelligence, the master is not in duty bound
generally to give warning, as in such cases the employe assumes tha
risks,^*® unless he is so inexperienced or ignorant, or young, as not
to appreciate the danger.^*^ The employer is invariably bound to
^"Abel V. Delaware, etc., Canal
Co., 103 N. y. 581, 57 Am. Rep. 773;
Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Lever-
ett, 48 Ark. 333, 348, 3 Am. St. 230;
Fay V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 30
Minn. 231; Evansville, etc., R. Co.
V. Holcomb, 9 Ind. App. 198.
^" Grady v. Southern R. Co., 92
Fed. 491.
^'^ Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Nickels,
50 Fed. 718; Chicago, etc., R. Co.
V. Flynn, 154 111. 448.
"^Richmond, etc., R. Co. v.
Thomasson, 99 Ala. 471; Abend v.
Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., Ill 111.
202; Rutledge v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 123 Mo. 121, 133.
'"Consolidated, etc., R. Co. v.
Haenni, 146 111. 614; Smith v.
Peninsular Car Works, 60 Mich.
501; Erickson v. St. Paul, etc., R.
Co., 41 Minn. 500, 5 L. R. A. 786;
Sullivan v. India Mfg. Co., 113 Mass.
396; Salem Stone, etc., Co. v. Grif-
fin, 139 Ind. 141; Atlas Engine
Works V. Randall, 100 Ind. 293
Reisert v. Williams, 51 Mo, App. 13
Gates V. State, 128 N. Y. 221
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 87
Ala. 708, 13 Am. St. 84; Norfolk
Beet Sugar Co. v. Hight, 56 Neb.
162; Fisk v. Central Pac. R. Co., 72
Cal. 38, 1 Am. St. 22; Hayes v. Col-
chester Mills, 69 Vt. 1.
"= Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Gray,
101 Fed. 623.
"" Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U. S. 238.
"'Wallace v. Standard Oil Co., 66
Fed. 260. This was a case decided
by the United States circuit court
J
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instruct new and inexperienced employes as to the nature of the work
upon which they are about to enter and the dangers to which they
for the district of Indiana, where a
boy, seventeen years of age, was
employed in the business of han-
dling, transporting and selling coal
oil, turpentine, gasoline and other
inflammable oils. One of the negli-
gent acts charged against the em-
ployer was that he failed to instruct
the boy, who was ignorant and in-
experienced, as to the dangers inci-
dent to such employment. The boy's
clothes had become saturated with
the oils, and, being cold and chilly,
he was directed by the employer's
agent, who was in charge of the
business, to go into the office, where
there was a stove containing a hot
fire, and warm himself. He did so,
and while there his clothing caught
fire from the stove and he received
such injuries as resulted in his
death. Speaking of the duty of the
master to instruct such a servant,
the learned district judge (Baker)
observed: "This duty is not dis-
charged so as to exonerate the mas-
ter from liability by mere general
instructions, but they must be so
full, plain and specific as to bring
to the knowledge and understand-
ing of such infant the dangers inci-
dent to and growing out of his em-
ployment. This duty is the mas-
ter's; and the agent, employe, or
servant who may be delegated to
perform it stands in the master's
place, and his negligence is the mas-
ter's negligence. In the perform-
ance of that duty, the servant, what-
ever his grade, is a vice-principal,
and speaks and acts for the master.
The defendant owed the decedent
the duty of instruction, so that he
might fully understand and avoid
the danger from fire arising from
the nature of his employment, and,
instead of performing that duty, he
misled the decedent by the false as-
surance that there was no danger
from fire. This was a plain breach
of duty, and, if the injury com-
plained of resulted from such
breach of duty, the complaint must
be held suflScient. If his clothes
had taken fire from exposure to it
while the decedent was actually en-
gaged at work for the defendant,
there could be no serious dispute
concerning its liability under the
circumstances. It is said the acci-
dent was one which ought not to
have been anticipated by the de-
fendant, and was not a probable
result of the saturation of his
clothes with oils and gases. It
seems to me that this contention is
unfounded. The danger of the ig-
nition of clothes, when saturated
with oils and gases as alleged, by
exposure to fire, is obvious, and is
one which the defendant was bound
to take notice of. It is equally ob-
vious that the decedent, in the cold
days of winter and spring, would
be likely to be about fires, and in
dangerous proximity to them, while
his clothes were impregnated with
oils and gases, especially if he was
told by his employer that there was
no danger in so doing, and he be-
lieved what he was told. The de-
cedent was guilty of no negligence
in acting on the direction of the
representative of the defendant In
going dangerously near to the hot
stove in question. He went where
he had a lawful right to be. His
danger in so acting arose from con-
ditions incident to the service,
which conditions continued to be
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Avill probably be exposed. After the servant has been sufficiently
instructed as to the dangers of the employment, and how to avoid
them, he assumes the risk if he enters upon or continues in it.^*^ The
duty to furnish safe working-places and appliances carries with it the
further duty of the master to make proper and adequate inspection
from time to time, for defects in such places and appliances, such as
are likely to occur as incidents of the business.^*® But the duty of
making inspection is not extended to the ordinary appliances and
tools with which employes are generally familiar; and the master
has a right to assume that the servant who makes use of these will
discover the defects and cease using them or apprise the master of
their unfitness for further use.^^" Another limitation of the rule
requiring the master to make inspection is in respect of defects that
arise "in the constant use of the appliances, for which proper and
suitable materials are supplied, and which may easily be remedied
by the workmen, and are not of a permanent character, or requiring
the help of skilled mechanics."^^^ The mere fact that the servant
might have avoided the accident by the use of special care in the
operation of a defective machine will not excuse the master. ^^- The
workman has a right to assume, generally, that the employer has per-
present with him, and caused the
burning of his clothes and subse-
quent death. This ignition of his
clothes, and injury therefrom, were
the direct result of the condition
of his clothes incident to his em-
ployment. While the boy was sent
to warm himself by his employer,
he did not cease to be in its service,
and he was, it seems to me, as much
entitled, under the circumstances, to
charge the defendant for its failure
of duty to instruct, as though, at the
time of the accident, he had been
actually at work in the room. His
clothes, saturated with the danger-
ous and inflammable substances
mentioned, continued to be a source
of danger, while unremoved, after,
as well as during, his hours of ac-
tual service; and, in my opinion, it
was actionable negligence to direct
the decedent to go into the room
containing the hot stove, even if the
direction were only permissive,
without instructing him in regard
to the danger from a too near ap-
proach to it."
"* Daester v. Mechanics' Planing
Mill Co., 11 Mo. App. 593.
"® Union Pac. R. Co. v. Daniels,
152 U. S. 684; Pennsylvania Co. v.
White, 15 Ind. App. 583; Rogers v.
Ludlow Mfg. Co., 144 Mass. 198, 59
Am. Rep. 68.
"" Wachsmuth v. Shaw Elec.
Crane Co., 118 Mich. 275.
151 pgj. Finch, J., in Cregan v.
Marston, 126 N. Y. 568, 572. See
also, McGee v. Bocton Cordage Co.,
139 Mass. 445; Whittaker v. Bent,
167 Mass. 588.
1" Stringham v. Stewart, 100 N. Y.
516; McGee v. Boston Cordage Co.,
stipra.
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formed his duty as to inspection and repairs, as well as other duties;
and if he relies upon this and is injured, he can not be held guilty of
contributory negligence. "It has been often said that the master is
not liable for defects in such things to a servant whose means of
knowledge thereof were equal to those of the master. But this is
an erroneous statement. The master has no right to assume that the
servant will use such means of knowledge, because it is not part of
the duty of the servant to inquire into the sufficiency of these things.
The servant has a right to rely upon the master's inquiry, because
it is the master's duty to inquire; and the servant may justly as-
sume that all these things are fit and suitable for the use he is directed
to make of them."^^^ If, however, the defect was of such a character
that its dangerous condition could not reasonably have been antici-
2Dated, the master can not be held accountable for it, and it becomes
simply a case of assumption of the risk b}^ the servant.^^* The de-
fect must be such, in order to render the master liable for failing to
remedy it, as could by the exercise of ordinary care have been de-
tected by him.^^^ If the master has promised the servant to .repair
or remedy the defect, the servant may rely upon the fact that the
former will do so within a reasonable time ; and if, within such time,
he is injured therefrom, he will not generally be charged with con-
tributory negligence ;^^'' but if, with a full knowledge of the defect,
and without any promise or probabilit}^ on the part of the master to
make the repair or supply other instruments, the servant continues
in the work, he assumes the risks, and can not recover if an accident
occurs.
^^^
"' Shearman & Redf . Neg., § 287, '=« Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend,
quoted with approval in Magee v. 107 III. 44; Donley v. Dougherty,
North Pac, etc., R. Co., 78 Cal. 430, 174 111. 582; Atchison, etc., R. Co.
12 Am. St. 69. See also. Western v. Sadler, 38 Kan. 128, 5 Am. St. 729;
Stone Co. v. Musical, 96 111. App. New Jersey, etc., R. Co. v. Young,
288. 49 Fed. 723.
^" Morris v. Gleason, 1 111. App. '^' Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v.
510. Watson, 114 Ind. 20, 5 Am. St. 578;
"'Pennsylvania Co. v. Congdon, Hunt v. Kane, 100 Fed. 256; Hous-
134 Ind. 226, 39 Am. St. 251; Reed ton, etc., R. Co. v. Myers, 55 Tex.
V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 164 Mass. 110.
129; Lanza v. LeGrand Quarry Co.
(Iowa), 88 N. W. 805.
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//. Liahility of blaster to Third Persons for Acts of Servant.
§ 484. In general.—The liability of a principal to a third party
for the acts of his agents, and incidentally some instances of accoiint-
ability of the master for the acts of his servants, have already been
presented/ ^^ It is proper now that we should notice more specifically
the duties and liabilities of those persons whose principal attributes
in the relation existing between them and their employes are those
of masters. As a general rule, a servant, who, in the main, possesses
none of the authority of an agent, can not render his master liable
on any contract he may undertake to enter into for him: the mas-
ter's only liability, as a general rule, for the acts of his servants is
the liability for his torts. The master may be liable to a third party
(a) for the negligence of the servant,^^*^ and (b) for the willful, wan-
ton or intentional wrongs of the latter. ^^^"^ Before there can be any
liability in either case, the relation of master and servant must
actually exist; that is, the servant must be in the emploj-ment of
the alleged master ;^^^ and there must be present the right to select,
control and discharge the servant or employe. "The liability of
any one, other than the party actually guilty of any wrongful act,
proceeds on the maxim, 'Qui facit per alium facit per se.' The
party employing has the selection of the party employed; and it is
reasonable that he who has made choice of an unskillful or care-
less person to execute his orders should be responsible for any
injury resulting from the want of skill, or want of care, of the
person employed; but neither the principle of the rule nor the
rule itself can apply to a case where the party sought to be charged
does not stand in the character of employer to the party by
whose negligent act the injury has been occasioned."^^" "The rela-
tion," said Field, J., speaking for the supreme court of California,
" * * * must be that of superior and subordinate, or, as it is
generally expressed, of master and servant, in which the latter is
subject to the control of the former. The responsibility is placed
where the power exists. Having the power to control, the superior
or master is bound to exercise it to the prevention of injuries to third
"'An^e, Chapter viii. N. E. 1096; Aldritt v. Gillette-
'^'a See 1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), Herzog Mfg. Co. (Minn.), 88 N. W.
ch. 15. 741.
"*b See 1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), '""Per Baron Rolfe, in Hobbit v.
ch. 16. London, etc., R. Co., 4 Exch. 254.
"»Kueckel v. Ryder (N. Y.), 62
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parties, or he will be held liable. The responsibility attaches to
the latter, upon the principle, 'Qui facit per aUiim facit per se.' To
determine the responsibility, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the relation existing between the party charged and the party
committing the injury be in fact that of superior and subordinate,
or master and servant."^ ^^ "The distinction on which all the cases
turn is this: If the person employed to do the work carries on an
independent employment, and acts in pursuance of a contract with
his employer, by which he has agreed to do the work on certain speci-
fied terms, in a particular manner, and for a stipulated price, then
the employer is not liable. The relation of master and servant does
not exist between the parties, but only that of contractor and con-
tractee. The power of directing and controlling the work is parted
with by the employer, and given to the contractor. But, on the other
hand, if work is done under a general employment, and is to be per-
formed for a reasonable compensation, or for a stipulated price, the
employer remains liable, because he retains the right and power of
directing and controlling the time and manner of executing the work,
or of refraining from doing it, if he deems it necessary or expe-
dient."^®^ If there be not the relation of master and servant, how-
ever, the master may still make himself liable for the torts of his
servant, where by a subsequent adoption or sanctioning of the acts
he renders himself a legal participator in them.^"* The offending
party need not, however, be actually in the employ of the alleged
master, under contract of employment for wages, before the latter
can be held liable: if he hold the person out to the public as his
servant, and the wrong is committed within the apparent scope of
such employment, or the alleged master receive the benefits of the
other's labor, he may be liable, although there is no actual employ-
ment or contract between the two.^®* "It is enough that, at the time
of the accident, he was in charge of the defendant's property by his
assent and authority, engaged in his business, and, in respect to that
property and business, under his control."^®^
^« Boswell V. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 68 and the note to Brown v. Smith, 86
Am. Dec. 345. Ga. 274, in 22 Am. St. 459.
'•^ Bigelow, C. J., in Brackett v. '°^ McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L.
Lubke, 4 Allen (Mass.) 140. See 356, 67 Am. Dec. 49; 1 Thompson
also, Miller v. Minnesota, etc., R. Neg. (2d ed.), § 539.
Co., 76 Iowa 655, 14 Am. St. 258; '"'Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Gustaf-
Robinson v. Webb, 11 Bush (Ky.) son, 21 Colo. 393.
464; Samuelian v. American Tool, "^ Per Wells. J., in Kimball v.
etc., Co., 168 Mass. 12, 46 N. E. 98; Cushman, 103 Mass. 194, 4 Am. Rep.
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§ 485. Master's liability for servant's negligence—Scope of em-
ployment—Contributory negligence—Proximate cause.—It is an ele-
mentary principle, coming down to us from the Roman law as a branch
of the doctrine of respondeat superior, that the master is liable for the
negligent acts or omissions of his servants, whereby the person or prop-
erty of a third party is injured, if the servant was at the time acting
within the scope of the employment.^^® "There is no material differ-
ence whether the party committing the injury is a servant or agent of
the defendant. A servant is an agent. The principal is responsible for
the act of his agent, and this case is only an application of the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.'''^^'^ The modern decisions make the doc-
trine rest upon public necessity or expediency :^^^ its hardships hav-
ing often been appreciated and deplored by courts, but its enforcement
being necessary to the reasonable security of society.^®® One who
makes use of dangerous agencies in his business owes a duty to the
public to exercise the greatest care in keeping and using them, and
this duty he can not devolve from himself upon his servant so as to
avoid liability.^^" The act, however, must be done within the scope
528, citing Wood v. Cobb, 13 Allen
(Mass.) 58.
^^2 Kent Com. (12th ed.) 260, n.
1; Alserver v. Minneapolis, etc., R.
Co. (Iowa), 88 N. W. 841; Tuel v.
Weston, 47 Vt. 634; Hays v. Millar,
77 Pa. St. 238; Schulte v. HoUiday,
54 Mich. 73; Conlon v. Eastern R.
Co., 135 Mass. 195; Stephenson v.
Southern Pac. R. Co., 93 Cal. 558,
27 Am. St. 223; Chicago, etc., R. Co.
V. Bryant, 65 Fed. 969; Garretzen
V. Duenkel, 50 Mo. 104; Stephens
V. Chausse, 15 Can. Sup. 359; Milner
V. Great Northern R. Co., 50 L. T.
N. S. 367; Waters v. Pioneer Fuel
Co., 52 Minn. 474, 38 Am. St. 564;
Gaines v. Bard, 57 Ark. 615, 38 Am.
St. 266; Gray v. Boston, etc., R.
Co., 168 Mass. 20.
^" Per Dowse, B., in Wilson v.
Owens, 16 L. R. Ir. 225.
^*'* Siegrist v. Arnot, 10 Mo. App.
197, per Thompson, J.
^"^ Shea v. Reems, 36 La. Ann. 966;
Hall V. Smith, 2 Bing. 160; McDon-
ald V. Snelling. 14 Allen (Mass.)
290, 92 Am. Dec. 768; Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co. V. Shields, 47 Ohio St.
387, 8 L. R. A. 464.
'"Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v.
Shields, supra. "And it stands to
reason," said the court in this case,
"that one charged with a duty of
this kind can not devolve it upon
another, so as to exonerate himself
from the consequences of injury be-'
ing caused to others by the negli-
gent manner in which the duty in
regard to the custody of such an
instrument may be performed.
Speaking of the absolute duty im-
posed by statute in certain cases, or,
also, the duty required by common
law of common carriers, of owners
of dangerous animals, or other
things involving by their nature or
position special risk or harm to
neighbors. Pollock observes: 'The
question is not by whose hand an
unsuccessful attempt was made,
whether that of the party itself, or
593 MASTER AXD SERVANT. § 485
of the employment or the master will not be bound; for otherwise
the rule respondeat superior does not apply. It is not always an
easy matter to determine whether an act was or was not within the
course of the business in which the employe was engaged for the em-
ployer. Where the facts are in dispute upon the question it is gen-
erally for the jury to determine. ^'^^ Thus, where a corporation, by
its agent, sold to a party by a parol contract a cooking-range, and
sent its servant to deliver it and set it up ready for use, and the
servant set it up in a defective and dangerous manner, and the serv-
ant took from the purchaser what was claimed to be a receipt, but
which proved to be a written contract at variance with the parol
agreement upon which the purchaser relied, the court held that it
"was for the jury to decide upon the terms of the agreement, and
whether, under such terms, the servant was acting within the scope
of the master's business.^^^ So, where a party was taking treatment
in a bath-house, and the baths were administered by servants, who
received their compensation from the bathers, but were selected by
and under the control and direction of the manager of the bath-
house, the court held that this was sufficient to authorize the conclu-
sion that the attendants were the servants of the owner and that he
was liable for an injury to one of the patrons caused by their negli-
gence.^^^ Prima facie, when a person is found doing service for an-
other he is in that other's employ; and the fact that the one so em-
ployed carried on another business or employment separate and
distinct from the one in which the negligent act was committed does
not change the rule.^^* In an action against a railway company for
the alleged negligence of its employe in attempting to stop a runaway
of his servant, or of an independent would be required of the master act-
contractor, but whether the duty ing in that regard for himself; if
has been adequately performed or it be the custody of dangerous in-
not:' Pollock Torts 64. We in struments, he must observe the ut-
no way limit nor question the most care."
soundness of the general rule "^ Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155,
which exonerates the master from 27 L. R. A. 161; 1 Thompson Neg.
liability for the acts of his servant (2d ed.), § 615.
done outside of his employment. '"- Wrought Iron Range Co. v.
What has been stated is strictly Graham, 42 C. C. A. 449, 80 Fed.
"Within the reason and principle of 474.
the rule, which is that whatever ^" Gaines v. Bard, 57 Ark. 615, 38
the servant is intrusted by the mas- Am. St. 266; 1 Thompson Neg. (2d
ter to do for him must be done with ed.), § 604.
the same care and prudence that "* Perry t. Ford, 17 Mo. App. 212.
38
—
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horse, whereby the occupant of the vehicle to which the animal was
attached sustained an injury, the court of civil appeals of Texas held
that the company was not liable, as the efforts of the employe to stop
the horse were not acts within the scope of his employment.^ ^^ And
where a grocer sued a street-railroad company for damages because
its foreman, by words and conduct, persuaded and induced the men
whom he employed, controlled and had tlie power to discharge not
to deal with the grocer, whereby the latter's business was injured and
he sustained losses, the court hold that the company was not liable,
such acts and conduct not being within the scope of the foreman's
employment.^ ^® In an action for negligence against a railroad com-
pany on account of permitting fire to escape from its right of way,
the complaint or declaration should charge that the negligent act
was done by the company, and not its servants; at least, it must
appear from the averments that the acts of the servants were done
while they were in the employ of the company ; and where there
is an allegation that the "workingmen and employes of the defendant"
committed the act, the pleading is insufficient on demurrer.^^^ The
good motives or intentions of the master constitute no defense to the
action; and he is not excused because the wrongful act or omission
was without his consent or even against his express orders :^'^ the
liability is not grounded upon the master's supposed acquiescence,
but, as stated above, he is held responsible for reasons of public pol-
icy.^^^ The mental condition of the servant at the time of the wrong-
ful act does not affect the employer's liability, if the servant was
acting in the line of the employment, such condition, if it was the
cause or occasion of the act complained of, being regarded simply
as the misfortune of the master.^"" Before the master can be ren-
"= San Antonio, etc., R. Oo. v. Belt
(Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 374.
I'o Graham v. St. Charles St. R.
Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656.
"^Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Palm-
er, 13 Ind. App. 161. See further, on
the point of the scope of employ-
ment. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132
U. S. 518; Driscoll v. Scanlan, 165
Mass. 348, 52 Am. St. 523; Morris v.
Brown, 111 N. Y. 318; Mayer v.
Thompson-Hutchison Bldg. Co., 104
Ala. 611, 53 Am. St. 88; Keating v.
Michigan Cent. R. Co., 97 Mich.
154, 37 Am. St. 328; First Nat'l
Bank v. Marietta, etc., R. Co., 20
Ohio St. 259. 5 Am. Rep. 655.
"^ Heinrich v. Pullman Palace-Car
Co., 20 Fed. 100; Garretzen v.
Duenkel, 50 Mo. 104; Consolidated
Ice Machine Co. v. Keifer, 134 111.
481, 23 Am. St. 688; Pittsburgh, etc.,
R. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399, 52
Am. Rep. 675; Powell v. Deveney,
3 Cush. (Mass.) 300, 50 Am. Dec.
738; Wood Master & Serv. 593, 594.
"" See note 165, supra.
ISO Thus, where an intoxicated
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dered liable there must, of course, be negligence on the part of
the servant, and the negligent act or omission must be the proximate
cause of the injur}-.^*^ Negligence is variously defined as the omis-
sion of that which a reasonable man would do, or the doing of some-
thing a reasonable man would not do; the neglect to use ordinary
care towards one to whom a duty is owing to use such care ; the
absence of due care; the omission of a duty, etc.^®- The authors last
cited themselves define it as "an omission, by a responsible person,
to use that degree of care, diligence and skill which it was his legal
duty to use for the protection of another person from injury, as in a
natural and continuous sequence causes unintended damage to the
latter."^*^ "Xegligence," said the supreme court of Nebraska, "is
the failure to exercise such care, prudence and forethought as, under
the circumstances, duty requires should be given and exercised. It
is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do."^®* But not only must the injured party prove
such actionable negligence, on the part of the servant engaged in the
master's business, as was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury,
but the latter can not recover damages unless he himself was free
from contributory negligence.^^^ Contributory negligence is the
want of due and proper care by the injured person such as con-
tributed proximately to his injury.^®*^ It is "such an act or omission/'
says Beach, "on the part of the plaintiff, amounting to a want of
employe of a railway corporation ^^ Kelsey v. Jewett, 28 Hun (N.
negligently left down the bars of Y.) 51; Jackson v. St. Louis, etc., R.
a fence, whereby the plaintiff's Co., 87 Mo. 422; Chicago, etc., R.
horses escaped and were killed by Co. v. Bell (Kan.), 41 Pac. 209.
a passing train, the corporation was '*^1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.),
held liable for such servant's negli- §§ 1-3; Shearman & Redf. Neg.,
gence: Chapman v. New York Cent. § 1, note.
R. Co., 33 N. Y. 369, 88 Am. Dec. ^'^ Shearman & Redf. Neg., § 2.
392. But in Christian v. Columbus, i** Brotherton v. Manhattan, etc.,
etc., R. Co., 79 Ga. 460, 7 S. E. 216, Co., 50 Neb. 214, 33 L. R. A. 598.
it was said that if the act of the ^^ Shearman & Redf. Neg., § 61;
servant was the result of insanity, 1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), § 168,
and the master was faultless in re- et seq.
gard to the employment of the serv- '^1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.),
ant, anything that would excuse the § 169.
latter criminally from the act would
excuse the master civilly.
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ordinary care, as, concurring or co-operating with the negligent act
of the defendant, is a proximate cause or occasion of the injury com-
plained of. To constitute contributory negligence there must be a
want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, and a proximate
connection between that and the injury."^^^ If, then, the injured
party could have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care,
he can not recover, although the defendant was guilty of negligence
which was, in part, the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; for
the common law, out of considerations of public policy, refuses to
apportion the damages arising from the negligence of the parties
combined ;^®^ although what is known as the doctrine of "compara-
tive negligence" has been recognized in at least one American state;
by which doctrine, if the negligence of the defendant was "gross,"
and that of the plaintiff but slight, the plaintiff could still recover,
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence also contributed to the
injury.^®*^ To support an action for negligence these two things
must concur : there must have been a negligent act or omission by the
defendant (or his servant), which was a proximate cause of the
injury complained of, and there must have been such ordinary care
by the complaining party as would have avoided the injury had the
defendant also acted with ordinary care.^*® Xot every act or omis-
sion showing a want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff
will defeat his right of action, any more than every act or omission
showing a want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant will
give the plaintiff a right of action. The plaintiff's negligence, to
defeat his right of recovery, must have been a proximate cause of the
injury; and the defendant's negligence, to give the plaintiff a right
to recover, must have been a proximate cause of the injury.^®" Xor
is it necessary that the defendant's negligence should have been the
sole cause of the injury ; for it is generally held that where the injury
was caused by the concurrent negligence of the defendant and a
stranger, the defendant is not excused.^^^
1^ Beach Contr. Neg., § 7. ^^ Butterfleld v. Forrester, 11 East
^^1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), 60.
§§ 176, 177; Beach Contr. Neg., ""1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.),
§§ 7-14. §§ 85, 86; Davies v. Mann. 10 M. &
i««a Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dimick, W. 546; Smithwick v. Hall, etc., Co.,
96 111. 43, 47. But the doctrine is 59 Conn. 261, 12 L. R. A. 279.
now abandoned in Illinois: City of ^"'Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lucas,
Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 111. 163, 119 Ind. 583, 6 L. R. A. 193; Carter-
165. See discussion of this doctrine ville v. Cook, 129 111. 152, 16 Am.
in 1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), ch. 10. St. 248; Atkinson v. Goodrich
1
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§ 486. Master's liability for willful or wanton wrongs of serv-
ant.—The rule respondeat superior, in its logical application, has orig-
inated the modern doctrine that a master is liable to a third party
for the intentional and malicious acts of his servant, if committed
within the scope of the employment, as well as for his acts of mere
negligence,^^- Formerly it was the view of the interpreters of the
law that the very fact that the servant had so far departed from the
master's presumed direction to do his business in a right and proper
manner as to commit a willful or wanton wrong was in itself suffi-
cient evidence that the act could not have been committed within
the scope of such business; and that, therefore, the injured party
could look only to the servant for redress ;^^^ but this is no longer the
law. According to the modern rule, a shopkeeper was held liable for
an assault and battery by a clerk upon a woman at the time in the
shop, in an attempt to take away from her an article which the clerk
believed had been stolen by her from the shop, such act being within
the scope of the employment.^^* And so, it is now held to be within
the scope of the employment of a salesman to cause the arrest and
search of a person suspected by him of having stolen property in her
possession which had been taken from the store, and the master is
liable therefor.^ '^^ And a master who sent his servant to take posses-
sion of furniture forfeited to him on account of non-payment of the
price is liable for the willful assault of such servant committed by
Transportation Co., 60 Wis. 141, 50 Van Den Eynde v. Ulster R. Co., Ir.
Am. Rep. 352; 2 Thompson Neg. R. 5 C. L. 6, 328; 1 Thompson Neg.
(2d ed.), §§68, 75; Shearman & (2d ed.), § 552, e^ seg.
Redf. Neg., § 66; Bishop Non-Con- "^ For cases holding that the mas^
tract Law, §§ 39, 450. . ter is not liable for the willful
^^- Pioneer Fireproof Constr. Co. v. wrong of his servant, see Wright v.
Sunderland, 188 111. 341; Lucas v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 343, 32
Michigan Cent. R. Co., 98 Mich. 1, Am. Dec. 507; Moore v. Sanborne,
39 Am. St. 517; St. Louis, etc., R. 2 Mich. 519, 59 Am. Dec. 209; Illi-
Co. v. Hackett, 58 Ark. 381, 41 Am. nois Cent. R. Co. v. Downey, 18 111.
St. 105; Moore v. Fitchburg R. 259; Church v. Mansfield, 20 Conn.
Corp., 4 Gray (Mass.) 465, 64 Am. 284; Lyons v. Martin, 8 A. & E. 512;
Dec. 83; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Sco- Story Ag., § 456. And see 1 Thomp-
ville, 62 Fed. 730; Golden v. New- son Neg. (2d ed.), § 552 and cases
brand, 52 Iowa 59, 35 Am. Rep. cited.
257; Pennsylvania Co. v. Weddle, "* McDonald v. Fanchere, 102
100 Ind. 138; Nelson Bus. Coll. Co. Iowa 496, 71 N. W. 427.
v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 46 L. R. ''''^ Staples v. Schmid, 18 R. I. 224,
A. 314; Maryland Consol. R. Co. v. 19 L. R. A. 824; 1 Thompson Neg.
Pierce, 89 Md. 495, 45 L. R. A. 527; (2d ed.), § 567.
487 PRIXCIPAL AND AGENT. 598
him in obtaining possession of such furniture, such act being within
the course of the transaction of the master's business.^^*' In a case
decided in New York the facts were that the plaintiff went into the
defendant's store and tried on an article of clothing, when he was
accused by defendant's floor-walker as being a spy from a rival store,
and by the direction of such fioor-walker a saleswoman took the gar-
ment from the plaintiff. The court held that an assault was com-
mitted for which the defendant was liable.^^" Where a street-rail-
way conductor wrongfully and maliciously ejects a passenger from a
car for alleged non-payment of fare, the conductor acts within the
course of his employment, and the company is liable for the wanton
and malicious act.^^* The same is true where a trespasser is ejected
with unnecessary force from a railway train by a servant in the em-
ploy of the carrier.^ ^^ A master is generally liable for any trespass
committed by a servant in the scope of the employment,^*'" and the
fact that the act was willful and malicious is no defense.^"^ If the
act was not within the scope of the employment, the master may still
be liable therefor if he knowingly receives a benefit therefrom or
otherwise ratifies or approves of it.-°^
III. Ohligations and Liabilities of Servants.
§ 487. Liability of servant to master for the servant's own wrongs.
—In a previous chapter we discussed the duties and liabilities of the
agent to his principal, and the rights and remedies of the principal
against the agent for their violations. ^''^ Wherever the employe is both
an agent and a servant, the duties under which he rests to the principal
are much the same as those owing by an agent to his principal. ^"^^ It
is only necessary to point out specifically a few of the wrongs for
which the servant may be rendered liable to the master. If he en-
tails a loss upon his master on account of his negligence or willful
misconduct to a third person, he thereby renders himself liable to
indemnify the master for whatever damage the latter has to pay.
^^Levi v. Brooks, 121 Mass. 501.
'" Meehan v. Morewood, 52 Hun
(N. Y.) 566.
"* North Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Gastka, 128 111. 613.
^"^ St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hen-
dricks, 48 Ark. 182, 3 Am. St. 220;
3 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.), § 3304.
^1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.),
§ 560.
="^1 Thompson Neg. (2d ed.),
§ 561.
-"- Dempsey v. Chambers, 154
Mass. 330, 26 Am. St. 249.
'^^ See Chapter vi. ante.
="^a See ante, § 243.
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This liability is not grounded upon the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, although that doctrine applies when it is sought to estal^lish
the master's liability for the wrongful act of the servant for which
the master had to pay damages: the liability of the servant to the
master arises out of his obligation to serve the latter faithfully, and
to exercise care and diligence in the performance of the work un-
dertaken by him; if he fails to fulfill this obligation, he violates his
contract with the master, and becomes liable to him on account of the
breach.^""* It is immaterial whether the injury is inflicted by the
servant directly upon the property of the master, or indirectly by an
injury to the property or person of a stranger, for which the master
must respond in damages: the principle upon which the master can
recover from the servant is the same in either case: in either case
it is, as between the master and the servant, a violation of the duties
'
-"^See Zulkee v. Wing, 20 Wis.
408, 91 Am. Dec. 425, in which
Dixon, C. J., delivering the opinion
of the court, said: "If the injury
is done by a servant in the course
of his employment, it is, in contem-
plation of law, so far the act of the
master, that the latter is civilly re-
sponsible therefor. 'Qui facit per
alium facit per se.' But this max-
im is applicable only as between
the master or principal and third
persons. It presupposes that the
parties stand to each other in the
relation of strangers, between whom
there is no privity; and has no
application as between the master
and his negligent servant, and the
principal and his agent who has so
unskillfully or carelessly conducted
his business as to cause him dam-
age. As between the master and a
stranger, the servant represents the
master, and the master is responsi-
ble; but as between the master and
the servant who has committed the
wrong, or violated his duty no less
to the master than to the stranger,
no such rule prevails. A servant is
directly liable to his master for any
damage occasioned by his negli-
gence or misconduct, whether such
damage be direct to the property
of the master, or arise from the
compensation which the master has
been obliged to make to third per-
sons for injuries sustained by them.
To apply the maxim in such a case
would be an utter perversion of it,
and destructive of all liability on
the part of servants. The serv-
ant in such case represents, not
the master, but himself. It is his
own negligence and misconduct for
which he is required to answer;
and in this respect he stands upon
the same footing as any other
wrongdoer. In the case above
supposed, the master, having paid
the damage caused by the negli-
gence of his servant in running
over a stranger, may sue the serv-
ant for the same act of negligence,
to recover back the money paid. It
would be strange if the servant, in
answer to such an action, could say:
'Respondeat superior. I was your
servant at the time of the injury;
my act was your act, my negligence
your negligence; and therefore you
can not recover.' Such an answer
would be absurd enough."
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the servant has undertaken to perform, resulting in an invasion of the
propertj'-rights of the master. Hence, where a hired servant sued
his master for wages, it was held that the latter could recoup the dam-
ages he had sustained by reason of the servant's seduction of the
master's minor daughter.^"^ The court said in this case: "The
plaintiff seeks to recover the wages on the contract of hiring. The
cases cited show that the seducer broke that contract, and these dam-
ages resulted to the defendant in consequence of the breach. This
gives the defendant the same right to recoup the damages that he
would have had if the servant had intentionally killed the defend-
ant's horse, or burned his dwelling, for in such cases the contract
of hiring would have been broken. The law is now well established
that whenever a party seeeks to recover on a contract which he has
broken, the defendant in the suit has the right to recoup the damages
he has sustained in consequence of the breach." Of course, the mas-
ter is not confined to the remedy of recoupment, but may maintain
an action against the servant for any such breach of his contract, or
violation of duty growing out of the contract. Wliere the baggage-
master of a railroad-train negligently carried a trunk belonging to a
passenger beyond the proper station, and placed it in charge of the
station-agent there, to be sent back by the latter to the station at
which the baggage-master was directed to deliver it, and the trunk
was stolen from the custody of the agent to whom it had been deliv-
ered,—the court held that the baggage-master was liable to the com-
pany for the damages for the loss of the trunk which it had to pay,
and that the company could set off such damages in a suit by such em-
ploye for his wages.^"® And where, by the fault and negligence of a
freight-conductor, one of the cars on his train was run into by an-
other train and the company suffered a loss, it was held that the
damages could be set off to a claim of the conductor for compensa-
tion.-°^ So, an officer of a corporation, whose duty it is to receive its
moneys and pay them over to another officer, is liable to the corpora-
tion for money stolen from him if he was negligent in paying it
Q^.gj. 208 jjj ghort, the servant is responsible to his master for all
damages suffered by tlie latter through the servant's failure to exer-
^"5 Bixby v. Parsons, 49 Conn. 483, ^°^ Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Clinton,
488, 44 Am. Rep. 246. 69 Ala. 392, 31 Am. Rep. 15.
'"" Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Jossey, -"^ Odd Fellows' Mut. Aid Ass'n v.
105 Ga. 271, 31 S. E. 179. James, 63 Cal. 598, 49 Am. Rep. 107.
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cise ordmary care or through want of proper skill, and which are
the proximate results of such negligence.-"^
§ 488. Servant's liability to third persons.—As seen in a pre-
vious place, an agent is generally under no obligations to perform any
affirmative act to any one but his. principal, and is therefore not liable
to a third person for nonfeasance, or for a failure to discharge a
duty which he owes only to such principal.-^" The failure of an
agent to act for his principal, when duty to the latter compels him
to act, may give rise to an action by a third party against the prin-
cipal, who was under obligation to perform such act. The prin-
cipal could certainly not excuse himself by pleading that he had
shifted the obligation to his agent; neither could the third party sue
the agent for such failure, because the latter owes the former no duty
and there is no privity between them. In such a case it might be-
come desirable for the third party to proceed against the agent for
various reasons, chief among which might be the principal's insolvency
and the agent's solvency; but the injured third party has no legal
remedy against the agent, and his only recourse is upon the principal,
the party who by the contract between them owed him the duty.
These principles are equally applicable to masters and servants. jSTo
duty is owing, no* obligation exists, which holds a servant responsible
to a third party for his mere failure to act, however serious the con-
sequences may be to such party. If A enter into a contract with B
in which B agrees to build a house for A within a certain time ; and
B employ C, D and E to work upon such house as carpenters, stone-
cutters, plumbers, etc., and by the failure of C, D and E, or either
of them, the house is not completed within the time, or, in conse-
quence of B's compulsion to employ other servants, the house is poorly
constructed and A is damaged, A must look to B, and to B alone, for
his indemnity.- ^^ But this doctrine can be accepted only with the
qualification that the servant owes the third party no duty ; for if he
does, the mere fact that he is a servant or agent will not excuse him.
And, generally, a servant or agent, because he happens to be such, is
under just as many obligations as any other person so to conduct
«» Shearman & Redf. Neg., § 242. Bristol, etc., R. Co. v. Collins, 7
^"Ante, §§ 300, 312. H. L. Cas. 194; Blackstock v. New
^"That the mere nonfeasance of York, etc., R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48; Carey
a servant will not give a right of v. Rochereau, 16 Fed. 87; Feltus v.
action to a stranger to whom no Swan, 62 Miss. 415; Shearman &
duty was owing by the servant, see Redf. Neg., § 241.
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himself and to use the mstruments in his custody and under his con-
trol as to avoid injury to his neighbors; and if he fails to do this he
is guilty of such misconduct as will render him personally liable to
one who sustains an injury or loss. This is usually denominated "mis-
feasance," and for that and any affirmative malicious or willful and
wrongful act, called "malfeasance,"' he is equally liable. Even mis-
feasance may sometimes consist partly in non-action, as was well de-
cided by the supreme court of Michigan.^^^ Thus, where a servant, who
was hauling wood for his master, and obtained permission of a neigh-
bor to open a gaji in his fence, but with directions to close it up after
he went in and after he came out, left the gap open, and the hogs of
the owner of the field escaped and one was killed and the other in-
jured on a railroad-track, it was held that the leaving down of the
bars was a misfeasance, and that the fact that he was a servant would
not exempt him from liability.^^^ It is sometimes erroneously stated
that a servant can not be held liable to a third party for mere negli-
gence. But negligence is not necessarily nonfeasance; and if it be
misfeasance in any given case, the servant is liable to the injured
party just as he would be if he had been acting for himself instead of
his master. And this is none the less true because the master is also
liable, for the master and servant are, in such cases, joint tort-feasors
;
as where a servant negligently drives his masters team over a
stranger and injures him.^^* A servant is liable jointly with the
principal, or separately, for other torts committed on behalf of his
master; as for a trespass on land;-^^ and for a conversion of the
property of a third party.-^^ The mere keeping of goods, however,
for the master, and refusal to surrender them, is perhaps not sufficient
to create a liability on the jjart of the servant : he must commit some
active wrong, such as converting the property to his own use, or aid-
ing another in doing so;-" but if, after having due notice of the title
^ Ellis v. McNaughton, 76 Mich. ^^^ McNichols v. Nelson, 45 Mo.
237. App. 446; Hazen v. Wight, 87 Me.
^^ Homer v. Lawrence, 37 N. J. L. 233, 32 Atl. 887.
46. =^«Cook v. Monroe, 45 Neb. 349;
-"Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78; Shearer v. Evans, 89 Ind. 400; Por-
Hewitt v. Swift, 3 Allen (Mass.) ter v. Thomas, 23 Ga. 467.
420. See also, Wright v. Compton, -'^ See Nelson v. Iverson, 17 Ala.
53 Ind. 337; Blue v. Briggs, 12 Ind. 216; Mount v. Derick, 5 Hill (N.
App. 105; Hill v. Caverly, 7 N. H. Y.) 455.
215. 26 Am. Dec. 735; Welsh v.
Stewart, 31 Mo. App. 376.
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of a person demanding the propert}', he persists in refusing to de-
liver it, this may amount to a conversion, such as will render him
liable to the party entitled to such property.^^^
§ 489. Servant's liability to fellow servants.—The fact that fel-
low servants do not stand in privity of contract the one to the other
has led some of the text-writers to lay down the doctrine that there
can be no liability of a servant to his coservant for negligence.^^®
This also seems to be the holding of some of the earlier decisions. ^^"
But there is no good reason why a person who occupies to another the
position of a fellow servant, or who is engaged with him in the em-
ployment of a common master, should not be required so to conduct
himself and so use the instruments in his custody as not to injure
such other j)erson, or, in other words, to exercise such reasonable and
ordinar}' care as he is required to exercise toward any other person.
Such fellow servant can not be held to have assumed the risks—as
between him and the other servant—which result from the other's
negligence; and it is now the universally-accepted rule that an em-
ploye or servant is in duty bound to exercise ordinary care in the
performance of the work intrusted to him ; and that for a failure to
do so he is liable to his coemploye or fellow servant for any injury
which the latter may suffer by the former's negligence. ^^^ If the
master himself assumes the position of a workman or superintendent
in the prosecution of the work, he is of course likewise liable for an
injury sustained by another workman or employe through his negli-
gence or tortious conduct.--^
"* Singer Mfg. Co. v. King, 14 R. ney v. Lane, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 150;
I. 511. Griffiths v. Wolfram, 22 Minn. 185;
""Wharton Neg., § 245; Wood Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102
Master & Serv., § 335. (overruling Albro v. Jaquith, su-
^"Southcote V. Stanley, 1 H. & N. pra); Warax v. Cincinnati, etc., R.
247; Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray Co., 72 Fed. 637; Shearman & Redf.
(Mass.) 99, 64 Am. Dec. 56. Neg., § 245; 2 Thompson Neg. (1st
"'Hare v. Mclntire, 82 Maine ed.) 1062.
240, 8 L. R. A. 450; Hinds v. Over- "^Ashworth v. Stanwlx, 3 El. &
acker, 66 Ind. 547, 32 Am. Rep. 114; El. (107 E. C. L.) 701; Leonard v.
Rogers v. Overton, 87 Ind. 410; Ken- Collins, 70 N. Y. 90.

APPENDIX.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS.
I. English Employers' Liability Act.
II. Alabama Employers' Liability Act.
III. Indiana Employers' Liability Act.
IV. Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act.
V. Mississippi Employers' Liability Act.
VI. New York Employers' Liability Act.
ENGLISH EMPLOYEES' LIABILITY ACT.
(43 & U Vict., ch. 42.)
An act to extend and regulate the liability of employers to make
compensation for personal injuries suffered by workmen in their
service. [7th September, 1880.]
Be it enacted by the queen's most excellent majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and com-
mons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority
of the same, as follows
:
1. ^^Tiere, after the commencement of this act, personal injury
is caused to a workman
(1) By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works,
machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the
employer; or
(3) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of
the employer who has any superintendence entrusted to him whilst
in the exercise of such superintendence ; or
(3) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the
employer to whose orders or directions the workman at the time
of the injury was bound to conform, and did conform, where such
injury resulted from his having so conformed ; or
(4) By reason of the act or omission of any person in the service
(G05)
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of the employer done or made in obedience to the rules or by-laws
of the employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by
any person delegated with the authority of the employer in that
behalf; or
( 5 ) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the
employer who has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomo-
tive engine, or train upon a railway, the workman, or in case the
injury results in death, the legal personal representatives of the
workman, and any persons entitled in case of death, shall have the
same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as
if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service of the
employer, nor engaged in his work.
2. A workman shall not be entitled under this act to any right
of compensation or remedy against the employer in any of the follow-
ing cases ; that is to say,
(1) Under sub-section one of section one, unless the defect therein
mentioned arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing
to the negligence of the employer, or of some person in the service
of the employer, and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that
the ways, works, machinery, or plant were in proper condition.
(2) Under sub-section four of section one, unless the injury re-
sulted from some impropriety or defect in the rules, by-laws, or in-
structions therein mentioned; provided that where a rule or by-law
has been approved or has been accepted as a proper rule or by-law
by one of her majestj^'s principal secretaries of state, or by the board
of trade, or any other department of the government, under or by
virtue of any act of parliament, it shall not be deemed for the purposes
of this act to be an improper or defective rule or by-law.
(3) In any case where the workman knew of the defect or negli-
gence which caused his injury, and failed within a reasonable time
to give, or cause to be given, information thereof to the employer or
some person superior to himself in the service of the employer, unless
he was aware that the employer or such superior already knew of
the said defect or negligence.
3. The amount of compensation recoverable under this act shall
not exceed such sum as may be found to be equivalent to the estimated
earnings, during the three years preceding the injur}', of a person
in the same grade employed during those years in the like employment
and in the district in which the workman is employed at the time of
the injury.
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4. An action for the recovery under this act of compensation for
an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice that injury has
been sustained is given within six weeks and the action is commenced
within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the
injur}^ or, in case of death, within twelve months from the time of
death: provided always, that in case of death the want of such notice
shall be no bar to the maintenance of such action if the judge shall be
of opinion that there was reasonable excuse for such want of notice.
5. There shall be deducted from any compensation awarded to
any workman, or representatives of a workman, or persons claiming
by, under, or through a workman in respect of any cause of action
arising under this act, any penalty or part of a penalty which may
have been paid in pursuance of any other act of parliament to such
workman, representatives, or persons in respect of the same cause
of action; and where an action has been brought under this act by
any workman, or the representatives of an}' workman, or any persons
claiming by, under, or through such workman, for compensation in re-
spect of any cause of action arising under this act, and payment has
not previously been made of any penalty or part of a penalty under any
other act of parliament in respect of the same cause of action, such
workman, representatives, or person shall not be entitled thereafter
to receive any penalty or part of a penalty under any other act of
parliament in respect of the same cause of action.
6. (1) Every action for recovery of compensation under this act
shall be brought in a county court, but may, upon the application of
either plaintiff or defendant, be removed into a superior court in like
manner and upon the same conditions as an action commenced in a
county court may by law be removed.
(2) Upon the trial of any such action in a county court before
the judge without a jury one or more assessors may be appointed
for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of compensation.
(3) For the purpose of regulating the conditions and mode of
appointment and remuneration of such assessors, and all matters of
procedure relating to their duties, and also for the purpose of con-
solidating any actions under this act in a county court, and otherwise
preventing multiplicity of such actions, rules and regulations may
be made, varied, and repealed from time to time in the same manner as
rules and regulations for regulating the practice and procedure in
other actions in county courts.
"County court" shall, with respect to Scotland, mean the "sheriff's
court," and shall, with respect to Ireland, mean the "civil bill court."
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In Scotland any action under this act may be removed to the court
of session at the instance of either party, in the manner provided by,
and subject to the conditions prescribed by, section nine of the Sheriff
Courts (Scotland) Act, 1877.
In Scotland the sheriff may conjoin actions arising out of the same
occurrence or cause of action, though at the instance of different par-
ties and in respect of different injuries.
7. Notice in respect of an injury under this act shall give the
name and address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinary
language the cause of the injury and the date at which it was sus-
tained, and shall be served on the employer, or, if there is more than
one employer, upon one of such employers.
The notice may be served by delivering the same to or at the resi-
dence or place of business of the person on whom it is to be served.
The notice may also be served by post by a registered letter' ad-
dressed to the person on whom it is to be served at his last known
place of residence or place of business; and, if served by post, shall
be deemed to have been served at the time when a letter containing
the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post; and, in
proving the service of such notice, it shall be sufficient to prove that
the notice was properly addressed and registered.
Where the employer is a body of persons corporate or unineorporate,
the notice shall be served by delivering the same at or by sending
it by post in a registered letter addressed to the office, or if there be
more than one office, any one of the offices of such body.
A notice under this section shall not be deemed invalid by reason
of any defect or inaccuracy therein unless the judge who tries the
action arising from the injury mentioned in the notice shall be of
opinion that the defendant in the action is prejudiced in his defense
by such defect or inaccuracy, and that the defect or inaccuracy was
for the purpose of misleading.
8. For the purposes of this act, unless the context otherwise re-
quires,
—
The expression "person who has superintendence entrusted to him"
means a person whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence,
and who is not ordinarily engaged in manual labor
:
The expression "employer" includes a body of persons corporate
or unineorporate
:
The expression "workman" means a railway servant and any per-
son to whom the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, applies.
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9. This act shall not come into operation until the first da}" of
January, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, which date is
in this act referred to as the commencement of this act.^
10. This act may be cited as the Employers' Liability Act, 1880,
and shall continue in force till the thirty-first day of December, one
thousand eight hundred and .eighty-seven, and to the end of the then
next session of parliament, and no longer, unless parliament shall
otherwise determine, and all actions commenced under this act before
that period shall he continued as if the said act had not expired.^
II.
ALABAMA EMPLOYEES' LIABILITY ACT.
(Civil Code Ala. 1896, §§ 1749-1751.)
^
1749 (2590). Liability of master or employer to servant or em-
ploye for injuries.—When a personal injury is received by a serv-
ant or employe in the service or business of the master or employer,
the master or employer is liable to answer in damages to such servant
or employe, as if he were a stranger, and not engaged in such service
or employment, in the cases following:
1. ^^^len the injury is caused by reason of any defect in the con-
dition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with, or used
in the business of the master or employer.
2. When the injury is caused by reason of the negligence of any
person in the service or employment of the master or employer, who
has any superintendence intrusted to him, whilst in the exercise of
such superintendence.
3. When such injury is caused by reason of the negligence of any
person in the service or employment of the master or employer, to
whose orders or directions the servant or employe, at the time of
^ This section, 9, is repealed by 57 cap. 58, and has been continued an-
& 58 Vict., cap. 56, Statute Law Re- nually since then by the Expiring
vision Act, 1894. Laws Continuance Act.
' The Employers' Liability Act, ' Found also in Code 1886, §§ 2590-
1880, was continued in force until 2592.
December 31. 1889, by 51 & 52 Vict,
39
—
Principal and Agent.
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the injury, was bound to conform, and did conform, if such injuries
resulted from his liaving so conformed.
4. When such injury is caused by reason of the act or omission
of any person in the service or employment of the master or em-
ployer, done or made in obedience to the rules and regulations or
by-laws of the master or employer, or in obedience to particular
instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the
master or employer in that behalf.
5. WTien such injury is caused by reason of the negligence of any
person in the service or employment of the master or employer, who
has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive, engine,
switch, car, or train upon a railway, or of any part of the track of a
railway.
But the master or employer is not liable under this section, if
the servant or employe knew of the defect or negligence causing
the injury, and failed in a reasonable time to give information
thereof to the master or employer, or to some person superior to him-
self engaged in the service or employment of the master or employer,
unless he was aware that the master or employer, or such superior,
already knew of such defect or negligence ; nor is the master or
employer liable under subdivision one, unless the defect therein
mentioned arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing
to the negligence of the master or employer, or of some person in
the service of the master or employer, and intrusted by him with the
duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery', or plant, were in
proper condition.
1750 (2592). Damages exempt.—Damages recovered by the serv-
ant or employe, of and from the master or employer, are not subject
to the payment of debts, or any legal liabilities incurred by him.
1751 (2591). Personal representative may sue, if injury results
in death.—If such injury results in the death of the servant or
employe, his personal representative is entitled to maintain an action
therefor, and the damages recovered are not subject to the payment
of debts or liabilities, but shall be distributed according to the statute
of distributions.
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III.
INDIAJTA EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
(Burns' Rev. St. Ind. 1901, §§ 7083-7087.)
^
7083. Liability for personal injuries.—1. That every railroad or
other corporation, except municipal, operating in this state, shall be
liable in damages for personal injury suffered by any employe while
in its service, the employe so injured being in the exercise of due
care and diligence, in the following cases:
First. WTien such injury is suffered by reason of any defect in
the condition of ways, works, plant, tools and machinery connected
with or in use in the business of such corporation, when such defect
was the result of negligence on the part of the corporation, or some
person entrusted by it with the duty of keeping such ways, works,
plant, tools or machinery in proper condition.
Second. Where such injury resulted from the negligence of any
person in the service of such corporation, to whose order or direction
the injured employe at the time of the injury was bound to conform,
and did conform.
Third. Where such injury resulted from the act or omission of
any person done or made in obedience to any rule, regulation or by-
law of such corporation, or in obedience to the particular instructions
given by any person delegated with the authority of the corporation
in that behalf.
Fourth. Where such injury was caused by the negligence of any
person in the service of such corporation who has charge of any
signal, telegraph-office, switch-yard, shop, round-house, locomotive-
engine, or train upon a railway, or where such injury was caused by
the negligence of any person, coemploye, or fellow servant engaged
in the same common service in any of the several departments of the
service of any such corporation, the said person, coemploye, or
fellow sen-ant, at the time acting in the place, and performing the
duty of the corporation in that behalf, and the person so injured,
obeying or conforming to the order of some superior at the time of
such injury, having authority to direct; but nothing herein shall be
'Acts Ind. 1893, ch. 130.
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construed to abridge the liabilit)^ of the corporation under existing
laws.
7084. [Repealed by acts 1895, chapter 64, section 1.]
7085. Measure of damages.—3. The damages recoverable under
this act shall be commensurate with the injury sustained unless
death results from such injury, when, in such case, the action shall
survive and be governed in all respects by the law now in force as to
such actions: provided, that where any such person recovers a judg-
ment against a railroad or other corporation, and such corporation
takes an appeal, and, pending such appeal, the injured person dies,
and the judgment rendered in the court below be thereafter reversed,
the right of action of such person shall survive to his legal repre-
sentative.
7086. Laws of other states not a defense. 4. In case any railroad
corporation which owns or operates a line extending into or through
the state of Indiana and into or through another or other states, and
a person in the employ of such corporation, a citizen of this state,
shall be injured as provided in this act, in any other state where
such railroad is owned or operated, and a suit for such injury shall
be brought in any of the courts of this state, it shall not be competent
for such corporation to plead or prove the decisions or statutes of
the state where such person shall have been injured as a defense to
the action brought in this state.
7087. Contracts of release void.—5. All contracts made by rail-
roads or other corporations with their employes, or rules or regula-
tions adopted by any corporation releasing or relieving it from lia-
bility to any employe having a right of action under the provisions
of this act are hereby declared null and void. The provisions of this
act, however, shall not apply to any injuries sustained before it takes
effect, nor shall it affect in any manner any suit or legal proceedings
pending at the time it takes effect.
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IV.
MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
(Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 106, §§ 71-79.)
If personal injury is caused to an employe, who, at the time of
the injury, is in the exercise of due care, by reason of
:
Section 71. First, a defect in the condition of the ways, works
or machinery connected with or used in the business of the employer,
which arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied in conse-
quence of, the negligence of the employer or of a person in his serv-
ice who had been intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the
ways, works or machinery were in proper condition ; or,
Second, the negligence of a person in the service of the employer
who was intrusted with and was exercising superintendence and
whose sole or principal duty was that of superintendence, or, in ab-
sence of such superintendent, of a person acting as superintendent
with the authority or consent of such employer; or,
Third, the negligence of a person in the service of the employer
who was in charge or control of a signal, switch, locomotive-engine
or train upon a railroad; the employer, or his legal representatives,
shall, subject to the provisions of the eight following sections, have
the same rights to compensation and of action against the employer
as if he had not been an employe, nor in the service, nor engaged in
the work, of the employer,
A car which is in use by, or which is in possession of, a railroad
corporation shall be considered as a part of the ways, works or
machinery of the corporation which uses or has it in possession, within
the meaning of clause one of this section, whether it is owned by
such corporation or by some other company or person. One or more
ears which are in motion, whether attached to an engine or not, shall
constitute a train within the meaning of clause three of this section,
and whoever, as a part of his duty for the time being, physically con-
trols or directs the movements of a signal, switch, locomotive-engine
or train shall be deemed to be a person in charge or control of a signal,
switch, locomotive-engine or train within the meaning of said clause.
Section 72. If the injury described in the preceding section re-
sults in the death of the employe, and such death is not instantaneous
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or is preceded by conscious suffering, and if there is an_y person who
would have been entitled to bring an action under the provisions of
the following section, the legal representatives of said employe may,
in the action brought under tlie provisions of the preceding section,
recover damages for the death in addition to those for the injury.
Sectiox 73. If, as a result of the negligence of an employer him-
self, or of a person for whose negligence an employer is liable under
the provisions of section seventy-one, an employe is instantly killed,
or dies without conscious suffering, his widow or, if he leaves no
widow, his next of kin, who, at the time of his death, were dependent
upon his wages for support, shall have a right of action for damages
against the employer.
Sectiox 7-1. If, under the provisions of either of the two preced-
ing sections, damages are awarded for the death, they shall be assessed
with reference to the degree of culpability of the employer or of the
person for whose negligence the employer is liable. The amount of
damages which may be awarded in an action under the provisions of
section seventy-one for a personal injury to an employe, in which no
damages for his death are awarded under the provisions of section
seventy-two, shall not exceed four thousand dollars. The amount of
damages which may be awarded in such action, if damages for his
death are awarded under the provisions of section seventy-two, shall
not exceed five thousand dollars for both the injury and the death,
and shall be apportioned by the jury between the legal representatives
of the employe and the persons who would have been entitled, under
the provisions of section seventy-three, to bring an action for his
death if it had been instantaneous or without conscious suffering.
The amount of damages which may be awarded in an action brought
under the provisions of section seventy-three shall not be less than
five hundred nor more than five thousand' dollars.
Sectiox 75. No action for the recovery of damages for injury or
death under the provisions of sections seventy-one to seventy-four,
inclusive, shall be maintained unless notice of the time, place and
cause of the injury is given to the employer within sixty days, and
the action is commenced within one year after the action which
causes the injury or death. Such notice shall be in writing, signed
by the person injured or by a person in his behalf; but if from
physical or mental incapacity it is impossible for the person Injured
to give the notice within the time provided in this section, he may give
it within ten days after such incapacity has been removed, and if he
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dies without having given the notice and without having been for
ten days at an}^ time after his injury of sufficient capacity to give it,
his executor or administrator may give such notice within sixty days
after his appointment. A notice given under the provisions of this
section shall not be held invalid or insufficient solely by reason of
an inaccuracy in stating the time, place or cause of the injury, if
it is shown that there was no intention to mislead, and that the
employer was not in fact misled thereby. The provisions of section
twenty-two of chapter fifty-one shall apply to notices under the
provisions of this section.
Section 76. If an employer enters into a contract, written or
verbal, with an independent contractor to do part of such employer's
work, or if such contractor enters into a contract with a subcon-
tractor to do all or any part of the work comprised in such contractor's
contract with the employer, such contract or subcontract shall not
bar the liability of the employer for injuries to the employes of
such contractor or subcontractor, caused by any defect in the condition
of the ways, works, machinery or plant, if they are the property
of the employer or are furnished by him and if such defect arose,
or had not been discovered or remedied, through the negligence of
the employer or of some person intrusted by him with the duty of
seeing that they were in proper condition.
Section 77. An emj^loye or his legal representatives shall not
be entitled under the provisions of sections seventy-one to seventy-
four, inclusive, to any right of action for damages against his
employer if such employe knew of the defect or negligence which
caused the injury, and failed within a reasonable time to give, or
cause to be given, information thereof to the employer, or to some
person superior to himself in the service of the employer who was
intrusted with general superintendence.
Section 78. An employer who shall have contributed to an in-
surance fund created and maintained for the mutual purpose of
indemnifying an employe for personal injuries for which compensa-
tion may be recovered under the provisions of sections seventy-one
to seventy-four, inclusive, or to any relief society formed under the
provisions of sections seventeen, eighteen and nineteen of chapter
one hundred and twenty-five, may prove in mitigation of the dam-
ages recoverable by an employe under the provisions of said sections,
such proportion of the pecuniary ])enefit which has been received
by such employe from any such fund or society on account of such
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contribution of said employer, as the contribution of such employer
to such fund or society bears to the whole contribution thereto.
Sectiox 79. The provisions of the eight preceding sections shall
not apply to injuries caused to domestic servants or farm laborers
by fellow employes.
V.
MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
(Acts Spec. Sess. 1898, ch. 66.)
FELLOW-SEKVANT RULE.
Section 1. Every employe of any corporation shall have the same
rights and remedies for an injury suffered by him from the act or
omission of the corporation or its employes, as are allowed by [law
to] other persons not employes where the injury results from
the negligence of a superior agent or officer, or of a person having
the right to control or direct the services of the party injured ; and
also when the injury results from the negligence of a fellow servant
engaged in another department of labor from that of the party
injured, or of a fellow servant on another train of cars, or one
engaged about a different piece of work. Knowledge by an employe
injured of the defective or unsafe character or condition of any ma-
chinery, ways, or appliances, or of the improper loading of cars,
shall not be a defense to an action for injury caused thereby, except
as to conductors or engineers in charge of dangerous or unsafe cars
or engines voluntarily operated by them.
When death ensues from an injury to an employe an action may
be brought in the name of the widow of such employe for the death
of the husband, or by the husband for the death of his wife, or by
the parent for the death of a child, or in the name of the child for the
death of an only parent, for such damages as may be suffered by them
respectively by reason of such death, the damages to be for the use
of such widow, husband or child, except that in case the widow should
have children the damages shall be distributed as personal property
of the husband. The legal or personal representative of the person
injured shall have the same rights and remedies as are allowed by
law to such representatives of other persons. In every such action
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the jury may give such damages as shall be fair and just with
reference to the injury resulting from such death to the persons
suing. Any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by an
employe to waive the benefit of this section shall be null and void;
and this section shall not deprive an employe of a corporation or his
legal [or] personal representative of any right or remedy that he
now has by law.
VI.
NEW YORK EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
(Laws 1902, ch. 600.)
Sec. 1. Where, after this act takes effect, personal injury is caused
to an employe who is himself in the exercise of due care and diligence
at the time
:
1. By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works
or machinery connected with or used in the business of the employer
which arose from or had not been discovered or remedied owing
to the negligence of the employer or of any person in the service
of the employer and intrusted by him with the duty of seeing
that the ways, works or machinery were in proper condition
;
2. By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the
employer intrusted with and exercising superintendence whose sole
or principal duty is that of superintendence, or in the absence of
such superintendent, of any person acting as superintendent with
the authority or consent of such employer
;
3. The employe, or in case the injury results in death, the executor
or administrator of a deceased employe who has left him surviving
a husband, wife or next of kin, shall have the same right of com-
pensation and remedies against the employer as if the employe had
not been an employe of nor in the service of the employer nor engaged
in his work. The provisions of law relating to actions for causing
death by negligence, so far as the same are consistent with this act,
shall apply to an action brought by an executor or administrator
of a deceased employe suing under the provisions of this act.
Sec. 2. No action for recover}^ of compensation for injury or
death under this act shall be maintained unless notice of the time,
place, and cause of the injury is given to the employer within one
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hundred and twenty days and the action is commenced within one
year after the occurrence of the accident causing the injury or death.
The notice required by this section shall be in writing and signed
by the person injured or by some one in his behalf, but if from
physical or mental incapacity it is impossible for the person injured
to give notice within the time provided in said section, he may give
the same within ten days after such incapacity is removed. In case
of his death without having given siich notice, his executor or adminis-
trator may give such notice within sixty days after his appointment,
but no notice under the provisions of this section shall be deemed
to be invalid or insufficient solely by reason of any inaccuracy in
stating the time, place or cause of the injury if it be shown that there
was no intention to mislead and that the party entitled to notice
was not in fact misled thereby. The notice required by this section
shall be served on the employer, or if there is more than one em-
ployer, upon one of such employers, and may be served by delivering
the same to or at the residence or place of business of the person
on whom it is to be served. The notice may be served by post, by
letter addressed to the person on whom it is to be served, at his last
known place of residence or place of business, and if served by post
shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter con-
taining the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of the
post. When the employer is a corporation, notice shall be served
by delivering the same or by sending it by post addressed to the
office or principal place of business of such corporation.
Sec. 3. An employe, by entering upon or continuing in the service
of the employer, shall be presumed to have assented to the neces-
sary risks of the occupation or employment and no others. The
necessary risks of the occupation or employment shall, in all cases
arising after this act take effect, be considered as including those
risks, and those only, inherent in the nature of the business which
remain after the emplo3'er has exercised due care in providing for
the safety of his employes, and has complied with the laws affecting
or regulating such business or occupation for the greater safety of
such employes. In an action maintained for the recovery of dam-
ages for personal injuries to an employe received after this act takes
effect, owing to any cause for which the employer would otherwise
be liable, the fact that the employe continued in the service of the
employer in the same place and course of employment after the
discovery by such emploj-e, or after he had been informed of, the
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danger of personal injury therefrom, shall not, as a matter of law,
be considered as an assent by such employe to the existence or con-
tinuance of such risks of personal injury therefrom, or as negligence
contributing to such injur}^ The question whether the employe
understood and assumed the risk of such injury, or was guilty of
^contributory negligence, by his continuance in the same place and
course of employment with knowledge of the risk of injury shall
be one of fact, subject to the usual powers of the court in a proper
case to set aside a verdict rendered contrary to the evidence. An em-
'ploje, or his legal representative, shall not be entitled under this
act to any right of compensation or remedy against the employer
in any case where such employe knew of the defect or negligence
which caused the injury and failed, within a reasonable time, to give
or cause to be given, information thereof to the employer, or to some
person superior to himself in the service of the employer who had
intrusted to him some general superintendence, unless it shall appear
on the trial that such defect or negligence was known to such em-
plo3'er, or superior person, prior to such injuries to the employe.
Sec. 4. An employer who shall have contributed to an insurance
fund created and maintained for the mutual purpose of indemnify-
ing an emploj'e for personal injuries, for which compensation may
be recovered under this act, or to any relief society or benefit fund
created under the laws of this state, may prove in mitigation of
damages recoverable by an employe under this act such proportion
of the pecuniary benefit which has been received by such employe
from such fund or society on account of such contribution of em-
ployer, as the contriljution of such employer to such fund or society
bears to the whole contribution thereto.
Sec. 5. Every existing right of action for negligence or to re-
cover damages for injuries resulting in death is continued, and noth-
ing in this act contained shall be construed as limiting any such right
of action, nor shall the failure to give the notice provided for in
section two of this act be a bar to the maintenance of a suit upon
any such existing right of action.
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ACCOUNT,
consequences of agent's failure to render, 249.
duty of agent to keep and render, 245.
need account only to principal, 246.
ADMISSION TO THE BAR,
See Attorneys at Law.
ADMISSIONS,
See Declarations and Admissioxs of Agent.
ADVERSE INTEREST,
agent must not acquire, 239, 241, 244.
person having, is incompetent as agent, 54.
when principal not bound by acts of agent having, 327.
ADVOCATE,
See Attorney at Law.
AGENCY,
aim and design of, 5.
analogy to relation of master and servant, 15.
compulsory, of wife, for husband, 84.
constituent elements of, 10.
creation of, 9.
by appointment, 55-82.
by implication of law, 83-89, 284.
by estoppel, 89a-95.
by ratification, 96-155.
definition of, 6, 14.
forms of contract of, 57.
founded on maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se, 2.
and on maxim Respondeat superior. 3.
general, special, and universal, 18, 19, 192, 325.
gratuitous, see Gratuitous Agency.
how created and proved, 55-155.
illegal, see Illegal Agency.
illegality of subject-matter, effect of. on contract of, 66, 82.
implied, of master of ship, 87.
implied, of vendor, when vendee of goods fails to accept them, 89.
(621)
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AGENCY—Continued.
importance of the law of, 1.
in supplying medical and surgical aid to injured employes, 85,
86, 478.
is generally based upon contract, 14.
nature of the relation of, 8.
purpose of the relation of, 7.
termination of, see Termination of Agency.
universal, 19.
voluntary, 64.
AGENT,
abandonment by, is renunciation, 165.
admissions of, when principal bound by, 350-353.
alien enemy as, 53.
appointment of, 55.
auctioneer as, see Auctions.
authority of, see Authority.
authority of, to employ physician or surgeon to treat injured fellow
servant, 85, 86, 284, 478.
bank officer as, see Bank Officers.
bankruptcy of, when it revokes power, 178.
breaking out of war, effect on authority of, 179.
broker as, see Brokers.
can not plead illegality of agency, when, 247.
classification of,
general and special, 18, 192, 325.
other, 20.
universal, 19.
competency of, see Competency.
corporation as, see Corporations.
death of, generally terminates relation, 171.
except where authority is coupled with interest, li'l.
definition of, 12.
discharge of private, from liability, after ratification, 155.
discharge of public, from liability, after ratification, 150.
distinction between general and special, 192, 325.
duty of, to principal, see Duty of Agent to Principal.
duty of, to third persons, see Duty of Agent to Third Persons.
duty to, of third persons, see Duty of Third Persons to Agent.
execution of written instruments by, 205-224.
factor as, see Factors.
fraud of, liability of principal for, 343.
husband as, for wife, 50.
implied powers of, 189, 192, 203, 204.
in pari delicto, can not be compelled to account. 68.
in what matters, must keep principal advised, 244.
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AGENT
—
Continued.
infant as, 47.
insanity of, generally ends relation, 174, 175.
notice to third persons when insanity not apparent, 175.
judicial declaration of lunacy is sufficient notice, 175.
Insanity of joint, revokes relation, 176.
insurance, see Insurance Agents.
interest of, in subject-matter of agency, generally sufficient to pre-
vent dissolution, 183.
illustrations of insufficiency of such interest, 182.
keeping and rendering of accounts, 245.
liability for not, 249.
liability of, for failing to keep principal's property separate, 250.
liability of, to third persons, see Liability of Agent to Third
Persons.
married woman as, 49.
may terminate agency at will, 164, 165.
misconduct of, gives principal right to discharge, 162.
must act in name of principal in order to convey latter's land, 224.
must not have interest adverse to principal, 239.
must use apt words to bind principal, 208.
notice to, when principal bound by, 354-359.
of corporations, when presumed to be acting for principal though
not so stating, 221.
partnership as, see Partners.
person of unsound mind as, 48.
person having adverse interest as, see Adverse Interests.
private, owes duty to principal only, 300.
not liable to third party for nonfeasance, 300.
private and public distinguished, 299.
public, see Public Agent or Officer.
renunciation of agency by, 164.
severance of relation by joint agents, 172.
threatening to abandon employment, result of, 165.
willful wrong of, principal liable for, 341.
ALABAMA,
employers' liability act. Appendix II.
ALIEN ENEMIES,
as agents, 53.
as principals, 44.
AMBIGUITY,
in instructions to agent, 238.
In written authority, how solved, 199, 202.
in written contracts made by agent for principal, how to avoid, 206.
interpretation and construction of agent's authority, 195, 198, 221.
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APPEALS,
in contempt cases, 414.
APPOINTMENT,
elements of, 56.
forms of contract of, 55-57.
intention as element of, 56.
of agent, by implication, 83-89.
of agent, how may be made, 55.
ASSENT,
is generally an essential element in agency, 83.
may be shown by proof of ratification, 96.
not necessary in agency created by implication of law, 96.
ATTORNEY,
general meaning of term, 23.
See Attorneys at Law.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
classes of—advocates, counselors, barristers, solicitors, proctors, 23.
definition and functions, 23.
distinguished from attorneys in fact, 23.
qualification and admission to practice,
admission to bar a privilege, not a right, 395.
admission generally a judicial function. 395.
admission in one state does not give right to practice elsewhere,
402, 404.
reason for this rule, 404, note,
qualification as to,
age, 399.
citizenship, 402.
dueling a bar to, 395.
educational qualifications,
diplomas, 397.
examination, 397.
graduation from law school, 396.
in Indiana, 396. /
in other states, 397, note.
requirement to serve clerkship, 403.
general statement as to, 395.
justice of the peace, admission of unlicensed attorney by, 407.
legislative control of, 395, 396, 397.
license to practice, 407.
mandamus to compel admission, 405.
moral character, 398.
non-resident attorneys, 402, 404.
oath of office, 406.
race, 402.
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ATTORNEYS AT L.AVi—Continued.
residence, 402.
women,
cases holding them ineligible under the common law, 400.
cases holding them eligible under the common law, 401.
enabling statutes, 401.
relation to the client,
contract of employment,
is one of agency, 23.
retainer, 415.
right to appear, questioning of, 416.
duties of attorney to client,
exercise of skill, care, etc., 419, 420.
fidelity, 418.
negligence, liability for, 419, 420.
not to represent conflicting interests, 418.
obedience to instructions, 421.
to account and pay over, 422.
obligations of client,
bound by act of attorney, how far, 417.
compensation, 423, 425.
attorney's bill, taxation of costs, 424.
attorney's lien, 426.
implied promise of, 266.
relation to the court,
as an officer of the court, 23, 408.
contempts,
classes of, 414.
penalties for, 414.
practice in. 414.
when and how proceedings reviewable, 414.
court's summary jurisdiction over attorneys, 409.
disbarment,
authority for, in whom vested, 409.
contempt of court not necessary for, 410.
contempt of court may or may not warrant, 410.
offenses punishable by, 409, 410.
disbarment proceedings,
defenses, 412.
practice in, 411.
review of, 413.
restoration to practice, mandamus to compel, 405.
ATTORNEYS IN FACT,
agents acting under a power of attorney are, 23.
all agents may be regarded as, 23.
40
—
Principal and Agent.
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AUCTIONS,
agreements to stifle competition not allowable, 428.
auctioneer,
authority of, 426a.
compensation of, 434.
definition, 24.
distinguished from broker, 24.
duty of,
not to be a bidder, 428.
to purchaser, 427, 432.
to third parties, 433.
to vendor, 427, 431.
fraud on the part of, 428.
in absence of statute, any one may be, 24.
is agent for both buyer and seller, 24.
license-tax may be required of, 24.
must not buy, 24.
must not sell at private sale, 24.
vendor's duties and liabilities to, 434.
by-bidding not allowable, 428.
conduct of the sale, 428.
definition, 24.
memorandum of sale, 427.
nature of contract of sale—are separately accepted bids separate
sales? 429.
purchaser,
duties and liabilities of auctioneer to, 432.
rights and liabilities of, 430.
resale when bidder has not made good his bid, 428.
statute of frauds, application to auctions, 427.
third parties, rights of, 433.
vendor,
acting as his own auctioneer, 428.
duties and liabilities of auctioneer to, 431.
rights and liabilities as to auctioneer, 434.
rights and liabilities as to purchaser, 430.
sale to the vendor himself, 428.
when title to property sold at auction passes, 430.
withdrawal of bids, 430.
AUTHORITY,
ambiguity in contracts made by agents, 199.
apparent and incidental, principal bound by, 192.
by parol, to fill blanks, when valid, 60.
collateral writings, when may enter into construction of, 201.
construction of. when in writing, 197, 198.
construed by intention of parties, 196, 200, 209.
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AUTHORITY—Continued.
coupled with interest,
death of agent having, 171.
not revocable, when, 159, 170, 171.
what is and what is not—illustrative cases as to, 181-183.
delegation of, see Delegated Authority.
determination of, is by court, 195.
execution of, by agent,
as acceptor—construction of indorsements, 221.
in making contracts with third persons,
agent's personal liability on contract made for principal, 21.
apt words required "to bind principal—mere descriptive
words not sufficient, 208.
verbal contracts, 206.
written contracts, 207.
construction of, 209.
intention of, 209.
in executing negotiable instruments, construction of, 210, 212.
as between original parties, 219.
extrinsic evidence to explain, conflicting decisions, 213.
from recitals and signatures alone, 214.
from recitals, signatures, headings and marginal notes, 215.
parol evidence, admission of, 216.
parol evidence, exclusion of, 217.
principal liable in equity, cases holding, 218.
summary of doctrine as to, 220.
when in hands of innocent transferees, 219.
in executing sealed instruments,
how executed to bind principal, 224.
results of defective execution, 225.
tendency to relax strict rules as to, 226.
statutes modifying common law rules, 226.
filling of blanks in written instruments,
innocent transferees of negotiable paper, how protected by
agent's act in, 59.
parol authority for, when valid, 59, 60.
presumption of authority for, 58, 59.
not extended to alterations not needed to make instrument
complete, 58.
how affected by usage, 193, 194.
how conferred, 9, 10.
how far third person may rely on usage as to agent's, 325.
implied, of agent generally, 189-204.
implied, of auctioneer to pay duty on goods, 204.
interpretation and construction of, 195.
how distinguished, 202.
may be general as to third parties but special as to principal, 18.
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AUTHORITY—Contimied.
no liability of principal unless agent acted witnin real or apparent
scope of, 93.
of auctioneers, 426a.
,
ratification of, see Ratification.
revocation or renunciation of, see Termination of Agency.
scope of, 17, 19, 93.
special and general, 192.
summary of, which agents may exercise, 194.
to appoint subagents, when and from what inferred, 191.
to banks to collect money, what implied in, 189, 190.
to collecting agencies, to collect money, 190.
undisclosed principal, when bound
—
parol evidence to hold liable,
223.
when express, always governs, 190.
written, how construed, 197, 198.
written or oral, what it carries with it, 203.
B
BAILMENTS,
definition and classification of, 232.
gratuitous bailee, liability of to bailor, 232.
BANK OFFICERS,
cashier as agent of bank,
duties of, 25, 435.
instruments payable to, principal may sue on, 367.
rule of descriptio personarurn generally not applicable to, 222.
who is, 25.
directors as agents of bank,
duties and liabilities of, 232, 233, 436.
liability of bank for acts of, 440.
liability of third persons to bank on contracts made with, 441.
president as agent of bank, 437.
tellers as agents of bank, 439.
BANKRUPTCY,
of agent, may terminate agency, 178.
of principal, terminates agency, 177.
BARRISTERS,
See Attorneys at Law.
BILL AND NOTE BROKERS, 21.
BLANKS,
authority of agent to fill, in written instruments, 58-61.
filling, in sealed instruments, 60.
filling without authority, 61.
INDEX. 629
IReferences are to Sections.]
BLANKS
—
Continued.
how authority to fill may be conferred, 61.
ratification of agent's act of filling, 61.
what authority implied from leaving, 59.
what are "blanks," 61.
BRIBERY,
of oflScers, contract for void, 79,
BROKER,
authority, 442.
bought and sold notes, 447.
distinguished from auctioneer, 24.
double dealing of, 244.
duties of principal to, 444.
liability of, for torts, 448.
may, by custom or usage, delegate authority to buy stock, 193.
must not sell at auction, 24.
not entitled to compensation when employment is illegal, 263.
obligations of, to principal, 443.
principal's liability for torts, 448.
principal's liability to third parties, 446.
remedies against principal, 445.
various classes of, 21.
who is, 21.
C
CARE AND DILIGENCE,
degree of, required of gratuitous agents, 232, 233.
degrees of, required of various agents, 243.
duty of agent to exercise, 243, 264.
CARGO,
controlled completely by the supercargo, 26.
pledging of, by ship's master, 28.
ship's master's lien on, 28.
CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE,
attorney's fees, when champertous, 256.
common-law doctrine of, 258.
its harshness criticised, 259.
tendency of modern decisions more liberal, 260.
compensation of attorney measured by amount of recovery not
necessarily champertous, 257.
definitions of, 256.
division of spoils the offensive ingredient, 257.
recovery on quantum meruit, 261.
See Compensation of Agent.
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COLLATERAL WRITINGS,
considered in construing written authority, 201.
COLLECTING AGENCIES,
implied power of to delegate authority, 190.
COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS, 463.
distinguished from pedlers and hawkers, 462.
sales of goods by—statute of frauds, 465.
COMMINGLING OF FUNDS OR PROPERTY,
by agent with that of principal, 250.
COMMISSION MERCHANTS,
See Factors.
COMMISSIONS,
what, agents entitled to, 265. f
what are, 265.
See CoiiPEXSATiox of Agent.
COMPENSATION OP AGENT, 252-285.
among members of common family, 268. '
ceases after death or insanity of principal, 273.
exceptions to the rule, 273.
champertous, see Champerty and Maintenance.
classification of, 253.
commissions, 265.
compensation of subagents, 283.
contingent, see Contingent Compensation.
constructive services, doctrine of, 270.
modern rule on subject, 271.
implied contract or promise to pay, 62-64, 266.
in case of death, insanity, sickness, etc., of agent, 273, 274.
lien of agent for, 284.
none for useless services, when, 264.
none in illegal agencies, 263.
none where agency is gratuitous, 267.
of lawyers and others in learned professions, 253.
quantum meruit, 254, 264, 266.
reasonableness of, question of fact, 253, 254.
remedies of agent for, 269-278.
renunciation of employment by agent, 275.
entirety or divisibility of contract of employment, 276, 278.
equity rule in case of, 276, 277.
when without cause, 276.
unauthorized agent whose acts are subsequently ratified entitled
to, 285.
except as rights of third parties are affected, 285.
when agency has been revoked, 269.
duty of agent to seek other employment, 272.
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COMPENSATION OF AGENT—Continued.
when forfeited by agent, 264.
when special contract governs, 254.
COMPETENCY OF PARTIES, 30,54.
CONDITION PRECEDENT,
See CoNTixGENT Compensation.
CONSIDERATION,
for appointment of agent, 62.
CONSIGNEES,
See Factoes.
CONSTRUCTION,
See Interpretation and Construction.
CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICES AS TO WAGES,
doctrine of stated, 270.
modern rule as to, 271.
See Compensation of Agent.
CONTEMPT OF COURT,
by attorneys, see Attorneys at Law.
CONTINGENT COMPENSATION,
can not be collected till contingency has happened, 255, 262.
contracts for, generally upheld in this country, 255.
but can not be collected in some jurisdictions, 260.
English rule making contingent compensation void for champerty
or maintenance, 255.
fulfillment of condition precedent, when necessary to recovery, 262.
recovery on quantum meruit, 261, 262.
See Champerty and Maintenance.
CONTRACT,
against public policy, see Illegal Agency.
agency generally based upon, 14.
consideration in contract of agency, 62.
effect of illegality on, 65-82.
execution of, by agent for principal, 205-278.
* for compensation, 253-278.
for compensation, whether entire or divisible, 276, 278.
for contingent compensation generally upheld in this country,
255, 260.
for contingent compensation, when void, 255.
for marriage brokage, 80.
hindering public justice, void, 78.
immoral, not enforceable, 67, 77.
implied, for compensation of agent, 62, 64, 266.
lobbying, void, 70.
actual fraud need not be shown—evil tendency suflScient, 72.
rendered void by federal statutes, 71.
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CONTRACT—Continued.
of agency, defendant may plead illegality of, 81.
defense of illegality can not be waived, 82.
of agency, forms of, 57.
by sealed instrument, 57.
by correspondence, 57.
by parol, 57.
of agency, involves acceptance by agent, 55.
of agency, may be express or implied, 55.
of agency terminated, when, see Tebmixatiox of Agency.
of appointment of agent, 55-82.
giiasi-coTitract—fiction of, 83.
to bribe officers, servants or agents, 79.
to collect claims against government, 75.
to divide attorney's fees, when void, 74.
to locate public buildings, etc., 75.
to procure false testimony, void, 78.
to procure office, etc., when void, 73.
to procure pardons, 76.
to procure true testimony, valid, 78.
CONTRACTOR.
distinguished from servant and agent, 467.
CORPORATIONS,
acts of, restricted by charter, 103.
agent of, presumed to be acting for principal, though not so stat-
ing, 221.
as agents, 51.
as principals, 41.
incidental powers of, 103.
liable for torts of its agents within course of employment, 342.
promoters of, 105.
ratification by, of unauthorized acts of agent by retaining benefits,
126, 127.
ratification of unauthorized acts by shareholders of, 102, 124.
rule of clescriptio personarum. when not applicable to contracts
made by agent of, 221.
ultra vires acts,
liability for, 342.
ratification of, 102.
CORRUPT ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS,
See Illegal Agency.
COUNSELORS,
See Attorxeys at Law.
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT,
See Scope of Authority.
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COURT,
jurisdiction of, over attorneys, 408, 409.
CRIMES,
principal's liability for agent's, 361, 362.
CUSTOM AND USAGE,
enters into terms and construction of agent's authority, when, 193.
how established, 194.
may influence measure of agent's compensation, 264.
D
DAMAGES,
need not be shown, to create resulting trust in favor of principal,
240.
DEATH,
of principal or agent, see Termination of Agency.
DECLARATIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF AGENT OR SERVANT,
must be of res gestae to be competent against principal, 350-352.
not received until after proof of agency, 353.
when will bind principal or master, 350-353.
DEL CREDERE COMMISSION,
definition, 22.
liability of factor for selling under, 22.
DELEGATED AUTHORITY,
can not be redelegated, 187.
exception to the rule, 188.
implied from what, 189.
when invalid, 186.
DEMAND,
when not necessary before suit for commission, 387.
DESCRIPTIO PERSONARUM,
mere descriptive words after agent's signature do not make contract
binding on principal, 208, 364.
DISBARMENT,
See Attorneys at Law\
DISSOLUTION OF AGENCY,
See Termination of Agency.
DRUMMERS,
See Commercial Travelers.
DRUNKENNESS,
effect of, on competency of party, 40.
ratification of contract made during, 40.
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DUTY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL,
in general, 228-251.
not to have interest adverse to principal, 239.
to act in principal's name, 224, 234.
to act within scope of authority, 236.
to advise principal, 244.
to enter on performance of trust, 229.
to exercise care and diligence, 243.
to keep and render account, 245.
to keep principal's property separate, 250.
to obey instructions, 236.
to observe good faith, 239.
to possess and exercise skill, 242.
to seek other employment when seeking to hold principal liable
for wrongful discharge, 272.
usually, to act in person, 235.
E
EMERGENCY,
physician or surgeon rendering services in case of, to injured
servant, 284.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS,
Alabama, Appendix II.
England, Appendix I.
Indiana, Appendix III.
Massachusetts, Appendix IV.
Mississippi, Appendix V.
New York, Appendix VI.
ENGLAND,
employers' liability act. Appendix I.
EQUITY,
rule in, as to compensation of agent, 277.
ESTOPPEL,
agency established by, 89a-95.
burden of proof in case of, 95.
by silence, 91.
definition of, 89a.
illustration of, 91.
may arise from external indicia of property, 94.
ratification of deed by, 118.
third party must exercise prudence and care, 92.
to deny forged instrument, 101.
EXCHANGE BROKERS,
definition, 21.
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EXECUTION OF AUTHORITY,
how effected by agent, in written contract made for principal,
205-208.
'*
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR,
agent's relation and liability to, 251.
F
FACTORS,
authority—how conferred and exercised, 450.
definition, 22, 449.
del credere factors, 22, 456.
factors' acts, 449.
factors' rights as to third parties, 453.
obligations to principal, 451.
principal's obligations to, 452.
principal's rights as to third parties, 454.
supercargoes are a variety of, 26.
third parties' rights as to factor and principal, 455.
FALSE TESTIMONY,
contracts to procure, void as hindering public justice, 78.
FATHER,
liability of, for necessaries for children by doctrine of implied
agency, 88.
FEDERAL STATUTES,
against certain illegal agencies, 71.
FELLOW SERVANTS,
See Master and Servant.
FEME SOLE AS PRINCIPAL,
marriage of, at common law, terminates agency, 180.
FIDELITY,
duty of agent to observe, 239, 244.
want of, on part of agent, is fraud upon principal, 241.
FIDUCIARIES,
agent's relation and liability to, 251.
FOREIGN PRINCIPAL,
liability of agent of—former and modern rules, 319.
FOREIGN WORDS,
See Interpretation and Construction.
FORGED INSTRUMENT,
estoppel to deny execution of, 101.
whether capable of ratification, 100.
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FRAUD,
of agent, when renders act illegal, 72.
of third party, in collusion with agent, avoids contract at princi-
pal's option, 392.
want of good faith by agent amounts to, 241.
when principal liable for agent's, 343-347.
whether act must be for principal's benefit, 344-346.
"FUTURES,"
dealings in, are illegal, 68.
G
GENERAL AGENT,
See Agent.
GOOD FAITH OP AGENT,
See Fidelity.
GRATUITOUS AGENCY OR SERVICE,
for what gratuitous agent is liable to principal, 231-233.
generally not enforceable, 63, 64, 231.
but agent liable for negligence if he enters on performance
of, 231, 232.
no compensation in, 267, 268.
persons who are related, 268.
what determines existence of, 267.
by members of common family, 268.
GROSS NEGLIGENCE,
use of term, not approved, 232.
GUARDIAN,
relation and liability of, to ward, 251.
H
HABEAS CORPUS,
in contempt cases, 414.
HAZARDOUS EMPLOYMENT,
injury to servant in, liability of principal for treatment by physi-
cian or surgeon rendered at request of superior agent, 284.
HOLDING OUT AS AGENT,
may create estoppel to deny agency, 90.
what amounts to, 90.
HONORARIUM,
for members of learned professions, 253.
HUSBAND,
as agent of wife, 50.
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IDENTITY OP PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
fiction of, the basis of principal's liability for acts of agent, 335.
IDIOTS,
as agents, 48.
as principals, 38-40.
ILLEGAL AGENCY,
bribery of oflficers, 79.
claims against government, 75.
contracts hindering public justice, 78.
contract of, may be pleaded as defense, 81.
contracts to locate public offices and buildings, 75.
contracts to procure office, 73.
contracts with attorney to divide fees, 74.
corrupt act of public officers, 70, 71.
dealings in "futures," "margins," etc., 68.
defense of illegality can not be waived, 82.
effect of, on contract, 66.
evil tendency of illegal contract sufficient to render void, 72.
in violation of federal statutes, 71.
in violation of morality, 65, 67, 77.
in violation of positive law, 65.
in violation of public policy, 65.
lobbying contracts, 70.
marriage brokage, 80.
no recovery for compensation in, 263.
not capable of ratification, 98.
procuring pardons, 76.
to procure false testimony, 78.
wagering contracts, 68.
when agent can not be compelled to account in, 68.
when agent can not plead, 247.
when agent must account in, 69.
ILLICIT SEXUAL INTERCOURSE,
contracts for procuring void, 77.
not enforceable on either side, 67.
IMMORAL CONTRACTS OF AGENCY,
not enforceable on either side, 67, 77.
IMPLICATION OF LAJV,
agency by, 83-89, 284.
assent not necessary in agency by, 83.
fiction of (j'Masi-contract, 83.
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IMPLIED POWERS,
See Authority.
IMPLIED PROMISE,
of compensation, see Compexsation.
INCOMPATIBLE DUTIES,
agent can not assume, 54.
INCOMPETENCY,
as agents, see Age>"t.
as principals, see Principal.
of infants, see Infant.
INDEMNITY OF AGENT,
against losses sustained by him in course of employment, without
his own fault, 280.
agent may pay loss without waiting to be sued and recover, 282.
can not recover for illegal outlays of which he had knowledge, 281.
not entitled to if he exceeded his authority, 280.
INDIANA,
employers' liability act. Appendix III.
qualifications for admission to the bar in, 396.
INFANT,
competency of, as agent, 47.
competency of, as principal, 33, 34.
when innkeeper not bound to receive as guest, 296.
INNKEEPER'S LIEN,
See Lien.
INSANE PERSONS,
See Insanity.
INSANITY,
of agent,
at time of becoming agent, 48.
terminates agency, 174.
of principal,
at time of becoming principal, 38-40.
terminates agency, 173.
terminates agent's right to compensation, 273.
INSTRUCTIONS,
duty of agent to obey, 236, 237.
remedies of principal against agent for violation of, 237.
when agent may deviate from, 238.
INSURANCE AGENTS,
agent's rights and duties,
authority, scope and limitations, 457.
duties, 457.
insurer's liability to, 461.
liability to insured party, 459.
liability to his principal. 460.
who is his principal, insurer or insured, 457.
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INSURANCE AGENTS—Contimced.
insured party,
liability of agent to, 459.
liability of insurer to, 458.
insurer,
agent's liability to, 460.
liability of to agent, 461.
liability of for acts of agent, 458.
INSURANCE BROKERS,
agent of insured as well as insurer, 21.
distinguished from insurance agents, 21.
INTENTION,
as element of appointment of agent, 56.
in construction of agent's authority, 196.
in construction of written instruments, 197.
INTEREST,
authority coupled with, see ArTHORixY.
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION,
of agent's authority, 195, 198, 202.
of words in foreign language, 202.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR,
sale of, by agent for principal, when principal liable for, 361.
INTOXICATION,
effect of, on competency of party, 40.
JOINT AGENTS, 54a.
JOINT PRINCIPALS,
See Principal.
K
KNOWLEDGE,
of agent, when principal bound by, 354-359.
See Notice.
L
LAW SCHOOL,
graduation from, as requirement for admission to bar, 396.
LIABILITY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL,
for failing to insure principal's property, 230.
for failing to keep and render accounts, 249.
for failing to keep principal's property separate, 250.
for failing to obey instructions, 237.
for losses caused by non-feasance, 230.
gratuitous agent not liable for, 231.
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LIABILITY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL—ConimMed.
for negligence generally, 242, 243.
gratuitous agent liable for negligence in performance of principal's
business, 231-233.
in case of auctioneers, 427, 431.
LIABILITY OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS, 299-319.
on contracts,
agent not liable if third party knew all the facts upon which
claim of authority was based, 308.
agent of foreign principal, 319.
becoming surety for principal, 302.
for money had and received, 309.
in case of auctioneers, 433.
intentionally pledging his individual credit, 302.
nature of agent's liability when acting without authority, 307.
not liable if principal would not have been, 310.
not liable personally, if within actual scope of authority, act
being for principal and in his name, 301.
presumption that agent intended to bind principal, 302.
promoters of projected corporations, 304.
public agents not generally liable personally, 311.
unincorporated societies, clubs and meetings, 305.
agent in some cases not liable where credit was expressly
given to the societj', 305.
may become legal entity by statute and rendered liable, 305.
when principal has no existence, 304.
unless principal died without agent's knowledge, 304, 308.
when principal is a fictitious person, 304.
nature of action against agent in such case, 306.
when principal is undisclosed, 303.
agent must disclose fact of agency and identity of prin-
cipal, 303.
not sufficient that third party had knowledge of agency
otherwise derived, 303.
parol evidence, admissibility of, 303.
when unintentionally using terms binding himself, 302.
for torts,
distinction between act of negligence and mere negligent omis-
sions, 312.
for conversion of property, 316.
for false warranty of authority, 317.
for fraud in executing principal's contract, 314.
for personal injuries, 315.
generally, 312.
liable for his misfeasance and malfeasance. 312.
no defense that agent received no benefit, 318.
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LIABILITY OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS—Co»<mtted.
no defense that principal is also liable, 313.
principal and agent are joint tort-feasors in such cases, 313.
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT,
for compensation, see Compensation of Agent; Master and Servant.
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO PHYSICIAN OR SURGEON,
for services rendered injured servant, at request of superior agent,
284.
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSONS,
for agent's contracts,
basis of doctrine of principal's liability, 321.
bound on authorized contracts, 322, 323.
general and special agents, 325.
how far third party may rely on usage or custom as to agent's
authority, 325.
identity, doctrine of, 321.
principal bound by authorized acts of agent and means of car-
rying into execution, 326.
principal not bound if agent had adverse interest, 327.
principal not bound unless agent contractedk in his name, 322.
principal undisclosed, see Undisclosed Principal.
third parties not bound by secret instructions to agent, but may
act on appearances, 323, 324.
when principal is undisclosed, 328.
basis of doctrine—identity of principal and agent, 329.
can not be rendered liable on sealed instruments, 333.
can not generally be rendered liable on negotiable instru-
ments, 334.
doctrine of liability of undisclosed principal stated, 328.
effect of settlement between principal and agent,
American rule, 330.
old English and modern English rule, 330.
election by third party to pursue principal or agent, 331.
how question of election is determined, 332.
what constitutes an election, 332.
no liability where credit was knowingly given to agent, 328.
parol evidence admissible to hold principal, 329.
when third party must ascertain agent's authority, 324.
which of two innocent parties must suffer, 323.
wholesale houses held liable for traveling agents' livery bills,
326.
for agent's torts,
doctrine of identity of principal and agent, 321.
basis of the principal's liability, 335.
conserves public policy, 335.
41
—
Principal and Agent.
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LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSONS—Continued.
for agent's negligence, 337.
fraud of agent, 343.
need fraud be for principal's benefit to make principal
liable? 344.
American doctrine, basis of, 346.
elements necessary to bind principal, 345.
generally answer question in negative, 344.
English doctrine,
answers in affirmative, 344.
federal courts, adoption of, by, 347.
meaning of "course of employment," 339.
illustrative cases in relation to, 339.
mercantile agencies, liability of, for injuries resulting from
false reports, 360.
notice to or knowledge of agent is notice to or knowledge of
principal, 354.
must be received in course of agency, 355, 357.
exceptions, 355.
when agent's knowledge is not binding on principal, 356.
principal of public agent not generally liable, 348.
principal not liable when third party acted in collusion with
agent, 349.
principal not criminally liable for crimes of agent, 361.
but may be civilly liable, 362.
relation of principal and agent or master and servant must
exist, 340.
servant's negligence, master liable for, 337.
servants or agents of corporations
—
ultra vires acts, 342.
third parties presumed to know powers of public agents, 348.
willful wrongs—master or principal liable for, 341.
reason for the rule, 341.
wrongful act need not have been authorized by principal, 335-
338.
sufficient if done in course of employment, 335, 336.
test of "course of employment" not applicable to carriers
of passengers, 336.
when principal is bound by admissions of agent, 350.
agency must first be proved, 350, 353.
must be within res gestae, 351.
See Master and Servant.
LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSONS TO AGENT,
agent may sue for injuries to property of principal, 373
agent may sue for injurious libel relative to business, 373.
agent's right subordinate to principal's, 366.
except when agent has beneficial interest, 366.
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LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSONS TO AGKNT—Continued.
cashier of bank may sue in his own name, 367.
code provisions that real party in interest must sue, 365.
exception in case of trustee of express trust, 365.
on negotiable instruments indorsed in blanlc, 368.
right to sue generally in principal alone, 363.
except where agent has contracted in his own name, 364.
ssaled instruments, when agent may sue on, 371.
suit to recover money paid by mistake, 372.
what agents have beneficial interests, 366.
what defense third party may set up, 369.
when agent has contracted for undisclosed principal, 368.
when alleged agent is himself the principal, 370.
LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSONS TO PRINCIPAL,
contracts,
in general, 374.
on authorized contracts, 375.
on unauthorized contracts subsequently ratified, 375.
principal can not sue on sealed instruments made in agent's
name but for benefit of principal, 380.
principal may pursue trust funds, 388.
even if commingled with other property or changed in
form, if identifiable, 388.
how far innocent holder protected, 388.
principal may sue,
for money obtained from agent,
by fraud or duress, 384.
by gambling, 385.
by wrongful barter, pledge or mortgage, 386.
for money paid agent by mistake, 381.
for money paid agent in violation of duty, 382.
except where the recipient is innocent, 382.
for property other than money, 383.
suit in these cases need not be preceded by demand, 387.
principal's right subject to those of third party, 376.
third party's right of set-off, 378.
undisclosed principal may bring suit, 377.
defenses available to third party in such cases, 377.
where contract is made on exclusive credit of agent undisclosed
principal can not maintain suit, 379.
torts,
for conversion of principal's property, 390.
for fraud in collusion with agent, 392.
remedy of principal in such cases, 392.
for fraud in contracting with agent, 391.
for injuries to property of principal, 389.
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LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSONS TO PRINCIPAL—Continued,
for injuring or enticing away servants, 393.
See Master and Servant.
I.IEN,
against whom it may exist, 290.
agent's right to, for compensation, etc., 287.
agisters and livery stable keepers not entitled to, at common law,
297.
hoarders at hotels not subject to, 293.
hoarding-house keepers have no common law lien, 292.
definition of, 287.
extends to property exempt from execution, 294.
for what supplies innkeepers may have, 295.
general and particular liens, 288.
horse-trainer has at common law, 297.
innkeepers' extends to what, 291.
guest need not have title to property, 294.
nature of, at common law, 298.
no remedy to enforce, at common law, 298.
possession essential to, at common law, 289, 298.
relation of host and guest, must be, 293.
statutes giving, to boarding-house keepers, 292.
various kinds of, 287.
what agents entitled to and for what, 288-290.
what guests innkeepers bound to receive, 296.
when innkeepers need not receive infant, 296.
who entitled to, 290.
LOAN AGENTS,
See Bbokebs.
"LOBBYING" CONTRACTS,
See Contract.
LUNATICS,
See Insanity.
M
MARRIAGE BROKAGE.
contracts in relation to are illegal at common law and in equity,
21, 80.
definition, 21.
valid under civil law, 80.
MARRIED WOMEN,
as agents, 49.
as principals.
appointment of husband as agent, 37.
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MARRIED WOMKN—Continued.
competency,
statute conferring authority not necessary, 35.
when competent, 35.
when incompetent, 35.
as to certain acts of a personal nature, 36.
under the common law, 35, 37.
but may have servants, 37.
MASSACHUSETTS,
employers' liability act, Appendix IV.
MASTER AND SERVANT,
general considerations,
close connection with relation of principal and agent, 15, 473.
distinction between the two relations, 15, 16.
parallel development of the two relations, 466.
relation of,
defined, 474.
master and principal distinguished, 474.
must exist before there can be any liability for servant's
acts, 340.
servant, agent and contractor distinguished, 474.
master's duties, obligations and liabilities to servant,
employers' liability acts, 482.
duration of employment, 475.
furnishing employment, 475.
furnishing medical and surgical aid, 85. 86, 284, 478.
incompetent coservants, liability for employing and retaining,
480.
inspection of appliances and working place, 477, 483.
making compensation, 476.
negligence of fellow servant, liability for, 479.
promulgating rules and regulations, 483.
providing and maintaining safe place in which to work, 477.
providing and maintaining suitable and safe machinery and
appliances, 477.
vice-principal and superior agent, 481.
warning employes of dangers, 483.
master's liability to third persons for acts of servant,
— general statement. 484.
negligence or contributory negligence, 485.
wilful or wanton acts, 486.
servant's obligations and liabilities,
to fellow servants, 489.
to master, 487.
to third persons, 488.
646 INDEX,
[References are to Sections.']
MEDICAL AND SURGICAL AID TO EMPLOYES,
authority to procure implied by law, 85, 86.
MERCANTILE AGENCIES,
liability of, for injuries resulting from false reports or ratings of
merchants and business concerns, 360.
MERCHANDISE BROKERS,
distinguished from factors, 21.
MISSISSIPPI,
employers' liability act, Appendix V.
N
NECESSITY, AGENCY BY,
See Implication of Law.
NEGLIGENCE,
as to different degrees of, 232.
of agent generally, 242, 243.
of gratuitous agent, 231-233.
principal liable for agent's, 337.
See Care and Diligence; Fidelity; Skill.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
acceptances and indorsements—construction of, 221.
ambiguity
—
parol evidence, 216, 217, 334.
construction of, as between original parties to, 219.
construction of, as to signature. 210-221.
generally only parties appearing on face of, liable on, 211-221.
innocent third party—how far protected, 212, 219.
personal liability of agent who executes for principal, 211-221.
summary of most approved doctrine as to construction of, with re-
gard to signature, 220.
undisclosed principal generally not liable on, 334.
NEGROES,
admission of, to the bar, 402.
NEW YORK,
employers' liability act. Appendix VI.
NOTICE,
civil law and equity rules as to, 168.
to agent, when principal bound by, 354, 359.
to third persons, in case of death of principal, 167.
to third persons, of agent's insanity, 175.
to third persons, of dissolution of agency, 163.
to third persons, of principal's insanity, 173.
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P
PARDONS,
contracts to procure, see Illegal Agency.
PARENT,
liability of, for necessaries for children, by doctrine of implied
agency, 88.
PAROL,
agent may be appointed by, 57.
authority by, to fill blanks, 60.
PAROL EVIDENCE,
to explain signature to negotiable instruments, 216, 217.
to explain signature to ordinary simple contracts, 209.
to hold undisclosed principal liable, 223, 328.
signature to sealed instrument not explainable by, 224.
PARTNERS,
are agents for each other and for firm, 29.
are principals as well, 29.
as agents of others, 52.
powers of, 29.
PAWNBROKERS,
definition, 21.
not strictly brokers, 21.
PEDLERS AND HAWKERS,
distinguished from commercial travelers, 462.
PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND,
See Insanity.
PHYSICIANS,
liability of corporation principal to, for services rendered injured
employe, 85, 86 284, 487.
skill and knowledge required of, 242.
PLEADING,
of illegality of consideration by agent, 81.
POWER OP ATTORNEY,
construction of, 197-201.
is the formal authority of an attorney in fact, 23.
void if given by an infant, 34.
when given by person of unsound mind, 38.
PRINCIPAL,
agents, third parties and, reciprocal rights and duties, 4.
assent of, generally necessary to create agency, 83.
bankruptcy of principal, revocation of agent's authority by, 177.
bound by acts of agent, when, 18.
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PRINCIPAL
—
Continued.
classes of principals, 31.
competency of, in general, 30-34.
consequences of revocation by, 161.
death of, generally revokes authority without notice to third par-
ties, 167.
rule of the civil law and in equity requires notice, 168.
definition of, 11.
distinction between power and right of, to revoke authority, 159.
drunkard as, 40.
effect of revocation by, as between him and agent, 163.
infant as, 33, 34.
insanity of, revokes authority if it renders incompetent, 173.
whether insanity must be established judicially, 173.
joint principal, death of revokes authority, 172.
joint principals, 45.
liability of, for agent's acts, see Liability of Pbincipal to Thied
Persons.
liability of, for agent's compensation, see Compensation of Agent.
married women as, 35, 36.
married women may be, of husband, 37.
may revoke agent's authority, 159.
may revoke expressly or by implication, 160.
mere descriptive words after agent's name not suflBcient to bind, 208.
only liable for acts of agent within scope of authority, 93.
person of unsound mind as, 38.
revocation of authority by, without right, gives remedy to agent in
damages, 161.
rule in case of partnership firm which is principal, 169.
undisclosed, parol evidence to hold, liable, 223.
"voluntary," who is, 30.
when may revoke as of right, 162.
who may be, 2, 31.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
relation of, must exist when agent committed wrongful act for
which principal sought to be made liable, 340.
PROCTORS,
definition, 23.
PROFESSIONS—MEMBERS OF LEARNED,
compensation of in Europe and America, 253.
persons holding themselves out as, held liable, though services are
gratuitous, 233.
skill and learning required of, 242.
PROFITS,
agent not permitted to make out of principal's business. 244.
for what, agent liable to principal, 230.
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PROMOTERS,
See Corporations.
PROXIMATE CAUSE,
agent's negligence must be, of principal's loss, to render agent
liable to principal, 230.
PUBLIC AGENT OR OFFICER,
authority of, usually conferred by statute, 299.
classification of, 466.
according to nature of duties, 467.
compensation of, 472.
definition of, 299, 466.
discharge of, from liability, after ratification, 150,
distinguished from private agents, 299.
executive officers, privileges and immunities of, 471.
judicial and g'tiasi-judicial officers,
disabilities of, 470.
impeachment of, 470.
liabilities of, 470.
privileges and immunities of, 470.
legislative officers, privileges and immunities of, 471.
ministerial officers,
delegation of duties, 469.
duties, nature of, 469.
liabilities and immunities, 469.
not generally liable personally to individuals, 311.
but may be if such was the intention, 311.
public, liability of the, for acts of its agents, 299, 472.
not liable for unauthorized acts of, 348.
reason for the rule, 299.
right of, to compensation, 472.
rule of descriptio personarum not applicable to, 311.
third party must ascertain authority of, 348.
unauthorized acts of, may be ratified, 149.
PUBLIC POLICY,
contracts in violation of, see Illegal Agency.
Q
QUANTUM MERUIT,
See Compensation of Agent; Contingent Compensation; Champebty
AND Maintenance.
QUASI-CONTRACT,
See Implication of Law.
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RAILROAD EMPLOYES,
liability of company to surgeon for services to injured, 284.
medical and surgical aid for, when injured in service of employer,
85, 86.
RATIFICATION,
accepting proceeds of sale of land, 141.
accepting satisfaction for embezzled proceeds of unauthorized sale,
132.
accepting services of attorney at law, 128.
acts of public agent, how ratified, 149.
acts that may be ratified, 98.
adjustment of equities, 147.
after express repudiation, 139.
agency established by, 96-155.
agent discharged from liability upon ratification of unauthorized
contract, 155.
assenting to alteration of terms of written contract, 134.
assumed agent must have acted for ratifying party, 110.
by accepting benefits, 123-129, 141.
by bringing action on unauthorized contract, 130.
by compromise of suit, 133.
by giving unauthorized contract In evidence, 131.
by implication from conduct of assumed principal, 121.
by intoxicated principal, after becoming sober, 40.
by promise to make good loss in case of unauthorized sale, 137.
by promise to pay unauthorized note, 135.
by retaining fruits of compromise where same was unauthorized,
138.
by silent consent, 136, 142.
can a forgery be ratified? 100.
can third party recede after principal has ratified?—American doc-
trine, 153.
English doctrine, 154.
definition of, 97.
distinction between, and estoppel, 101.
effect of, between principal and agent, 148.
effect of on public agent, 149.
effects of, 143-155.
essential elements in, 98-113.
form and method of express ratification, 114.
from what circumstances may be implied, 121.
illegal contracts not capable of, 99.
intention, in case of, 121.
manner of, generally, 114-142.
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RATIFICATION—Continued.
may be express or implied, 114.
mistake or fraud will relieve from, 111.
must be in toto, 112.
must have been existing principal, 107.
of acts of promoters of corporations, 103, 104.
of agent's torts, effect of, 152.
rule criticised by Justice Holmes, 152, note,
of contracts made on Sunday, 106.
of corporation, by shareholders, 124.
of deed by estoppel, 118.
of instrument required to be in writing by statute of frauds, 119.
of sealed instrument by parol, 115-117.
Massachusetts rule same as in partnerships, 117.
of ultra vires acts of corporation, 102.
of unauthorized act entitles agent to compensation, 285.
of unauthorized act of agent in filling blanks, 61.
of unauthorized warranty, 129.
of written instrument, how may be made when ratification must be
in writing, 120.
person ratifying must have been competent as principal, 108.
person ratifying must know all the facts or willfully or carelessly
disregard them, 109, 140.
principal can not recede, 145.
question of. is for jury, 113.
relates back to performance of act, 144.
but rights of innocent third persons not injuriously affected by
it, 144, 285.
vested rights can not be disturbed by, 146.
what will amount to, 122.
when act was totally or partially unauthorized, 113.
when agent has deviated from instructions, 151.
When agent relieved of liability after, 150.
when benefits accepted without knowledge of facts do not bind
principal, 140.
REAL-ESTATE AGENTS,
See Brokers.
REIMBURSEMENT,
illegal outlays not recoverable where agent had knowledge of
illegality, 281.
of agent for payments made in course of agency, 279.
REMEDIES,
lien of agent for compensation, 287.
none to enforce lien at common law, 298.
of agent against principal generally, 286.
of agent for compensation, 253-276.
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REMEBIES—Continued.
of agent for compensation, when must include all claims in one
action, 269.
of employes of agents in cases of emergency, when servant is in-
jured, 284.
of principal against agent for violating principal's instructions, 237.
of subagents, 283.
of third persons against agent for acting without authority, 307.
of third persons against agent, generally, 306.
RENUNCIATION OF AUTHORITY,
See Termixation of Agency.
RETAINER,
of attorney, 415.
REVOCATION OF AUTHORITY,
compensation of agent in case of, 269-271.
duty of agent to seek other employment, 272.
See Termination of Agency.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS,
in case of ratification of unauthorized act, 144.
to notice of dissolution of agency, 163, 167, 172, 175.
S
SCOPE OP AUTHORITY,
apparent and real, 17.
duty of agent to act within, 236.
meaning of, 17, 339.
principal responsible for acts of agent within, 93, 338, 339.
See ArxHORiTY.
SEALED INSTRUMENTS,
consequences of defective execution of, 225.
contract of agency may be by, 57.
distinction between, and simple contracts of less importance than
formerly, 61.
estoppel to deny execution of, 118.
executed in blank, presumption as to, 61.
filling blanks in, by agent, 60.
growing tendency of courts more liberal in construction of, 226.
how must be executed to bind principal, 224.
parol authority to fill blanks in. 60.
parol evidence to hold undisclosed principal liable on, not admis-
sible, 380.
ratification of, 116-118.
statutes abolishing seals, 60.
third person, when liable on, to agent, 371.
third person, when not liable on, to principal, 380.
undisclosed principal not liable on, 333.
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SHIP BROKERS,
definition, 21.
SHIP'S HUSBAND,
duties of, 27.
how appointed, 27.
who is, 27.
SHIPS' MASTERS,
definition of, 28.
duties of, 28.
have implied power, by custom, to insure vessel, 193.
SILENCE,
may estop party to deny agency, 91.
SIMPLE CONTRACT,
authority to fill blanks in, 58.
of appointment of agent, 57.
See Contract.
SKILL,
members of learned professions required to possess and exercise,
242.
SOCIETY,
unincorporated, as principal, 43.
SOLICITORS,
definition, 23.
See Agent.
SPECIAL AGENT,
STAKEHOLDERS,
definition of, 248.
liability of, 248.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS,
as affecting resulting trusts in favor of principal, 240.
ratification of instrument required to be in writing by, 119.
as applicable to sales at auction, 427.
STOCK BROKERS,
defined, 21.
SUBAGENT,
compensation of, when payable, 283.
notice to, when principal bound by, 359.
power to appoint, from what inferred, 191.
relation of to principal, 283.
rights and remedies of, 283.
who is a, 13.
SUPERCARGOES,
definition, 26.
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SUPERIOR AGENT,
and vice-principal, 474.
T
TERMINATION OF AGENCY,
by act of party, 158-165.
abandonment of agent amounts to renunciation, 165.
agent may renounce with or without right, 164.
consequences of, 161.
distinction between power and right to revoke, 159.
effect of, between principal and agent, 163.
either party may terminate agency at will, as of right, 165.
how authority may be revoked by implication, 160.
if without cause, principal liable to agent in damages, 161.
misconduct of agent gives principal right to revoke, 162.
principal may revoke, though it constitutes breach of contract,
159.
principal may treat as abandoned, when agent threatens to
leave, etc., 165.
revocation by principal or renunciation by agent, 159.
exception when agency is coupled with interest, 159.
revocation may be express or implied, 160.
specific performance can not be enforced, 159n.
what is authority coupled with interest, 159n.
when either party may terminate relation as of right, 162.
when notice must be given to third parties, 163.
when principal has right to revoke, agent has no remedy, 161.
written or oral revocation, 160.
by agreement of parties in original contract, 155a-157.
relation is dissolved,
when event happens at which it was to expire, 156.
when object is otherwise accomplished than by agent's
acts, 157.
when purpose of agency is accomplished, 157.
illustration of real estate broker finding purchaser, 157.
when term of employment expires, 156.
by operation of law, 166-183.
bankruptcy of agent may revoke power, 178.
bankruptcy of principal terminates power of agent to control
principal's property, 177.
breaking out of war, effect of on agency, 179.
compensations from proceeds not sufficient interest, 182.
death of agent generally terminates relation, 171.
exception where authority is coupled with interest, 171.
death of principal. 167.
notice to third persons not generally required at common
law, 167.
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TERMINATION OF AGENCY—Continued.
modification of common-law rule by statutes, 168.
rule of civil law in equity, 168.
followed by some courts in this country, 168.
terminates liability for compensation, 273.
death or severance of interest by one of two or more joint prin-
cipals or agents, 172.
derivative authority expires with original authority, 166.
in partnerships, death of one partner does not generally ter-
minate agency, 169.
insanity of agent generally dissolves relation, 174.
this is true, though there has been no inquest, 173, 174.
insanity of joint agent revokes power of others, 176.
insanity of principal, rendering him incompetent, 173.
judicial declaration of agent's lunacy is sufficient notice, 175.
marriage of feme sole principal under common law, 180.
notice to third persons required if insanity not apparent, 175.
power coupled with interest not revocable, 170.
power given to creditor to collect debt of principal, without as-
signment, not a sufficient interest, 182.
illustrations of interest sufficient to prevent, 183.
power may be irrevocable by contract if based on sufficient con-
sideration, 182.
when power of attorney makes authority irrevocable, 169.
where act may be done by agent in his own name, principal's
death will not revoke authority, 170.
THIRD PERSONS,
See Authority; Liability of Agent to Third Persons; Li.4.bility of
Principal to Third Persons; Liability of Third Persons to Agent;
Liability of Third Persons to Principal.
TORTS,
liability of principal for agent's, 335-349.
principal liable for unauthorized acts of agent if ratified, 152.
See Liability of Pbincipai- to Third Persons.
TRAVELING SALESMEN,
classes of, distinguished and defined, 462.
commercial travelers or drummers, 463.
sales of goods by—statute of frauds, 465.
pedlers and hawkers, 464.
TRUST,
funds,
—
principal may pursue, 388.
resulting in favor of principal by agent's conduct, 240, 390.
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U
ULTRA-VIRES ACTS,
See Corporations.
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL,
agent liable on contracts for, 303.
liability of, when discovered, 329.
not liable generally on negotiable instruments, 334.
not liable on sealed instruments made by agent for, 333.
parol evidence to hold liable, 223, 329.
qualifications and exceptions of doctrine of liability, 330, 331.
third party liable to, when, 368.
third party may elect to hold agent or, 331.
what amounts to an election, 332.
See Liability of Principal to Third Parties; Principal.
UNIVERSAL AGENT,
See Agent.
USAGE,
See Custom and Usage.
V
VENDOR OF GOODS,
implied agency of to sell for vendee, in case of failure to accept
goods bargained for, 89.
other remedies of vendee in such cases, 89.
VICE-PRINCIPAL,
and superior agent, 474.
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPAL,
defined, 30.
W
WAGERING CONTRACTS,
See Illegal Agency; Conteact.
WARRANTY OF AUTHORITY, 307.
WIFE,
as compulsory agent of husband, 49.
WILLFUL WRONGS OF AGENT,
principal liable for when within scope or course of employment, 341.
WORDS,
agent must use apt, to bind principal, 208.
See Descriptio Personarum; Interpretation and Construction.
Whole number of pag-es, 767.
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